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# VARIATIONS ON A FAMILIAR THEME*

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As I set out to prepare for this combined inaugural and valedictory, I sought a theme worthy of the occasion and within the span of my own limited vision. Notwithstanding the lush crop of "problems" confronting our world and our profession, no suitable theme came readily to mind. I experimented with many, including "Variations on a Theme by Joe McCarthy," or "Acheson at Armageddon," or "General MacArthur Fades Again." But in all such cases the theme was obscured by the variations. And so I've called these remarks "Variations on a Familiar Theme."

Since 1903 when Frank Goodnow spoke on "The Work of the American Political Science Association," no less than forty-five presidents have prepared annual speeches on as many different themes. It is interesting to note that of thirteen such speeches up to 1917, only one gave any major attention to international relations. Then, between 1917 and 1924, four of the seven were devoted to an international theme. But during the twenty-six years from 1924 through 1950, only two dealt primarily with international relations.

Thus, it would seem that the presidential addresses of the American Political Science Association have reflected the prevailing mood of the American people—a mood dominated by domestic rather than world affairs. It is, of course, possible to see in this history the evidence of intellectual myopia. How, one might ask, could these men (there were no women among them), all careful students of government, be so blind to the promethean forces that have changed the face of our world during the lifetime of the Association over which they have presided?

It would be as presumptuous as it is unnecessary for me to answer for my predecessors. Their preoccupation with domestic affairs was in any case more apparent than real. For they knew (at least some of them did) what many have yet to learn—that the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is, and always has been, an artificial one. Hence "Social Planning Under the Constitution," which was the theme of President Corwin's address in 1931, had a bearing on international relations as direct as Quincy Wright's "Political Science and World Stabilization" in 1949.

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* Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association at its forty-seventh annual meeting in San Francisco, California, August 28, 1951.

So-called domestic policies relating to tariffs, immigration, race relations, national defense, taxation, education and even social welfare have been as much a part of our foreign policy as the Monroe Doctrine or the Open Door, for they help to determine our "stance," as it were, in the world community. And however obscure the integral relation between domestic and foreign policy in the past, it has become crystal clear today. "The foreign affairs of the United States," says Jim McCamy, "consumed more than three-fourths of the money spent by the Federal government in four years following World War II and more than half the Federal expenditures in all but nine of thirty years following World War I."

The contribution of ECA to the economic and political stability of Western Europe is now generally admitted. But the impact of this same program upon the economic and political life of the United States is less generally appreciated. When it was still in the discussion stage, Senator Taft referred to the "so-called Marshall Plan" as a "complicated mixture of foreign and domestic policy. . . . " We need ask, he said, whether "the advantages to be gained in foreign policy outweigh the disadvantages at home. . . . How far shall we make a present to other people of the fruits of our labors?" Not all the effects of ECA, at home and abroad, have been beneficent. But surely even the senior Senator from Ohio must now admit that the advantages, both foreign and domestic, far outweigh the disadvantages.

As a final illustration of the interrelations of foreign and domestic politics, consider what is happening to our "free" economy and our "open" society under a global cold war and a limited hot war in Korea. Consider the effects upon such "domestic" problems as inflation, manpower supply and utilization, taxation, public works, education and social welfare, and civilian defense, to mention but a few.

Even more serious has been the effect of the cold war upon the basic democratic institutions which our policies are presumably designed to protect. Consider the so-called loyalty program of the federal government, the outcry from committees on un-American activities for even more stringent controls over subversive activities, and their effects upon our traditional civil liberties. Under the new regulations of the

Loyalty Review Board, we not only have continued a policy of establishing guilt by association but have gone one step beyond this to assume guilt by accusation. As Alan Barth has recently observed: "The presumption of innocence supposed to surround an accused person has been abolished. The doctrine that guilt is personal and cannot be imputed on the basis of mere association does not apply. The right of the accused to confront and cross-examine his accusers is forfeited. The immunity from rearraignment on a charge that has been disproved is abandoned."[1]

Step by step the cold war against Communism has been accompanied by a transformation of our democratic state into a garrison state, in which, as a report of the Committee for Economic Development says, "the soldier and political policeman rise to power while the institutions of civilian society and of freedom shrink."

How far along this road we have traveled since 1946 and how the trend can be checked or its direction changed, should be a problem of major concern to members of this Association. It is a problem, however, that cannot be attacked piecemeal by narrow specialists working under a self-imposed compartmentalization. It is no more a problem for those who profess international relations than for those who profess constitutional law, public administration or political parties. Unless we realize this, we shall be like the men in a French fable who sought to understand the elephant by looking separately and intensively—one at his tail, another at his trunk, another at his legs, and a fourth at his torso. What each one saw was real enough, and his description was accurate within his frame of reference. But none of them ever saw or described the elephant.

We have learned the meaning of total war; we are learning the meaning of total diplomacy, which utilizes not only political but economic, ideological, and even military weapons. As political scientists we must now learn the meaning of total politics. For total politics implies that the problem of political power in our world—its nature, basis, structure and scope—is in fact a seamless web not to be fully understood by viewing it in segments. Just as foreign and domestic policy are integrally related, so students of American government, political parties and public opinion, international relations, public administration, political theory, public law, and comparative government are not rivals in a race for academic preferment, but partners in a common quest for understanding and control of what Hobbes so accurately named *The Leviathan.*

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[1] *The Reporter*, Vol. 5, p. 15 (July 24, 1951).

I am not now talking about integration but about understanding. What I am pleading for is a return to political science as Aristotle and the other founders of our profession conceived of it—as a Master Science in terms of which the other social sciences find their meaning and significance.

I need not remind this audience that Aristotle wrote not only about *Politics* but also about *Ethics* and *Economics;* that Hobbes' *Leviathan* is made up of books not only on the Commonwealth, but also on Man, the Christian Commonwealth, and the Kingdom of Darknesse; that John Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* is a necessary part of his political science; that Rousseau had written a *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality* and a *Discourse on Political Economy* before he wrote *The Social Contract;* that Immanuel Kant's *Essay on Eternal Peace* was preceded by his *Critique of Pure Reason;* that Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* was but a part of his total political theory, of which his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* was the foundation; that Montesquieu and De Tocqueville were happily blind to the barriers which lesser men have erected between special compartments of political science and between us and the other social sciences. To them jurisprudence, administration, international relations, public finance, political parties and public opinion, comparative government, as well as much of anthropology, sociology, economics, history and psychology, were but special aspects of the total science of man as a political animal.

I am not arguing that political scientists return to the orientation and methods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At times these earlier writings appear "hazy," as, for example, in the case of John Daniel Gros, professor at Columbia from 1784 to 1795 and author of the first American textbook on political science. Among other things, this textbook dealt with the *Natural Principles of Rectitude, for the Conduct of Man in All States and Situations of Life, Demonstrated and Explained in a Systematic Treatise on Moral Philosophy: Comprehending the Law of Nature—Ethics—Natural Jurisprudence—General Economy—Politics—and the Law of Nations.*

We rightly smile at the presumption and naïveté of anyone who would undertake to explore an area so vast and so complex—and to do so without benefit of a special Institute or Bureau, staffed with research assistants, secretaries, technical assistants, and IBM machines. Yet there is a lesson for us in the cosmic cogitations of Daniel Gros. He had as his central purpose the instruction of his students in those principles of morality and rectitude by which they could "become good men and good citizens." Obviously we could use more of this type of instruction today. Gros knew that ethics, jurisprudence, economics, politics and international relations were not independent and unrelated disciplines but simply convenient frames of reference for inquiring into the "natural principles of rectitude for the conduct of man."

If one is to argue that such training is a poor preparation for practical politics, at least he must admit that it did not seriously handicap Jefferson and Madison, Hamilton and other practical politicians, who became the architects of democratic government in the modern world. Indeed, one may well ask whether the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Federalist Papers could have been written except by men trained in this way. We might well ask ourselves also where in America we are today preparing the Jeffersons, the James Wilsons, the James Madisons or Alexander Hamiltons that our world so sorely needs?

The kind of education we offer today, as in Jefferson's day, reflects the demand which society makes upon the schools and colleges. And this demand is for experts and specialists in every field. The demonstrable advantages of a division of labor in increasing the rate and volume of industrial production, the manifest superiority of the trained specialist in medicine, law and engineering, and the spectacular achievements of specialized scientific research, have all conspired to accelerate the trend toward specialization. Moreover, the sheer volume of scientific information accessible to modern scholars has made the man of universal knowledge a singularly rare bird.

Added to these influences in the United States were our individualistic and pragmatic traditions, which have emphasized "practical" education at the expense of theoretical and cultural studies. This is, no doubt, one reason why the United States has proved such a laggard in the field of basic science and so preëminent in applied science and technology. For a century or more we drew upon the European storehouse of basic science and contributed precious little to it. Now, as we are being called upon to replenish this storehouse, we may find our emphasis on "practical" education and training not so "practical" after all.

De Tocqueville, in a chapter that deserves careful and prayerful rereading today, commented on *Why the Americans Are More Addicted to Practical Than to Theoretical Science.* "Those who cultivate the sciences amongst a democratic people," he said, "are always afraid of losing their way in visionary speculation. They mistrust systems; they adhere closely to facts and the study of facts with their own senses." Can it be that this distrust of systems, and of the theoretical implications of what we do, helps to explain why we on the one hand succeed so well with the "practical" aspects of a program like ECA and on the other hand fail so signally in explaining its ideological significance either to ourselves or to the rest of the world?

At any rate, this distrust of theory and of knowledge for its own sake, this preoccupation with so-called practical training adapted to each student's needs and interests, has had far-reaching effects upon American education. In our passion for the "practical" and in our system of free election of courses by students, we have a prescription for educational anarchy—without system, without theory, without plan and without purpose.

"Practical" courses of dubious, or at best transitory, value have been added to the curriculum at the expense of time-honored disciplines. New schools have developed to grant degrees in a mounting variety of specialties, with little or no theoretical foundation and often with no significant body of knowledge, skills or principles. In the structure of the university, the college of arts and sciences, where the old lights still burn even if dimly, has been overshadowed by the new arrivals. In the competition for students, physical facilities, faculty and funds, it usually comes off badly. Administrators continue to speak of it as the "heart and soul" of the university, but rarely understand it well enough to fight for it against the barbarian invasion. The result is that graduates emerge from our colleges who are moderately well "trained" in this skill or that, but lack even the rudiments of an education. This progressive impoverishment and fragmentation of human knowledge has not only made a mockery of anything worthy to be called a liberal education but has also undermined the common core of knowledge and training in science, history, literature and philosophy that had been a bond of union among educated men and women for a thousand years.

Thus it is that technical specialization, which has made possible a united world, has at the same time undermined the cultural unity without which a united world is impossible. Indeed it is doubtful whether even a regional grouping like N.A.T.O. can be more than a temporary alliance unless we achieve a greater measure of cultural understanding than now exists.

All of these developments are of particular importance to political scientists. For we have seen the Master Science itself progressively whittled away. In a kind of intellectual chain reaction, political economy, jurisprudence, and history broke away from moral philosophy; economics broke away from political economy; and political science became a foundling of history and jurisprudence. Nor did the process of segmentation stop here. Public finance broke away, public administration is restive. Other areas of study which scarcely justify a single full-year course in any reputable university are coming to be regarded as separate and independent disciplines. And because academic empire-building is as common as that of its bureaucratic brother, the barriers between studies became higher and more impermeable. The founding fathers of our profession would not have thought of public administration, international relations, public opinion or public finance as disciplines apart from or independent of political science. They realized that if these studies are cut away from the parent stock, they wither into sterile, empty husks. Or they reach out, vampire-like, to absorb other disciplines, either to fill in or to conceal their own emptiness. I have recently been told, for example, that "public administration is broad enough for all of us to get under that tent." There are, I believe, species of animals in which parents often devour their offspring—but this is my first encounter with a species in which the offspring seek to devour the parent.

It was not always so. Even as recently as my own undergraduate days, the study of political science embraced areas and "disciplines" which today are regarded either as alien or at best as peripheral to it. No one, for example, regarded it as strange that political science majors should be required to include in their courses of study statistics, public finance, general, abnormal and social psychology, history, philosophy, formal logic and literature, as well as political theory, comparative government, public law, political parties and public administration. It never occurred to me that Vernon Parrington's course, which he called "Main Tendencies in American Thought," was not as much a course in political theory as in literature. Nor were those of us reared in this tradition surprised when Parrington's monumental study of *Main Currents in American Thought* was dedicated to a political scientist, the late J. Allen Smith.

The trend toward specialization and concentration changed this. A distinguished political scientist, a former President of this Association, once told me that no student of political science should "waste his time" on psychology. He was particularly opposed to Freud and J. B. Watson—none of whose works he had ever read but whom he knew to be charlatans, and immoral ones at that. Yet political scientists can scarcely hope to understand political behavior or public opinion without at least a passing acquaintance with recent research in such fields as group dynamics, industrial relations, social psychology and the technical methods used in social surveys. The barriers of ignorance and misunderstanding between the psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists have seriously impeded significant research on political behavior and public opinion.

Innumerable experts write about public opinion with a political naïveté that would astound any undergraduate major in political science. In no other field is the triumph of technique over purpose so obvious. At the risk of laboring the point, may I again suggest that our preoccupation with technique at the expense of purpose has materially reduced our effectiveness in the current ideological war with Communism. With our faith in the technician, we have turned to radio, press and motion picture executives, public relations and advertising experts, not only to advise us concerning techniques of transmission but to forge our ideological weapons as well. The result has been a campaign to "sell" America to the world in much the same terms in which we "sell" Coca-Cola or Ivory Soap to Americans.

Tom Paine could mobilize a nation with a pamphlet written on a drumhead and distributed hand to hand because what he had to say struck fire in the hearts of those to whom his words were addressed. So far, unfortunately, no Tom Paines have appeared on the staff of the Voice of America. Nor are they likely to appear until we realize, as Professor Padover says, that "we are dealing with a world revolutionary situation involving races and cultures and aspirations totally alien to the experience of [the average] advertising executives." The anthropologist, historian, political scientist and philosopher are more likely to develop a meaningful framework for ideological warfare—but only if they are able to emerge from the narrow cubicles in which specialists are too often confined.

Much of the impetus toward specialization arises from a commendable desire to be scientific. It is obviously easier to apply rigorous standards of observation, classification, and analysis to a limited than to a more extended universe. By limiting the field we also limit the variables, and thus make it easier to formulate generalizations, forecasts, and predictions. But when variables *outside* a field of inquiry are related to others included within the field, we do not increase either the reliability or the validity of generalizations by excluding them—however much we may seem to simplify our problem by doing so. In the long run, of course, science contributes to understanding not through restriction of the universe to which any given generalization applies but through its progressive extension.

The inadequacies of the brass-instrument psychologists in explaining human behavior led inevitably to Behaviorism, as Behaviorism led to *Gestalt*. It is now, I believe, generally accepted doctrine among psychologists that human behavior, whether in courtship or in Congress, is molar and not molecular. Hence it is that the greater the specialization and the narrower the field of inquiry, the greater becomes the need for coördination and integration at higher levels and over broader areas. It is this capacity for scientific integration and coordination at progressively higher levels that marks the great from the mediocre scientist, whether in physics or in politics.

Not all that goes under the name of science can be said to add to our knowledge and understanding of man as a political animal. Much current literature seems to be based on the theory that politics becomes scientific by becoming polysyllabic and obscure. New and strange vocabularies have emerged. It is as though some scholars—usually strangers to the city hall, county court house, state or national capitol—find sublimation in a kind of Semantic Nirvana. One of them, for example, writes about the importance of diversity of "interaction patterns" "to a working conceptual scheme, including . . . the segmental chain reaction patterns of greatly varying extent of political distance, and the segmental interlapping patterns where there is in effect the paradox of a discontinuous continuum." Another, quoted by Stuart Chase in his excellent book on *The Proper Study of Mankind*,[2] says: "In conformity with the preceding point, if all the interacting parties (in marriage, in minority-majority groups, in different occupational, religious, political, economic, racial, ethnic and other interacting groups and persons) view the given overtly similar (or dissimilar) traits: A, B, C, D, N (physical, biological, mental, socio-cultural) as negligible values or as no values at all, as comprising even no similarity (or dissimilarity), such overt similarities-dissimilarities are innocuous in the generation of either solidarity or antagonism."

I forbear to cite other examples, of which unhappily there are many. "Some professors," says Chase, "seem to feel that if they can only get a terminology which is dense enough, they have somehow achieved the scientific method. All they have done is to shatter the communication line." Perhaps there is method in this madness, if we are to believe with T. S. Schiller that "nothing has a greater hold on the human mind than nonsense fortified with technicalities."

I shall not pretend that these are fair samples of the language of contemporary political science. If they were, this Association would long since have dwindled to a fraction of its present membership. Those who remained would have been properly exiled to some semantic sanctuary accessible only, as they would say, to the neologistic *cognoscenti*. Nevertheless, the all-too-common passion for pseudoscientific gobbledegook—one of the ill-begotten offspring of excessive specialization—constitutes another barrier to the internal unity of political science and to effective communication with the other social sciences.

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[2] (New York, 1948).

Never before has the need for understanding and cooperation among the social sciences been so great. Ask any hundred men and women to name the most pressing problems confronting mankind! Although the order of priority might differ, the following would inevitably be included: war and peace, security and freedom, economic stability, population and food supply, medical care and public health, racial and other intergroup relations, equal justice under just laws, labor-management relations and industrial peace. The list could be extended to include a host of other headaches that plague our civilization. Almost without exception, they are problems arising not in the fields of natural science and technology but in the field of human relations, and more particularly in what Aristotle called "Politics."

Yet in the face of these problems, social scientists are divided and confused. As one student put it, "We are like soldiers lying in isolated foxholes without means of communication . . . yet (we) are concerned with different aspects of the same critter—man—and the notion that we can abstract the economic or the psychological (or the political) aspect of his behavior without regard to the rest, is nonsense."[3]

Does this mean that every social scientist must be an expert in every field? I think not. But it does require that he be aware of the essential unity of knowledge concerning man and his universe. It requires also a searching inquiry into the subject matter, methods, skills, principles and problems of all the social sciences to discover what they have in common and how each may best contribute to the mitigation or solution of the major problems of our civilization. It means also a return to a truly liberal education as the basis for any and all scientific training.

If a liberal education means anything, it means more than a smattering of information about this and that, and also more than technical competence in a single highly specialized subject. Both the dilettantes and the narrow specialists are intellectual cripples easily victimized by the first plausible pied piper who comes along. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin have counted thousands of them among their most ardent collaborators and supporters. They can be found in the entourage of Senator McCarthy, Gerald K. Smith and William Z. Foster, among the hooded hoodlums of the Ku Klux Klan, and within the ranks of those pseudo-intellectuals who become Stalin's stooges and shock troops. Because they bear the trademark of a college degree, they give a sort of academic absolution to these campaigns of subversion, hatred and reaction.

To reconcile the legitimate demand for specialized training with the equally urgent need for a liberal education is a central problem of higher education in the United States. As political scientists, we cannot hope to discharge the great responsibilities which have come to us if we continue to educate *our* students on the catch-as-catch-can basis that now prevails. We need to face frankly the problem of professional standards and qualifications for those who seek to be political scientists.

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[3] Quoted by Chase, p. 45.

What should be the minimum educational requirements for an A.B., an M.A., and a Ph.D. in political science? Isn't it time for the American Political Science Association to establish such standards? As an aid to such an inquiry, I venture to propose the following as a *minimum* for all political science majors during their undergraduate years:

(1) Two full-year courses taken successively in mathematics and natural sciences. Under no circumstances should these courses be merely *about* natural science but full-bodied laboratory courses *in* mathematics and the natural sciences.

(2) Two full-year courses—taken successively if possible, although not necessarily so—in the humanities, fine arts and music.

(3) Two full-year courses in history and social sciences outside the field of the student's major.

(4) One full-year course dealing with selected problems in American civilization. The course now being given at Amherst College might serve as a model.

(5) Two full-year courses in a modern foreign language or languages —unless the student can pass a proficiency test in at least one foreign language.

Such a minimum program would absorb approximately half of the student's time during his undergraduate years, leaving ample opportunity for concentration in more strictly professional courses as he goes along. These latter should certainly include at least one full-year course in each of the major fields of political science. The development of a similar minimum program on the graduate level should be undertaken by the American Political Science Association.

I present these suggestions not as a panacea nor as something novel and revolutionary, but as a small step toward restoring to political science the scientific, cultural and humane foundation that it had in the beginning. Only along some such road can we hope to recover a sense of the unity of knowledge without which our highly specialized sciences become sterile and dangerous. Only along some such road can political science again become the Master Science.

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of political science in our world. The liberty and security of the individual, interpersonal and social relations, economic and social welfare, world peace and security—yes—even survival itself, depend in large measure upon the character and quality of our political institutions and the wisdom of public policies. Compared to the problems we confront, those of the nuclear physicist are child's play.

We do well to honor, and in some respects to imitate, our friends in the natural sciences. Their achievements have transformed the world. They have increased the span of human life and at the same time devised new and more effective means for its destruction. The Four Horsemen—War, Famine, Disease and Death—are today armed with more lethal weapons for mass destruction than ever before in history.

Humility befits the political scientist in the face of these miracles. But in eating our humble bread, we ought not to forget the contributions of politics to civilization. How shall we compare the invention of the steam engine with the framing of the Constitution, or with the development of the federal system of government? Without the commerce clause and its interpretation under Marshall, could we have had our spectacular industrial growth? Who is to say that the invention of the telegraph or the electric dynamo, or of radio and television, is more important to American civilization than a uniform currency, or the Sixteenth Amendment? Politics has been a more or less silent partner of physics from the beginning of our history. Over 2,500,000 patents have been issued since the framers gave Congress power "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" by granting patent and copyright to authors and inventors.

The spectacular progress we have witnessed in the natural sciences and technology has been made possible only by progress in the science and art of government. I mention all this only so that as political scientists we may raise our heads a bit in the company of our glamorous and affluent colleagues in the natural sciences.

Every year hundreds of millions of dollars—over eighty percent of which is supplied by the federal government—flows into research and development of the natural sciences and technology. By comparison the social scientists are very poor relations indeed.

Nevertheless, when measured against the slender support they have had, their record of achievement is impressive. They have helped to enrich and to buttress our civilization by bringing reason to bear in the development of domestic law, both private and public, constitutional government, economic and social planning, and international law and organization. They have helped to substitute reason for sentiment and self-interest in dealing with the conservation and management of both natural and human resources, in administrative management at all levels, in municipal government and urban planning, national defense, and a host of other equally important and complex problems affecting the public welfare. Some day we may learn that scientific training, research and development in human relations, and more particularly in the field of government and law, is at least as important as in physics and chemistry, medicine and engineering.

It is a commonplace to say that our generation stands simultaneously on the brink of disaster and on the threshold of a new civilization. Others have said that we are witnessing once again the decay of one civilization as another is striving to be born. We are both spectators and participants in this process as citizens and as scientists.

For science alone is not enough if we are to master the problems that confront our civilization. Medieval civilization, it is said, was an age of faith—and modern civilization is the age of science. But, like most neat phrases, this harbors a half-truth. For ours, too, is an age of faith—of faith in science and reason as the best means for discovering the laws of God and nature. But our faith goes beyond this and embraces those human values which give meaning and direction to our lives:

(1) Respect for the dignity of all men regardless of racial, religious or economic origin and status.

(2) Recognition of individual and cultural differences and of the different needs and aspirations to which these differences give rise.

(3) Recognition of, and respect for, the role of reason in the conduct of human affairs and awareness of the desirability of extending its scope to embrace ever-widening areas of individual and social behavior.

(4) Recognition of the principles of free inquiry, expression and association as logical corollaries of the rule of reason.

(5) Recognition that social responsibility is a logical corollary of power and that to find ways and means for the enforcement of this responsibility is an inescapable and continuing obligation of all members of society.

These values have their roots in the basic aspirations of the human heart. But they are also values that are compatible with science and without which science cannot flourish or endure.

Political science, if it is to be worthy of its claim to be the Master Science, must take account of these values. It must also recognize the essential unity of human knowledge. Only by doing so can it contribute to our salvation and to the bright future that lies ahead.

# THE BRITISH LABOUR LEFT AND U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

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Perhaps it is the absence of a substantial communist opposition in Great Britain that has caused Americans to be less concerned about the reactions of our British allies than of the continental nations to the recent foreign policy of the United States. However, if Americans assumed an almost universal British acceptance of the foreign policy adopted by the United States and formally adhered to by the British Government, the Bevanite revolt of early 1951 administered a sharp jolt. First, in April there were the resignations from the Government of Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Labour, former Minister of Health, and one of Labour's strongest and most popular leaders, Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade and one of the Government's young intellectuals, and John Freeman, a lesser figure but in the significant position of Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply. Their resignation speeches made it clear that, while the immediate cause of their departure was a new budgetary provision requiring a health service charge for dentures and spectacles, the root of their dissatisfaction lay in the burden of rearmament expenditures accepted by the Government in accordance with the main lines of U. S. policy.[1] In July the three dissenters expounded their case against American foreign policy when they placed their imprimatur on a pamphlet billed as the "socialist analysis of the present world crisis."[2] The import of this criticism may be most fully appreciated when it is understood that the Bevanite revolt is only a clear and open manifestation of the pattern of distrust of U. S. foreign policy by the Labour Left since the end of World War II. The nature of this distrust, its ideological roots and its specific forms constitute the subject of this essay.

Doubtless British suspicion or dislike of various aspects of American policy is not confined to the body of left-wing opinion here examined. At the moment, however, the reactions of the Labour Left seem to be of greatest political significance. The term "Labour Left," of course, is loose and amorphous; in this paper it is used to designate only those left-wing critics of the Labour Government who remain within the fold of the Labour Party, either as Members of Parliament or as journalists supporting the Party despite their criticisms. Deliberately excluded from consideration are not only the members and fellow-travelers of the Communist Party, who see United States policies essentially in the Soviet image of them,[3] but also those critics whose line has been close enough to that of the Soviet as to cause them to lose status within the Labour Party. Specifically, then, concern is not given to the group of five M.P.'s who were expelled from the Labour Party in 1949 and who in the 1950 General Election campaigned, and lost, as "Labour Independents."[4] Among these five was Zilliacus, the most prolific and ubiquitous of the foreign policy critics, who incidentally has landed in the Titoist and not the Kremlin camp.[5] Despite the wide hearing given to Zilliacus's reactions to American policies, they are not representative of the Labour Left. It is apparently worthwhile to confine attention to those critics whose allegiance to the democratic socialism of Britain is not open to reasonable doubts.

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[1] See *The* (London) *Times*, April 23–25, 1951.

[2] *One Way Only*, *Tribune* pamphlet (July, 1951), with foreword by Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman.

[3] See, for example, the remarks of the two Communists who were M.P.'s, Gallacher and Piratin, in *House of Commons Debates*, 5th Ser., 1945–50, *passim*, or the files of *Labour Monthly*, edited by R. Palme Dutt.

### I. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S.S.R.

Since sometimes the policies of the United States have, in the eyes of the Labour Left, seemed too adamantly anti-Russian, it is well to begin this inquiry with an examination of the Left's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Has there been a special reluctance on the part of the Left (that is, of the non-Communist Left) to recognize Russia as an enemy? Has there been a softness toward Communism resulting from a left-wing affinity?

In the period just at the end of World War II, there were indications pointing toward affirmative answers to these questions; but these indications are in some ways deceptive. The fact was that immediately after the War, during the 1945 electoral campaign and for a short time afterward, the Labour Party sought to capitalize politically on the tremendous fund of British good will toward the Russians as fighting allies by identifying itself with a policy sympathetic to the U.S.S.R.[6] Yet even during this period the Labour Party overwhelmingly rejected any domestic implementation of left-wing kinship when it refused to permit the Communist Party of Great Britain to affiliate with it.[7] Furthermore, it should be noted that Labour's statements of friendship for the U.S.S.R. did not differ very much in tone from many Conservatives' remarks about Russia during 1945 and early 1946.[8] It would seem fairly clear that much of the immediate postwar display of softness toward the U.S.S.R. by Labour simply reflected the general current of British optimism concerning the Soviet Union.

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[4] The five Labour Independents were Zilliacus, Solley, Hutchinson, Pritt, and Platts-Mills (the author of the famous telegram of support sent to Nenni, the fellow-traveling Italian socialist leader, during the 1948 election campaign in Italy). All five were persistent critics of the Anglo-American alignment in the 1945–50 Parliament; see, e.g., *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 427, cols. 1542–52, 1690–97, 1711–26 (Oct. 22, 23, 1946); Vol. 450, cols. 1182–94, 1327–40 (May 4, 5, 1948); Vol. 468, cols. 1450–54, 1474–83 (Oct. 26, 1949). Their fight was also carried to labour party conferences, especially in 1948, and may be noted in the *Report* of the 47th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London, 1948), pp. 184–200.

[5] Zilliacus expounded his special position in "Cominform and Tito," *New Statesman and Nation*, Vol. 38, pp. 446–47 (Oct. 22, 1949), and in "The Cold War and the Balkans," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 22, pp. 85–94 (Jan.–March, 1951).

[6] For instance, see the statement of Sir Stafford Cripps as reported in *The* (London) *Times*, June 26, 1945, and that of Hugh Dalton as quoted in the *Report* of the 44th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London, 1945), p. 104.

[7] See the *Report* of the 45th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London, 1946), pp. 169–74.

[8] See the remarks of Winston Churchill, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 415, col. 1291 (Nov. 7, 1945); of Anthony Eden, *ibid.*, Vol. 416, col. 617 (Nov. 22, 1945); and of Harold MacMillan, *ibid.*, Vol. 419, cols. 1165–66 (Feb. 20, 1946).

However, there is a persistent labour left way of "looking on the good side" of the Soviet Union that cannot so readily be discounted. This is not a matter of being pro-Russian or pro-Communist so much as it is a habit of thinking of the U.S.S.R. as not so bad as the Conservatives (and the United States) say that it is. Some of this attitude has been traced to the immediately favorable emotional reaction of British socialists to the Russian Revolution of 1917,[9] and to the "long period during which the Labour Movement felt that it was called upon to protect the Soviet Union from the reactionaries of every country."[10] That such a state of mind need not persist in the face of Soviet behavior is evidenced by the career of Ernest Bevin, who in 1917–1918 led the workers' Councils of Action that were meant to prevent, by threat of a general strike, the shipment of arms to the opponents of the Russian revolutionary government, but whose policies as Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951 betrayed no softness toward the Soviet Union. Despite this prime example, it would be surprising if some of the rank and file of Bevin's generation, as well as the less pragmatic and more ideologically-minded of his colleagues, did not retain residues of their former emotional attachment to the communist cause. Even such residues have probably diminished in importance during the labour tenure of power in Great Britain. With a pride in the achievements of democratic socialism, there has come to be less need for identification with socialist accomplishments in the U.S.S.R. Now there is even the opportunity to contrast what has been done democratically with what has been done by totalitarian methods.[11] Thus, most notably in the *Tribune*, there has been a recent tendency to juxtapose socialism, as a British phenomenon, against Russian Communism. Especially has this been the case since the communist suppression of Eastern European socialist parties, and most emphatically after the Czech *coup d'état* of 1948.

If any of the residue of socialist attachment to the Soviet Union now finds expression, it is in the mild idea, advanced by Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman*, that communist totalitarianism is that form of socialism appropriate to countries without a "democratic tradition of liberty."[12] This way of thinking makes it possible to remain unhostile to Communism within the U.S.S.R., while opposing its extension to Western Europe and championing democratic socialism as a superior form of collectivism. Such a view does not necessarily mean softness toward Russia; but insofar as it finds some common ground between Communism and democratic socialism, there may be implied at least a certain reluctance to attribute the same evil to the Kremlin as to Hitler. Indeed, the editorial position of the *New Statesman* has appeared to minimize the chances of Russian military aggression, even while granting the necessity for economic measures against the spread of Communism.[13] Nonetheless, this point of view, frequently expressed by the Labour Left, is related to other ideological conditioning than the heritage of attachment to the Soviet Union.

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[9] Francis Williams, *Fifty Years' March* (London, n.d.), p. 264.

[10] Edward A. Shils, "Britain and the World," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 7, p. 514 (Oct., 1945).

[11] R. H. S. Crossman, "The 'Russia' Complex," *New Statesman*, Vol. 35, pp. 64–65 (Jan. 24, 1948).

[12] "Marxism Re-viewed," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 18, p. 249 (July–Sept., 1947).

So far as direct evidence is concerned, it is difficult to label any of the durable reaction to U. S. policy as the consequence of softness toward the U.S.S.R. Such softness may well exist; but if it does, it is in depths of the political subconscious into which the ordinary social scientist cannot plumb.

### II. THE DISLIKE OF POWER POLITICS

A more fruitful line of inquiry into a traditional state of mind is an examination of the abhorrence of "power politics" that is thought to characterize democratic socialists in general and British socialists in particular. The point has been very clearly put in a scholarly and cogent analysis by M. A. Fitzsimmons, who emphasizes the "ethical repugnance to the use of power" felt by British socialists and their belief that power is unnecessary.[14]

Such an attitude is not confined to the absolute pacifists within the Labour Party. Yet the pure abhorrence of power represented by the pacifist fringe is itself a phenomenon of significance worth noting in passing. Within the Parliamentary Labour Party there have been, since 1945, at least two vigorous pacifist spokesmen, Rhys Davies and Emrys Hughes. Even if on occasion their opposition to Anglo-American policies has been shared by the communist fellow-traveler or the non-pacifist socialist, the attitudes which constitute the Davies-Hughes position have been readily distinguishable. Of course, Davies and Hughes have consistently opposed rearmament and military measures of all sorts. Hughes, who has identified himself as a member of the Society of Friends, specifically opposed the U. N. action in Korea, even at the beginning.[15] And Rhys Davies has declared: "I will do or say nothing which would induce the use of force between one man and another for any purpose whatsoever."[16] This Christian pacifism has led to a universal condemnation of the powers—Russia, America, and Britain. Just as there is no predilection for the U.S.S.R., so there is no particular bias against the United States. However, since in the nature of the situation the policy of military strength is tied to the Anglo-American alliance, in which the American partner is the major instigator of rearmament, the pacifist opposition is really directed against the policies of the United States. The importance, in terms of British public opinion, of this pacifist strand of opposition is not easy to estimate; it is not even clear whether its few parliamentary spokesmen overstate or understate the proportion of pacifist sentiment in the country at large, although doubtless it extends beyond the Society of Friends into the realm of other non-conformist sects. The religious element is always thought to account ideologically for a good many British socialists, but obviously a Christian socialist need not also be a Christian pacifist.

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[13] Examples of this position were "Peace and Propaganda," Vol. 37, p. 316 (April 2, 1949) and "Atlantic Impact," Vol. 37, p. 344 (April 9, 1949).

[14] "British Labour in Search of a Socialist Foreign Policy," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, p. 203 (April, 1950).

[15] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 463, cols. 508–12 (March 23, 1949), and Vol. 477, cols. 552–58 (July 5, 1950).

[16] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 456, col. 944 (Sept. 12, 1948).

If there is relatively little absolute pacifism to be explained by the Christian background of British socialism, the more significant abhorrence of power by non-pacifists may be more understandable in terms of the Christian, or at least the general humanitarian, principles of socialists. The Labour Left's allergic sensitivity to power politics has never been more clearly displayed than in the immediate response to Winston Churchill's famous Fulton address. Both Churchill himself and his "fraternal association of English-speaking peoples" in a policy of military strength, represented evil incarnate.[17] To the Labour Left this was simply an old-fashioned military alliance to "frighten Soviet Russia into submission"[18] and "the shortest way to create the gulf across which the next war will be fought."[19] Even two years after the Fulton speech, by which time the Labour Government had moved at least as close to the United States as Churchill had suggested in 1946, there were still attacks on what the Left called Fultonism.[20] It was argued, for example, that Churchill had somehow started the isolation of the U.S.S.R., and that his rallying of American "reactionaries" had begun a cycle of power politics that had led by 1948 to the unfortunate impasse between East and West. Even as late as 1950, one of the frequent foreign policy critics, while placing most of the blame for the cold war on Russia, could still insist that Churchill "[had fired] the first shots" at Fulton.[21] The method of checking power with power, the very essence of Churchill's policies, is precisely what the Labour Left finds morally offensive. And while this state of mind may not have immediate kinship with absolute pacifism, it is something like a first cousin.

Moral repugnance to power politics has, since the end of the war, been intensified by the consciousness of American possession of atomic bombs and capacity to deliver such bombs. Specifically, this has meant a continuous criticism of the location of United States air bases in the British Isles and a very great sensitivity to American military talk of a preventive war.[22] It would seem, from the frequency of the use of the figure, that there is strong feeling against the use of Britain as a "permanently anchored aircraft carrier off the coast of Europe." Not only does the idea of advanced American atomic bomber bases appear as the quintessence of power politics, but it is also coupled with the objection to the subordinate role thus assigned to Britain as an ally (after the manner of George Orwell's "Airstrip One").[23] In fact, in the image held and popularized by the Labour Left, Britain often appears to be the more or less innocent instrument of American power politics.

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[17] Text of the Fulton address in the *New York Times*, March 6, 1946, p. 4.

[18] "Nothing Doing, Mr. Churchill!" *Tribune*, March 8, 1946, p. 1.

[19] Michael Foot, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 423, col. 1931 (June 4, 1946).

[20] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 457, cols. 189–95, 550–59 (Oct. 27, Nov. 1, 1948).

[21] Sydney Silverman, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 476, col. 2139 (June 27, 1950).

[22] For examples see "Mr. Churchill's Defeatism," *New Statesman*, Vol. 31, p. 167 (March 9, 1946); *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 456, col. 1184 (Sept. 23, 1948), and Vol. 457, cols. 287–303, 318–25 (Oct. 28, 1948).

It has become the sincere view of many British socialists, off and on since the end of the War, that there are two power blocs in the world, the American and the Russian, that both of these possess the evil that goes with power blocs as such, and that the proper policy for Britain involves staying out of both blocs. Carried out consistently, such a line of thought would lead to the neutralism of certain continental intellectuals. But such consistency is rare among British socialists (and perhaps on the Continent too); for while they abhor the American power bloc, they also want close relations with the United States. The *New Statesman*, for example, in cautioning Foreign Minister Bevin at the beginning of his task, wanted him to "retain American good will, and at the same time to prevent us from becoming a partner (very junior) in an Anglo-American bloc."[24] Every step in the direction of such a bloc, or even of the appearance of a military bloc, was denounced on the Left as a means of lining up for a future conflict with the U.S.S.R. If there were danger from Russian imperialism, there was also the danger of American imperialism. The Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey seemed to the Left to be a case in point.[25]

The fullest exposition of the quasi-neutralist position was made in 1947 by Leonard Woolf, the veteran Fabian pamphleteer. He viewed, not untypically, the world situation in terms of the hostility and fear between the United States and Russia. What, he asked, should be the Labour Government's attitude "towards these two powers and the game of power politics which they have begun to play against each other?"[26] His rejection of entry into either the American or the Russian camp represented essentially his conception of a possible withdrawal from power politics in favor of an independent British course. This withdrawal, it was assumed, could be achieved by an act of will. Thus if a Russo-American war were to develop, Britain would simply act upon her earlier decision to take no part in it. Since Woolf thought that Britain could never emerge from a major war as a winner anyway, there seemed to be no point in preparing for one by alignment with the United States or by a large-scale military establishment, although it did seem reasonable for Britain to prepare for small defensive wars.

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[23] In *1984* (New York, 1949).

[24] "Britain and Europe," Vol. 30, p. 119 (Aug. 25, 1945).

[25] See *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 423, cols. 2046–71 (June 5, 1946), Vol. 435, cols. 15–20 (March 17, 1947); and *New Statesman*, Vol. 32, p. 109 (Aug. 17, 1946).

[26] *Foreign Policy*, Fabian Research Series, No. 121 (London, 1947), p. 10. See the attached critical comment by W. N. Ewer.

The dislike of joining the "American camp" persisted. Even *Socialist Commentary,* a journal of the moderate Left which has not been hostile to the United States, editorialized as late as 1948 against a military alliance, while welcoming American guarantees of the defense of Western Europe in case of attack.[27] Critical reaction to the Atlantic Pact, while not actually so widespread in 1949 as the subsequent importance of the pact would seem to have warranted, was in the same vein. The military power of the pact, it was said, was not the right kind of answer to the challenge of Communism. A power bloc was being built up around Washington, and this would only encourage a similar polarization of power around the U.S.S.R. The Atlantic Pact was also denounced as a return to the old pre-1914 type of alliance that made for war and not for peace.[28] The wickedness of the "arms race" was even linked to the Korean War.[29] However much these sentiments seem to belong to another age, their importance as rallying cries of opposition to American policies should not be underestimated. There is an obvious appeal in the portrayal of a war, when and if it comes, as only a struggle between the United States and Russia. British participation in such a conflict represents a culmination of all the fears of those who abhor power politics.

### III. ANTI-AMERICANISM

The identification of the United States with such unpalatable policies as those dictated by power politics is affirmed by certain general British ways of looking at the United States. Among these is the fastidiousness with which members of the British intelligentsia have traditionally viewed American culture, as well as American politics. As Crane Brinton has pointed out, without doubt there exists, among highly educated Britishers, a basic dislike for American "vulgarity, brass and all-too-evident worldly success."[30] For this reason, intellectuals of the Left have joined some of the upper class in fearing the Americanization of the British masses supposedly being produced by Hollywood films.

In a modified form, dislike of the United States has been expressed by placing intellectual stress upon the differences between European civilization and American. This appears to be the emphasis of G. D. H. Cole, a representative upper-class labour intellectual, who has coupled his persistent criticism of U. S. foreign policy with such exposition as the following:

> Our differences from the Americans in values and way of life are based mainly on this—we in Western Europe are old settled peoples, with long, continuous national traditions, living thick on the ground, and long accustomed to the husbanding of scarce resources. The Americans are a new people, of very mixed racial composition, still imperfectly fused into

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[27] "Whither Western Union?," Vol. 12, p. 195 (June, 1948).

[28] For example, "The Lesson of History," *New Statesman,* Vol. 37, p. 289 (March 26, 1949); *H. C. Deb.,* Vol. 462, cols. 2538–39 (March 18, 1949) and Vol. 464, col. 2040 (May 12, 1949).

[29] *H. C. Deb.,* Vol. 478, cols. 1207–15 (Sept. 13, 1950).

[30] *The United States and Britain* (Cambridge, 1945), p. 235.

an American nation, and living scattered over a vast continent, whose resources they have been accustomed, until quite recently, to regard as boundless.[31]

The feeling that there is a wide gulf between European and American ways has not always been stated to the disadvantage of the American; but in general, as might be expected, the British intelligentsia has preferred what it regards as the cultural advantages of the Anglo-European environment. This point of view, which supplied the thesis for Matthew Arnold's essays on America,[32] has a considerable lineage.

However, cultural fastidiousness itself is not so much of a factor in the consideration of British attitudes toward American policies as the political superiority that is often its accompaniment. There is, especially among the labour intellectuals of the *New Statesman*, a tendency to belittle the abilities of the average run of American statesmanship. In the beginning of his presidency, for instance, Truman was designated "a simple farmer from the Deep South"; and even a year later it was his "Babbitt-like incompetence" that impressed the editors.[33] More generally, there are deep misgivings about the political maturity of the American people and about the efficacy of constitutional arrangements in the United States. On the latter point, the British intellectual outlook has been thoroughly conditioned by the invidious comparison of American presidential-congressional rivalry with the British cabinet system which was initiated by Walter Bagehot and has been fostered by legions of political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic ever since. The idea is now deeply rooted that, even with intelligent executive leadership, American policy is likely to be immature or irresponsible as a result of the vicissitudes of politics, especially congressional politics. And for a broader-than-academic stratum of the British community, there was confirmation of this concept in American conduct during the postwar Palestine crises.[34] Regardless of whether the United States deserved the animosity which developed over Palestine, the point remains that there was a readiness, growing in part from a general distaste for things American, to attribute irresponsibility to American foreign policies. In other words, to some of the Labour Left the United States personifies not only power politics, but irresponsible power politics as well.

## IV. ANTI-CAPITALISM

Bulking much larger than any other of the Labour Left's stereotypes of the

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[31] *Labour's Foreign Policy, New Statesman* pamphlet (London, 1946), p. 44.

[32] See *Civilization in the United States* (Boston, 1900), esp. pp. 172–77.

[33] *New Statesman*, Vol. 29, p. 252 (April 21, 1945), and Vol. 32, p. 217 (Sept. 28, 1946).

[34] The pattern of British reactions to moves of the United States on Palestine questions is a subject worthy of separate consideration. Animosity to them was widespread and not confined to the Labour Left. Occasionally there was a coupling of anti-Semitism with anti-Americanism, especially when U. S. policies seemed to reflect Jewish pressures. For a sampling of various critical reactions, see Ernest Bevin's speech, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 433, cols. 1901–20 (Feb. 25, 1947); and parliamentary addresses by other M.P.'s, *ibid.*, Vol. 445, cols. 1278–86, 1299–1307, 1345–53, 1408–14 (Dec. 11, 1947), Vol. 448, cols. 1288–90 (March 10, 1948), and Vol. 460, cols. 1000–08 (Jan. 26, 1949).

United States has been the belief that American foreign policies must be conditioned by capitalist motives that are somehow antithetical to those of a socialist Britain. Some specific acts of the United States have increased this socialist distrust, while other American policies have tended to reduce the hostility. But generally there is readily available, whether drawn upon or not, the image of capitalist America acting as a capitalist nation, according to socialist texts, is supposed to act. It is not surprising that this particular stereotype was most prominent in 1945 and 1946, when the Left felt the full flush of enthusiasm over the opportunities which Labour's success at the polls had afforded socialism. Along with a great deal of self-confidence at the chance to apply clearly socialist solutions, was a feeling that there was an economic world of difference between Labour Britain and capitalist America. Doubtless this feeling was strengthened by evidently conservative American trends, just after the war, in domestic politics and international finance. On the other hand, with the apparent reversals of both of these American trends which were noted at least by the end of 1948, and coincident with the dissipation of purely socialist hopes in Britain, the American capitalist whipping boy receded at least temporarily from discussion. It is useful to consider each of these phases of opinion.

*Phase One.* Although neither the termination of lend-lease nor the conditions of the Anglo-American loan agreement can be held solely responsible for the existence of the anti-capitalist stereotype, there is no question but that these American policies contributed to the intensity of the Labour Left's hostility just after the war. Indeed, the unexpected announcement on August 24, 1945, that lend-lease contracts were to be cancelled, amounted to a traumatic experience for the Labour Party generally, and for the rest of Britain to only a lesser extent. The news, it is reliably reported by Prime Minister Attlee's former public relations adviser, provided the "new Labour Government with one of its blackest hours."[35] Even the ordinarily pacific and uncomplaining Mr. Attlee admitted having hoped that cessation of lend-lease would not be effected without consultation. The abrupt end of American aid, he said, "puts us in a very serious financial position."[36] Non-governmental labour voices were not so constrained. *Tribune* hinted at the possibility that it was "a calculated blow against the new Government from Wall Street."[37] *Socialist Commentary* interpreted the American decision as "the beginning of that policy of world domination which has to be expected from America."[38] And, more significantly, the event left a scar so deep as to be bitterly recalled even two years later in parliamentary discussion.[39] It is fair to say that what was regarded as the capitalist restoration of the dollar sign on economic aid never departed from the consciousness of the Labour Left. The abrupt termination of lend-lease seemed to conform to the Left's vision of capitalist America in relation to labour Britain. (It was, incidentally, in accord with the *idée fixe* that American bankers had produced the economic crisis of 1931, and so the subsequent labour debacle.)

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[35] Francis Williams, *Socialist Britain* (New York, 1949), p. 143.

[36] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 413, col. 956 (Aug. 24, 1945). Also note Churchill's comment, *ibid.*, cols. 957–58.

[37] Aug. 31, 1945, p. 2.

[38] Vol. 9, p. 165 (Sept., 1945).

[39] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 443, cols. 199–206, 938–46 (Oct. 22, 29, 1947).

In this context of suspicion, the terms of the Anglo-American loan agreement of 1945–46 also played a substantial part. While Labour Left was not the only group to feel hostility to that financial policy of the United States of which the loan was a part, again it was the group whose thinking was such as to fit the specific adverse reactions (to U.S. bargaining) into what was regarded as the durable capitalist pattern of American conduct. The undoubtedly general British feeling was expressed by the regrets of official government spokesmen that American financial aid had not "approximated to a grant," or at least an interest-free loan without conditions as to the release of sterling balances; such generosity, it was thought, would be only fair compensation from an ally for Britain's early economic sacrifices in the common cause.[40] But from the Left came sharper barbs. The American administration was one of "hard-faced business men."[41] The loan agreement was "dollar diplomacy," and for Britain a "disastrous bargain" that would permit American capitalists to export their unemployment.[42] The United States was heading, the Labour Left was certain, for economic "boom and bust," and the terms of the loan represented the effort to tie Britain to this same unfortunate capitalist cycle. What were regularly referred to as the "onerous loan terms" continued to play a part in fostering the Left's suspicion of American motives even at the beginning of the Marshall Plan proposals.[43]

Such lingering suspicions are not at all strange in the light of socialist predispositions. Hard-driving, strictly capitalist bargains are what the Labour Left had been taught to expect from the United States in international relations. In fact, Labour Left had been so taught by its most prodigious mentor, the late Harold Laski. For all of Laski's generally favorable impressions of the United States, his focus was always such as to emphasize the dominance of a Big Business, which he saw, virtually in caricature, as responsible alike for reactionary domestic policies and, in partnership with American militarists, for essentially imperialist foreign policies.[44] With such an America, the Labour Left had no desire for partnership. It did not want Britain to be "tied to a capitalist policy,[45] or to establish a "close liaison with a private monopoly capitalism."[46] The Labour Government, it was feared on the Left, was being "dragged at the heels of American big business and their representatives."[47] This fear was the ideological basis for the abortive parliamentary revolt of sixty labour M.P.'s against Foreign Minister Bevin in 1946,[48] as well as for the very widely supported Trades Union Congress resolution against "tying of the economy of Britain with that of Capitalist America."[49]

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[40] Lord Keynes, *H. L. Deb.*, Vol. 138, cols. 779–80 (Dec. 18, 1945); and Chancellor of the Exchequer Dalton, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 417, cols. 427–28 (Dec. 12, 1945).

[41] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 417, col. 666 (Dec. 13, 1945).

[42] *New Statesman*, Vol. 30, pp. 383–84, 397 (Dec. 8, 15, 1945). Also "A Savage Bargain," *Tribune*, Dec. 14, 1945, pp. 1–2.

[43] "The Washington Trap," *Tribune*, Aug. 22, 1947, pp. 1–2.

[44] Note especially Chapter 11, "America as a World Power," in *The American Democracy* (New York, 1948).

[45] *Socialist Commentary*, Vol. 9, pp. 290–93 (March, 1946).

From the fall of 1945 to early 1947 there was little in America that seemed promising to the Labour Left. That the United States was headed for an economic slump was a matter of firm socialist conviction.[50] The "rulers of America" stood for the most reactionary economic and political policies, and the worst of these rulers were consolidating their grip on the Administration. Truman, it appeared, had liquidated the New Dealers from his cabinet. First the reactionary Southern Democrats seemed to be taking over; and after the congressional elections of 1946, there was even the spectre of Republican power.[51] The United States, it appeared, was becoming less and less fit as an ally for socialist Britain. Without turning to an alliance with the U.S.S.R., which the Labour Left rejected as no less grotesque than an alliance with the U.S.A., what policy was there for Britain?

In the first rush of the Left's confidence in 1945 and 1946, what suggested itself was a "socialist foreign policy," independent of capitalist America as well as of communist Russia. The British combination of political liberty and economic democracy was a unique offering which could unite the nations of Western Europe and the British Commonwealth in a philosophy of social democracy. This was the argument for a "Third Force" presented in the pamphlet *Keep Left,* which represented a kind of summary of the anti-capitalist case against an American alliance. An America "wedded to free enterprise" and dominated by the Right could not lead the progressive peoples of the world. The United States was only trying, for military purposes, to exploit Europeans in general and the British in particular, and thus to present to the world the "bleak alternatives of anti-Communism and Communism."[52] Britain should free herself from an American alliance, and then go ahead with a European federation built on socialist principles. If this third force argument did not suit the practical circumstances, it met the ideological necessities. For what the *New Statesman* had called "the Socialist analysis of the causes of both war and revolution" forbade a British Labour Government from accepting an alliance with a "capitalist" power.[53] And in the image created by the Labour Left during the first postwar phase, the foreign policies of the United States appeared undeviatingly to be those of unalloyed capitalism.

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[46] Alaric Jacobs, "The Big Two and Ourselves," *Political Quarterly,* Vol. 17, p. 114 (April–June, 1946).

[47] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 430, col. 222 (Nov. 13, 1946).

[48] *Ibid.*, cols. 526–39 (Nov. 18, 1946).

[49] *78th Annual Report* of the Trades Union Congress (London, 1946) pp. 469–70. The critical resolution received 2,444,000 card votes to 3,557,000 standing by the government policies.

[50] Assurances of the coming U. S. slump were repeated again and again by the parliamentary critics of Anglo-American relations from the fall of 1945 well into 1947.

[51] For example, see the editorial notes in *Socialist Commentary,* Vol. 10, pp. 502–505 (Dec., 1946); in *Tribune,* July 27, 1945, p. 3, June 14, 1946, p. 2, and Nov. 15, 1946, p. 3; and in *New Statesman,* Vol. 31, p. 385 (June 1, 1946).

[52] R. H. S. Crossman, Michael Foot, and Ian Mikardo, *Keep Left, New Statesman* pamphlet (London, 1947), Ch. 4. In addition to those of the authors, the pamphlet represented the views of twelve other Labour M.P.'s. Furthermore, judging from the labour left press of the period, *Keep Left* was representative of a very frequently voiced conviction of the efficacy of the third force solution. The rise (and fall) of this conviction is a tale of its

*Phase Two.* The closest approximation to a point at which the Labour Left changed its prevailing conception of the United States from capitalist bludgeon to helping hand would be the day in June, 1947, when Secretary of State Marshall made his famous Harvard address offering economic assistance to Europe. Undoubtedly, with the increasingly obvious impossibility of British economic recovery without outside help, the European Recovery Program became the single most important influence on the Left's perspective in relation to American foreign policy. However, phase one does not become phase two precisely and completely in June, 1947. For one thing, overtones of the capitalist bogy theme persisted well after the Marshall proposals. But, on the other hand, during the several months preceding June, 1947, there had been some labour expression of a more favorable view of the United States. Foreign Minister Bevin and the Anglo-American alliance found an articulate socialist supporter in late 1946, when Aidan Crawley, M.P., braved the *New Statesman* editorial tide with a sympathetic portrayal of the American policies that was, a year or two later, to become standard socialist fare. In brief, Crawley emphasized that political democracy, which the United States had in common with Britain, produced adequate checks of popular conscience on foreign policy. Further, he argued that American capitalism, like capitalism generally, was being rapidly modified in a socialist direction.[54] The latter interesting discovery appears also to have been made by *Tribune* editors early in the spring of 1947, when there were observed in the United States some true friends of socialist Britain in "the newer generation of trade unionists, among men like Walter Reuther, and the rising progressive politicians of the type of Mayor Humphrey of Minneapolis."[55] Such New Dealers, belonging to the Americans for Democratic Action, were found to be among the staunchest supporters of the U. S. Administration's foreign policies; in consequence, those policies appeared to be less the instrument of Wall Street expansionism.

In fact, the European Recovery Program, when it came, was not a capitalist

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own, which could be told largely by an analysis of the editorial pages of the *New Statesman* from 1945 to 1950.

[53] "The Soul of the Labour Party," *New Statesman*, Vol. 32, p. 412 (Dec. 7, 1946).

[54] "The Case for Mr. Bevin," *New Statesman*, Vol. 32, pp. 412–13 (Dec. 7, 1946). Mr. Crawley also adopted this position in a speech reported in *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 427, cols. 1560–66 (Oct. 22, 1946).

[55] P. C. Gordon-Walker, "Who Are Britain's Friends and Enemies in the U.S.A.?" *Tribune*, April 4, 1947, pp. 1–2.

measure at all, so far as the Labour Left was concerned, but rather an international extension of New Dealism. The *New Statesman* welcomed Marshall's speech, which it interpreted as reflecting a progressive American desire "not merely to fight a war of ideology but to use her wealth to help rebuild Europe."[56] And it was largely as an act of generosity, indicating the good-heartedness of an American people not wholly corrupted by capitalism, that Labour defended the Marshall Plan in parliamentary discussion. Socialist ideology forbade accepting economic aid that was inspired either by strictly capitalist motives or by anti-communist power bloc policies. Consequently, it was necessary that E.R.P. be viewed less as an arm of U. S. foreign policy than "as an act of great immediate generosity and enlightenment";[57] on this basis the European Economic Cooperation agreement could be approved even by the members of the *Keep Left* group. The theory that the Marshall Plan was primarily a weapon of America's anti-Russian policy was championed only on the extreme Left, by the Communists and fellow-travelers (for whom, of course, this belief was reason enough for opposition to E.R.P.), and well over on the Right, for example, by the tory spokesman David Eccles (for whom an anti-Russian basis was cause for warm support). The Labour Left, as well apparently as the Labour Government, simply preferred to separate its enthusiastic acceptance of Marshall Plan aid from its attitudes toward the rest of U. S. foreign policy. Or perhaps, put more descriptively, the Left viewed E.R.P. as a new and welcome change in American international behavior. So long as economic assistance was the most obvious feature of American policy, a most favorable image of the United States could exist within the perspective of socialist ideology. And, of course, for the two or three years after June, 1947, E.R.P. was the most striking manifestation of American action in Britain—so dominant, in fact, as to preclude much discussion of the signing of the Atlantic Pact.[58]

There developed then on the Labour Left an almost entirely favorable estimate of the American Administration responsible for E.R.P., a probably exaggerated view of the strength of organized American progressive forces supporting that Administration, and, most significantly, a ready identification of British socialism with those progressive forces. Such views were rather cautiously put forward until Truman's election victory in November, 1948. Then faith in the American people, who had defied their pollsters and elected Truman on a fair deal platform, became boundless. It was, so far as British socialists saw the election, a victory for the Left and a defeat for the counterpart of their tory enemies. The revitalized Truman Administration not only would initiate progressive domestic programs, but would display a sympathy for socialist experiments abroad.[59] The Democratic Party, no longer the slightly more attractive of two capitalist parties, began to look like the Labour Party. Even one of Labour's semi-revolutionary generation, Margaret Cole, was enthusiastic. "The great country," she wrote in a foreword to a study of American politics, "which faint hearts and wall-eyed propagandists persistently described as the stronghold of unrestricted laissez-faire capitalism has swung definitely and unmistakably leftwards."[60]

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[56] Vol. 33, p. 425 (June 14, 1947). There is the same note in *Socialist Commentary*, Vol. 11, pp. 670–74 (July, 1947).

[57] Sir Stafford Cripps, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 453, cols. 41–65 (July 5, 1948); other labour comments, *ibid.*, cols. 220–342 (July 6, 1948), and Vol. 446, cols. 383–622 (Jan. 22, 23, 1948).

[58] The Labour Left, with some exceptions, appeared to accept the Atlantic Pact, although without enthusiasm. At best it was defended as a means of preventing war. See Michael Foot, "Socialists and the Atlantic Pact," *Tribune*, May 20, 1949, pp. 7–8.

Truman's "Point Four" program of January, 1949, seemed to confirm all the hopes of the Labour Left. Then even Jennie Lee, wife of Aneurin Bevan, rose in Parliament to revise the postwar estimate of the United States that had inspired her opposition to the Anglo-American loan agreement. Truman's proposals were "momentous and imaginative." They did not represent "a Wall Street threat but a helping hand from the ordinary American people, particularly the organized industrial workers of America." These workers, she said, had put their candidate in the White House. And there were "dominant current trends in American public opinion and Government circles which make it possible for us to face our problems co-operatively."[61] These problems, as the Labour Left saw them, were principally if not almost entirely economic. Therefore, the good policy besides the E.R.P. was especially Point Four, "that Fair Deal for the backward peoples which is the only alternative to Communism and the only basis for a lasting peace with the U.S.S.R."[62] Bad policies, on the other hand, were those that emphasized rearmament at the expense of economic aid. From these policies it was hoped that the United States Administration had been turned by the "dominant" progressive currents in America. As if to make it clear that these hopes were realizable, it was now asserted that capitalist America was not so thoroughly capitalist as to have to suffer, according to "the classical contradiction of capitalism," the over-production that would lead to depression and to aggressive imperialism.[63]

For the United States appeared to be, say in 1949, something of a welfare state under the guidance of Keynesian economic policies. In fact, Truman's Government seemed to differ only in degree from Attlee's,[64] although such an identification would have seemed preposterous to the Labour Left in 1945 or 1946. But by 1949 not only had the Truman Administration announced itself more clearly—clearly enough, at any rate, to be heard across the Atlantic—

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[59] *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1948, pp. 1–2; and *Socialist Commentary*, Vol. 12, pp. 340–46 (Dec., 1948). One of the contributors to the latter's discussion of the 1948 election was David Williams, representative of the Americans for Democratic Action in Britain. From about this date until 1951, Williams was a frequent contributor, especially to *Tribune*, of informative articles on American politics. He was also a conveyor of rather optimistic accounts of the potency of the A. D. A. in the United States.

[60] In Mark Starr, *Labour Politics in U.S.A.*, Fabian Research Series, No.133 (London, 1949), pp. 3–4.

[61] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 460, cols. 1193–97 (Jan. 27, 1949).

[62] *New Statesman*, Vol. 37, p. 96 (Jan. 29, 1949), and Vol. 38, p. 747 (Dec. 24, 1949).

[63] *Ibid.*, Vol. 37, p. 196 (Feb. 26, 1949).

[64] *Ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 1–2, 373 (July 2, Oct. 8, 1949).

as dedicated to social welfare and full employment, but also had such relatively modest aspirations, after four years of labour power, become the principal content of British socialism.[65] What would have been only capitalist reformism to the Labour Left of 1945 and 1946, when socialism meant chiefly nationalization as the route to a new society, was in 1949 a program pointed in the same direction as that of Labour Britain.

The change was signalized by the position of *Keeping Left*, a pamphlet issued in 1950 by substantially the same group of M.P.'s responsible in 1947 for *Keep Left's* criticism of the United States. Now this parliamentary conclave of the Labour Left could proclaim that America "first under the New Deal and now under the Fair Deal, has been moving towards similar ideals [to Britain's], though much more slowly." This optimism concerning the United States significantly provided *Keeping Left* with one of the reasons for the statement that the foreign policies of *Keep Left* "had to be scrapped."[66] The third force idea was now generally regarded as of the past. Indeed its abandonment, already implicit in the commentary of the left press, was announced in May, 1950, by the National Executive of the Labour Party in its pamphlet on *European Unity*. In the excitement occasioned by this publication's relevance to British opposition to the Schuman Plan, there was neglect of its more significant acceptance (with labour left approval) of the American alliance in preference to a European Third Force. But the pamphlet stated clearly what had come, perhaps reluctantly, to be recognized by British socialists:

> Finally, in its social and economic policy Western Europe as a whole would stand to the Right of the U.S.A., not between America and Russia. Outside Britain and Scandinavia there is no government with a more progressive domestic or foreign programme than the present U. S. Administration. Ever since 1931 America has pursued more advanced policies than most of the European countries.[67]

Perhaps this socialist blessing of America was unusual in that it was retroactive over two decades. But it was in some ways typical of the enthusiasm with which the Labour Left, in the second phase of its postwar reactions, maximized the importance of all that it found attractive in the United States. On this score, the postwar record of R. H. S. Crossman is a case-study. It was Crossman who led the Labour Left's parliamentary revolt on foreign policy in the fall of 1946, and who was until the summer of 1947 the most active proponent of the third force doctrine. By his own account, he changed his mind when the Marshall Plan was announced and Russia turned it down.[68] Like almost all of the Labour Left, Crossman fully supported the E.R.P. because he found it not just military containment but constructive economic aid. From this point on, Crossman identified himself and his socialist cause with what he thought were the strong and dominant forces in the making of American foreign policy—"President Truman, and Mr. Acheson and the Fair Dealers."[69] Crossman welcomed Labour Government collaboration with such an American Administration, which he said shared the same ideals and wanted the same sort of world as the "fair shares" program of the British Commonwealth. In this spirit Crossman welcomed the Cold War. The alliance of British socialism with "the American labour movement and the Fair Dealers in Washington" could constitute, he thought, "the beginnings of a socialist foreign policy."[70]

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[65] Compare Labour's 1950 electoral program of *Let Us Win Through Together* with that of 1945's *Let Us Face the Future*.

[66] *New Statesman* pamphlet (London, 1950), p. 19.

[67] (London, 1950), p. 9. There was further exposition of this point of view in *Socialist Commentary*, Vol. 14, pp. 156–58, 213–14, 265 (July, Nov., Dec., 1950).

[68] Autobiographical sketch in Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar* (New York, 1949), pp. 78–80. Also, for E.R.P. support, *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 446, cols. 561–69 (Jan. 23, 1948).

What is significant about the labour left position, as exemplified by Crossman, is that it was possible to accept the American alliance only within the matrix of the socialist ideology. To qualify as a suitable ally, the United States had at least to appear to have some socialist promise and direction. From the circumstances of the 1947–50 period, however, it is plain that nothing very drastic was required under this heading; with relatively little real change in the American political situation from 1945–46 to 1948–50, the socialist accolade was granted. The growing exigencies of Britain's international situation, especially in relation to Soviet power, might have been thought to suffice to place the United States in the changed perspective, yet such exigencies did *not* cause the ideological blinders to be removed so that international power relationships could be seen for what they really were. Rather, the blinders were only tilted slightly, to enable the Labour Left to accept American foreign policy as somehow related to socialism. To put the matter more precisely, a favorable view of the American policy was held during that period of time when the emphasis was on measures of economic aid. Whether the foreign policy of the United States would seem as attractive when it stressed military preparedness, was another matter.

## V. THE RESERVATIONS OF THE LABOUR LEFT

On the surface it may seem that the Left's good will toward the United States gave way rather suddenly to the suspicions of the 1951 Bevanite revolt. But such a view neglects the real qualifications which the Labour Left attached to its acceptance of U. S. foreign policy even during the phase of fair deal infatuation. These qualifications were, it is true, largely in the background from 1947 to 1950, but they obtruded sufficiently so that there could be no doubt of their significance.

Most evident was the Left's reservation with respect to American Far Eastern policy. Throughout the postwar years there was a continual barrage of criticism of the American control over Japan. This criticism was not always connected with personal resentment of MacArthur, although the difficulty of finding out what was going on under his regime was frequently voiced. More specifically what was complained of—and by groups, whose opinions differed ideologically, in addition to the Labour Left—were any moves of the United States which seemed to encourage a revival of the Japanese textile industry. Such a revival especially was feared by British labour and British industry because of the prewar capacity of the low-wage Japanese industry to undersell British textiles.[71] Besides identifying United States Far Eastern policy with this anathema, the Labour Left also found fault, even before the Korean War, with the American position on China.[72] Especially after British recognition of the Communist Government in 1949, the socialists thought even the half-hearted U. S. support for Chiang to be evidence of potential danger. The British Government's decision to establish a basis for economic relations with Communist China was much more to the taste of the Labour Left than American nonrecognition, which seemed to be based on political or strategic considerations.

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[69] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 478, col. 1269 (Sept. 14, 1950).

[70] "Reflections on the Cold War," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 22, p. 15 (Jan.—March, 1951).

Before the Korean War, these objections concerning the Far East were only minor, off-key voices in the dominant theme of satisfaction with those U. S. policies that were most importantly evidenced in Europe. But after the outbreak of actual hostilites in Korea, the voices became more numerous and insistent. Although generally the immediate response of the Labour Left to the U. N. Korean action was favorable, it was not long before misgivings became apparent. These, as might be expected, concerned the ambiguities of American policy on Formosa and the consequent possibilities that the war would spread in Asia. Most serious of all was a readiness to impute the spread of war to the United States, or at least to the policies of some Americans.[73] The image of the bad America of militarism and capitalism began to reëmerge. By the time of the Labour Party Conference in October, 1950, the spectre of American imperialism had again been raised;[74] and for the Labour Left the spectre became reality after the American advance into North Korea and the subsequent Chinese intervention. The *New Statesman* was quick to conclude that what had begun as United Nations resistance to aggression had now "ended as an insane American gamble in the diplomacy of power politics."[75] *Tribune*, somewhat slower to give up its hopes for the United States, in January, 1951, regretfully decided that there had been a "total surrender of the American moderates, men like Acheson and Truman, to the Republican clamor."[76] Generally this remained the view of the Left: that on Far Eastern policy the American "moderates" have been fighting a steadily losing battle against the proponents of more active military measures. Only occasionally, as at the time of the ouster of MacArthur, has the picture altered—but only slightly and very temporarily.

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[71] There is a wealth of parliamentary discussion indicating concern with Japan. See, e.g., *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 433, cols. 2367–72 (Feb. 27, 1947), Vol. 437, cols. 1881–1912 (May 16, 1947); Vol. 457, cols. 119–27, 476–83, 1109–13 (Oct. 27, 29, Nov. 4, 1948); Vol. 470, cols. 2615–21, 2871–77 (Dec. 13, 1949); and Vol. 473, cols. 304–306, 1415–38 (March 28, April 6, 1950).

[72] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 464, cols. 1260–65, 1287–88 (May 5, 1949).

[73] *New Statesman*, Vol. 40, pp. 1–2 (July 1, 1950); also *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 477, cols. 569–78 (July 5, 1950), and Vol. 481, cols. 1382–91 (Nov. 30, 1950).

[74] *Report* of the 49th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London, 1950), pp. 81–82, 101, 117, 141–50.

[75] Vol. 40, p. 576 (Dec. 9, 1950).

[76] Jan. 26, 1951, p. 3.

The reactions to American Far Eastern policy reached a crescendo in the winter of 1951 with G. D. H. Cole's well-advertised statement: "If Great Britain gets dragged into a war with China by the Americans, I shall be on the side of China. . . . "[77] This was only the most striking point of Cole's general case against U. S. foreign policy. He thought that the entire Korean campaign was a mistake. First, because the Koreans were only fighting a civil war, in which the United Nations had no case for intervention. Second, because the North Koreans, even though Communists, were a lesser evil than "reactionary landlordism backed by foreign force against the will of the people."[78] Cole concluded that the Chinese intervention was the responsibility of the United States, and, more generally, that the worsening of the world situation subsequent to the communist victory in China was mainly the fault of the Americans. While it is evident that all of his outlook was not shared by the Labour Left as a group, there is little room for doubt concerning a widespread willingness to respond to this very extreme case against American policy. All of the Left's reservations concerning U. S. Far Eastern policy have been called into play by the events of the Korean War.

Actual participation in a war, and in one that threatened to grow larger, was itself a challenge to a qualified support of the American alliance. What *Tribune*, for example, thought it had been supporting was a "situations of strength" policy only as a means of preventing war. In that perspective, the United States, by her apparent willingness (at least, greater than Britain's) to engage in a Far Eastern war, had departed from "situations of strength." Furthermore, "situations of strength" had never been understood by the Labour Left to mean a really large-scale rearmament program by the European members of the Atlantic Pact. The Left's support of the pact was from the beginning conditioned by the premise that, if there were to be a large military expenditure, it would be made by the United States. Britain, it was said, should "allow America to produce the bulk of her arms, so that her own industrial machine [should not be] unbalanced by producing goods that are only useful in war."[79] Crossman, for instance, even during the heyday of his acceptance of the American alliance, thought in terms of keeping Britain's military commitments to a minimum and "making the Americans pay for them."[80] When he spoke, in mid-1949, in favor of fixing an upper limit to British defense expenditures and of asking the United States to supply the rest under a peacetime lend-lease, he envisioned the Atlantic Treaty as a means of providing a form of security that would enable a decrease in armaments rather than an increase.[81] And the joint authors of *Keeping Left*, while accepting the American alliance, stated frankly that they were against imperilling Britain's recovery with too heavy an arms expenditure.[82] From the stridency of the *New Statesman* to the more measured tones of the Parliamentary Left, this qualified interpretation was always repeated as an article of socialist faith.[83]

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[77] "As a Socialist Sees It," *New Statesman*, Vol. 41, p. 121 (Feb. 3, 1951).

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] Denis Healey, "The Political Aspect," *Fabian Quarterly*, Summer, 1948, pp. 7–8.

[80] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 456, col. 1155 (Sept. 23, 1948).

[81] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 467, cols. 1602–09 (July 21, 1949).

There were other labour left reservations to the American alliance. Foremost among them, it had to be clear that the United States intended no interference with British socialism. In 1947 and 1948, it was insisted that accepting Marshall aid did not require any retreat from nationalization programs in response to American economic pressure. And while under E.R.P. such pressure did not materialize, even in the eyes of the Left, it remained a threat which was thought likely to reappear in the backhanded form of U. S. insistence on British military, instead of welfare, expenditures. American policy, the Left always wanted to stress, was accepted only on the basis that it assume no form incompatible with British socialism.[84] From 1948 until 1950 there was a high degree of confidence, only occasionally disturbed by doubts, that the trend of American politics was such as to keep in effective power an Administration that would, on the basis of its own ideology, be tolerant of socialism; but especially after the 1950 congressional elections, this confidence was shaken.[85] The Fair Dealers appeared defeated, and it was doubted that anything but a fair deal administration would adopt an international position acceptable to a socialist. Any move to the right in American domestic politics was interpreted as likely to result in foreign policies less friendly to socialist allies than to reactionary or fascist ones (of whom Franco was the *bête noir*).[86] And this fear was related to another qualification of the Labour Left's acceptance of America's lead—that it not only be oriented so as to favor socialist developments, but that it specifically eschew power alignments on the far Right.

## VI. CONCLUSION

It is apparent that virtually all of Labour Left's reservations to U. S. foreign policy became operative after the development of the Korean campaign. The new military emphasis of the post-1950 American policy was something that the Labour Left had never been prepared to accept; when that policy stressed military rather than economic weapons, the image of the United States held by the Labour Left began to revert to that of 1945 and 1946. Inherent hostility was expressed by the Bevanite revolt.

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[82] *Op. cit.*, pp. 19–27.

[83] See *New Statesman*, Vol. 39, p. 593 (May 27, 1950); *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 462, cols. 609–14 (March 3, 1949), Vol. 478, cols. 1011–16 (Sept. 12, 1950) and Vol. 484, col. 736 (Feb. 15, 1951). The last reference is to a statement of the Left's limitations on accepting large-scale rearmament that was made by Aneurin Bevan in a speech in behalf of the Government's defense proposals. It is one of his last speeches as a government spokesman.

[84] *Tribune*, Nov. 21, 1947, p. 2, *New Statesman*, Vol. 40, p. 616 (Dec. 16, 1950), and *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 453, cols. 301–304 (July 6, 1948), furnish examples of this attitude.

[85] See *New Statesman*, Vol. 40, pp. 413–14, 576–77 (Nov. 11, Dec. 9, 1950).

[86] For instance, worry over the "rightist" trend in U. S. foreign policy, especially after the 1950 election, was regularly displayed in *Tribune* even in the period before the Bevanite revolt when its general editorial policy was clearly committed, though with increasing misgivings, to the American alliance.

*One Way Only*, the pamphlet-testament of the Bevanites, is notable for its enumeration of the whole of the familiar postwar ground of socialist objection to American foreign policy. Of course, there are not the early postwar delusions concerning the good will of the Soviet Union; but, while assuming the need to deter evil Russian intentions, *One Way Only* insists that the U.S.S.R. is much weaker than is generally thought and that, therefore, the projected armament, American-scale, will be larger than necessary to deter Russia. The socialist abhorrence of power comes again to the fore: it is reiterated that rearmament can be the cause of war, and even responsible for weakening the free world's will to resist Communism. This distrust of military power is blended with the specific suspicion that American "militarists," when heavily superior to the Russians, would be sure to bring their armed forces into action.[87]

Socialist fears of capitalist America are also brought into play in the pamphlet, although in a different form than in 1945–46. Now it is not Wall Street domination in general that is so much complained of, but mostly the American unwillingness to impose stringent government economic controls during a period of large-scale rearmament expenditures imposed on a booming civilian economy. It is felt that the unrestrained variety of capitalism represented by the American economic system will be responsible for a world-wide inflation in connection with military expansion. The chances for a socialist-type control policy in the United States seem to be receding. There is a new dominant American temper of a "wild anti-Communist crusade," to which Truman and Acheson appear to have yielded; despite the ouster of General MacArthur, the views of his crusade have been adopted.[88] In addition to the resulting general military content of U. S. policy, specific American actions disturb the Labour Left. Among them are the evident shunting of Point Four, increased support for Chiang Kai-Shek, the proposed rearmament of Germany, and interest in Franco Spain.

In fact, by the middle of 1951 American foreign policy seemed (or could easily be made to seem) the embodiment of all those elements to which the Labour Left always objected. Since the chief of these is rearmament, which is almost certain to be the major concern of American policy for some years, it is likely that the Labour Left will have a grievance that is durable and capable of rallying that considerable British public for whom large-scale military expansion is antithetical to socialism. There is little doubt, especially after the Bevanite display of strength at the September, 1951, meeting of the Trades Union Congress,[89] that British workers are effectively appealed to when welfare expenditures are presented as alternatives to rearmament outlays. (This appeal might be even more actively presented if the Labour Party should be in opposition for a prolonged period.) But no matter how successfully the Labour Left recruits present support, its hostility to United States foreign policy seems likely to continue. Any repetition of its favorable turn toward America during 1948–50 would require changes in the United States that cannot now be foreseen. Barring actual Russian military aggression in Europe, the price of labour left support for the current U. S. policy would be an almost total American subsidy of British rearmament, so that no appreciable dent would be made in either British civilian production or British welfare programs, or at least a new trend in American domestic politics that would be sufficient to push to the foreground, even along with rearmament, the point four type of program. These, it will be granted, are not very probable developments.

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[87] *Op. cit.*, pp. 8–10. For the fear of U. S. war-making, see also Kingsley Martin, "Answer to an American Liberal," *New Statesman*, Vol. 41, pp. 264–65 (March 10, 1951), who quotes Toynbee's popular "No Annihilation without Representation."

[88] *One Way Only*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 10. The Labour Left, while having applauded Truman for the ouster of MacArthur, only a little later thought the Truman-Acheson position to have been surrendered. See, especially, *New Statesman*, Vol. 41, pp. 549–50, 609, 637–38 (May 19 and June 2 and 9, 1951).

In the absence of such developments, it is not surprising that the tempo of the campaign against the acceptance of U.S. foreign policy was maintained in the highly charged political atmosphere of the fall of 1951. Almost simultaneously with the announcement in September of the General Election, there appeared another *Tribune* pamphlet, *Going Our Way*, which restated the Bevanite critique in language no less vigorous than that of a few months earlier.[90] Although the pamphlet added little that was new to the Left's objections to the American-sponsored armament program, it did serve notice that Bevan and his followers still thought that they had a sufficiently popular cause upon which to base their political careers. What has happened since must have confirmed that optimism. For in October, both at the Labour Party Conference and at the General Election, the Bevanites scored clear-cut, although minor, victories. At the Conference Bevan and his followers won four of the seven places filled by local party organizations on the Labour Party Executive.[91] While this by no means gives the Bevanites a majority on the Executive, most of which is selected by the trade unions, nevertheless the result provides a rough measure of the rank and file support for Bevan's position. The fact that the local party organizations have customarily been farther left than the dominant trade union wing of the Labour Party lessens somewhat the overall importance of this conference victory, yet it is a victory not without its significance. For obviously the local party organizations, though preponderant neither in numbers nor in financial resources, are of some moment to the success or failure of the Labour Party.

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[89] Although there were few T.U.C. votes for a resolution offering outright criticism of the Government's foreign policy, the Bevanites did better on resolutions relating to the effects of rearmament on domestic matters, especially on a proposal (only narrowly defeated) to condemn the budgetary charges on teeth and spectacles. Reported in the *New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1951, Sec. 4, p. 2.

[90] *The* (London) *Times*, Sept. 21, 1951, p. 3.

[91] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1951, p. 4.

Matching the Bevanite triumph in the strictly party polling was the success in the General Election of those eight or nine members of Parliament openly identified with Bevan's revolt. A few of these representatives of the Labour Left were in marginal constituencies, where to be returned in 1951 as a Labour M. P. was something of an accomplishment. The extent to which the appeal of the Bevanites in such areas consisted of criticism of U.S. foreign policy (rather than emphasis on domestic matters) is, of course, not accurately measured. However, there were first-hand newspaper accounts from Bevanite constituencies which indicated that campaign oratory at the local level included the semi-pacifist, anti-capitalist line associated with the Labour Left's distrust of the United States.[92]

Perhaps more significant than such reports of an anti-American approach among the Bevanites (where its existence might have been assumed) is the suggestion that other candidates of the Labour Party thought it politically expedient to voice the Bevanite criticism of rearmament and to portray, in general, their party as more peaceful and less acquiescent in American demands than Churchill and the Conservatives.[93] Except in a very subdued way and without anti-American overtones, this was not the line of official party leadership during the campaign. But how extensively the multitude of local labour campaigners hit on the Bevanite theme remains open to question. There is just enough evidence to suggest the possibility that the virus of anti-Americanism, associated with the Labour Left's criticism of U.S. foreign policy, has been injected into a substantial part of the British body politic. However, it is not yet fair to assume that to use the United States as a whipping boy for British politicians is as well established a custom as the old American political act of twisting the tail of the British lion.

[92] *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1951, Sec. 4, p. 3, and Oct. 24, 1951, p. 30.

[93] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1951, p. 5.

# GOALS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE: A DISCUSSION

A product of four years of investigation, *Goals for Political Science* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1951) is the final Report of the American Political Science Association's Committee for the Advancement of Teaching. The Committee was composed of Harold M. Dorr, *University of Michigan*, Claude E. Hawley, *United States Office of Education*, E. Allen Helms, *Ohio State University*, Andrew E. Nuquist, *University of Vermont*, Ruth G. Weintraub, *Hunter College*, Howard White, *Miami University* and Marshall E. Dimock, *Florida State University*, Chairman.

Based upon answers to a fifteen-page questionnaire to which 252 institutions of higher education responded, as well as to a supplementary "letter of inquiry" sent to 112 institutions offering graduate degrees, and upon personal visits of its authors to institutions throughout the nation, the Report deals with the following subjects: citizenship, international relations, training for the public service, the departmental major, integrated social science courses, the introductory course, high school-college relationships, graduate training and methods of instruction.

*Goals for Political Science* represents the most recent effort of the Association to undertake "a national inventory on the state of political science." In view of the importance of this effort, the Editor of the REVIEW has solicited comments on the Report from a number of individuals who have manifested a special interest in the material and problems with which the Report deals. Each person was urged to use his own discretion in his choice of discussion matter—the Report as a whole or any aspect of it, the methods of inquiry and analysis used by the Committee, the assumptions implicit in the study, the recommendations made to the profession by the Committee, general trends or goals in political science or developments in any one or more specific fields. It is hoped that this discussion will stimulate interest in the Report and focus the attention of the profession upon the problems highlighted by it. (ED.)

JAMES W. FESLER
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*Goals for Political Science* appears to have four major themes. One of these attempts to give us a deeper awareness that we are *teachers*, and therefore counsels us to give more attention than we have in the past to citizenship education, our duties vis-à-vis secondary schools, modernization of our teaching methods, teacher evaluation devices, academic rewards for good teaching, and the training of our graduate students in teaching methods.[1]

A second theme seeks to establish a goal, a core, and a scope for "political science." The goal appears to be "citizenship education." The core is "systematic and conceptual political science." The scope is about what we are accustomed to, but with firm binding to our bosom of the wandering brethren of international relations and public administration and with the addition of the field of public policy.

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[1] The Report even provides a formula of key words for achieving effectiveness as teachers of citizenship: "example, motivation, preparation, application, participation, and balance." Fortunately, the initial letters, "EMPAPB," do not spell a readily pronounceable word.

A third theme encourages closer relations with other social sciences. This is to be achieved both through our treating governmental institutions as parts of a total culture and through our participating fully in interdepartmental programs.

A fourth theme is directed to strengthening of the graduate training of political scientists. This objective is to be gained through selective recruitment, training in the scope and method of our discipline, reduction in number and broadening in character of graduate courses, tailor-making of each student's program of courses, tightening up of the master's degree requirements, and reconsideration of language requirements.

The Committee, it seems to me, has done well in the how-to-teach area but less well in the what-to-teach and how-to-organize-what-we-teach areas. None of us, I suspect, can fail to profit from the Committee's challenge to improve our teaching, its description of how other departments and teachers have undertaken to meet the challenge, and its provision of specific recommendations reflecting the Committee's own judgment on how it should be met. This should perhaps be regarded as an adequate discharge of the duties of a group named the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching. The Committee, however, saw its task in broader terms. This is most sharply revealed in the title, *Goals for Political Science*, as also in its query, "How can one deal with improvements in teaching without dealing with goals?" It is revealed in more detail in the Report's asking such questions as "What form will the curriculum finally take, and what will be its spirit and methods?" What is the unifying element, the central core, of political science? "What is the division of labor within the social sciences?" Is "political science the science of democracy or the science of government and culture generally"? It seems fair to conclude that the Committee decided that it could not discharge its mandate properly unless it considered what political science should be and how its parts should fit together. It is on these two basic matters that the Report seems to this reader least satisfactory.

The nature of political science is probed in various ways. Suggestive questions are put: Is theory the core? Is political power? Is power under whatever guise? "Should political science be content with nothing short of its original Aristotelian role as the great integrator of the social sciences?" But one looks in vain for clear answers. Instead, the discussion slides off into endorsement of the way in which political science has been subdivided into fields. This, though, tells little of why these fields belong together. An answer appears essential at a time when some of our colleagues feel identified as teachers less with the political science department than with interdisciplinary programs in international relations and foreign areas, integrated social science courses, and schools of public and private administration. Furthermore, the insights and methodologies of psychology, anthropology, and sociology are having an important impact on many political scientists who specialize in political parties and public opinion, public administration, international relations, and labor relations. A number of these colleagues probably find among neighboring disciplines more reading immediately relevant to their special interests, and more congenial and stimulating campus friends with whom to discuss their intellectual interests, than they find in their own departments.

As key problems increasingly are posed in terms of decision-making and policy-formation processes, the nature of man (or, as I prefer to say, the natures of men), face-to-face groups, bureaucratic structure, and psychological foundations of leadership and consent, we are faced with the prospect of a dramatic challenge to both the unity of political science and its distinguishability from other social sciences. This is not the place to discuss whether this is good or bad. I shall simply assert my belief that it is good.

The Committee does not, it seems to me, adequately meet this issue by defining the major goal of political science as "citizenship education."[2] It is true that many of us can (or think we can) get under that umbrella, though we may need renewed vigor and updating of our teaching techniques. Indeed, the umbrella is so broad that deans of students, teachers of other social sciences, teachers of the humanities, and student government organizations, the Committee says, are all in the same business of citizenship education. While we find here something to which political science can contribute, we are not much advanced in our effort to find out what is the distinctive role of political science.

Complete absorption in a goal of "citizenship education," as that term is generally interpreted, would in my judgment be fatal for political science in this country. It may well rank high among goals for the beginning course, but to relate all undergraduate political science work to this objective would be to forget that we are a political science department in a college or university, not a civics department in a high school. Our task, as is that of the other social sciences, is to master, as far as we can, the knowable in a field, develop informed insights, transmit the most significant knowledge and intuitions to our students, develop in them understanding, and encourage them to think critically about social phenomena.

The problem is partly one of semantics. "Citizenship education," to the Committee, appears to imply a concern for the development of the individual student, rather than a concern solely for subject matter; few of us who treasure our designation as teachers can dissent. The phrase, to the Committee, also seems to call for analytical and critical thinking, rather than for indoctrination and preaching. This, too, answers some of my principal doubts—if others in the profession adopt the Committee's interpretation of the term. My fear is that "citizenship education," *as widely understood*, covers our sins as well as our virtues. It provides a ready rationalization for those who exhort and preach, for those who mostly communicate their own biased reactions to the day's newspaper headlines, for those who concentrate on inducing student discussion without inducing first a student effort to become informed on the subjects to be discussed. Simply put, I am concerned lest in pursuing a goal of citizenship education, we forget that we also are obligated to justify the designation of our field as political *science.*

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[2] I have said "the major goal," though the Committee makes it this by emphasis rather than by specific phrasing. The Committee seems to find four goals: "training of citizens," "diffusion of knowledge concerning international relations," "production of leadership for all branches of the public service," and "training teachers" (p. 24).

The Committee is aware of this obligation. Consequently, the Committee's most significant contribution to defining the nature of political science is its report of a wide feeling that political theory should be the heart of the subject and that "political science should be made increasingly systematic and conceptual." The Report continues:

> It should not be inferred, however, that the usually expressed desire is for a definitive formulation of scientific principles, for that will take time and cannot be rushed; the usual plea, therefore, is that the conceptual treatment be applied to political science in all its subdivisions; that the common elements in politics, administration, and adjudication be brought forth; that the field of government be not considered segmented and partitioned; that pressure groups, for example, be studied as they impinge on the administrative and judicial process and not merely as they are directed at the legislature. This will mean a closer integration of the several parts of which political science is composed and the checking of tendencies toward disintegration and separatism.
>
> Accordingly, we recommend that in the revision of departmental programs, looking toward improved teaching effectiveness, increased attention be given to conceptual and systematic political science as the factor around which all other elements should adhere.[3]

This is an admirable statement. It seems, however, to be quite differently focused from the identification of citizenship education as our dominant goal. The two can be reconciled only by taking a much more sophisticated approach to "citizenship education" than the term usually evokes.

The conceptual and systematic approach will command the support of political theorists who relate theory to practice; careful scholars in political parties and public opinion; students of comparative government; those studying group processes in labor, farm, business, professional, and other interest groups; analysts of the roots of national power in international affairs; students of the realities of bureaucratic administration; and all who bring to international and domestic organizations an institutional approach. These are men who take the "science" part of political science seriously. I doubt that these same men, on whom the future of our discipline so greatly depends, will feel that designation of a primary goal of citizenship education either sharpens our focus or provides a desirable, even though diffuse, focus.

Designation of systematic and conceptual systematic political science as the core of our discipline does more to suggest an approach and a spirit than to identify the nature of political science. The latter task might have been discharged at the workaday level by some indication of what an undergraduate major or a graduate student should be expected to master to be qualified in political science. Should the products of our educational efforts emerge with a broad acquaintance with all or most of the fields of political science, or should they, largely at their own option, emerge without any political theory, or without any international relations, or without any comparative government, or without any American Government? It does little good to insist on the unity of our subject if we have no concept of the minimum qualifications of a political scientist or of the proper scope of an undergraduate major program. Two quite different patterns are prevalent in American universities. Under one, political science is divided into four fields (political theory, comparative government, international relations, and American Government), and the student is expected to become acquainted with at least three of the fields. Under the other pattern, six fields are designated through breaking up the American Government field of the first pattern into the three areas of public law, political parties, and public administration. It is common for requirements to be so arranged that a student may confine his courses to these three American fields and to one additional field. He may become a practicing political scientist with a Ph.D. or a college graduate, without any competence in two of the broad fields of political science.

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[3] Pp. 126 ff.

I go into these details not to suggest a conclusion, but to demonstrate that there are at least two quite different concepts of what a political scientist is, and, by implication, of what political science is. Yet the Committee does not, so far as I can discover, recommend any particular pattern of training as either most suitable for student development or most expressive of the nature and scope of political science. Where the Committee tangentially touches on this problem, its emphasis is less on unity than on diversity, as in its endorsement of an eight-field subdivision of political science and in its advocacy of greater flexibility in graduate degree requirements.[4]

The Committee's Report reflects faithfully the state of political science at mid-century. Political scientists are riding off in all directions, and some of them, even while riding in one direction, are wistfully wondering whether some other direction might not have been better. The Committee has not brought us all back and suggested that we start afresh in a direction that will unite instead of divide us. The Report records the catholicity of viewpoints in the profession; it does not penetrate deeply into the nature of our calling and formulate a restatement of what we are about. Instead, we are challenged to be more systematic and scientific and at the same time to impress students with the rightness of democracy and inspire them to participate in government. We are adjured to be high-flying theorists, to be down-to-earth practical men sharing in our community's government, and to devote time to workshops with high school teachers and to preparation of articles for high school journals. We are to cultivate real distinction in our special areas, resist narrow specialization, be stunning teachers of sophomores, learn the use of visual aids, and be

[4] Note should be made, however, of the Committee's advocacy of fewer and broader graduate courses and of its disapproval of "excessive proliferation of courses" at the undergraduate level. Let me also note that my discussion is addressed to Committee recommendations, and is not meant to imply that the Committee does not present an inventory, largely without critical appraisal, of what political science departments are doing.

rigorous in the training of graduate students. We are to collaborate fully with sister disciplines but remain loyal to political science. Almost all of these things need doing. Many of them are being done. And the Committee has performed a useful service in reporting this pattern of action and in urging that it be more widespread.

And yet, to one political scientist at least, these activities are but incidents of our being engaged in the effort to discover and communicate the knowable about certain significant aspects of the behavior and organization of men operating in a complex setting of social institutions. We need to reëxamine our calling and pierce through the cacophony of voices toward a substantial consensus on the nature, the goal, and the scope of political science. That the present Committee has been unable to do this is less a ground for criticism of the Committee than an evidence of the present state of political science and an index to the difficulty of the task.

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The Committee on Teaching of the American Political Science Association seems to agree with a majority of the teachers it polled that the main purpose of their work ought to be the production of good citizens,[1] but it insists that this must be accomplished not through "indoctrination" but through "analysis." The last two terms are nowhere clearly defined, and we are left with the impression that "indoctrination" has to do with the inculcation of values, while "analysis" has to do with the exploration of fact. But is not citizenship superlatively a matter of holding certain values, of defining right and wrong, good and bad? If indoctrination is ruled out, how is citizenship to be promoted? Moreover a further question arises. The Committee, in its attack on indoctrination, notes that when even the "most laudable viewpoints" are advanced in the classroom, the "effect on most students is to make them recoil from the position being advocated."[2] Which leaves us with the dilemma that if we attempt to create good citizens, we are likely to create bad ones—that trying to achieve our goal, we destroy it.

What is the way out of these contradictions?

The first thing we must do, it seems to me, is to give up the proposition that the function of political science education, even on the undergraduate plane, is the creation of good citizens. Its function, like that of other types of liberal training, is to communicate to students the experience of thought, and is therefore, in one sense, purely formal. The job of the political science teacher is not to produce a good citizen but to produce an intelligent man. It is not to give a student values but to develop his talent for valuation. If education contributes to citizenship, then it does so indirectly, and not as the central goal of its effort. For the essence of a free university is that it has no party line; and

[1] The Committee does not explicitly take this position. It merely notes, sympathetically, the present "predominant interest" of political scientists (*Goals for Political Science*, p. ix).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

when we define its purpose in terms of citizenship, we embark on the road that, bit by bit, delivers it up to the state.[3] There is no escaping indoctrination here, and the Committee is right in condemning it.

This position, however, can easily be misinterpreted. It is not a plea for the so-called "factual" teacher, the man who is forever at work freeing himself from all convictions, all conclusions, all values. The paradox of liberal education is that while its goals are formal, it cannot achieve them without immersing itself in content. For if the task of the teacher is to communicate to students the experience of thought, how can he expect to meet it unless he is ready to share that experience himself? Thought is not a matter of facts and premises alone. It is, above all in the social sciences, a matter of values and conclusions as well. Thus the teacher is bound to advance in the classroom the results that he has arrived at, unless he is prepared to teach a type of thinking that leads to no results at all. He is bound to affirm his own values, unless he is prepared to argue that, in his case, none have been at work.

But it might be asked: if this is so, are we not back at indoctrination? What is the difference between the indoctrinator and any other teacher who enthusiastically confronts a class with the theories and values he believes in? The difference is a difference of approach and it seems to me essential. The indoctrinator advances his point of view with the primary object of imposing it on his students. He is a strategist in the realm of propaganda, a salesman of ideas, a man with the manipulative outlook. Professor Clinton Rossiter, who recently defended elementary indoctrination in this REVIEW, has given us a picture of the life of the indoctrinator which can scarcely be improved upon. He is confronted, alas, with a task which "will never be easy" because it "can hardly be openly proclaimed." He must watch his students, lest they catch on to the fact that they are being "lured into good citizenship"—lest, in other words, they begin to "recoil" from "laudable viewpoints." As soon as he sees them getting into this mood, and indeed "not a second later," he must jump back to the "neutral recitation of facts and theories."[4] Presumably, after a safe period has been spent in neutral recitation, and the suspicions of his students have died down, the teacher may return to the task of teaching citizenship.

Now what distinguishes the liberal teacher from the man engaged in indoctrination is that the former has absolutely no regard for any of these Machiavellian arts. And the reason is that while he boldly advances his own ideas, he does so not in order to impose them on his students, but rather to display the sort of process by which ideas are in general formulated. There is therefore nothing about his mission that he needs to keep a secret, that he cannot "openly proclaim." He is not in a permanent state of inner tension, wondering whether his object has been exposed. His movement from theory to fact, instead of being governed by the suspicious glances of his students, is governed by what he conceives the proper relationship between theory and fact to be. He is, as it were, a scholar in action. And this, it seems to me, is the secret of the greatest teaching, the sort of teaching that, for example, a McIlwain did. Many of McIlwain's students have forgotten his interpretation of Bodin, and some undoubtedly did not accept it when they heard it. But few of them will ever forget the supreme integrity of the method, or the ardent enthusiasm of the work, by which that interpretation was developed.

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[3] I am indebted to a discussion with Professor Samuel Beer for clarification on this point.

[4] Clinton L. Rossiter, "Political Science I and Political Indoctrination," this REVIEW, Vol. 42, pp. 542–549, at pp. 542 and 544 (June, 1948).

Professor Rossiter's theory of education scarcely leaves room for an achievement of this sort. It appears to be based on the belief that the possibilities of teaching are exhausted either by the man who tries naïvely to suppress his own values or by the man who tries strategically to saturate his students with them. "The instructor does not live," he asserts, "who can teach political science in a completely neutral fashion." Then he goes on to say: "Since we are willy-nilly in a position to teach more than facts, we not only *can* teach good citizenship but we *should* teach it." And by this chain of reasoning we are led, "at least in the introductory course," to the subtle arts described above. The crucial term here is obviously the term "teach." Professor Rossiter defines it in a curious way. Instead of defining "teach," he defines the term "indoctrinate"; and looking into Webster's dictionary, he discovers that "indoctrinate" means to teach.[5] What Webster has to say on a question of this sort is not in any case important, but the procedure may serve to illustrate the method by which Professor Rossiter has sidestepped the meaning of liberal education. If indoctrination is teaching, then it is not the only kind of teaching. The fact that a man must affirm his values in the classroom does not mean that he must "teach" them in the sense of trying to put them over on students, elementary or advanced. He can affirm them, as the great liberal teachers have always done, as part of an intellectual pattern which the student is free to reject or to modify.

Rejection and modification are not horrendous evils. The tendency of students to "recoil," instead of being a sign of the teacher's failure, is indeed a sign of his success. It is proof that his action has struck a spark in the mind of the student. It is the point at which teaching moves from monologue to dialogue, from the dullness of the lecture to the excitement of dialectic and controversy. The citizenship indoctrinator will say: what if the student chooses to defend Marxism, not going to the polls, or a number of other civic vices? To some extent, it is worth noticing, this man brings his troubles on himself. Frightened of disagreement, he evokes it all the more readily. Determined to pound loyalty home, he is astounded by how much sedition he finds. This is a fine commentary on the human nature of students. But it is true that even the liberal teacher, who engages in no propaganda enterprises, will find dangerous thoughts among his students. And the answer to this question, I submit, is that dangerous thoughts are an inevitable part of the educational process in a free society. When they do not occur to anyone in the classroom, that society will have ended, and the need for sedition will indeed be great.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 543 and 544. While Professor Rossiter speaks of questions that are "no longer open questions" and doctrines that are "no longer exactly controversial in this country," in fairness to him it must be pointed out that he favors a wider latitude of criticism in "our more advanced courses" (*ibid.*, p. 545).

One thing more has to be said about the indoctrinator. There is invariably a touch of the imperialist about him. The liberal teacher, concerned with the integrity of the intellect rather than with any particular social conclusion, is ready to live with his colleagues in peace, even though their conclusions may differ widely from his own. But how can the indoctrinator reasonably do this? He defines the educational task as the creation of civic virtue; and if his colleagues do not seem to be actively engaged in creating it, how can he let them rest? Incompetence is a minor charge compared to the charge of treason. Fuzzy thinking is an amiable vice compared to the vice of un-Americanism. Thus what is really frightening about Professor Rossiter's Political Science I is not that Professor Rossiter chooses to teach it, but that in the end we may all be forced to teach it too.

It is hard to separate the movement for indoctrination within the university from the current attack on academic freedom outside it. They breathe a single atmosphere, they march in the same direction. The Report of the Committee on Teaching does not openly confront the problem of academic freedom, which seems to me a limitation. The Report is obviously the product of keen and experienced minds, of men wise in the ways of teaching and in the social problems teachers face. It is a storehouse of excellent technical suggestions, which will be referred to by political scientists for a long time to come. It is impossible, therefore, to believe that the issue of academic freedom as it appears at the present time did not occur to its authors. One is left to conclude that it was a deliberate policy decision which excluded this issue either from the polls of political scientists that were taken or from the report that was built upon them.

But what conception of policy can justify such exclusion? It is a commonplace that political science, of all the areas of study in a university, is most vitally hit by the threat to academic freedom, for it is fated to deal with precisely the issues that its enemies define as dangerous. Alongside this question, one is bound to say that many of the excellent concerns of the Committee seem relatively unimportant. What has the teacher gained through the expansion of "integrated" courses, or of audio-visual methods of education, or of "area studies," if he has sacrificed to some of our current fanatics even a hundreth part of that freedom to say what he thinks and to think what he says which lies at the heart of liberal teaching? One cannot believe that the Committee's emphasis on citizenship education, by the logic of the indoctrination it condemns, has led it to adopt a passive view toward a problem as important as this.

The problem is by no means entirely a matter of teachers' oaths, pernicious and recurrent as these manifestations of the civic conscience are. A time of national hysteria takes hold of the teacher in a thousand subtle ways. It can frighten him, and doing so, can set in motion a silent and private process, often even an unconscious process, which confounds out of existence the distinction between thought and strategy. It can produce a censorship of self which, in the end, is more powerful than the censorship of the state. And with students it can lead to the same results, producing in the classroom a new and unprecedented caution, an unwillingness to play with dangerous ideas, a faint paralysis of mind when certain questions appear. These are imponderable effects, but are we prepared to say that, over the last five years, none of them have been at work in American universities?

In the case of the student, an added factor is becoming increasingly important: especially if he seeks government employment, he knows that his teacher may be questioned concerning his political convictions. This is a corrosive preoccupation. Even a hint of it can do immeasurable harm. So far teachers have accepted their role as a source of information on the political views of their students, although not, I think, without an occasional twinge of inner shock or embarrassment. But may it not be time frankly to reconsider this policy? There are undoubtedly security grounds for checking into the political views of candidates for certain government positions, but is the teacher a man the government has a right to turn to? His job, unless he has embarked on the journey of indoctrination, is to urge the student to think what he pleases, to follow the path of his reasoning wherever it leads him. He presides over what may well be the freest and most iconoclastic moment many of his students will ever have, a moment they may look back upon with the wistfulness of Babbitt. Having watched this experience, and having done his best to inspire it, is there not something disloyal itself in communicating its outcome to government agents? Other professions have standards of the inviolability of communications. Perhaps it is time that teachers developed their own.

It would be hard to assert, given the hypothetical situations one might well conceive of, that this is an easy problem. There may, in the end, be no absolute solution to it, and, as with other problems, we may have to be pragmatic about it. But even a pragmatist ought to have a base line of principle, an ideal point of departure. For the liberal teacher, that principle and that point ought, I believe, to be this: that as a teacher his ultimate loyalty is to the intellectual enterprise in which he is engaged. When the state, even when it is fighting to defend civilization, comes to him with what he conceives to be a permanently suicidal request, he has a right to reply to it: "The defense of civilization is vital. But a free university is the very civilization you are fighting to defend."

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The Committee for the Advancement of Teaching is to be commended for the energy it has expended in gathering a great deal of factual information that will be of interest to the profession. Very little of this is easily available elsewhere and much of it is significant to the understanding of current practices and trends. The Report, however, is disappointing—both in the superficiality of the method it has employed and in the triteness of its recommendations. This is not to say that the recommendation, for example, that we "guard against excessive proliferation of courses and a tendency toward disintegration" is not a good one, but rather that such a recommendation could probably have been made without a committee investigation.

Probably there is no more pressing question confronting the profession today than the nature and scope of political science. But when the Committee proceeds to answer that question by enumerating the kinds of courses that are currently offered and the number of times they are taught, the superficiality of the method they have employed becomes obvious. What departments are currently teaching may or may not be political science. To evaluate their endeavors, it is necessary to employ some standard or principle of evaluation. To define political science as what political science departments currently teach is to beg the question by refusing to ask it. To delineate the nature and scope of political science is essentially an *intellectual* endeavor. It cannot be done by a questionnaire, by compiling course statistics, or by a poll of opinion on the subject. Course titles tell us little about the content of courses or about the methods employed in teaching the subject matter of those courses. The list of faculty opinions on the "scope of political science instruction" (pp. 116–126) is interesting but not very helpful or conclusive, for no one can possibly say in a sentence or two what the nature and scope of political science is, or present within the limitations of a questionnaire anything like a reasoned argument for his judgment. Instead of asking for random opinions on the nature and scope of political science, the Committee might better have consulted and evaluated the existing literature on the subject, which is both abundant and easily available.[1] Why the Committee should have ignored rigorous intellectual efforts to define political science in favor of the random sample of opinion is by no means clear, unless the Committee is prepared to defend the position that the determination of the nature and scope of political science is not an intellectual task but simply one of soliciting opinions and taking a vote. When the profession relies upon questionnaires and polls to define its task, it will lose all claim to intellectual respectability.

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[1] See, for example, Munroe Smith, "The Domain of Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 1, pp. 1–9 (Mar., 1886); L. S. Rowe, "Problems of Political Science," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 10, pp. 165–186 (Sept., 1897); C. E. Merriam, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 15, pp. 173–185 (May, 1921); J. A. Fairlie, "Politics and Science," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 18, pp. 18–37 (Jan., 1924); W. B. Munro, "Physics and Politics—An Old Analogy Revised," this REVIEW, Vol. 22, pp. 1–11 (1928); E. S. Corwin, "Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science," *ibid.*, Vol. 23, pp. 569–592 (Aug., 1929); Harold F. Gosnell, "Statisticians and Political Scientists," *ibid.*, Vol. 27, pp. 392–403 (June, 1933); Charner Perry, "Relation Between Ethics and Political Science," *Ethics*, Vol. 47, pp. 163–179 (Jan., 1937); George H. Sabine, "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 24, pp. 865–885 (Aug., 1930); William Anderson, "The Role of Political Science," *ibid.*, Vol. 36, pp. 1–17 (Feb., 1943); Thomas I. Cook, "Politics, Sociology and Values," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 6, pp. 35–46 (Oct., 1940); Karl Loewenstein, "Report on the Research Panel on Comparative Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 540–548 (June, 1944); Francis G. Wilson, "The Work of the Political Theory Panel," *ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 726–733 (Aug., 1944); Erich Voegelin, "Political Theory and the Pattern of General History," *ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 746–754 (Aug., 1944); Benjamin F. Wright, "Research in American Political Theory," *ibid.*, Vol. 38, pp. 733–740 (Aug., 1944); Robert R. Wilson, "Teaching of International Law in Undergraduate and Graduate Courses in Political Science," *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, pp. 77–88 (1947); J. Roland Pennock, "Reason, Value Theory and the Theory of Democracy," this REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 855–875 (Oct., 1944). In addition to the periodical literature on the nature and scope of political science, of which this list is a meager sample, there are also a number of books on the subject: for example, S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928); G. E. G.

If the Committee, moreover, wanted to use as a frame of reference and point of departure a book that represented "an ambitious effort to explain the social sciences" and one that would give "political scientists, like all other social scientists, something to ponder" (p. 4), it could have found a more substantial work than Stuart Chase's *The Proper Study of Mankind.* There are innumerable political classics which it might have chosen, and none any better for this purpose than Aristotle's *Politics.* For although Aristotle's information was not obtained from leaders in the social science field nor his appraisal asked for by the Social Science Research Council, and although he worked at his task without the aid of foundation support, his work on *Politics* is a much more "ambitious," intellectually rigorous and systematic attempt to explain the task of social science than Stuart Chase's, and it is likely to continue to be more enduring. Even after the lapse of several centuries, there is still a great deal in his work that political scientists in twentieth-century America might well ponder. This is not to say that the Committee should have been expected to endorse the views of Aristotle, any more than it intended to endorse the views of Stuart Chase, but it is to say that the Committee's analysis and recommendations might have been more significant if they had told us how their conception of the task of political science differs from Aristotle's conception of that task and why.

The perspective of the Committee, as revealed in this Report, is parochial in the extreme. For one would have expected a report dealing with *Goals for Political Science* to have considered at least, if only for the purpose of rejecting them, those goals as they have been defined throughout the centuries and to have considered experience and thought on the subject earlier than the twentieth century and other than American. The Report implies by its omissions that nothing significant on the subject of goals for political science has been said previous to the twentieth century and that only American thought on the subject is of interest to the profession. The Committee might well have considered and brought to the attention of the profession the discussions published in the UNESCO publication, *Contemporary Political Science.*[2]

In considering goals for citizenship education, the Committee cites no work

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Catlin, *Science and Method of Politics* (New York, 1927); Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature—An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method* (New York, 1931); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America* (Boston, 1941), esp. Ch. 25; Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950).

[2] Although it was probably not available to the Committee at the time it was making its report, another UNESCO publication, edited by Richard McKeon, *Democracy in a World of Tensions* (Chicago, 1951) is an invaluable addition to the existing literature on democracy.

earlier than 1916 and appears oblivious to the fact that practically every major political philosopher has been concerned with the problem of education and had something significant to say about it. Concern for "citizenship education" dates at least as far back as the fifth century B.C. There is no problem that engaged the attention of Plato and Aristotle more than this one, and there are no more thought-provoking discussions of the problems encountered in educating citizens than the discussions in their works. Indeed, there is a sense in which it might be said that Plato's *Republic* is primarily concerned with this very problem. Plato's attempt to grapple with the problem of educating citizens merits at least equal consideration with Hollis P. Allen's evaluation of the "Riverside County Curriculum Studies" or Bulletin No. 22 of the National Council for the Social Studies, entitled "Developing Citizenship Through School Activities."

Is the good citizen identical with the good man or is it possible for a bad man to be a good citizen? This is a question which Aristotle ponders in Book III, Chapter 4 of the *Politics*, and it is one which seems to me to go to the heart of the matter: yet it is not a question which the Committee even considers. How does education for citizenship, moreover, differ from just plain education? The Committee apparently assumes a distinction but nowhere tells us specifically what it is. And what is the distinction between indoctrination and education? The Committee clearly thinks that there is a distinction and implies that the distinction is relatively easy to make.

Although it frequently warns against indoctrination, the Committee nowhere defines it. The Committee cites with approval a list of "characteristics of the good democratic citizen" as compiled by Professor Rossiter. If we accept this list and recommend these characteristics or principles to our students, are we indoctrinating them or educating them? If we teach our students to respect the dignity of human personality, to value, respect and defend basic human rights, to promote equality of opportunity, to put the general welfare above his own whenever a choice between them is necessary, etc., is this exhortation and indoctrination or is this education? What do we mean by "objectivity"? Does objectivity preclude all value judgments or is it possible for value judgments to have an objective basis? Is a value judgment identical with a personal bias or preference or do values exist independently of subjective preference for them?[3]

The Committee suggests that "Citizenship should be taught through analysis and through helping students to think critically, not through indoctrination or preaching" (p. x). There is no quarrel with this recommendation and all of us would accept it, but the point is *how* do you teach students to "think critically"? Should we encourage our students to evaluate arguments and evidence or to avoid evaluation? Should we encourage them to reach conclusions, however tentatively those conclusions may be held, or to avoid reaching conclusions? In another part of the Report, the Committee declares that "Students become good citizens when their teachers inspire them to be such by example" (p. 42). Does this example include "thinking critically" and thinking critically in the classroom? Or is all the critical thinking to be done by the students? And, incidentally, how does the word "inspire" creep into a Report that looks askance at anything resembling exhortation? The word "inspire" means to infuse thought or feeling into a person. Is this infusion different from indoctrination and in what sense?[4]

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[3] The Committee might well have considered the problem raised by Professor Lippincott in an article on "The Bias of American Political Science," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 125–139 (May, 1940). "It is impossible . . . ," Professor Lippincott argued, "for the empiricist to avoid a point of view, a bias. Not only does he assume a theory and a scheme of values when he selects his facts, but also when he writes about them and tells us what they mean. Although he may think his objectivity is simon-pure, nevertheless, there will be found in his text, in the lines and in between the lines, all sorts of conclusions—in fact, a whole philosophy" (p. 132). Whether he is right or wrong, the problem he raises merits consideration. A recent attempt to grapple with the problem of objective evaluation as it relates to the problems of politics is J. Roland Pennock's *Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950).

Throughout its Report, the Committee suggests that "we should emphasize political participation rather than observation of political phenomena; that we should encourage the student to be politically active rather than to be merely politically well informed" (p. 187). This raises a serious question as to the proper function of the college and university. And the Committee, I think, has inadvertently said more than it intends. It has not, in my opinion, thought through the implications of this advice. Is the Committee advising us to encourage our students to participate as partisans in political activities or, if they are not to participate as partisans, how are they to participate? Is it the proper function of the college or university to encourage partisan political activities? Political science, it seems to me, is primarily an intellectual discipline, a body of knowledge. Its proper function is to impart knowledge about politics, not to give practical training in politics. If the knowledge imparted by the study of political science is later used in practical politics, so much the better for politics, but this is a different matter from encouraging our students "to be politically active" when they are students.

The suggestion also raises the question whether the only effective way to understand politics is to participate in it. This seems to be the assumption implicit in the advice, but that assumption, I think, is fallacious. We do not expect physicists to build bridges in order to understand the principles that hold them up, nor do we think a man a poor physicist if he is a poor engineer or no engineer at all. We do not teach the principles of geometry by a manual training course in carpentry, even though the carpenter has many occasions to make practical use of geometrical principles. As a body of knowledge, political science must be taught and learned like any other body of knowledge, and no amount of practical experience can ever be a substitute in acquiring such knowledge for intellectual discipline. The Committee says that "Amongst political scientists in the United States, training for intelligent citizenship is the predominant interest and emphasis" (p. ix). I hope that this means that we are giving at least as much attention to the training of intelligence as we give to the kinds of practical projects that occupy so much of the Committee's attention. If guided tours around the state capitol and audiovisual aids stimulate the student to think about what he has seen, all well and good; but, if such projects are thought to be more effective preparation for responsible citizenship than just plain learning and thought, the result is likely to be a badly informed citizenry and an irresponsible one. A person learns to think by thinking, as he learns to evaluate by evaluating, and no amount of "practical" observation or participation will teach him automatically how to do either. Responsible citizenship requires intelligence, knowledge, and the ability to evaluate wisely, and no amount of sightseeing can take the place of old-fashioned education in the cultivation of these qualities. Some of our most practical politicians, however much some may admire their mastery of political techniques for gaining and keeping office, would undoubtedly have been better politicians had they been better educated.

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[4] My own view is somewhat different from that expressed by Clinton L. Rossiter in "Political Science I and Political Indoctrination," this REVIEW, Vol. 42, pp. 542–549 (June, 1948). For there is, I believe, a significant difference between education and indoctrination, difficult though it may be at times to say exactly what that distinction is. I do not believe that the teacher should impose his value judgments upon his students, however laudable those value judgments may be. I do think he should make his judgments explicit and share with his students his premises as well as the evidence and train of thought that lead him to his conclusions. The students should be encouraged to take issue with him when they feel so inclined and be free always to reject his judgments, as well as to accept them if they find them sound. I conceive of the educational process as a mutual search for truth and in no sense at all a propagandistic undertaking. This point of view is elaborated in more detail in "Religious Perspectives of College Teaching: In Political Science," published by the Hazen Foundation (New Haven, 1951), esp. pp. 23 ff. I have argued at some length in the same place that the kind of knowledge at which political science aims, or ought to aim, is practical knowledge of the best means of promoting justice among men.

Throughout its Report, the Committee seems to suggest that we would turn out better citizens if we gave our students more practical and less theoretical instruction. That argument has been answered most recently and effectively by Professor Odegard in his presidential address to this Association. The textbooks of our greatest statesmen were the classics, and moral philosophy figured prominently in their education. Inquiry into the "natural principles of rectitude for the conduct of man" was more common in their day than it is in ours, and it was thought that men could not become good citizens without becoming good men. "If one is to argue that such training is a poor preparation for practical politics," Professor Odegard declared, "at least he must admit that it did not seriously handicap Jefferson and Madison, Hamilton and other practical politicians, who became the architects of democratic government in the modern world. Indeed, one may well ask whether the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Federalist Papers, could have been written except by men trained in this way."

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The impact of the Report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching is, at best, like that of a genteel gad-fly. In dispassionate language, teachers of political science are told by the Committee that their objectives are often diffuse and confused, their techniques uninspiring and outdated. Political scientists have failed not only to make their full contribution towards the organization of integrated social science courses within the university but also have failed to maintain integration even within their own departments. And little attention has been given to contacts with social science teachers in the secondary schools. At the graduate level, inability to provide adequate supervision and to maintain uniform requirements in conferring the M.A. has cheapened the degree. Standards for the Ph.D. degree remain high but the language requirements are often ritualistic instead of functional, and too few programs leading to the degree prepare students adequately for teaching careers.

The Committee maintains that there is no immediate panacea for these professional ills. Long-range planning and study (for example, a thorough exploration of the vocational aspects of political science teaching, which the Committee felt unable to make at this stage) are held essential to any ultimate cure.

Nevertheless, the Committee does make a number of recommendations designed to implement the goals of the profession. Most notable among them are the following:

1. In citizenship training, first-hand observation must be balanced with reading and discussion if the training is to achieve maximum effectiveness.
2. Increased attention should be given to theory as the core of political science.
3. While proliferation of courses should be avoided, courses in public policy, including public finance, must be added (perhaps restored) to the political science curriculum.
4. Courses in scope and method should be required of all graduate students. Group research should be promoted on essential problems, and seminars in teaching techniques should be more prevalent.
5. The trend toward autonomy of bureaus of public administration and institutes of international relations should be halted.
6. The REVIEW should inform APSA members of new developments in content and technique not only in political science but in allied social sciences as well. The APSA is urged to sponsor the production of films and records for classroom use.
7. To facilitate teamwork between high schools and colleges, political scientists are urged to participate in activities of the National Council for the Social Studies. At least one member of every political science department should be familiar with the content of social studies instruction in the secondary schools of his state.

These observations and recommendations should certainly be given earnest consideration. Unfortunately, however, apart from presenting them, the Report as a whole has little more than distinguished authorship to recommend it. While, at best, its impact is like that of a genteel gad-fly, more often it is like "Jenny," of *Lady in the Dark* fame, whose inconsistent actions and ultimate demise were due to the regrettable fact that "she couldn't make up her mind." The Committee could not make up its mind about:

*Separatism.* The Committee emphasizes as "goals for political science" the training of citizens, the training of leaders for the public service, the training of teachers, cultural development, and the diffusion of knowledge about international relations. Why the diffusion of information in one specific field should be listed as a distinct goal for political science is mystifying. Is the diffusion of knowledge about international relations on a different and higher plane than knowledge of American government, constitutional law, civil liberties, or political theory? That the Committee does not really believe this is shown by its emphasis upon theory as the core of political science and its insistence that the trend toward separatism in political science departments be checked. Nonetheless, the Committee strikes a blow for separatism by treating international relations as a unique discipline.

*Techniques of evaluation.* The Committee takes political scientists to task for failing to provide students with the tools for appraising and evaluating the teacher. But by failing to publish the data upon which its own conclusions are based, the Committee is guilty of a similar offense. An appendix to the Report would have been appropriate, containing, at a minimum, a copy of the questionnaire and letter of inquiry sent out by the Committee, a compilation of the responses received, and records of the field trips taken by individual committee members.

*Field work.* Despite emphasis upon first-hand observation of governmental processes and participation in political activities by undergraduate students, the Report makes no equivalent recommendation for graduate students. Since, however, as the Report contends, graduate students constitute the reservoir of future teachers, and since teachers provide the motivation for students, the graduate curriculum ought to include a reasonable amount of similar field work.

*Citizenship.* The Committee leaves the reader exhausted and confounded by its uneven reaction to the Reed Report of 1950. Entitled an "Evaluation of Citizenship Training and Incentive in American Colleges and Universities," the Reed Report was made to New York University's Citizenship Clearing House and indicted political scientists for allegedly failing to prepare students "for actual participation in politics." The Reed Report maintained that, as part of the introductory course, students should observe their government in action, join political parties, and take part in political campaigns. The instructors, too, were urged to be active in politics, but to avoid becoming "offensive partisans."

In its chapter on citizenship training the Committee declares that, while we could do a better job of training students for participation in politics, "we are doubtful whether the particular emphasis given citizenship training by these investigators is most conducive to the best results in the long run if it should fail to balance along with it other emphases which seem to us equally important." The term "citizenship," in the eyes of the Committee, not only is a political concept but is also broadly cultural, "meaning all of men's relationships and adjustments to his fellow creatures and to his physical environment." Accordingly, the Committee calls, in this chapter (2), for a balance in curriculum planning between practical political training and speculative study.

The Reed Report is discussed again in Chapter 7, however, and this time the Committee takes a different view. In Chapter 2 the Committee says, "We do have to conclude, however, on the basis of our own field investigations that more of the sort of thing the Reed study is interested in emphasizing actually takes place, than that report would seem to convey"; whereas in Chapter 7 one reads, "The paucity of student participation deplored in the Reed Report is confirmed in the replies to the Committee's questionnaire. Few departments provide participation experiences, and the opportunities afforded are limited to a narrow range of rather unimaginative projects."

In Chapter 7 the view of citizenship as "broadly cultural" is discarded toward the end of the chapter in favor of the Reed Report's "exclusively political" conception. As late as page 203, the multi-faceted objectives proposed by the Wilcox Committee in 1947, and more recently by the Committee on Standards of the Southern Political Science Association, are hailed as "an effective answer to the critics of the beginning course." Suddenly, on page 205, this stand is reversed; we are accused of harboring a "hodgepodge of objectives" which "expose the beginning course to unanswerable attacks."

It would appear that Chapter 7, dealing with the introductory course, was based on responses to the questionnaire; while the conclusions of Chapter 2, on citizenship training, were probably supplemented and modified by the field studies. In any event, the editorial oversights and "split personality" revealed by these aspects of the Report materially weaken the Committee's contribution.

*Cooperation with general university objectives.* Although the Committee calls for "closer cooperation with general university objectives in the direction of general education," it fails itself to provide such cooperation. The Report might have had greater unity and coherence if the Committee had followed its own advice and, at the outset, considered the teaching role of the political science department within the larger context of the teaching role of the university.

All of our schools, from the kindergarten to the college, play a part in developing, observing, and testing the patterns of thought and behavior that are conducive to democratic society. But the unique contribution of the university lies in enabling the student to study and to live with instructors and fellow students from different backgrounds. In the light of his past training, his current studies, and his class, dormitory, and washroom discussions, the student can begin to formulate and to test the norms that condition his set of values. It is the task of the university—through its curriculum, its field work program, its staff of instructors and administrators, and its utilization of buildings and grounds—to provide the proper environment for the formulation and testing of those norms. The student learns to understand himself, his fellow human beings, and the physical, social, and political aspects of his own and other societies. He also learns to understand—not accepting as immutable all that he learns—how better to determine the changes that are desirable; how to choose from the desirable changes, those that are possible; and how, from the possible changes, to select those that can be instituted with optimum ease and success.

The political science department provides one segment of that experience. It does not seek to train precinct captains, party workers, or government employees *per se.* As part of the university, it seeks to develop in those who may later choose to become precinct captains, party workers, government employees—and in all others as well—the mental processes, value concepts, and technical skills that will help them to contribute to their own fulfillment as individuals and to their society.

Developing mental processes and value concepts is a task for teachers as distinguished from lecturers. While the Committee's recommendation of annual APSA awards for distinguished teaching is worthwhile, it is far from sufficient. So long as the lecture process—with its concomitant emphasis upon student skills in stenography and regurgitation—remains the predominant means of undergraduate instruction, the contribution of political science to mental processes and value concepts will remain at its submerged minimum. Far more than it needs motion pictures, recordings, or trips to council meetings and firehouses, the political science profession needs teachers. The feelings expressed about the lecture system by Cardinal Newman in 1852 are even more applicable today: "How much better it is to eschew the College and the University altogether than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a mockery so contumelious."

The technical skills imparted by the political science department center upon politics: the nature, basis, scope, theories, dynamics, processes, and structures of political power. One cannot disagree with the Committee's assertion that "political science possesses a logical and practical reason for being considered a separate entity," but one can wish that the Committee had left a more distinct picture of political science as a discipline. For example, what can we expect a political science major to know by the time he receives his bachelor's degree? The establishment and acceptance of minimum standards—not simply in terms of numbers of units but in terms of specific courses—is crucial to our status as a profession. Furthermore, uniform undergraduate standards are essential to the revitalization of graduate programs. Instead of setting down mollifying generalities about the objectives of curriculum building and superficial summaries of departmental requirements, the Committee could better have proposed sets of specific standards for the profession. As an alternative, it could at least have tested and evaluated reactions to prior proposals, like that of Landon Rockwell.[1]

As an additional consequence of its failure to consider "general university objectives in the direction of general education," the Committee overlooks several basic questions of interrelation in its discussions of the introductory course, the integrated social science course, and cooperation with secondary schools. Should the political science curriculum, for example, be altered in deference to the patterns and content of secondary-school social science courses? To what extent does the integrated social science course overlap the introductory political science course? And, consequently, should the introductory political science course be altered or abandoned where integrated social science courses are required?

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[1] "Toward a More Integrated Political Science Curriculum," this REVIEW, Vol. 41, pp. 314–320 (April, 1947).

The question "When to teach?" is just as important as "What to teach?" Few will deny the contribution of political theory or of practical training in politics to the development of the student. But there is considerable argument over *when* these studies can best be undertaken. The Committee throws no light on this subject. The Reed Report claimed that practical training in politics should begin with the introductory course; Harvard begins the formal study of theory with the introductory course; we at Berkeley believe that neither practical training in politics nor formal theory can be of value to the student until he has acquired a frame of reference from the knowledge of institutions, processes, and structures. A comprehensive discussion and analysis of "when to teach the course" was called for by the objectives of the Report. Having been neglected at this stage, such an investigation is sorely needed in the immediate future.

A member of the Committee who was present at the Association's Convention in San Francisco asserted that the Report was a "photograph" of the political science profession as of 1951. A delegate, not a member of the Committee, retorted that the inadequacies and distortions of the Report made it a "passport photo." What is most significant is not the accuracy of the "photograph" but the fact that the Committee was not assigned the passive role of photographer in the first place. Its task was an active one: in the Committee's own words, "to discover means of improving the teaching of political science." As a whole—despite several worthwhile suggestions, which were pointed out earlier—the "means" discovered by the Committee are abstruse and/or inconsistent to a degree that makes the result hardly worthy of four years of effort.

One may hope that in the future the Committee will be more consistent in adhering to its objectives, will facilitate evaluation by publishing records of the substance and processes of its research, and, above all, will begin to offer specific proposals of minimum standards relating to what to teach and when and how to teach it.

### WALTER H. C. LAVES

*Mutual Security Agency*

One of the characteristics of a free society is the leadership afforded by voluntary associations to its members in terms of standards, qualifications and professional ethics. Through the publication of the Report of its Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, the American Political Science Association has shown an awareness of its responsibility and has taken an important step toward raising the standards of political science teaching and toward strengthening, therefore, the democratic foundations of American society. The Report, however, is only a first exploratory step, and the substantive job still lies ahead of the Association.

The Report may be considered as a first reaction from a group of consulting physicians making a periodic check-up on the apparent state of the body, and in this respect it should be read in comparison with the reports of previous committees of the Association. It is also in a sense a snapshot photo of the teaching of political science today. Unfortunately, its similarity to a passport photograph clearly cannot be blamed solely on connivance between the camera and the photographer!

The Report takes on special significance when viewed in a broader setting than merely American political science. In terms of the major world ideological conflict between freedom and its several alternatives, including Communism, this Report gives some indication of the contribution now being made by institutions of higher learning in the United States toward developing intelligent citizenship and imaginative leadership. The world position of the United States gives special cause for concern over any apparent inadequacies of the job political scientists are doing.

In terms of the somewhat more limited framework of the free world and its efforts to strengthen its own ideological foundation, the status of American political science is again highly important. A recent volume published by UNESCO[1] shows immediately the preferred position which American political scientists have enjoyed in terms of opportunity and resources. By the same token, it reveals the role of world leadership within the profession that has fallen to us, and the worldwide consequences of failure to move vigorously forward in building stronger foundations for democratic society through adequate political science teaching.

The development of an International Political Science Association under the auspices of UNESCO provides an extraordinary opportunity for international professional collaboration from which all, including American political scientists, can profit greatly. Although the role of political science inevitably differs according to the educational and cultural backgrounds of different countries, the International Political Science Association will provide a special chance for men to work out, with professional colleagues in the countries of the free world, ways of promoting greater political literacy and gaining support for the ideology of freedom. In this respect, it will behoove the American Political Science Association to give special attention and cooperation to the study of political science teaching now being undertaken by an international committee under the auspices of the International Political Science Association.

Looked at in the perspective of the short history of political science in the United States and the brief years of experience of the American Political Science Association, the Report can give hope, while it shows that there are still great weaknesses to be overcome. Within this short history, political science has become a recognized profession which is incorporated in the curriculum of most reputable institutions of higher learning. Concentration upon particular areas for research and teaching affords intensive and sometimes specialized professional training for students at the undergraduate and graduate levels. There is a steady flow of the products of this teaching and training into secondary schools, into both national and international public life, into college and university teaching, and, of course, into the citizenry of our country and of the world at large.

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[1] *Contemporary Political Science* (New York, 1950).

No political scientist, however, can feel happy over this Report, except as it may lead to positive action by the Association to rectify the very serious weaknesses it reveals.

Although it is called *"Goals" for Political Science*, the Report's most significant revelation is the lack of clear goals in the teaching of political science. From this flows in large part the absence of agreed professional standards both in training and in teaching, the multiplicity of approaches to teaching, the heavy reliance in many places upon a few rather rigid, often unimaginative and narrowly conceived basic textbooks, the general lack of professional concern with effective teaching standards, and the continued unavailability to many institutions and students of adequate teaching materials. To the lack of clarity regarding goals may also be ascribed much of the splintering of attention in teaching and in preparation for teaching, as well as the continued inadequacies of efforts to give political science teaching the broader setting provided by the other social sciences and without which political science must be mechanical, formal and unreal.

The absence of agreed goals for teaching has made impossible any real evaluation of the status of political science teaching in this Report. The principal weakness of the Report itself is, therefore, but a reflection of the weakness of political science teaching at this date and of the essentially unimportant role it still plays in education at the college and university level. These two things are interrelated. They are both related in turn to the power position of political science in most college and university faculties.

The time would seem to be here, as the members of the Association respond to the shock of this Report, for a major inquiry into the goals and purposes of political science teaching in American colleges and universities. Such an inquiry undertaken by leaders of our profession, receiving help from other fields of knowledge, including particularly psychology, could serve at least to raise our sights from courses, credits, textbooks, job preparation, fields of concentration, and job security, to the more important issue of what it is that political science can and should contribute. If such an inquiry should reveal agreement that, among other things, the goals of political science teaching include the substantial raising of standards of political literacy among the rank and file of our citizenry, it should not be difficult to determine fairly objectively what the earmarks of political literacy are and then to decide by what means this higher political literacy can be attained.

Today an extraordinary amount of guesswork, personal prejudice and highly personal judgment is allowed to determine what is contained in courses of political science. What the goals are and what kind of teaching methods and materials will attain these goals, are issues so far largely reserved to the free enterprise of the individual political scientist. Curious factors result in this situation, including, for example, the continued teaching of international relations as an independent subject, usually unrelated to basic introductory political science and usually reserved to a more selected group of students,[2] with the result that its place in the curriculum tends to confirm the impression of the student that international relations are not a part of total and basic social and political relations today. But the profession is judged by the individual political scientist's choices and the political literacy of our nation by the important consequences for world affairs. An inquiry in the name of the Association, of the kind suggested above, could directly affect the place of political science in the curricula of colleges and universities. In the meantime, most college graduates have not been exposed to any political science, and the politically illiterate portion of our population seems steadily to increase.

An important phase of an inquiry by the Association should be to see whether polling techniques such as those of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan can help us find methods of teaching which will have more lasting effect. There is a clear difference between verbal commitment to ideas and a motivational commitment. This is another way of distinguishing rational from nonrational influences upon decisions and choices. How can our political science teaching be improved so that decisions on public questions will be made by the citizen with some regard for the knowledge he gained in his political science education?

Speakers and others present at the round table on *Goals for Political Science* held at the recent San Francisco Conference of the American Political Science Association, showed a healthy concern not only over what the Report revealed but also over the situation faced by most teachers, particularly of the beginning course. There were many general echoes of the fears expressed by Peter Odegard in his presidential address about the overspecialization that is manifest whenever political scientists get together, and about the narrow-gauge training of political scientists. But there were also a number of specific requests for action by the American Political Science Association that should be given careful attention now by the Executive Council. Among these was the suggestion that some easy means should be found whereby, at a work-aday level, communication about techniques, courses, content, materials, etc., can be quickly circulated back and forth among the members of our profession. The Association might borrow here from the experience of UNESCO in its clearing house facilities, and set up such a service. Another suggestion was the immediate creation of a committee to formulate a concrete suggestion for the reform of the introductory political science course, this suggestion to be the subject of an intensive discussion in several sessions at the next annual convention in 1952. Several members of the round table were particularly worried over the continuing lack of contact between college and university political scientists and secondary school social studies teachers, and the apparent absence of interest by political scientists in the content of social study teaching. Training in attitudes in respect to both domestic and international affairs seemed to be a matter of great importance to several members in the course of the the discussion, and particularly attitudes that permit a realistic participation by the citizen after he has completed his education. To some participants it would be useful to secure the advice of persons who employ those trained in political science, to find out whether the content of our courses is what it should be to provide the training for political scientists who go into jobs other than teaching. It was particularly apparent, throughout the discussions, that the beginning course still needed to be rethought in terms of whether it was to be an introduction to political science or an introduction to American government. Such considerations go to the heart of the problem of citizenship training and of the kind of training that is most effective. Finally, it was suggested that the Association extract from the Report, as printed, the positive recommendations made by the committee and that these be circulated immediately to all members of the profession as a check list and as a first step toward a reëvaluation of their work in the field of political science.

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[2] The Brookings Institute has been making special efforts toward improving both the scope and materials of international relations teaching. See also the Report of the International Relations Committee of the APSA, submitted at San Francisco, 1951.

Considering both the potential importance of political science teaching to the successful functioning of the democratic system and also the Association's inevitable concern with professional qualifications, it seems hardly possible for the Association to neglect doing something to rectify the conditions which this Report reveals. Possible action clearly poses the question of how far the Association can go toward outlining in detail the goals, scope and method of teaching. For behind the teaching profession lies a long tradition, dating back at least to mediaeval times, that puts the teachers of higher education in a unique position of independence with respect to the content and method of their teaching. Whatever may be the justification for the continuation of this free position of teachers in other fields, it is becoming clear that the teachers of political science carry a responsibility so intimately related to the maintenance and development of a nation's political ideology and to its social-political evolution that the society has a special cause for being concerned about the adequacy and quality of that teaching. In a free society, no doubt that concern can best be expressed through professional and voluntary devices and institutions. If these methods fail, it is likely that resort to controls of an involuntary and public character will follow. Indeed, a failure of the political science profession itself to face the issues may well become a cause in furthering the growth of public sentiment for such controls over teaching the foundation and characteristics of our political order. An undisciplined and unenlightened freedom of intellectual enterprise may thus easily succumb to most disastrous and unenlightened public controls.

This Report on *Goals for Political Science* is a necessary beginning, but it cannot be considered as being anything more, in terms of the task of the APSA in improving the content and standards of political science teaching. In the perspective of the developing American democracy and of the broader free world and United Nations community, it is essential that positive steps be taken to make more solid the foundation of political literacy upon which democracy and peace in large measure depend.

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The surveys made by the American Political Science Association from time to time into the teaching of political science in the United States are helpful not only to members of the Association but also to political scientists in other countries. They enable them to see their own problems more clearly against the background of American experience.

The recent Report published under the title of *Goals for Political Science* is of special interest in view of the investigation which has been set on foot by the International Political Science Association into the teaching of political science in eight selected countries. This investigation is sponsored by UNESCO as part of a broader inquiry into the teaching of the social sciences. Professor Marshall Dimock is the national *rapporteur* for the United States, and I am the *rapporteur-general.* In responding to the invitation of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW to comment on "Goals for Political Science," however, I am doing so only in my personal capacity.

Political science is taught more widely in the United States than in any other country in the world. Indeed, the subject is probably taught to a greater extent in the United States than in all the other countries of the world combined. Moreover, political science enjoys in America a more clearly defined status in the university organisation and a more firmly established position in the academic curricula than in most countries. The independence of political science in America, as elsewhere, is nevertheless threatened by vast secular forces of which no mention is made in this report. I refer to the challenge to academic freedom and liberal traditions arising from the conflict between East and West. The resulting tension is especially marked in the United States, and it is bound to focus largely on political science teaching, since the great debate of our time is primarily a political question, and only in a secondary sense economic, religious, or ethical.

The omission is strange in view of the emphasis given by the Report to education for citizenship as one of the goals of political science. "We could inspire students to become better citizens without trying to indoctrinate them or without preaching at them," declares the Report (p. 42). That statement is true, but its possibility of attainment can be gauged only if an attempt is made to consider the tendentious pressures which are likely to be brought on the political science teacher if the present state of public opinion continues. Clinton L. Rossiter of Cornell University is quoted as including among the characteristics of "the Good Democratic Citizen" the acceptance of responsibility for "the maintenance and improvement of a competitive economic system assisted and regulated when necessary by governmental action," and acceptance of the basic idea that in a democracy the majority has the right to make decisions under the Constitution. A deliberate attempt to inculcate citizenship by means of doctrinal teaching of this kind might become an instrument of established interests and the negation of the intellectual freedom we seek to preserve.

Education for the public service is another of the goals of political science teaching which is discussed at length in a chapter containing much wisdom and insight. The Committee's findings and conclusions on this question will command widespread assent, but it is unfortunate that "training" and "education" for the public service appear to be used as though they were synonymous. They are, or should be, quite different. Education for the public service deals with principles and problems, mainly in the social sciences; whereas training is concerned with vocational techniques and methods. Education in this sense is clearly a task for the university. I doubt whether the same can be said of training, despite the many ingenious devices which are introduced to aid both teacher and student in connection with training programs.

I agree entirely with the Committee's views on the regrettable tendency to narrow the meaning of public administration; on the undesirability of permitting political science to break up into a number of fragments devoid of any overriding unity; and on regarding political theory as the quintessential core of the subject. I wish, however, that the Committee had dealt also with the effect of textbooks on students and teachers. It is a question of great importance which needs attention.

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In making these notes brief I risk suggesting greater dogmatism than I intend.

1. What is the major premise of the authors of this Report? What should a university attempt to do? I suspect that if an introductory chapter had sought answers to these questions, the Report would have been cast along different lines.

The major premise I have long accepted has two parts: (1) It assents to Edmund Burke's view that the aim of a university (or education) is to make available "the general bank and capital of nations and of ages"; and (2) it adds that a university should cultivate scepticism and clearheadedness.

Such a premise is not novel. It was Cardinal Newman's: "[A university should assist a man in obtaining] a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, truth in developing them, eloquence in expressing them, and force in urging them." It was Charles W. Eliot's: "The worthy fruit of academic culture is an open mind trained to careful thinking, instructed in the methods of philosophic investigation, acquainted in a general way with the accumulated thought of past generations, and penetrated with humility." The Harvard Committee of a few years ago did no more than echo President Eliot: "To think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, and to discriminate among values."

If the draftsmen of this Report had had some such premise constantly in mind, they would, I think, have been far more severe on the proliferation of political science courses and the severely factual content of many of them. It might have been better also if they had pondered a statement by the late

Professor A. N. Whitehead. He expressed his conviction, "based on no confusing research [*sic*], that as a training in political imagination the Harvard School of Politics and Government cannot hold a candle to the old-fashioned English classical education of half a century ago."

2. "Education for Citizenship?" Well, the major premises listed above—particularly the Harvard Committee's—suggest, by indirection at least, that a university should help men and women to be better citizens. But I venture to doubt whether the generality of students who take courses in political science are more inclined toward good citizenship than the generality of students who do not take such courses. This Republic, it should be remembered, had a patriotic and energetic citizenry in the days when, outside the law schools, there were no courses in political science and indeed very few courses in history, which, it was expected, one would read for oneself.

3. I hold that a university ceases to be a university when it trains for the public service. Some years ago I expressed myself at length on this matter, and I shall not repeat the argument here.[1] The argument still seems valid, even though (or the more so because) I did not anticipate that there would be a vastly increased demand for public servants. I add that I do not see any inconsistency in the fact that a part of my teaching is now in a School of International Affairs. This new creation is of chief importance as an administrative agency and as an employment office. It offers no courses that do not have a cultural value. There is no danger of its Director's receiving a complaint similar to that reaching a school teacher in Great Britain. "Don't teach my boy poetry," a mother wrote. "He is going to be a grocer."

4. On undergraduate instruction in political science, I confine myself to two remarks. Save for political theory, the less of it the better. Even though, if my view were generally accepted, there would be fewer job opportunities for my students, I must doubt the wisdom of political science "majors." The undergraduate can spend his time to better advantage. Moreover, when it comes to graduate work in political science, I do not notice that students are handicapped by not having had undergraduate courses. I prefer a student who knows something of the Elizabethan House of Commons to one who is able to discuss closure by compartment.

My second observation is this: undergraduate courses in political science may give intending graduate students some factual knowledge, but every generation is less literate than the previous generation. Allusions which were once familiar to every person with a smattering of education now fall flat. The trouble goes back to the home and mechanical aids for the use of leisure; to high schools which put the intellectual temperature at the lowest common denominator; to colleges which struggle unsuccessfully to help students catch up with lost time. Each year graduate students seem to be less well-read and television has not yet had time to take its toll. In the not too distant future, some lecturer, referring to the Sermon on the Mount, will find that he has no comprehending hearers.

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[1] "Working for the Government," *New Republic*, Vol. 84, pp. 260–263 (Oct. 16, 1935) and Vol. 85, pp. 14–15 (Nov. 13, 1935).

5. The Report discusses the question of foreign languages for graduate students but it says nothing about their ability or inability to use English. It is lamentable but indubitable that every batch of graduate students by and large is unable to express itself as well as its elders could. Even when students can express themselves clearly, few pay attention to the niceties of our language. How many graduate students in political science have ever heard of Fowler's *Dictionary of Modern English Usage?* Do any of them know that it is admirably suited for the bedside table?

6. The Report speaks of political scientists' improving "their plans and their methods of producing leaders for the public service," but is this not a small part of an important whole? What should be the role of the University in training élites? Can courses in political science play any part? The first question worries President Conant, who believes that "we tend to overlook the specially gifted youth. We neither find him early enough, nor guide him properly." Mr. Conant, however, fears that "we are committed to a democratic undifferentiated education as far as possible." Thomas Jefferson would be horrified. His proposal was that boys "of best genius" be taken from local schools and tested in grammar schools, the best to be kept on and the rest dismissed. "By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually, and be instructed at the public expense."

The training of an élite for more than "the public service" might be a "goal" for political science, but it is too large a matter for discussion here. The British have given it extended and intelligent attention since taxation annihilated their political élite and the Government decided to make greatly increased grants for university education. I refer my readers, if any, to some of the literature.[2]

7. Finally, I agree entirely with what the Report says about the need for better fiscal and honorific accolades for stellar teachers and the damaging indifference of graduate faculties to whether their products will be able to teach. When I left the Johns Hopkins University, I was struck by the fact that the professor under whom I had studied used warm terms in recommending me as a teacher when he did not have the faintest idea whether I could handle myself in front of a class of undergraduates. He knew me as a member of his seminar, as the possessor of a certain number of facts, and as the author of some articles

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[2] All of the articles in the *Political Quarterly,* Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct.–Dec., 1944) deal with university education. Particularly acute is the article by Professor Bonamy Dobrée, "Arts' Faculties in Modern Universities," pp. 341–352. Dr. Eric James, the famous High Master of Manchester Grammar School, has recently published a provocative little book, *Education and Leadership* (London, 1951). Sir Walter Moberly's *The Crisis in the University* (London, 1949) should be more widely known in the United States. Virtually unknown is the *Report of the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research,* July, 1946 (Cmd. 6868)— a parliamentary paper deserving of study by all teachers and researchers in the social sciences. If anyone says that in these egalitarian times talk of an élite is out of the question, I refer him to Harold Laski's article, "The Élite in A Democratic Society," *Harper's Magazine,* Vol. 167, pp. 456–464 (Sept., 1933).

in American and English reviews and of a dissertation that was almost ready for the printer.

I was so impressed by his indifference to my jejuneness that I wrote a short article entitled "A Neglected Aspect of Graduate Instruction."[3] I pointed out that medical schools gave clinical training; that law schools had moot courts; and that at theological schools there was practice in preaching. I boldly announced that "this analogy is closest, for both the clergyman and the teacher give the public not what it demands but what is good for it." I suggested that in the graduate school there should be some practice in "oral and extemporaneous discussion of elementary problems" so that the professors might discover "whether the student is able to teach," and his fellow students might report on whether they profited or suffered. I bolstered this proposal by quoting from a recent report by Nicholas Murray Butler to the Trustees of Columbia University: "The youngest of instructors," he said, "is shut up in the classroom with a company of students and left to his own devices. The damage he may do in learning what teaching is all about is frequently irreparable but no older or more experienced head is at hand to counsel and direct him."

I read in the Report under discussion that there are five thousand persons "teaching" political science in the United States. When I recall my tyrociny and when I reflect on those whom we have speeded from the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia—some brilliant and now on the faculties of major league universities; some good and doing useful work in the minor leagues; and some lost in the sticks—and when I ponder the figure five thousand, I am inclined to shudder.[4]

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[3] *The Nation,* Vol. 101, pp. 327–328 (Sept. 9, 1915).

[4] Since the contents of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW are protected by copyright, I disclose an idea with which I have long toyed and which will not lose its merit, if any, when American universities and colleges face the serious financial difficulties that are in prospect. Could universities and colleges learn a lesson from organized baseball? Could there be universities in major leagues and in minor leagues, and colleges which were "farms" for the major institutions, with young instructors serving apprenticeships and with professors being traded in? I once remarked to my friend James T. Shotwell that, if such a system had been in existence when he was younger, a university, in order to get him, would probably have been willing to offer Columbia a Nobel Prize Winner, an associate professor of English, and $10,000. Major league universities would have their talent scouts watching performances in the minor leagues and then draft professors. Before university seasons began, the presidents could take their "teams" to Florida or Puerto Rico and the professors would practice their lectures. The more valuable ones would hold out and demand better contracts. When the season began, the number of professors could not exceed the figure agreed upon. The surplus ones would be "farmed out."

The principal catch I see is that in baseball there are practices known as "obtaining waivers" and "unconditional releases." But the American Association of University Professors should be able to make proposals for the proper modification of these practices. See *Baseball Bluebook, 1951: The Official Administrative Manual of Organized Baseball* (Ft. Wayne, Indiana: Heilbroner, 1951).

# THE FAR EASTERN SCENE

## THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ROLE OF THE BURAKU (HAMLET) IN JAPAN*

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### I

There presently exists in Japan an entire level of socio-political organization practically unknown to Westerners and little studied by the Japanese themselves until recent years. It comprises one of the lowest units of group organization in rural Japan and, in a practical everyday sense, plays a more immediate and important role in the daily lives of a larger proportion of the Japanese people than do any of the more formal and better known units of organization, such as the village, town, *gun* (county) or prefecture. This unit is known as the *buraku*, perhaps best rendered into English as *hamlet.*

A *buraku* is a social, not a geographical, unit of organization. It is essentially a settlement group consisting of the families living and owning land within an area smaller than a village and usually smaller than an *ōaza.* In the coastal plain or river valley sections of Japan the houses constituting such a settlement group are apt to be contiguous and clustered in the midst of, or adjacent to, their owners' fields; in mountain villages they may be far more widely scattered.

A brief explanation of the system of major and minor civil divisions now existing in Japan will perhaps clarify this definition. Legally speaking, the present system of civil divisions rests in large part on the new Local Autonomy Law;[1] in fact, however, it stretches back to April 1, 1889, when the Law on the Organization of Cities, Towns and Villages of the preceding year was put into effect and to May 17, 1890, when the Law on the Organization of Urban and Rural Prefectures and *Gun* (counties) was promulgated. These, plus certain amendments and ancillary laws and ordinances, established the foundations of the present system.

The major civil divisions of Japan immediately subordinate to the national government are the prefectures, variously known in Japanese as *To, Dō, Fu* or *Ken.* Regardless of name, all now have basically equivalent powers. These prefectures are subdivided geographically into cities (*shi*), towns (*chō* or *machi*) and villages (*son* or *mura*). The distinction among these is primarily one of population. All are legal entities and within any one prefecture the sum of their areas equals the total area of that prefecture. Japan lacks the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated areas with which we are familiar. Consequently, Japanese cities, towns and villages differ from our own comparably named settlements mainly in the sense that they are not compactly or contiguously built-up areas. This is, of course, progressively less true of towns and cities than of villages, but, even so, cities are apt to include extensive tracts of distinctly rural land and towns are certain to. These units then—prefectures, cities, towns and villages, in descending order of size and legal importance—constitute the ordinary major and minor civil divisions of contemporary Japan. There formerly existed a further unit known as a *gun*, intermediate in position between towns and villages on the one hand and the prefecture on the other. Though stripped of its legal personality in 1923, the *gun* still continues to exist in popular speech and usage and to serve a variety of administrative and statistical purposes.

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* This article is based primarily on research carried on by the author throughout the year 1950 in Okayama Prefecture, Japan. During most of that period he served as Field Director of the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies and carried on, in cooperation with a number of colleagues, an intensive interdisciplinary study of one agricultural, one fishing and one mountain village located in that prefecture. Consequently, because of the geographical limitations of this research, no claim of nationwide validity is made for the findings embodied in this article, although it is hoped that the cumulative results of the Center for Japanese Studies' research program will ultimately result in generalizations of national scope and significance. The writer would like to express his gratitude to the Social Science Research Council and the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan for the generous support which made this research possible.

[1] Law No. 67 of April 17, 1947.

The village is the lowest regular legal unit of public organization in Japan. Below that, however, one does encounter in rural areas the even smaller units of *ōaza* and *aza* or *koaza.* These now have no legal personality but are essentially units for the registry of land ownership and title, somewhat comparable to our surveyor's townships and sections. In the speech, attitudes and traditions of the peasantry, however, the *ōaza* possess far more importance than is indicated by this legal status. Prior to the Meiji Restoration and the final adoption of the present structure of local government in 1889, *ōaza* were in most cases villages (*mura*) in their own right. They thus constituted the elemental units of legal organization throughout a long and important part of Japanese history. Local tradition, ceremonial practice, shrine allegiance, irrigation systems and many other significant aspects of daily life still tend to focus about the far older *ōaza* units rather than about the more or less artificial conglomerations of *ōaza*—made largely for the sake of achieving a more adequate tax and administrative base—that are the modern villages or towns. The still smaller units known variously as *aza* or *koaza* seem never to have enjoyed a comparable social importance and today serve purely as units for the convenient registry of land titles and boundaries.

Against this background it is possible to describe more clearly the nature of a *buraku.* A typical village in Okayama Prefecture covers some five to fifty square kilometers of territory. Within this there is usually no one dominant or unusually large contiguous settlement corresponding to our idea of a village. Rather are there a considerable number—perhaps from ten to fifty or so, depending on the size and population of the village—of small settlement groups, or hamlets, which are usually quite separate from one another. Their location is determined primarily by the fields owned or tilled by their inhabitants. These are *buraku.* They exist in towns and cities as well as villages, the only difference being that a town or a city invariably has within its boundaries one or more dominant population centers considerably larger, more populous, more commercial or industrial and less rural than the *buraku* which dot the countryside about it and legally form a part of it.

*Buraku*, then, lack legal identity. They are settlement groups composed of a number of family units owning or renting and tilling land in the immediate vicinity of their *buraku*. It is perhaps of particular interest to political scientists to learn further that *buraku* not only have no recognized legal status but are, as organized social units, at present positively illegal. This requires a bit of explanation. As settlement groups, *buraku* extend far back into mediaeval Japanese history. During this older stage of their existence, their organization seems to have been largely of an informal nature. With the outbreak of the Manchurian and China Incidents in the 1930's, however, the national government began to tighten its controls over economic and social life at all levels. In the *buraku* this trend first manifested itself in the field of agriculture with the establishment of the *nōka kumiai* (associations of agricultural households) and later of the *nōji jikō kumiai* (associations for the prosecution of agricultural affairs). By 1940 these had expanded into a net of so-called *burakukai* (literally, *buraku* meetings or assemblies) organized in all the *buraku* of Japan. Each of these possessed a *burakuchō*, or leader, and, in the opinion of the Occupation authorities, served as a vicious, exploitative, national intelligence system; a means of enforcing collective responsibility for, and control over, the activities of individual citizens; and a convenient administrative device for national rationing, requisitioning, financial and morale-building programs. In fact, it seems probable that there is considerably more truth in the objectionable aspects of this accusation when it is limited to the activities of *tonarigumi* (block associations), which were the wartime urban equivalents of the rural *burakukai*. In any event, SCAP did not see fit to make such a distinction, and in January and May, 1947 the Japanese Government, acting at SCAP's behest, abolished and made illegal both the *buraku* and *tonarigumi* systems.[2] *Buraku* still remain under this legal interdiction.

As will later be seen, however, these orders have in fact had little effect on actual practice. *Buraku* continue to exist, to elect or otherwise choose certain *buraku* officials and to perform an astonishing variety of collective functions. Such a pattern of association has been found convenient both by *buraku* inhabitants and, particularly, by the mayors and local government offices of rural Japan. They have, however, taken the precaution of disguising their identity behind such new and misleading names as *chōsakai* (research assembly), *rinji chōsain* (special research personnel), *renrakuin* (liaison personnel), etc.

Having defined *buraku* in the foregoing manner, we may now attempt to arrive at some estimate of their role in Japanese society viewed from the standpoint of population. This must necessarily represent a very crude approximation to the correct figures, since the published vital statistics do not specifically provide this type of information. When carefully weighted, however, for a variety of factors too complex to describe here, these statistics indicate that, of the present population of over 84,000,000, a minimum of 40 to 50 per cent—33,600,000 to 42,000,000—probably reside in *buraku.*[3] The writer is inclined to place the figure in the neighborhood of 50 per cent because of continued housing, food and employment shortages in the cities and the large proportion of repatriates and others obliged thereby to return to the family farms. Such an estimate by itself is impressive enough. Even this figure, however, is a poor reflection of the actual cultural position and influence of the *buraku* in contemporary Japanese life. One must remember that the process of urbanization in Japan has been both recent and rapid in terms of the residence of the majority of the population. A very high proportion of present city dwellers were themselves born and brought up in the countryside and have lived in and been influenced by the *buraku* pattern of living and thinking. The writer's calculations indicate that *buraku* dwellers probably comprised some 48 per cent of the population in 1935, 52 per cent in 1930, 55.9 per cent in 1925 and 59.9 per cent in 1920, the date of the first modern-type census.

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[2] Home Ministry Instruction No. 4 of January 22, 1947, and Cabinet Order No. 15 of May 3, 1947.

A minority of Japan's present adult population are, then, city-born and bred. A significant proportion came from towns, it is true, but the real common cultural denominator of at least some sixty per cent, and probably appreciably more, of living adult Japanese is to be found in the *buraku.* A social unit of such statistical predominance certainly merits extensive examination by all social scientists. There is a high degree of probability to the hypothesis that research at this level will shed new and important light on the political, economic and social attitudes and behavior of the Japanese people.

## II

Against this background we may now proceed to an examination of the internal organization, functions, external relations and political importance of *buraku.* Within the writer's experience, the organizational pattern of *buraku* tends to vary considerably in terms of officials, the manner of their selection, frequency of assembly meetings, etc. But one factor remains basic and constant: the prime constituent element of all *buraku* so far encountered is the family; individuals have only a secondary significance. This is a fact of fundamental importance. *Buraku* may or may not represent an extended family—in practice it is difficult to ascertain the older relationships because of the peasants' lack of surnames prior to the Restoration—but in either case they are usually organized into households composed of members of two or three lineally related generations. The number of such households is the common index of the size of a *buraku;* its members in conversation obviously think of *buraku* as composed of such and such a number of families. A count of individuals takes considerably more reflection. The life and daily activities of each member of a *buraku* are carried on with primary reference to his or her family unit. Children are born into families of a particular local social and economic status. To a large extent their treatment and role within and outside of that household are conditioned by their sex, order of birth and position in the family hierarchy. Their expectations of education beyond the compulsory level, marriage and employment are essentially dependent on family rather than individual considerations. They are reared in a tradition of honor and obedience to family superiors and of primary regard for the interest and preservation of the family. Land, property and social authority in the countryside are still concentrated in the hands of the household heads. The tiny farms which provide their livings are worked cooperatively by the family group. In such ways as these, the *buraku* preserves in relative vigor and strength many of the traits and relationships of Old Japan, the most important of which is the traditional family system. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the family also serves as the basic unit of representation within the *buraku*. Any other system would be highly abnormal, given the existing conditions of daily life in rural Japan.

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[3] These computations are based on figures given by Tōkei Iinkai Jimukyoku, Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku, *Nihon tōkei nenkan, 1949* [Statistical Yearbook of Japan, 1949], (Tōkyō Tōkei Kyōkai, 1949), pp. 56–57. Comparable and reliable figures for a more recent date will not become available until the detailed results of the census of October, 1950, are published.

Of course, the degree of stability and traditionalism of this family base can readily be overstated. Even before the war the old order was under attack and signs of slow change had been apparent for some time. The war, the Occupation, economic unrest and hard times, increasing urbanization, SCAP-sponsored legal changes (such as those in the new Civil Code altering the position of household heads, abolishing primogeniture and granting equal rights of inheritance to all children), the relative moral laxness of postwar days and numerous similar factors have combined to facilitate and hasten the processes of basic social change, particularly in the cities. Everywhere the older people are aware of this and complain of the unrest, disobedience and subversive views and practices of the younger generation. Even so, however, the astonishing thing is the strength and persistence of the patterns of stability and traditional organization. Changes are in process, but they come piecemeal and very slowly. Such change or progress is best measured in terms of generations, not the brief six years of Occupation.

Proceeding, then, from the family base to an examination of other patterns of organization now existing in *buraku*, it is found that they all possess some type of assembly. Meetings are irregular and highly informal. They take place whenever there is a sufficient accumulation of collective business to necessitate a gathering. Such occasions may develop once or twice a month or only once every several months, depending on the habits and circumstances of the particular *buraku*. They are almost invariably held at night in the *kokaidō*, or *buraku* meeting hall, if the *buraku* has one, or if not, by rotation in various homes.

Membership in these assemblies is based on household units. Each family has a single vote in the decision of *buraku* business. In so far as there exists any recognized theory of representation governing these bodies, it is considered proper that each household should be represented by its head. Frequently, however, the head of the family will not care to attend meetings—they are generally considered very dull—and some other member of the family, a son, wife, or daughter, will go in his stead. It is noteworthy that such a system maximizes the role and importance of the family and minimizes that of the individual.

Membership in a given *buraku* is now usually quite stable. This fact is primarily due to the very small size of Japanese farms, especially since the postwar land reform. Practically all arable land is in use and it is almost impossible to divide further the average existing farm and still retain a viable economic unit. Consequently, the number of farms and farm households in a given *buraku* tends to remain fairly constant, though there are shifts among the merchant and non-farmer populace. The general rule is that all households in a *buraku* are members of the *buraku* association. Membership is no longer compulsory, but such is the cohesiveness of rural society that it is very unusual to find families which do not belong and actively cooperate in the conduct of collective business.

The manner of arriving at decisions at *buraku* meetings is quite different from that to which we are accustomed. The traditional means of taking group decisions in Japan is by the joint technique of recommendation (*suisen*) and consensus. In rural areas this practice still flourishes, as indeed it does at every level including the national government itself. The writer has observed its operation with fascination in both *buraku* and village assembly meetings, as well as in a variety of less formal contexts. The chairman or presiding member will announce some item for consideration. Following a certain—and not infrequently exhaustive—amount of discussion, one of two things will happen. Either the chair, without a vote and often without any overt statement of individual stands on the part of the other participants as far as an outsider can see, will announce the consensus of the group; or some member will make a positive recommendation as to the course which should be followed, and the chair will then announce the adoption of that recommendation in the absence of objection. In neither case has the writer ever seen any member of such a group at the local level forthrightly proclaim his disagreement with such an announced consensus, though he knows of a number of cases where various members in fact dissented strongly from this consensus. Japanese concepts of propriety place a very heavy premium on at least the appearance of conformity in almost all social and public contexts. It is a very serious matter in most situations, particularly in rural areas, to oppose openly a publicly declared course of action or consensus. While not considered immoral, such an action would be viewed as improper and radical—which can be worse in a tradition-based society. In a personal sense, it would raise immediately the question of the "face" of the individual whose recommendation was thus challenged; in a larger sense, it would publicly acknowledge the existence of a serious rift in the solidarity of a group which attaches extraordinary importance to the outward preservation of a common and undifferentiated front. It is obvious that neither of the above processes has much in common with the use of the open or secret ballot in the West. Both place a premium on conformity; they weight meetings and decisions in favor of conservative and accepted courses of action; they give great power to the individual presiding, who is generally a respected elder and/or a socially conservative man; and they require an open, positive and extraordinarily courageous stand by anyone who would oppose the recommended decision.

The Japanese are quite familiar with occidental voting techniques. Indeed, they use them in public elections, in the national Diet and a few other contexts. In reporting that they seem to prefer the older and more familiar methods of recommendation and consensus, the writer does not wish to convey the impression, however, that these older techniques offer more facile solutions or indicate any monolithic quality to Japanese opinion in rural areas. They represent essentially a highly developed instrument for the attainment of compromise. They can be used for the "railroading" of decisions, but more frequently the writer has seen them used in such a manner as to produce endless indirect discussion which gradually clarifies—to the adept—the areas of agreement and disagreement and ultimately suggests an acceptable compromise solution. It should also be noted that the securing of such a consensus by no means guarantees the loyal support of all participants for the decision taken. As is common in societies placing such importance on the appearance of unanimity, the arena of conflict is often simply removed from the floor of the meeting to less conspicuous channels, where bitter secret opposition and sabotage are quite possible.

It remains to consider the matters to which the *buraku* assemblies apply these techniques of decision. What are the functions of these assemblies? In a formal sense they are very simple and of narrowly local significance. Their most important function is probably the selection of certain *buraku* officers—primarily a headman and vice-headman. This selection is usually made by secret ballot, the only instance of the use of this technique at the *buraku* level encountered by the writer. In addition, they discuss and make recommendations or reach decisions on such matters as requests for the reassessment of the productivity index of land owned by members; the repair of local roads, bridges and irrigation systems; minor reclamation projects; the collective purchase of prize goods made available by the government as a reward for the fulfillment of crop quotas; the time to carry out the collective spring housecleaning; the date and arrangements for certain religious or traditional holidays; the holding of collective entertainments such as *naniwabushi* recitals; and a variety of other matters of local concern. Usually, however, they meet in order to learn from the headman about announcements or programs which the village office wants to call to their attention. These are a sampling of functions performed by various *buraku*. Actual lists would vary widely, depending on the circumstances and customs of the particular *buraku* concerned.

Most of the collective business of a *buraku* is transacted by its officers, and particularly by its headman. As already mentioned, the latter is an elective official usually chosen by secret ballot for a term of one or two years. Quite frequently, if he or they can be prevailed upon to serve, the same man or a limited number of men in rotation will be reëlected to the office many times.

It should be noted that the office is often not a welcome one. It takes time which many farmers can ill afford to give, and it obliges its occupant to initiate or make public recommendations which are certain to incur the ill will of at least some members of the *buraku.* For this reason, although recognized as an honor and a mark of general confidence, the post of headman is generally assumed with some genuine reluctance. By our notions, however, the headman's responsiblitities are not onerous. He appoints for limited terms certain other *buraku* officials, such as a treasurer, purchasing agent, field guards or irrigation-system tenders. He presides at meetings of the *buraku* assembly. He is responsible for planning and making recommendations in respect to certain aspects of the crop-requisitioning program. He represents the *buraku* in a ceremonial or collective capacity on the few occasions when such services are necessary. He formally informs the people of births, deaths and accidents within the community and may take the lead in any collective actions made necessary by these. But by far his most important and time-consuming function is liaison with the village office. One of the principal reasons moving the national government to establish the *buraku* on a legal basis in 1940 was the administrative utility of having definite headmen in every community responsible for communicating to the people information about all relevant official programs. Village and town mayors and officers still find them extremely useful for the same purposes, especially in relation to the continuous complexities and troubles of the tax, rationing and crop-requisitioning systems. Consequently, headmen are obliged to walk or bicycle to the village office with some frequency to listen to the explanation of new regulations or programs, and then to return and explain these to the families of their *buraku.*

Under present circumstances, it is highly incorrect to regard these headmen as petty tyrants or corrupt and grasping bosses. In the first place, they have practically no formal authority. In the second place, the collective decisions and actions of *buraku,* while they may be initiated by the headman, are usually the product of extensive group discussion and some kind of consensus. Headmen tend to function as group representatives and liaison officers. Their formal leadership functions are relatively negligible.

The roles of the remaining type of officers do not require extended comment. The vice-headman (*fukukumiaichō*) plays a significant part only in the absence or illness of the headman. His office is elective for the same term as the headman. The treasurer (*kaikeikakari*) is usually appointed by the headman. He collects two or three times a year the small payments made by every household to defray the *buraku's* collective expenses, e.g., for joint entertainments, lighting and equipment for the public meeting hall, etc., and receives and records the contributions which families traditionally make on such felicitous occasions as marriages or the birth of a son. Some *buraku* also appoint several purchasing agents (*kōhankakari*), responsible for obtaining rationed incentive, or prize, goods made available by the government to *buraku* fulfilling their crop delivery quotas and for several other matters in connection with the crop-requisitioning system. There may also be other officers responsible for the management of the local irrigation facilities or the inspection of roads and bridges.

Attention has been directed so far to the internal structure and functions of *buraku*. They also have external connections of some interest and importance, which exist between *buraku* and the *ōaza* within which they are situated and between *buraku* and the village. The latter are of far greater contemporary importance.

At the present time *buraku* relations with the *ōaza* in which they are situated are apt to be relatively few. Irrigation is undoubtedly the most important link binding them together. The irrigation systems in most of rural Japan are centuries old; that is, they originated long before the present units of local government were established in 1889. Consequently, most of these systems were organized on the basis of the pre-Restoration rather than the post-Restoration system of villages. Since the *ōaza* very often were villages at that time, the irrigation systems became associated with them and the connection has continued. Today one often finds the *ōaza* used as a local tax and labor unit for the support and maintenance of a multi-village irrigation system, and the several *buraku* of each *ōaza* function as subordinate units within the system. *Buraku* and *ōaza* may also be associated through such groups as local fire brigades, the P.T.A., or youth groups which may be organized on an *ōaza* rather than village basis. In most instances, however, the traditional and sentimental ties binding a *buraku* to the *ōaza* are more important than the above types of administrative connection. In point of time the semi-feudal past is very close to the present in Japan. The Restoration occurred only eighty-three years ago, and the peasants, still tilling the same soil and often living in the same houses as their pre-Meiji forebears did, are quite conscious of their close connection with the local institutions and traditions of those former days. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the local legends, traditions, religious ceremonies, shrines, patterns of family status, etc., are still more intimately connected with the *ōaza*, i.e., the villages of the Tokugawa period, than with the modern villages.

From a purely political viewpoint, though, the present connections between *buraku* and village are undoubtedly more important. It has already been pointed out that the government's reason for establishing the *buraku* on a nationwide legal basis in 1940 was primarily the administrative convenience of thus acquiring clear channels of control, information and responsibility from Tōkyō direct to the smallest hamlets in Japan. Since the war they have, from the national, prefectural and village standpoint, proved equally convenient as points of contact at the lowest level for the dissemination of information about, and the securing of compliance with, the never-ending stream of legislation, reforms, educational and social programs, etc., flowing from SCAP down through the channels of the government. These postwar years have been characterized by relative economic and social chaos in Japan and have, at the Occupation's behest, given rise to a peculiarly bifurcated and partially contradictory attempt to decentralize radically the structure and operations of government and, at the same time, to put into effect nationwide economic and financial programs of the complexity and dimensions of the rationing and crop-requisitioning systems. The *buraku* have constituted the rural administrative termini of both these latter systems and have been most useful to the harassed village officials. Connections of this sort make up the chief administrative relationships between *buraku* and village.

The broader relations between *buraku* and village are, however, of greater interest and importance. These have little to do with technical administration but a great deal to do with politics in the wider and more practical sense. To understand politics at the village level in Japan, one must keep in mind several fundamental facts. First, a village is in no wise a monolithic structure. In a socio-political sense it is composed of a number of *buraku,* in practice usually anywhere from six to fifty. Secondly, for local political purposes these *buraku* usually tend to function as quite cohesive units. Thirdly, sometimes reinforcing but sometimes weakening this unified functioning, family bonds are more important than *buraku* bonds in controlling political attitudes and behavior. And finally, Japanese society is so organized as to confer great prestige and considerable practical authority, usable for political as well as other ends, on persons possessed of no official position or status. The following discussion indicates how these factors work out in practice.

Under the postwar system, all members of village, town and city assemblies and all mayors of such jurisdictions are popularly elected. In rural areas campaigns for assembly seats are waged primarily along *buraku* lines and secondarily along family lines. To a slightly smaller degree, the same is true of mayoralty campaigns. All *buraku* are anxious to place at least one of their own members in the village assembly, there to represent their interests in respect to the apportionment of local taxes, appropriations for the maintenance, repair or extension of irrigation systems and roads, remission or reduction of crop-delivery quotas in the event of poor harvests or natural disasters, and a variety of similarly unglamorous but locally important matters. Few problems arise when a village's *buraku* are of approximately equal voting strength and their total number is equal to, or exceeded by, the number of seats in the assembly. But when, as usually happens, there are more *buraku* than there are seats and their voting strengths are varied, an interesing situation results. In a quiet and private fashion, the leaders of each *buraku* will figure out by simple arithmetic what will be the probable minimum number of votes necessary to assure a seat in the assembly. If they have that quota, well and good. They will run one candidate and the great majority of the people in the *buraku* will vote for him.[4] If they have enough strength to elect two candidates, they will split the *buraku's* vote and attempt to do so. If, however, their *buraku* has an insufficient number of votes, they will probably look around for some other *buraku* in similar circumstances—preferably a neighboring one with which theirs has close and cordial relations—and try to make an arrangement for pooling the strength of both *buraku* behind a mutually selected candidate. The interesting thing is that all of these collective pre-election arrangements usually work with such precision that not infrequently an election is rendered unnecessary because the number of candidates will exactly equal the number of seats available.

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[4] Not all persons will, however. A few may have a relative standing for election in another *buraku,* in which case they are apt to vote for him. Others may have such a strong personal dislike for the *buraku* candidate that they will vote against him, while a very few will simply fail to vote. Voting rates are very high in Japanese village elections. A turnout of eighty to one hundred per cent of the electorate is quite common.

Personally conducted and hard-fought campaigns in our sense of the word are rather unusual at this level, and, when they are encountered in the villages of rural Japan, are apt to be a sign of the presence of strong internal dissension or "radical," i.e., communist or doctrinaire socialist, elements within the community. This does not mean that one will not often find a few more formal candidates than there are seats; but when this happens, it seems usually to indicate an erroneous evaluation by the excess candidates of the strength of their potential support. The average villager regards a seat on the *songikai* (village assembly) as a mark of considerable honor and prestige, and would undoubtedly like to achieve such status. Yet any attempt on his part to gain such a position by unduly overt and active means, such as a real campaign, would make him an object of ridicule. It would involve such a candidate in obvious public issues of "face" vis-à-vis his more passive opponents, and would probably lose him the sympathy and support of the conservative majority. Various campaign techniques, perhaps appropriate in the individualistically organized societies of the West, are not approved in the family-centered and cohesive communities of rural Japan. The writer knows of one case in which a villager, most anxious for office, confined his entire public campaign—aside from a few discreet contacts with relatives in other *buraku*—to the utterance at a meeting of his own *buraku* assembly of a single sentence: "*Kondo tatte imasu kara, dō ka yoroshiku ōnegai shimas* (Since I am standing [for election] this time, please do what you can)." Not content with the self-effacing qualities of so resounding a pronouncement, he further went to considerable pains carefully to arrange that his services in the campaign be drafted by an array of cautiously approached close friends and neighbors. Similar public displays of diffidence seem quite normal and provide excellent examples of traditionally approved Japanese conduct.

The selection of a village mayor differs somewhat from the above-described "contests" for seats in the village assembly. Mayoralty campaigns focus the ambitions of all *buraku* in a village on a single office, and this the most important of all local offices. Naturally, therefore, a somewhat different approach is necessary and the problems involved place a greater strain on traditional approaches and techniques. Contests are more common at this level; but, even so, there are a surprisingly large number of instances where no election is necessary because of general prior agreement on a single candidate or where, if an election is held, it is a heavily one-sided contest.[5] Basically, the situation is similar to that described above in respect to "campaigns" for village assembly seats. A candidate seldom advances his own candidacy; he is drafted, though the draft may well have been preceded by discreet but intensive prompting and groundlaying on his part. Campaigning, by local standards, may be more intense, though the personal part played by the candidate may still be negligible. The campaigning will probably be managed in his behalf quietly but effectually by a small group of local leaders operating through *buraku* and family units and connections. The men most apt to take such action are the members of the village assembly, the top officials of the village agricultural cooperative association and/or any village residents of outstanding general prestige and status. (Membership in all three of these categories is apt to be substantially identical, or at least to overlap to a marked extent.)

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[5] The available statistics on the 1947 local elections fail to distinguish in this respect between mayoralty campaigns at the city, town and village levels. Even so, however, there were 3,374 such jurisdictions out of a total of 10,419 (32 per cent) where no mayoralty election occurred because there was only a single candidate. Undoubtedly a large majority of such cases occurred at the village level. GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. 1, p. 331.

The role played by the members of the village assembly in the selection and seating of a mayor is of particular interest. When they can agree among themselves on a candidate, the chances are all in favor of an easy, perhaps even uncontested victory for him. This practice amounts to a *de facto* restoration of the prewar system whereby village assemblies regularly and legally selected their mayors. It avoids the present law calling for popular election, giving evidence that Japanese politicians are just as aware as their American counterparts of the power accruing to those who can control nominations to an elective office, and of the variety of ways in which a law can be honored in form but subtly sabotaged in spirit and practice.

It is thus apparent that *buraku* function as somewhat less cohesive units in a mayoralty than in a village assembly election—a lack of cohesion which tends to increase as one ascends the election scale through the prefectural and national levels. Still, in all village elections there is a pronounced tendency for *buraku* to vote in blocs. Bloc voting minimizes the percentage of individual deviation from the *buraku* pattern and thus greatly simplifies the work of those prominent and respected members of the village so placed as to be able to influence or control the vote of one or more *buraku*. It enables them to plan and deal primarily in terms of a relatively small number of groups, rather than of a far larger number of individuals; it enables them to take advantage of each group's traditional preference for cohesiveness and the adoption of a common pattern of action on matters of collective concern; and it provides them with accepted and effective channels of communication and control based on the intricate system of status relationships which characterizes traditional Japanese life. The nature and ramifications of the resultant power system are so complex and extensive as to preclude description at this time. The writer now simply notes the existence of such a system and that its ultimate basis is to be found in the *buraku*.

## III

In the light of the foregoing description of the structure, functions and external relations of *buraku*, we may now examine the larger question of the socio-political role of the *buraku* in Japanese society. Why and how does it affect in important fashion the political attitudes and behavior of the people of Japan? An adequate answer to this question would be long and complex and should be based on a nationwide sampling of *buraku* conditions, but the writer's experience suggests the following hypotheses.

Japan today is in a relatively critical socio-political situation. Historically she represents a traditionally organized oriental society placing great importance on family and other collective bonds and possessed of an intricate and highly important set of status relationships. Long before the recent war, however, the disturbing and subversive force of individualism with its variant attitudes, beliefs and patterns of action had been making quiet but significant incursions into the old order. Wartime stress and its attendant social and economic displacements hastened this process; and the impact of defeat with all its terrible consequences, plus the Occupation's vast "reform" program, acted as a further powerful catalytic agent. As a consequence, Japan now finds herself in mid-passage, her people pulled one way by the older traditional attitudes, patterns of behavior and institutions, and the other by the subversive forces of individualism seeking a new integration and abetted by the basic but slow-acting processes of urbanization, modern economic organization and the social stress characteristic of our times. There is nothing unusual in this situation, which now characterizes most of Asia, except the fact that it is considerably farther advanced, and perhaps more immediately critical, in Japan than elsewhere in the Far East.

The *buraku* plays an important cultural rolė in this struggle. It is a stronghold of social conservatism. It is a milieu favorable to the survival of powerful attitudes and modes of behavior characteristic of Old Japan. It has changed and is changing, but its rate of change is far slower, its capacity for resistance far greater than is the case in the more fluid circumstances of urban life. Given the bitter and increasing pressure of man on land in Japan and the existing system of land ownership and use, there has been no compelling incentive—such as has prevailed in the cities—for the structure or role of the *buraku* in Japanese society to change greatly. The writer doubts that it will undergo basic change in the near future, barring a fundamental alteration of agrarian conditions in Japan.

If this diagnosis is correct, if the *buraku* and the attitudes generated by life therein do represent a powerful conservative force in Japanese society, it remains to make clear just what attitudes and what aspects of behavior of major socio-political importance may be attributed in part or whole to *buraku* patterns of living. The writer would rank first in importance the role and status of the family in *buraku*. In other milieu the solidarity of the Japanese family has been crumbling at a considerably more rapid rate than in these rural communities. If some inroads and changes in family structure are apparent even in the *buraku*, still family solidarity is undoubtedly a stronger and more significant social force there than elsewhere in Japanese society.

This fact has socio-political consequences of fundamental importance. For years before the war, and now more vociferously and optimistically than ever, scholars, journalists and statesmen have been proclaiming the imminent or accomplished "democratization of Japan," usually with very little specific awareness of all that is implied by the phrase. Without pausing to consider the vast differences in cultural heritage and historical background which exist between Japan and the states of Western Europe or North America, it must be noted that democracy in our sense is certainly based upon an individualistically-structured society. Such a society stresses the primacy of the individual and places a corollary emphasis upon personal rights and personal responsibilities. It is not sufficient that these be given mere legal recognition; they must find further support in the accepted philosophy, behavior and aspirations of a sizable proportion of the people.

It is no reflection on the Japanese people to say that, to the extent the family rather than the individual is regarded as primary, these qualifications are not met in present-day Japan. Different cultural circumstances have simply produced different results. There exists a basic contradiction in attitudes and practice between family-structured and individualistically-structured societies. This difference implies no moral preference between the two, but it does make one wonder to what extent the political institutions and practices of one society can be indiscriminately imposed upon, or even voluntarily adopted by, the other with fruitful results.

A second aspect of *buraku* life having considerable importance is the political role of the *buraku* itself. In a sense similar to, but less fundamental than, that outlined above with respect to the family, it too is a denial, or at least a serious qualification, of political practice based on the tenets of individualism. Western democracy, it is true, also provides many examples of cohesive groups acting politically along concerted lines, but such activities do not rest on the same foundations or spring from the same basic motivations as do the practices in Japanese *buraku*. *Buraku* solidarity, to the extent that it prevails, makes it significantly more difficult to make political decisions on a primarily personal basis.

The *buraku* and its collective affairs and concerns also provide an immediate focus of interest for its members. It would be difficult to say absolutely whether or not the average rural Japanese is more fixed in his concentration on matters of narrowly local and personal concern and more apathetic to matters of wider purport than his counterpart in the Occident. In an effective sense, that is, from the standpoint of organizing or taking any action to implement his interests at either level, he probably is. The average peasant, for obvious cultural reasons, has very little feeling of participation in the governing process and practically no conception of any right or ability to control the course or actions of government. He regards himself and his kind as playing an essentially passive role unless, as occasionally happens, he is pressed beyond endurance. Towards government and government officials, his normal attitude is one of mixed suspicion and fear. His attention tends to concentrate upon matters of direct concern to himself, his family, and his *buraku;* his prime interests are likely to be taxes, the crop-requisitioning system, fishing and lumbering regulations, the rationing system and the high cost of living. His fund of political and general information may well extend considerably beyond these matters, much farther in fact than the average Westerner imagines, but other affairs are usually of distinctly secondary concern.

On a somewhat lower plane, there are other aspects of political practice at the *buraku* level important enough to merit mention. These can be seen in operation at other levels of Japanese society but nowhere, probably, are they as prevalent or pristine in form as in the *buraku.* Knowledge of them is prerequisite to an understanding of Japanese politics at any level.

The reader will recall the above-described techniques of decision-taking in *buraku* and village assemblies, the devices of recommendation and consensus which so effectively reinforce the conservative position. The importance of this practice far transcends the local level. It continues to be the approved and ordinary way of reaching group decisions in all save the most formal and public of contexts. A careful reading of the minutes and records of such high national organs as the Imperial Conferences, Liaison and Senior Statesmen's Conferences and meetings of the Four and Five Ministers which preceded the outbreak of general warfare in 1941, reveals that many of the basic decisions bearing on the great issue of war versus further diplomatic negotiations were made in this manner. The technique thus extends through all levels of Japanese society, yet fundamentally it is indicative of the anti-individualistic elements of the culture. It represents a submergence of personal responsibility in an anonymous group process, and makes practically impossible the assignment of meaningful responsibility for any acts of government.

To the uninitiated, this technique of decision by consensus may also convey a distinctly false sense of the unanimity or accord of the decision-taking group. A lack of overt objection to the proposed decision is not to be taken as signifying the unqualified approval of all participants. It simply means that they prefer at the time to remain quiet and to appear to go along with the rest, thus avoiding an unpleasant and embarrassing public clash involving issues of "face." In fact, some members may strongly oppose the decision taken and will at once start working to sabotage its operation and bring about a change over a period of time. Thus the technique of decision by consensus often does no more than convey the public impression of unanimity—which the Japanese considers important—while at the same time concealing bitter antagonisms which will continue to be expressed insistently but secretly. Occasionally when some untoward circumstance forces such disagreements to the surface, their expression is apt to be amazingly and disproportionately violent.

Again one may recall the careful avoidance of public controversy and overt personal commitment described as characteristic of most campaigns for office at the *buraku* and village level. This, too, is indicative of a deeply ingrained general characteristic of Japanese politics, namely, the desire to avoid face-to-face or public clashes on issues, no matter how controversial these may be. The same considerations of "face" noted above are also operative here. A far greater number of persons may desire seats in a village assembly than can possibly be accommodated, yet the number of formal declarations of candidacy will probably approximate quite closely the actual number of seats at stake. The remainder have withdrawn as a consequence of the failure or unpromising results of their private pre-declaration-of-candidacy soundings. A few persons—either more determined or less perceptive—will actually run and be defeated. A good deal of popular sympathy may accrue to them for the loss of face which they suffered as a result of this public setback, and this sympathy may be widespread enough to aid them materially as a vote-getting device in the next election. The important thing to understand in this general connection, however, is the extent to which elections at this level in Japan merely confirm the preëstablished results of a highly intricate and completely non-public system of "nominations." This system operates in such a manner as further to reinforce the conservative domination of local politics by the concepts of status, propriety and "face" inherent in the traditional culture.

These last matters discussed—the political roles of consensus and of the avoidance of unseemly public clashes—do not have exclusive reference to the patterns of thought and behavior attributable to residence in *buraku*. They are, however, perhaps most obvious and best studied at this local level.

It is the writer's contention that the *buraku* actually plays a more important role in Japanese culture and in Japanese politics than has hitherto been recognized. While its formal administrative and political role is small in the total picture of national politics, it is nevertheless impossible to understand local politics in rural Japan or the functioning of the so-called "political boss" system except in terms of *buraku* organization and practice. Of far greater importance, certainly, is the role of the *buraku* as the conserver of the traditional culture with its family and collective bases, its intricate status relationships and the personal attitudes and behavior patterns derived therefrom. The pace of change differs widely in Japan from milieu to milieu. The old order is changing most rapidly under the stimulus of modern economic and social forces in the cities and towns, but in the countryside, the impact of change, though felt and obvious, is less violent. The techniques of agriculture, the organization of the agrarian society, the basic relationships of men to land have not undergone fundamental change. Consequently, it is relatively easier for the old attitudes and practices to survive here than in the cities and towns; and, when social change does come, its progress is slower and more piecemeal. It is this phenomenon which gives to the *buraku* its peculiar socio-political importance.

When one considers that upwards of half the living adult population have spent their lives or a varying portion of their more formative years in *buraku* environments, one begins to comprehend the strength and resilience of conservative and traditional patterns in Japan. The real marvel is not that Japan has changed so much as a result of her defeat and Occupation, but that she has changed so little. The strength of the forces of conservatism and resistance demonstrated thereby find a major source of support in the *buraku*.

# THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE CENSORATE AND THE NEW PEKING REGIME

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The "People's Government" at Peking, which has been functioning since October, 1949, under the sponsorship of the Chinese Communist Party, includes a system of disciplinary surveillance over government personnel that in several aspects is reminiscent of one of the world's most remarkable institutions. This is the Chinese Censorate, traditionally a highly systematized organ of administrative and political control that was an integral, and usually a prominent, part of China's governmental structure for more than two thousand years.

The new control system in China bears only a partial resemblance to the old. It is even possible that China's censorial heritage may not have had any part in shaping its development. However, since that heritage may conceivably channel its future development in directions that would be unforeseeable and unexplainable in any other context, it would appear to be desirable to take a fresh look at this long-lived institution. Aside from prospects of future influence, the Censorate, as a unique and, in its setting, a durable solution to the universal and ever-present problem of control in government, has intrinsic significance for students of political science.

What is happening now may prove to be the greatest change yet to occur in China's censorial history, but it is by no means the first. Through its long and almost uninterrupted existence,[1] the Censorate underwent successive developments in organization and prescribed functions, as well as numerous fluctuations in the scope and influence of its actual activities. Since it can be said of no period that the Censorate had then arrived at a typical status, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make accurate generalizations about its true nature, its power, its effectiveness, or its importance. Yet it is possible to point out in general that the Censorate provided a service in Chinese government that has no institutionalized counterpart in any modern western nation. This service was not censorship, as of the press or the theater, like that exercised by many other governments. It was not primarily control of thought among the people of the state. Rather, it was usually and characteristically surveillance over governmental activities and exposure of violations of law and derelictions of duty by government personnel, with the intent both to purge the administration of incompetence, arbitrariness, and malfeasance and to stimulate the implementation of prevailing political doctrine. Many familiar aspects of government in the West have elements in common with this system, but the West has never developed the specialization and institutionalization of control techniques that are the preëminent characteristics of the Chinese Censorate.

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[1] Brief summaries of the history of the Censorate appear in Hans Wist, *Das Chinesische Zensorat* (Hamburg, 1932), and in Richard L. Walker, "The Control System of the Chinese Government," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 7, pp. 2–21 (Nov., 1947). A most useful short history in Chinese is Kao I-han, *Chung-kuo yü-shih chih-tu ti yen-ko* [*Evolution of the Chinese Censorial System*] (Shanghai, 1934).

The traditional Chinese government, developing under the influence of Confucian philosophy, became what might be described, at least in principle, as a government *of* hereditary emperors removable by revolution, *by* non-hereditary officials selected on the basis of individual merit, and *for* the people.[2] Censors served a twofold purpose in this system. In the beginning they seem to have been created only as investigators to satisfy the emperors' natural desire for a check on policy at the level of execution. But eventually they took over the additional function, as remonstrators, of checking on policy at the level of formulation. For this they had unchallengeable justification in those precepts of China's revered ancient sages, Confucius and Mencius, which made it a part of every official's moral duty to criticize the ruler fearlessly and forthrightly if he deviated from the true aim of government, the happiness of the people.[3]

The general idea of censorship was translated into functional reality in different forms at different times, and, as has been noted above, none can be considered typical. In addition, since no adequate general history of the Censorate in action has been written, no period can yet be confidently represented as either the high point or the low point of censorial effectiveness. Typical or not, especially significant or not, however, a sampling must be taken within some narrowly delimited period if valid answers are to be obtained to specific questions about the institution. For this paper, the Ming dynasty will be the period under review.

## I. THE CENSORATE OF THE MING DYNASTY[4]

The Ming dynasty governed China from 1368 to 1644, after bringing a century of Mongol rule to an end. It was the last native dynasty in China, for it was succeeded by new, Manchu conquerors, who occupied the imperial throne until the republican revolution of 1911. Thus it represents the end point in the native development of imperial governmental institutions, free of the special considerations deriving from conquest situations.

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[2] A discussion of the theoretical basis of government in imperial China can be found in Hsieh Pao Chao, *The Government of China, 1644–1911* (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 1–23. Also see Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese, Their History and Culture* (New York, 1946), pp. 513–551.

[3] See H. G. Creel, *Confucius, The Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), pp. 142–172; and James Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (Oxford, 1893–1895), Vol. 1, pp. 245, 269, 285 [Analects of Confucius, Ch. 11, Sec. 23; Ch. 13, Sec. 15; Ch. 14, Sec. 23], Vol. 2, pp. 161, 219, 319 [Mencius Bk. 1, Pt. 2, Ch. 4, Sec. 10; Bk. 2, Pt. 2, Ch. 5; Bk. 4, Pt. 2, Ch. 3].

[4] The following discussion of censorial practices under the Ming dynasty is derived essentially from the present writer's *The Chinese Censorate of the Ming Dynasty, Including an Analysis of Its Activities during the Decade 1424–1434* (unpublished ms., 1950), which is obtainable on microfilm from The University of Chicago Library. This work is based primarily on standard Chinese historical sources: *Ming-shih* [*History of the Ming Dynasty*], Chs. 72–76; *Ta Ming hui-tien* [*Collected Institutes of the Ming Dynasty*], Chs. 209–211; and the sections of the *Ming shih-lu* [*True Records of the Ming Dynasty*] that pertain to the reigns of the Emperors Jen Tsung (1424–1425) and Hsüan Tsung (1424–1435).

The Ming emperors wielded theoretically absolute power, and the early ones actively and personally directed the work of the government. The later ones frequently permitted an informally organized Grand Secretariat (*Nei-ko*), consisting of a few eminent and trusted officials, to manage affairs for them. At the worst, they slothfully turned over their prerogatives to ambitious eunuchs, who nominally were concerned only with household tasks in the palace. In any case, routine governmental chores were attended to by a hierarchy of civil-service career men, at this time recruited primarily through large-scale public examinations based on mastery of the Confucian classics.

The Censorate was one of three agencies in the top level of the governmental structure, supplementing a disunited civil administration consisting of six Ministries (*Pu*) and a similarly disunited military administration consisting of five Chief Military Commands (*Tu-tu fu*). This perpetuated, in outline, the central government of the preceding Mongol period, which Kublai Khan once described as a civil administration serving as his left hand, a military administration serving as his right hand, and a Censorate serving as his means of keeping both hands healthy.[5]

Known by a designation that literally means "chief investigating bureau" (*Tu ch'a-yüan*), the Ming Censorate had a prescribed staff of two Censors-in-Chief (*Tu yü-shih*), two Vice Censors-in-Chief (*Fu Tu yü-shih*), four Assistant Censors-in-Chief (*Ch'ien Tu yü-shih*), one hundred and ten Investigating Censors (*Chien-ch'a yü-shih*), and an assortment of administrative and clerical personnel. Investigating Censors were the backbone of the censorial service, and in some degree they were considered to be independent of the Censors-in-Chief.[6]

Though the Censorate specialized in supervisory-critical functions, it did not monopolize them. In Confucian theory, as has been observed above, every official had the right and obligation to criticize the government; and the early Ming emperors particularly prided themselves on maintaining freedom of criticism even for the humblest citizens. They installed outside the palace a "complaint drum," which, when struck, summoned an attendant to transmit to the Emperor any citizen's complaint.[7] Moreover, the Censorate was not even the only agency that specialized in censorial functions. Independently there existed six Offices of Scrutiny (*K'o*), normally staffed by sixty Supervising Secretaries (*Chi-shih-chung*), who were expected to attend the Emperor at state functions, to remonstrate against unwise policies, and especially to maintain systematic surveillance over the six Ministries by editing incoming memorials and outgoing orders. They and the censors shared the unofficial designation of "speaking officials."[8] Also, there existed in each province, alongside a Provincial Administration Office (*Pu-cheng ssŭ*) and a Provincial Military Command (*Tu ssŭ*), a Provincial Investigation Office (*An-ch'a ssŭ*) which, though not directly subordinate to the Censorate, exercised functions on a local scale similar to those exercised throughout the empire by the censors. They specially watched over the administration of justice and served as courts of judicial appeal.[9]

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[5] Kao I-han, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[6] After Nanking was made auxiliary capital in 1420, a second Censorate was set up there. It had a smaller staff than the Peking Censorate, nominally including thirty Investigating Censors, and had jurisdiction only over the city and its immediate environs.

[7] *Ming-shih*, Ch. 94, pp. 10b ff.

The Censorate proper, nevertheless, was the control organ *par excellence*. On the establishment of his government, the founder of the Ming dynasty pointed out that, of its three great organs, the civil administration was to be in general charge of governmental matters; the military administration was to be in charge of the armies; and the Censorate was to be in charge of "investigations." "The dynastic principles," he said, "are all suspended upon these, and the investigatory duties of the Censorate are of especial importance."[10] This was the general mandate under which the censors functioned. In time it was particularized and clarified in a constantly-increasing number of specific and detailed directives that called upon the Censorate to provide the kind of disciplinary surveillance that has been described above. Based on these directives, also, were two perhaps separable but related functions, which were supervisory in part and substantive in part: participation in judicial processes and participation in the formulation and execution of government policies.

Though not all of the questions that come to mind in relation to an institution so organized and so directed can be answered with complete satisfaction, the more significant ones may at least be discussed in some detail.

1. *Who were the censors?* At the outset it must be emphasized that censors were civil servants who in general shared the conditions of service to which all civil servants were subject. That is, although in organization and functions the Censorate stood somewhat apart from the central administration, the censors did not constitute an elite corps with personnel rules distinct from those of the bureaucracy. Before even becoming censors, they had to be admitted to the civil service. While admission could be arranged in several ways, primary emphasis under the Ming dynasty was given to recruitment through periodic written examinations of students who had been approved and recommended by appropriate government authorities. The cream of the recruits were not necessarily earmarked for the Censorate; but constant efforts were made to obtain for the Censorate men who had entered the service in at least the second-best category of recruits, and few officials could expect an appointment there unless they held the doctorate (conferred at triennial palace examinations) or the lesser degree of licentiate (conferred at preliminary provincial examinations) or had graduated from the National Academy, the highest educational institution in the empire. Even licentiates and National Academy graduates were intermittently ineligible for censorial appointments.

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[8] *Ibid.*, Ch. 74, pp. 11a–13a.

[9] *Ibid.*, Ch. 75, pp. 13b–15b.

[10] *Ibid.*, Ch. 73, p. 4b.

It should also be noted that censors generally cannot be considered to have been the men who in the West are called "elder statesmen." The prescribed rank for Investigating Censors, who carried on the bulk of the Censorate's work, was only 7a in a scale of civil-service ranks running from 1a at the top to 9b at the bottom, indicating that their previous experience in government service could not have been great. Indeed, a sample analysis of censorial appointments made in the decade 1424–1434 reveals that 215 of 319 appointments went to men who presumably were entirely new to the service. Subsequent rules restricted eligibility to men who had at least three years' prior experience and, furthermore, required that new Investigating Censors serve probationary periods of six months or one year before being confirmed in substantive appointments. Even so, it is clear that appointment as Investigating Censor was not the climax of a civil-service career.

Aside from these formalistic regulations regarding experience qualifications and the avenues of original recruitment, there was repeated insistence on the need to obtain for the Censorate men who were thoroughly indoctrinated in the principles of government and were just, honest, intelligent, and upright. The Emperor Ch'eng Tsu (1402–1424), for example, once proclaimed: "As censors it is necessary to employ incorrupt, cautious, resolute, and upright men. If incorrupt, they will lack selfishness. If cautious, they will lack indifference. If resolute and upright, they will dare to speak out. Those who are not capable of this should forthwith be demoted."[11] In fact, selection of relatively young and inexperienced men for the Censorate may reflect a conscious, though unstated, policy directed toward obtaining men before their idealism and ardor had waned through long acquaintance with official corruption or through the forming of political ties.

2. *What were their techniques and powers?* The techniques of the Censorate were adapted to the three large categories of its prescribed functions. The first of these was disciplinary surveillance over the government as a whole. This surveillance was maintained primarily through a system of "commissioning" individual Investigating Censors to specific supervisory chores, a system which made it possible for almost all types and areas of government operations, both in and outside the capital, to be subject to thorough routine inspections. Of the commissions, those of Provincial Inspectors (*Hsün-an Chien-ch'a yü-shih*) seem to have been most significant. Provincial Inspectors, as general field representatives of the Censorate, probably most nearly deserved the traditional censorial appellation, "the ears and eyes of the emperor." In theory at least, "they honored what was good and exterminated tyranny and corruption so as to rectify public morale and activate the governmental principles."[12] For these purposes, they served one-year tours of duty on which they were expected to make visits of inspection to all localities within their respective jurisdictions and to investigate the conduct of all government personnel.

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[11] Sun Ch'eng-tse, *Ch'un-ming meng-yü lu* (blockprint pocket ed., n.d.), Ch. 48, pp. 6a–7a.

[12] *Ming-shih*, Ch. 73, p. 2b.

Specifically, wherever they went, they were expected first to conduct judicial reviews of local prisoners, checking their case records for evidence of injustice. Then they inspected the condition of installations and equipment at local ceremonial areas. They also inquired after, and provided for, the relief of orphans and the aged; inspected public granaries and storehouses, checking their funds and contents; and visited schools in order to observe the progress of students. These and similar commissions permitted the censors to gain information about government personnel and practices by direct personal observation and investigation. They also were able to gain information by accepting criticisms and complaints from other officials or from the public, and by receiving routine reports from various other agencies.

A primary aim of this surveillance, of course, was to ferret out cases that required disciplinary action. Thus, on the basis of the information they received, censors were individually empowered to submit impeachments directly to the throne. For lesser offenses, they might warn the responsible officials. In the case of low-ranking civil service personnel on duty outside the capital, they could even seize and try offenders on their own authority. Also, they participated in the Ministry of Civil Service's (*Li pu*) periodic formulations of merit ratings for administrative officials, which served as grounds for routine promotions and demotions. Beyond this, they could, if so inclined, remonstrate with the Emperor, in person or in memorials, about his own part in the conduct of affairs. Some emperors urged them to do so, taking an attitude shared by the Mongol Kublai Khan, who once said: "The duties of the Censorate's officials lie in speaking out straightforwardly. If I perchance commit improprieties, let them speak out to the extreme without concealment and without fearing others."[13]

As their second major responsibility, censors engaged in various kinds of judicial functions. After inspecting reports of legal cases submitted from Provincial Investigation Offices, they participated with the Ministry of Justice (*Hsing pu*) and an autonomous agency known as the Grand Court of Revision (*Ta-li ssŭ*) in the ratification of important sentences. They investigated complaints about official injustice. Moreover, they took part in judging major offenders who were tried at the capital, and they themselves conducted special trials and judicial investigations when so ordered by the Emperor. Provincial Inspectors, and on occasion other censors, paid particular attention to persons detained in local prisons, ordering suitable adjustments on their own initiative when case records indicated that prescribed punishments were disproportionate to the crimes. Also, on their own authority and without recourse to the impeachment process, censors were capable of inflicting punishments on government personnel of certain categories. Altogether, they exercised more than supervisory powers of criticism. They exercised substantive judicial powers and were, in effect, what might be called "judges at large."

Thirdly, censors participated actively in many ways in the formulation, and even the administrative implementation, of government policies. Holding a wide general mandate to speak out forthrightly about the advantageousness or disadvantageousness of government policies, they could individually submit recommendations for the Emperor's consideration if they saw the need for action of any kind. The censors on duty in the capital attended and participated in policy deliberations that were convoked irregularly by the emperors. While they were on commissions in the provinces, they even had considerable opportunity to participate actively and directly in administration. A Provincial Inspector, for example, was more than a mere inspector: he and the high provincial authorities jointly deliberated about important problems and approved plans offered by lesser officials. Wherever he went, if he noted things that ought to be done, he could order the local authorities to undertake them. Sometimes censors were specially deputed to direct such undertakings as the capture of bandits and the extermination of locusts. And at times it seems that some went so far as to authorize expensive relief measures in disaster areas without obtaining specific imperial sanction.

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[13] *Yüan-shih* [*History of the Yüan Dynasty*], Ch. 6, p. 15b.

The censors' power to intervene directly in administration and to take punitive and corrective action on their own authority seems to have been an innovation of the Mongol period that was carried over to the Ming dynasty. It perhaps diluted their proper censorial function, criticism, by robbing them of the objectivity that is every critic's best claim to a hearing. What is more, it undoubtedly subjected them to temptations toward arbitrariness that only the most exceptional men could resist with complete success.

3. *What was their freedom to act?* The fact that censors were members of the regular civil service had significant implications regarding their freedom to act. Primarily, it meant that they were appointed officials whose tenure in office was by no means guaranteed. Normal tenure in any one administrative office was nine years. Except in the highest-ranking posts, to exceed this limit was apparently a rarity. There was no such thing, therefore, as life tenure for a censor; and to fall short of even a nine-year tenure in any office was quite common. An official might be specially promoted, transferred, demoted, or dismissed entirely from the service at any time. The Ministry of Civil Service had overall charge of promotions, transfers, demotions, and dismissals; and censors were subject to its dispositions on an equal basis with all other officials, except for one important consideration—that is, no censor could be removed from his office without the express consent of the Emperor. This in some degree protected censors from the enmity of their superiors in the Censorate and of personnel in the Ministry of Civil Service. However, it left them entirely defenseless against the whims of the Emperor or of whoever might have the Emperor's confidence.

Neither did censors enjoy immunity of person; for the Ming emperors, when aroused, took full advantage of their absolute authority and imposed flogging, exile, imprisonment, and sometimes death on whoever displeased them or their favorites.

It is even questionable that Investigating Censors in practice were significantly independent of their immediate nominal superiors, the various Censors-in-Chief. According to law, individual censors had the right to make proposals and impeachments in sealed memorials submitted directly to the throne. They were also assigned to major commissions by choice of the Emperor, and on returning from commissions were required to report to the throne before filing reports with the Censorate itself. However, their superiors periodically gave them merit ratings which determined their future careers unless the Emperor vigilantly intervened, and this fact cannot have failed to influence relations among members of the Censorate staff. One Censor-in-Chief, as a matter of fact, so dominated the Investigating Censors that they took orders from his civilian son, altered records to conceal his own misdemeanors, unanimously impeached at least one official at his insistence, and submissively paid him fees for the privilege of going out on and returning from commissions.[14]

The independence of Ming censors was also restricted by the fact that they were individually accountable for the accuracy of their memorials. In submitting impeachments, they were specifically required clearly to set forth the evidence, and were enjoined from incorporating careless accusations, slanderous gossip, or trifles. The founder of the dynasty once demoted a censor for impeaching an official on the basis of what he had overheard "in the streets." Under the earlier T'ang (618–907) and Sung (960–1279) native dynasties, censors had the right to impeach on the basis of hearsay, using the phrase "I have heard a rumor that";[15] but this practice was apparently discontinued. The lack of protection for informants that derived from the custom of using only open evidence must have reduced the censors' sources of information in some degree.

All these factors make it clear that the position of a censor was a somewhat precarious one. If he offended the Emperor, he could lose his life. If he offended his superiors within the Censorate, he risked getting an unfavorable merit rating, which could result in his demotion or dismissal from the service. And, in dealing with other censors and officials in general, he was aware that he, too, could be impeached and that the victim of his action today might be his superior or an imperial favorite next year. These considerations might seem to have constituted, in actual practice, a tight restriction indeed. On the other hand, however, there were compensations. In the first place, censors were expected and urged to act, and emperors repeatedly assured them that it was needless to be afraid. Moreover, there was some consolation in the fact that they could be disciplined only with the Emperor's consent. But the greatest shield of all was the tremendous prestige that custom gave the censor's status. This status was realistically derived from the fact that effective control of the empire depended upon the Emperor's knowledge of actual conditions. Of necessity restricted in his own movements and observations, no wise emperor could allow himself to become dependent for information upon only one minister or only one element in the government. As the Chinese put it, the "avenues of expression" had to be kept open. What could better serve this need than an active and unintimidated Censorate? And what could sooner deprive the Emperor of trustworthy information than the determined silence and non-coöperation of a whole officialdom sullenly resentful of autocratic maltreatment of censors who, from its point of view, were its champions? At least one Ming emperor, victimized by such a campaign of passive resistance, came to terms in the end, crying, in substance, "Nobody tells me anything any more!"[16] Thus, when emperors did punish censors, they usually tried to convince the public at large that the punishments were deserved, not because of excess zeal in line of duty, but because of heinous offenses that made the censors unworthy of their exalted and responsible offices.

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[14] This was Liu Kuan, who held office from 1415 to 1428. See his biography in *Ming-shih*, Ch. 151, pp. 11a–12b.

[15] Hung Mai, *Jung-chai sui-pi* (*Ssŭ-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.; Shanghai, 1935), Pt. 4, Ch. 11, p. 8a.

4. *What were their motivations?* The problem of censors' independence is related closely to the problem of motivation. In actual practice, what impelled censors to act or not to act? No conclusive and generally valid answer can be given, of course; but a detailed analysis of the recorded activities of Ming censors during the decade 1424–1434 suggests some observations that appear to be valid at least for this one brief period. It indicates that many censors were undoubtedly motivated by greed. Succumbing to the lure of bribes was probably their most common failing. Whereas one hundred twenty-eight Investigating Censors were promoted out of the Censorate during this period, one hundred thirty-five lost their offices through disciplinary action and twenty-two others were disciplined without losing their offices. Venality, occurring in forty-five instances, was the most frequent charge against them. Several cases, reported in detail in the historical records, show that some censors, for example, were willing to reduce judicial sentences in return for bribes.

Objectivity among censors was, of course, the ideal, and many provisions were made to guard censors against irrelevant personal or political pressures. It was generally the rule that no relative of a high official in the central administration might be appointed to the Censorate. While traveling on commissions, censors were not allowed to be accompanied by relatives, to receive private letters, to attend banquets, to accept presents or loans, or to work in areas of which they were natives or in which they had previously resided or served in office. Yet personal enmity was clearly evident in some of their acts, and the influence of friendship can be inferred without much difficulty in others. (Broad political alignments were not apparent at this time, although they became of great historical significance late in the Ming era.)

One emperor of this ten-year period complained that censors were the easy dupes of flattery because of youthful desires to exaggerate their importance, and the charge is plausible. The Investigating Censors were usually in their early years of government service and relatively young. Thrust into positions of great traditional prestige, glorified as the "ears and eyes of the emperor," given precedence over much higher-ranking officials (as in the relations between a Provincial Inspector and the regular provincial authorities), and empowered to punish, or at least to impeach, all whom they encountered, censors understandably might have been carried away by a sense of their own importance. Abuse of authority was specifically cited as the ground for seven disciplinary actions against censors during the decade analyzed.

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[16] *Ming-shih,* Ch. 164, pp. 4a–5b; *Ming shih-lu,* Jen Tsung, Ch. 7B, p. 2a, Ch. 8A, pp. 4b–5b.

On the other hand, it is not surprising to find evidence that censors were to some extent inhibited by fear. The Chinese social order was such that his status as an official was among the most prized possessions of every civil servant. The fact that Investigating Censors were subjected to disciplinary action at an average rate of fifteen per year during this decade, even though such disciplinary action was intended to stimulate and encourage the censorial staff as a whole, served in fact as a reminder that censors had no guaranteed tenure and no immunity of person. This reminder probably induced many weaker censors to adhere closely to the seemingly safe policy of caution and irresolution, except insofar as greed, friendship, or the desire to seem important overcame their fears.

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that censors' acts and omissions were always based on such motives. The recruitment of men for the Ming civil service was based primarily on educational qualifications, with the education of a would-be civil servant beginning at a very early age. The Confucian classics served as the content of his education, and the method was predominantly memorization. By the time he entered the service—especially if he did so through the examination process—he had necessarily become saturated with the language of these works. At the very least, he could reproduce passages of the Analects of Confucius from memory, and it would appear improbable indeed that the ethical ideals of Confucianism could have escaped him entirely. Among other things, the classics laid upon ministers the obligation fearlessly and resolutely to criticize the government. Men so indoctrinated, when appointed to an office of which the prescribed function was criticism, can hardly be supposed to have renounced without qualms the ideals that had virtually been bred into them. And Ming censors did at times act vigorously on their principles.[17]

5. *What did they accomplish?* Evaluations of censors' accomplishments and effectiveness can properly be made only on the basis of their actual activities during a given period, insofar as they are recorded in historical sources. What, then, can be discovered from the decade 1424–1434, to take this one sampling again? It is clear that relatively good government prevailed during this time, but one must inquire about the extent to which the prevailing good government was attributable to the censors.

The policies of the two Emperors whose reigns are considered here, Jen

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[17] For numerous examples, see Lin Yutang, *A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 58–73.

Tsung and Hsüan Tsung, do not appear to have been instigated or notably altered by the censors. The historical records reveal that censors did, however, submit one hundred sixty-nine proposals that seem on the whole to have been sincere attempts to make implementation of the policies more successful. One hundred forty-three, or approximately four-fifths of them, were approved by the Emperors. It appears reasonable, then, to assert that censors assisted and encouraged the Emperors to follow their desirable inclinations. Nevertheless, they did not reprove some injudicious aberrations on the part of Jen Tsung, and they apparently made no attempt to alter the less desirable policies of the Emperors, which included at least one—the increasing employment of eunuchs in positions of trust and authority—that had clearly ominous implications. Thus this period, undoubtedly because these Emperors were on the whole conscientious and "constitutional" in the Confucian sense, does not show censors at their legendary and dramatic best in fearlessly challenging the autocratic and arbitrary powers of tyrannous rulers. But the fact remains that many later Ming censors rose to such heights when conditions prompted them to do so.[18]

Censors were also active in seeking to discipline or remove unworthy officials and so to improve the quality of the personnel charged with administering the Emperors' policies. How many persons were punished by censors on their own authority is not revealed by analysis of the records; but 13,814+ persons were denounced during these ten years in recorded impeachments by censors. Even disregarding two almost incredible mass impeachments that resulted in investigations, trials, or finings of 13,259 government employees, there were 555+ individual denunciations, of which only 122 were ignored by the Emperors. Forty-nine, or 8.8 per cent, of the persons denounced were promptly demoted, dismissed, or disgraced by the Emperors, apparently without benefit of trial or any further hearing; 353+, or 63.6 per cent, were fined, reprimanded, imprisoned, or otherwise punished, sometimes summarily and sometimes after investigations; nineteen, or 3.4 per cent, were subjected to further investigations the results of which do not appear in the records; and twelve, or 2.2 per cent, were subjected to trials the results of which are similarly not indicated. Thus, although the Emperors sometimes complained that the censors were not diligent and just in making impeachments, they nevertheless took positive action on approximately four-fifths of the censors' denunciations. Moreover, merit ratings by censors brought about the demotion of at least 264+ other civil and military officials. Many persons, therefore, were affected by the surveillance of censors.

The analysis reveals that censors of this period did accomplish much that seems to have been good. But it also suggests that they neglected other things that they might, and perhaps should, have accomplished. The types of activities for which many censors were disciplined, together with those for which censors generally were criticized, make it evident that the venality and petty vanity of some censors must have reduced general confidence in the integrity of the censorial force, and thereby in the government service as a whole. The power of censors to discipline certain categories of persons on their own authority may also have tended to stifle initiative by restraining such persons from action not clearly sanctioned by orders and regulations.

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[18] *Idem.*

Perhaps the most significant effect of the Censorate's work was an indirect one. Such an organization, specially devoted to criticism and supporting a widespread net of surveillance, must have had considerable influence of a cautionary nature. Emperors as well as officials and citizens probably were not so concerned about what censors did as about what they could do, and such considerations may well have served as restraints in ways both detrimental and beneficial. As was said at an earlier time: "The Censorate is like a sleeping tiger. Even if it does not bite men, men still dread its tigerishness."[19]

## II. CENSORIAL CONTROL IN MODERN TIMES

The political organization of the Ming dynasty was taken over almost intact by the Manchu conquerors, who ruled China from 1644 to 1911. Changes were made as the years passed, and some of these changes significantly affected the control system. Yet the Censorate functioned in essentially the same old ways, and the tradition was still strong.[20]

With the republican revolution of 1911, the old political institutions disappeared; and for many years thereafter the state as an organism was in flux, unstable if not chaotic. A censorial institution finally reappeared as one of five theoretically independent organs at the top level of the National Government as it was organized by the Kuomintang after 1927.[21] The structure of this government was based on a five-way separation of powers that had been advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the party and a prime mover in the earlier revolution. The major government organs were an Executive Yüan, a Legislative Yüan, and a Judicial Yüan, as might have been expected. But on the same plane, as unique features of the Chinese system, were established an Examination Yüan, in charge of recruitment for the civil service and determination of qualifications for elective offices, and a Control Yüan, described as the highest supervisory organ of the state. This development reflected Dr. Sun's contention that the examinatory and censorial powers were worthwhile elements of the traditional monarchical system and that they had been essentially independent of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers exercised by the emperors.[22]

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[19] *Yüan-shih*, Ch. 148, p. 8b.

[20] See Li Hsiung-fei, *Les Censeurs sous la Dynastie Mandchoue (1616–1911) en Chine* (Paris, 1936); Edgar Cha Tang, "The Censorial Institution in China, 1644–1911," in Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, *Summaries of Theses . . . 1932* (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 155–158; Hsieh Pao Chao, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–98; William Frederick Mayers, *The Chinese Government* (Shanghai, 1897), pp. 23–24; H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, trans. by A. Beltchenko and E. E. Moran (Shanghai, 1912), pp. 75–79; and Hans Wist, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–45.

[21] See Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 262–277; Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek; A Political Study* (Boston, 1941), pp. 313–324; Wu Chih-fang, *Chinese Government and Politics* (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 211–217; W. Y. Tsao, *The Constitutional Structure of Modern China* (Melbourne, 1947), pp. 188–203; Siu Qui, *Le Pouvoir de Controle en Chine* (Nancy, 1937); and Richard L. Walker, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), pp. 15–19.

Formally established in 1931, the Control Yüan was granted the specific powers of impeachment and auditing. It was allowed no influence over the action taken on its impeachments, but in practice it frequently publicized them vigorously so as to discredit its victims at least in part. During the Japanese war, it was granted special additional powers to circumvent the somewhat cumbersome and time-consuming procedure required in impeachments. If an official was remiss to such an extent that prompt disciplinary action was desirable, the Yüan was permitted to send a report of censure to his immediate superior requesting such action. Also, it was permitted to send proposals or recommendations to government agencies when there was need for positive administrative measures not undertaken by the agencies on their own initiative. The Yüan, however, could not enforce either reports of censure or proposals.

From the beginning of its operations through August, 1946, members of the Control Yüan impeached 2,175 officials.[23] From July, 1937, through December, 1947, in addition, they censured 2,126 officials and submitted 1,197 proposals. During the same period they accepted 48,256 petitions from the people.[24] Available data do not indicate the realistic consequences of all these activities. Their effectiveness, however, has undoubtedly been moderated by the political interests of the Kuomintang, which has always had separate party organs for ideological control. Still operative with the National Government on Formosa, the Control Yüan has consistently struggled to expand its authority, particularly hoping to gain jurisdiction over the disciplinary organs that consider its impeachments. It seems to have tried to strike a comfortable balance between popular demand and political expediency, but more than a few high-ranking personages of the government have at least been annoyed by its impeachments.[25]

Although the Control Yüan of the National Government is directly related, through the political philosophy of Dr. Sun, to the ancient censorial tradition in China, this is not the case with the control system of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China that is now functioning at Peking in accordance with an organic law promulgated on September 27,

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[22] Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I, the Three Principles of the People*, trans. by Frank W. Price (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 356–358.

[23] Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

[24] *China Handbook 1950* (New York, 1950), p. 163.

[25] See Chen Chih-mai, "Impeachments of the Control Yüan; A Preliminary Survey," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 331–366 (Oct., 1935); No. 4, pp. 515–542 (Jan., 1936); and Siu Qui, *op. cit.*, p. 88. For some more recent impeachments, see *New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1950, p. 17, and Jan. 15, 1951, p. 3.

1949.[26] In general, five-power government—or, apparently, any system of government based on distinctively Chinese principles—has been rejected by the Chinese Communists in favor of a "democratic centralism" patterned after the example of Soviet Russia.

The new government was set up by a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which was to wield supreme governmental powers pending the election of an All-China People's Congress. The Conference elected a Central People's Government Council and vested in it, under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung, the power of exercising state authority. This Council in turn organized the major subordinate agencies prescribed by the organic law: a State Administration Council as a supreme executive organ, a People's Revolutionary Military Council as a supreme military command, a Supreme People's Court, and a People's Procurator General's Office in charge of a state-wide hierarchy of public prosecutors.[27]

Administrative control practices in this government are of, course, overshadowed in general political significance by the techniques of ideological control, in part extra-governmental and in part intra-governmental, utilized by the Communist Party. However, this ideological control—like the "party tutelage" exercised by the Kuomintang, the effects of which have been felt throughout the government—has little in common with the Chinese censorial tradition. More suggestive of the tradition is the system of control through disciplinary surveillance functioning within the governmental structure itself.

This system is embodied in a Committee of People's Supervision that has been set up under the immediate jurisdiction of the State Administration Council. The organic law states that this Committee, which is clearly patterned after a Russian prototype,[28] is responsible for "the supervision of the execution of duties by government institutions and government functionaries."[29] Within a few months after its creation, the committee had a chairman, two vice chairmen, fifteen members, and a secretariat of two men.[30] Moreover, the establishment of similar organs at lower levels of government proceeded rapidly. By December, 1950, Committees of People's Supervision had been organized in six large administrative areas, each comprising several provinces, and in twenty-nine provinces and municipalities; and the central Committee had deputized more than two hundred "supervisory correspondents" in various agencies of the central government.[31]

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[26] A translation of the organic law appears in Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 477–481. The original Chinese text occurs in *1950 Jen-min shou-ts'e* [*1950 People's Handbook*] (Shanghai, 1950), sec. *i*, pp. 28–31.

[27] Any procuratorial system, of course, is to some extent suggestive of the traditional Chinese censorial system, since censors exercised the authority of public prosecutors. However, the new system lacks the characteristic core of the censorial concept, which is disciplinary surveillance over government personnel. Specifically, the new Chinese procuratorial system is directly adapted from that of Soviet Russia. Cf. Ch'en Ch'i-yu, *Hsin Chung-kuo chien-ch'a chih-tu kai-lun* [*A summary of the New China Procuratorial System*] (Peking, 1950), and Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1947* (New York, 1948), pp. 305–310. Procurators have a long history in Russia, although the modern Soviet system seems markedly different from the original imperial one. The original, in fact, may have had far more in common with the traditional Chinese Censorate than does the Soviet system. As the office was set up by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century, the original Procurator General was in charge of a hierarchy of public accusers or "fiscals," who were charged with investigating and denouncing persons employed in the public service. Considering that Chinese censors were traditionally designated "the ears and eyes of the emperor," it is of especial interest that Peter referred to the Procurator General as "the all-seeing eye of the czar." Cf. Maxime Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions* (Chicago, 1902), pp. 109 ff., and V. O. Kluchevsky, *A History of Russia*, trans. by C. J. Hogarth, Vol. 4 (London, 1926), pp. 170–173, 183–187. However, the possibility that this old control system of imperial Russia had indirect connections, through France or Sweden, with the Chinese censorial system cannot be explored here.

The term "supervision" that occurs in the designation of this Committee is in Chinese *chien-ch'a*, literally meaning "to oversee and investigate." It is the same term that appears as "control" in the designation "Control Yüan"[32] and as "investigating" in the traditional designation "Investigating Censor." More than a terminological similarity is involved, however. In its first Report, covering activities through May, 1950, the central Committee stated that it had received one hundred forty-two charges for consideration: fifty-eight brought to its attention by "the masses," thirty-six reported by various organs and organizations, seventeen reported by provinces, seven referred to it by the Central People's Government or the State Administration Council, and twenty-four initiated by the Committee itself, partly on the basis of newspaper accounts. Neglect of duty and violations of law were the most frequent charges. Many cases were transferred to the lower-echelon committees and to other military and legal agencies over which the State Administration Council had no jurisdiction. Only fifty-six cases were retained and dealt with by the Committee in Peking, and seventy per cent of those had been terminated at the time the Report was made. The Report also spoke of the Committee's intention to develop inspection practices.[33] In historical context, the Report has a not unfamiliar ring, even though such specific terms as "impeachment" do not appear.

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[28] In the final paragraph of its first official Report, the Committee of People's Supervision announced that it saw the need to study further the theory and practice of the supervisory system of the Soviet Union. See *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* [*New China Monthly*], Vol. 2, pp. 994–995 (Sept., 1950). The prototype indicated is the Soviet Union's Ministry of State Control, which is expected "to establish strictest control over accounting and expenditure of state funds and material values, and over execution of governmental decisions." (Julian Towster, *op. cit.*, p. 173).

[29] Art. 18; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

[30] *1950 Jen-min shou-ts'e*, sec. *ping*, p. 3.

[31] *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong, American Consulate General), No. 33, p. 5 (Dec., 19, 1950).

[32] Actually, the Committee of People's Supervision is the direct descendent of a so-called "Control Yüan," identical in designation to that of the National Government, that existed under the North China People's Government, the immediate predecessor of the Peking government. One of the first tasks of the new Committee was to take over pending cases from this North China People's Control Yüan. See the Committee's Report in *Hsin-yua hüeh-pao, loc. cit.*

[33] A subsequent Report covering the months of September, October, and November, 1950, is briefly summarized in translation in *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 33, p. 5

How the charges discussed in the Report were dealt with is not wholly clear. The Report speaks of small investigatory units that were sent out to act on complaints in conjunction with the officials directly concerned. It also states that these units, after clarifying responsibility for derelictions and errors, imposed "disciplinary action or notoriety" on the guilty persons. That the Committee does have some sanctions is further indicated in a later newspaper announcement that it had rescinded a previous order to "punish" certain railroad officials charged with responsibility for serious accidents. The "punishments" that were rescinded included "criticism," "penalty," "warning," "demerit," and "major demerit."[34] Whether these represent the full extent of the Committee's disciplinary powers is not indicated.

Like the Control Yüan of the National Government, the new and still imperfectly defined Committees of People's Supervision constitute a control system that differs markedly from the traditional one. Moreover, the two modern systems differ from one another. With regard to structural organization, whereas the old Censorate had a semi-autonomous status in the top level of the government, independent of the central administration, and the Control Yüan theoretically perpetuates this relationship, the new Committee at Peking is distinctly subordinate to the central administration. In fact, it is only one of several committees, commissions, and ministries grouped under the State Administration Council. In comparison with the traditional system and with the five-power system of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the new organizational alignment has clearly restricted the prestige, the scope, and the independence of the disciplinary-surveillance institution.

With regard to techniques and powers, the new Committees and the Control Yüan of the Nationalists both differ from the old system in that they lack the traditional censorial emphasis on judicial matters—now relegated entirely to the domain of the judicial and procuratorial agencies. The modern counterpart of the old censor can no longer be considered a "judge at large." His participation in the formulation and execution of government policies has also been severely curtailed; the modern control agencies do not have a voice in the top-level deliberation of important matters, nor do their members appear actively to direct governmental projects of any sort. And even in the field of disciplinary surveillance itself, there has been a notable change. Thanks to its theoretical independence, the Control Yüan at least surveys the traditional, unlimited field of jurisdiction, but the new Committee at Peking presumably has jurisdiction only over administrative personnel subject to the State Administration Council, and not over personnel of the military, judicial, or procuratorial services.

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(Dec., 19, 1950). A full translation of a five-month Report by the Committee of People's Supervision of the Central-South administrative area appears in *Current Background* (Hong Kong, American Consulate General), No. 39, pp. 43–47 (Dec. 9, 1950).

[34] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 33, pp. 5–6 (Dec. 19, 1950.)

A most significant feature of both modern systems is the decline in importance of the individual censor, who was the unit of action in the traditional system. Although the individual member may initiate proceedings in the Nationalist Control Yüan, official action is taken only by the Yüan as a whole, through committees. And the individual seems to have become even more submerged in subcommittees and "investigatory units" under the Peking system.

The problem of motivation points up what are probably the most profound differences among the three systems under consideration. The effectiveness of any control institution depends upon the extent to which fear, greed, and vanity among its members are outweighed by a strong ideological motivation. This positive motivation was provided in the traditional system by the highly moral Confucian creed, together with the censorial heritage itself. Under Kuomintang tutelage there has been a partial adherence to the old morality and a partial assimilation of new, western concepts of morality. In Peking, zealous indoctrination in Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism, mixed with widespread enthusiasm for the vision of a New China, has created an entirely new ideological climate.

Though it provides for a type of disciplinary surveillance with some features roughly comparable to that of the traditional censorial system, the new control system in Communist China seems to lack any provision for remonstrance about the formulation of government policy. This function was a generally prescribed one, and the most dramatic activity, of the old censors. One wonders if the policy-criticism tradition may be considered latent at all under the new regime, and if so, when and how it might reëmerge.

At present, it is most unlikely that members of the new control organs might, through the influence of the native censorial tradition, arrogate to themselves the right to criticize the policies and persons of China's new rulers. The subordination of the organs of disciplinary surveillance to the central administration will militate against such an occurrence, as will the relative impotence of the individual in the system. The workings of "democratic centralism" and the ideological setting will probably leave no channel for it. However, as long as the Chinese are able to study their own history, the temptation to consider themselves the successors of the old Censorate may conceivably exist among the new control officials. Undoubtedly alert to the danger of traditionalistic reaction in general, the Chinese Communists must also be aware that the system they have created could in this way turn upon them in time of crisis. It is therefore hardly to be expected that they will hold up heroic censors of old as objects of emulation, or in any way encourage development toward the criticism of policy formulation by the control organs. After all, as the Chinese say, one does not deliberately give wings to a tiger.

# RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

## STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND THE PUBLICATION OF STATISTICS*

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The importance to an enemy's intelligence services of information regarding such targets vital to the United States as important installations, plant locations and shipping routes is generally recognized. Although the methods for withholding such information from the enemy are not foolproof, they are at least clear and unclouded by conflicting values. What is not so generally recognized is the importance, in connection with an enemy's plans for the destruction of targets, of detailed economic data. One of the few writers in this field expresses it this way:

> The targets which you are after constitute, in essence, the vulnerable areas of the enemy's way of making war and maintaining a functioning society; and these most vulnerable areas cannot be picked out from the least (or less) vulnerable areas until a great deal is known about the enemy's entire way of life and his entire way of making war. . . . Before the planes went off on their first mission of systematic destruction, the planners for the bombardment of Germany had to know a very great deal about the airframe, aircraft-engine and aircraft-component production, the production of ball bearings, of synthetic rubber, and of oil. Moreover, before they decided that these sectors of the economy were the ones whose destruction would give them the most significant, rapid and permanent weakening of German war-making capacity, they had to know a very great deal about other sectors.[1]

The usefulness of statistical information is more apparent in the waging of economic and psychological warfare than is its relevance to military targets. For instance, it can be presumed that when the enemy plans to cut off or impair our sources of supply of strategic and critical materials, he will first assemble such data as our production and consumption statistics, stockpile information, and foreign trade statistics. To confuse and frighten our citizens and allies, in the waging of psychological warfare, the foregoing types of information are equally important to him. Here, the emphasis is likely to be upon information regarding bottlenecks and production failures. In addition, the intelligence agent will find statistics on the public's attitudes and opinions highly useful.

Thus, enemy intelligence bases its operational plans to a great extent upon information about the United States' economy, and much of the information published about our economy consists of statistics issued by government agencies, or derivations from these statistics. There is need, then, in a period of international crisis, to maintain a surveillance of the publication of statistical

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[1] Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence* (Princeton, 1949), pp. 18–19

information by agencies of the government in order to prevent the disclosure of that information which might be most essential to an enemy's intelligence effort, and therefore harmful to the security of the United States.

During World War II, this responsibility was assigned to the Bureau of the Budget by Executive Order 9103, signed by President Roosevelt on March 18, 1942, in view of the Bureau's responsibility through its Division of Statistical Standards for the development, improvement, and coordination of federal statistical services. In November, 1950, President Truman directed the Bureau of the Budget to resume its surveillance of the publication of statistical information, a task which had been dropped immediately after V-J day. In reassigning this responsibility, President Truman, as did President Roosevelt before him, pointed out the extent to which our economy and society depend upon full and free publication of information, and urged that full consideration be given to the public's need for information whenever any curtailment should be contemplated.

When President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9103 in March, 1942, we had already been at war for over three months. In many respects the situation made momentous decisions easy to make, when the alternatives were victory or disaster. An Office of Censorship began its operations on almost the very day of Pearl Harbor, and the Office of Facts and Figures, later to become the Office of War Information, was organized soon after that. When the Bureau of the Budget received its assignment some time later, there was a framework into which its new function readily fitted: The Office of Censorship exercised authority over public and private communication, especially that flowing into and out of the United States; the Office of War Information, among its other duties, applied security standards to government top-level announcements and publications; and the Bureau of the Budget kept a close watch over statistical publications. Other nations, notably Great Britain, had already instituted far-reaching restrictions over the publication of statistics, and we were able to obtain advice and assistance from them, as well as to coordinate our own actions with theirs.

Furthermore, before the Executive Order was signed, the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Facts and Figures had listed the types of information to be restricted. It was, therefore, possible for the Bureau to issue, two days before the actual signing of the Order, a directive to all federal agencies outlining the needed restrictions. At the same time it was assumed by all concerned that the restrictions would in large measure end (as they did) the moment that victory was achieved.

Today the situation is very different in a number of respects, and each difference raises thorny problems:

(1) We are not engaged in a "shooting" war with the regime that most of us consider to be the menace to our security, namely, the Soviet Union. Should we impose drastic restrictions upon the publication of statistics on the premise that we will be engaged in such a war in the near future? What will happen to our statistical system if this "twilight" period lasts for five, ten, or twenty years?

(2) There is today no Office of Censorship, and patently the public is not prepared to support censorship. How effective can restrictions upon publication by federal agencies be when there is no control over international communications, and when possible future enemies can send information through diplomatic pouches?

(3) There is today no Office of War Information, nor does it appear likely that there will be one in the near future. The Bureau of the Budget can prevent routine publication of statistics by a federal agency, and statistical agencies can and do impose restrictions on their own initiative. But what if legislative or policy-making officials inadvertently make public facts and figures that have been withheld from more routine forms of publication?

(4) Most other friendly nations have not begun a program of restrictions on the publication of statistics. This problem is especially acute in respect to foreign trade data. The United States has been restricting certain data on exports for over two years, while some countries to whom we have been exporting continue the public release of certain import information on the very items which we have placed on a restricted list.

(5) The government and the nation are more aware of the needs for security safeguards than at the beginning of World War II and, therefore, insist upon more rigorous control of "classified" material. These safeguards have been made uniform on a government-wide basis by means of a recent executive order which sets forth minimum standards for the classification, transmission and handling of information of a "security" nature. This facilitates conformance with the imposition of restrictions. However, classified material of the higher categories requires such protective devices as safes and special facilities for the transmission of documents. Some agencies produce data which go through the hands of many clerks and analysts. To "classify" these data would entail security clearances for these clerks and analysts. That is to say, formalizing the handling and transmission of some types of classified material may involve expense and delay.

(6) Our economy was under strict control during World War II and, consequently, the responsibilities for making decisions upon production, distribution, capital investments, wage rates, etc., for which statistics would normally be needed by leaders in industry, farming, and labor, were taken out of their hands to a considerable extent. That is, the needs of the public for statistics were reduced. Present controls affect a much smaller segment of the economy, and the public needs for statistics are correspondingly greater than during the war.[2]

Largely as a result of these factors, decisions have been deferred upon the general categories of information which should be withheld under present circumstances.

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[2] This is true as an overall statement of the need for statistics in our economy. However, it should be pointed out that whenever possible under a system of restrictions upon publication, "qualified" users (and this category includes users outside the government), may be granted access to classified information.

These points of difference between the situation today and that of March, 1942, may be summarized by saying that there are wider needs for published statistics today than there were under the war conditions of 1942, and that in the absence of the whole complex of wartime controls on release of information it is now more difficult to conceal statistics. The conclusion which the Bureau of the Budget has drawn from this analysis is that restrictions upon the publication of statistical information must be imposed cautiously, and only after careful study. To this end, the procedure employed in determining restrictions to be imposed differs somewhat from that used during the war years.

The general categories in the 1942 list provided the framework within which the Bureau of the Budget carried out its responsibility for maintaining a surveillance of the publication of statistical information. Specific problems which arose after the list was promulgated were in large measure questions of interpretation.

Early in 1942, the Bureau called together representatives of agencies responsible for protecting the security of the United States and agencies primarily concerned with the collection and analysis of statistical information. They were asked to advise the Bureau on specific restrictions which were necessary in the interest of the national security. From the very beginning, it was clear that agreements on restrictions would be very difficult to obtain from such a group. The security-minded representatives, aware of the importance to strategic intelligence of almost all types of economic data, favored drastic limitations; the representatives of statistical agencies, mindful of the great reliance of the American public upon full and accurate statistical information, were appalled at the thought of any restrictions upon statistical publication. After a vain attempt to reconcile these antithetical viewpoints, the Bureau turned for assistance to the Security Advisory Board, a body which the Bureau helped to establish and which represented the agencies responsible for protecting the national security.

Whenever a specific problem arose concerning publication of statistics which was not amenable to prompt interpretation in accordance with the published list of restrictions, the Bureau of the Budget sought guidance from the Security Advisory Board or its member agencies. These were the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information. At the same time, the Bureau continued to seek the advice and expert knowledge of the statistical agencies in order to be sure that it had an adequate understanding of the statistical interrelationships of any given series and that public interests in statistics were taken into account before a decision was reached.

Today a basic list of items for which information should be restricted has not yet been, and perhaps should not yet be, formulated, for reasons which have been enumerated above. These reasons are predicated on the essential difference between the politico-military situation in 1942 and the situation today. In 1942, we were waging all-out war. Today, we are building such strength as will enable us to win any war that is forced upon us; but our primary object is to *prevent* war. We hope to convince possible enemies that our strength is such that they cannot hope to win a war against us. Hence, it has been argued that we should disseminate as widely as possible information about our defense production effort.

There are, however, at least two flaws in this argument. In the first place, full publication of our armed strength would cancel out our advantage, in the event of attack upon us, from the elements of surprise in our retaliation. For example, the value to the enemy of information about our stockpile of atom bombs becomes obvious if we ask how valuable it would be to us if we knew the size of the Soviet stockpile of the same weapons. We are confident that our supply of these bombs is larger than that of Soviet Russia, but does this mean that we should publish statistics telling the world exactly or approximately how many we possess? Such information would be of extreme importance to the Soviet intelligence organization, and would be invaluable in helping the USSR plan military operations. Similarly, information about our new weapons and their characteristics would enable the Soviet military to plan counterweapons or to perfect methods of defense.

Secondly, we have not yet, as of recent date, been in a position of overwhelming strength. There have been definite weaknesses in our supplies of strategic and critical materials, and we have not yet built up our Army, Navy, Air Force and industrial facilities to the strength that we feel necessary for our defense. From this point of view, it would appear that we should not make available to the enemy information which would indicate the weak spots in our defense effort, or indications of our plans and methods for correcting these weaknesses.

In World War II, the American war agencies strove to maintain a vigilant surveillance of the routine publication of information regarding the nation's war production and strategic plans and operations, and at the same time to give the widest possible distribution to spot announcements illustrative of our growing strength. Such psychological devices were designed to influence the people of enemy and neutral countries and occupied areas. The same overall policy would appear to be advisable today, were it not that the difficulties of concealment under present circumstances, together with the needs of our people for information, prevent so simple a general solution to the problem of security.

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The uses which enemy intelligence can make of economic and strategic information in a time of war or in a time of planning for armed attack upon us may be summarized under three headings: statistics may provide target information, clues to military strategy, and guides to the waging of economic and psychological warfare.

A target is disclosed to a hostile or unfriendly power by information concerning the location or character of a military or naval installation or unit, a plant or facility for war production, a land or water movement, or a route over which troops, strategic materials or products are moved. "Target" is used in a broad sense, to include objects of potential sabotage as well as of shell-fire, bombing, or submarine action. Statistics on imports and exports may reveal the sailing of a ship and the location of ocean trade routes. Construction and transportation statistics might indicate plans for the erection of a munitions plant or the transport of strategic materials by rail or highway.

Clues to military strategy may be disclosed by statistical data of seeming innocence. For example, statistics which indicated an exceptional increase in the production of certain types or weights of men's gloves or underwear might provide a "tip-off" to an impending military expedition to the arctic or the tropics, as the case might be. Domestic commodity shipments to certain ports might disclose prospective embarkations and their destinations. Statistical series on national income, broken down into major components, may furnish clues as to the size of the armed forces. Data on industrial employment or payrolls are almost as useful to the enemy's economic analysts as are the corresponding industry figures on production.

The directors of economic and psychological warfare may utilize almost any item of information concerning the economic and social system of the nation toward which their plans are directed. Their objects are to build up rounded and comprehensive pictures of the economy and the social psychology of a nation; to determine its elements of strength and weakness; to forecast general economic, social and political trends; and, in the light of these, to develop specifications for military, economic, political or psychological attack. Their further object is to forecast the possibilities of defensive or aggressive action by the nation whose social and economic vitality is thus examined.

Unless in any segment of the economy free enterprise is completely replaced by government directives—and this situation rarely exists outside of the Soviet Union and its satellites today—a continued public supply of statistical data is important. Hence, all contemplated actions which would restrict the publication of statistical information must balance off the disadvantages of these actions to individual citizens and to the nation against the advantages to hostile or unfriendly powers of continued access to the same information.

A point which deserves comment is the frequently advanced contention that the United States publishes such an enormous amount of statistical data, and has done so for so many years, that it is actually impossible adequately to conceal the basic facts about our economic and military strength. It is alleged that a skilled economist or statistician, having at hand our voluminous statistical publications for the past years, can make accurate estimates of the present situation in regard to almost any segment of our economy. The conclusion derived from this is that restrictions on publication will deprive the public of the statistical information it needs, while enemy intelligence will continue to be well informed.

This point of view is essentially the counsel of defeat. A skilled statistician can arrive at amazingly accurate estimates based upon seemingly innocuous information; but how long does it take him to find this "innocuous" information, how much effort and time must he expend in order to arrive at his estimate, and how can he tell whether the estimate is accurate without published data to use as a baseline? In maintaining surveillance of the publication of statistics, we think it axiomatic that, while it is not always possible completely to restrict access to information, enemy access can be made more difficult. To create such an obstacle is in the national interest. There are limits upon the possibilities of espionage, and enemy efforts expended in one penetration of our security defenses cannot simultaneously be expended in another.

Thus there are at least three possible advantages to be gained by restricting enemy access to information. More effort and time must be expended in obtaining the data, some data will not be obtained at all, and those data which are ferreted out will in many cases be obtained so late as to be practically useless. In addition, as more parts of an enemy intelligence organization are compelled to switch from "overt" to "covert" operations, its personnel runs a greater risk of detection and apprehension.

When the time gap between the date of publication of the latest statistics and the date of their use is small, the data can be brought up-to-date by an expert analyst with a good degree of accuracy. But as this gap in time increases, the margin of error increases. Thus in 1938 the Japanese government began systematically to restrict the publication of statistical information. Four years later, experts in Washington were compelled to admit almost complete failure in their efforts to estimate Japanese production and other economic data.

If a program of concealment of carefully selected items is to be initiated, it should, ideally, be begun in advance of the most critical period of a national emergency. For the United States at present, such action is something of a gamble since there is no way of knowing whether the situation of today will become more serious or not. If it does not become more serious, we will have imposed unnecessary restrictions upon the full and free flow of statistical information. If the situation does become more serious, we will have acted wisely on the whole, in restricting the enemy's access to our most important economic information. The Bureau of the Budget up to the present time has striven to walk the middle road by restricting only the most obviously important data.

How, then, do we determine which data are to be concealed? The one broad guiding principle under which our policy is formulated is that we should seek to prevent publication of information having a value to enemy intelligence which outweighs its importance to the American public. This kind of information was spelled out during World War II and included such general categories as statistics of aircraft, ordnance and the size, composition or movement of the armed forces.

Our instructions to the federal statistical agencies in 1942 were that publication of production schedules, progress reports, and other statistics which would reveal the current or prospective situation concerning these and other items on the list, should be restricted. The data withheld would have been of value to an enemy's intelligence because they provided target information or clues to such information, gave direct or indirect indications of military strategy, and in many cases provided guides to the waging of economic warfare.

To be more specific, let us see how information in one important category—our exports and imports—combined with information about another class of data—our shortages of strategic and critical materials—could be used by enemy agents. Knowing that the United States is suffering from a shortage of rubber and tin, adding to this knowledge data on our imports and on the sources of these commodities, what can an enemy's intelligence agency do to prevent the United States from overcoming this shortage? The following news article from the *Washington Star* of January 21, 1951, makes the answer painfully clear:

> Leading British newspapers, including the London *Times* and Manchester *Guardian* have recently called attention to the lawlessness which has swept across the rubber and tin producing areas in Africa and Asia. One of the worst spots is Nigeria.
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> A Nigerian newspaper, the West African *Pilot*, published at Lagos, says that the "Rivers Province," where the detrital deposits are rich with casiterite (tin), are under a virtual reign of terror. Watchmen on large properties are being slain regularly and many districts have been practically cut off. One of the most alarming developments has been the Communist infiltration into the effeke, or Egho, secret society, one of the strongest in that part of Africa. It was formerly concentrated largely on the coast and was a stabilizing influence, but today, suddenly well-financed, it is reaching far into the back country and protecting bandits from the police.
>
> In Brazil the destruction of rubber plantations began in August and has been continuing. One newspaper reports that the Caiapos Indians are on the warpath against all American and Allied properties in the distant Amazon country and especially on the rich banks of the Xingu River. These activities have been connected with the invasion of the district by small groups of free-spending Communists. Destruction around Belem, one of the best sources, has been heavy.
>
> The Bangkok *Post* reports that during the early part of December Communist bands were operating in the nearby Malay peninsula on such a scale that the government there had stated that it was spending half its revenues on keeping a force of 20,000 men in the field against the outlaws. Yet Malaysia is the source of about half of the world's rubber today. Part of its sales last year had to be from old stocks. One of the heaviest buyers was Russia.

During the present period, the Bureau of the Budget has taken action in respect to only two of the items listed for restrictions during World War II, and a third will be reactivated in the near future. Certain export information which would reveal the composition, amounts and destinations of our shipments under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program is being restricted, and figures which would reveal the status of our armed forces strength have been eliminated from various government publications. A policy statement on the publication of individual defense contract awards and itemized procurement information is at this date being prepared. In other words, the list used as a framework in 1942 is not uniformly applicable today and must be brought up to date if it is to meet the needs of the present situation.

The actions enumerated above have been taken upon the advice of the Committee on Statistical Security, an interdepartmental advisory group which the Bureau of the Budget has organized to assist in developing plans and procedures for the surveillance of statistical publication. The committee is composed of representatives of those agencies deemed to have the greatest responsibilities for the national security, with a staff member of the Bureau of the Budget presiding. Those with preconceived ideas of the attitudes of the "military" and of "security-minded" personnel might expect that such a group would advocate immediate and drastic curtailment of statistical publications. However, the Committee has been remarkably sympathetic to continuing the publication of as full an amount of information as possible. The best proof of this is to be found in the limited actions, outlined above, so far taken upon this group's recommendations.

The methods used by the Bureau of the Budget in reaching a decision on problems in the field of statistical publication can best be illustrated by a description of the procedure which was followed when a particular type of information was under discussion for possible restrictions.

Soon after the President's directive to the Bureau of the Budget had been issued, the Bureau was asked for advice in regard to publication of import statistics. From the standpoint of the national security, there were good reasons for restricting such information: import statistics reveal our sources of critical and strategic materials with the possible result that these sources could be impaired, as shown by the foregoing extract from the *Washington Star*; increased imports of certain materials with well-defined uses would reveal increased production of the end-products and might conceivably indicate strategic planning. However, before a decision could be made to restrict publication of this information, certain questions had to be resolved. Should all import statistics be restricted, or only statistics for a limited number of commodities? If a limited number, which commodities? Once a list of commodities should be tentatively selected, what difficulties would arise in implementing a decision to restrict import data for them?

The answer to the first question was easy; there was no doubt that the restrictions, if imposed, should fall on as small a group of commodities as possible.

To answer the next question—which commodities?—the Committee on Statistical Security asked the Bureau of the Budget to convene a working group of specialists in the field of foreign trade. This group, representing major statistical and security agencies with interests in foreign trade, held several lengthy meetings and subsequently submitted a list of thirty commodities, out of the many thousands imported by the United States, for which statistics might advantageously be restricted. In order to select this list, the working group had developed, among others, the following criteria:

a. The commodity is of critical or strategic importance to the United States' defense effort;
b. The United States is wholly or in large part dependent upon imports of the commodity;
c. The commodity is currently being stockpiled;
d. There are no satisfactory substitutes for the commodity.

All of the thirty commodities submitted by the working group met at least these four criteria.

There would seem to be little doubt about the desirability of restricting information regarding imports of such a list of commodities, but there was still the third question to answer: What difficulties might there be in restricting this information? Briefly, the answer to this question was that the restrictions on import statistics would accomplish little, or nothing, if data on production, consumption, etc., continued to be published. Were we prepared to extend the restrictions to cover these data too? The answer to this question has not yet been resolved.

Again, most foreign governments are currently making available export data which, when they name the United States as the destination of exported commodities, may give approximately the information we might wish to restrict (i.e., statistics on our imports). Moreover, there are certain commodities which are imported by a small number of companies, and complete or fairly complete statistics on these imports, which can be obtained from the importing companies, appear in trade journals. These statistics would continue to appear regardless of Budget Bureau restrictions, unless the journals could be persuaded to cooperate. Obviously, the Bureau of the Budget has no authority to censor trade publications.

However, these difficulties are not insurmountable. We can be optimistic concerning the willingness of friendly foreign nations to cooperate with our program of restrictions; production and consumption statistics can be restricted; and trade journals can be persuaded of the necessity for concealment. When, and if, it becomes apparent that these statistics should be restricted, the Bureau of the Budget will not hesitate to take such action and make such arrangements as may be necessary.

Up to the present, restrictions on import statistics have not been imposed. In the case of other categories of information, some restrictions have been imposed either by the Bureau of the Budget or by other federal agencies, acting in cooperation with the Bureau or independently. Thus there are some restrictions on data concerning aircraft, new weapons production, and overseas bases; on certain export statistics; on size, composition and movement of the armed forces; on certain aspects of defense contract awards; and on our stockpile operations.

If the international situation in which this country is involved could be located at either of two extremes—total war or genuine peace—the question of what controls, if any, are to be imposed upon our federal statistical publications would be easier to answer. In case of the certainty of genuine peace, of course, there would be full publication; in case of total war, we would have a clearly defined framework within which controls would be imposed, and a workable mechanism for formulating and implementing the controls. Our present reluctance to take sweeping action stems from what John Foster Dulles has so aptly termed the "indecisiveness" of our present problems. It is worthwhile, we think, to quote at greater length a passage from his Tucson, Arizona speech of May, 1951, to illustrate how closely the problem faced by the Bureau of the Budget, as described in this article, is related to the much wider problem faced by the American government and by the American people:

> . . . we are engaged in a gigantic sacrificial effort, of a kind which, in the past, we have made only in the face of obvious and dire peril and only to force an early decision which would end the necessity for such sacrifices. Today, the peril to our homeland seems to many to be somewhat speculative, while continuance of our present measures could impair the very foundations of our American way of life without forcing an abandonment of Soviet strategy. . . . I have deliberately chosen to present the problem in terms of what, to the American temperament, is its most baffling aspect, namely, *indecisiveness*.

Lest this passage be misinterpreted, it should be emphasized that it is the *problem*, or the situation, which is indecisive; our reaction, both in the larger context of our defense effort and in the small area discussed in this article, has been positive. We are rapidly approaching a state of preparedness.

# AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSE

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The battleground of administrative theory has witnessed the rise of functional-institutionalism, under the banners of Gulick and others, and the yielding, in part, of its "principles" to the hordes of the iconoclastic "pragmatic revolt" (or the cult of "administrationism" as Waldo labeled it). But just as legal realism has been interpreted by some observers as law's acid bath, so, too, this new "administrative realism" is considered by many a catharsis, not a cure.

Some present-day theorists have attempted to throw normative life-lines to the administrator. Appleby has written of the socio-political role of the administrative process. Barnard and Friedrich have called upon the administrator to act under the rubric of his moral responsibility. Others on the organizational level—Stene for example—have attempted to derive a "pure theory of organization," not based upon all-embracing, clearly predictive rules, but rather in the form of theories of "administrative statics" (another Waldoism) which may be cast over a framework of the concrete purposes of any specific administrative situation.[1] The underlying continuum supporting both the social norms of Appleby, Barnard and Friedrich, and the organizational theoretics of Stene, is *purpose*. Indeed, defined purpose alone could make sensible Stene's axiom that "The degree to which any given organization approaches the full realization of its objectives tends to vary directly with the coordination of individual effort." If the objectives are discoverable only by hindsight, a query may well be raised: Does coordination exist because the purpose was realized, or is the purpose realized because coordination existed? Clearly, a well-grounded theory of public administration must be based on a predictively refined approach to the concept of *purpose*.

The objective of the following essay is the development of a philosophy of purpose. Part I points to the relation which purpose bears to its sister concepts, knowledge, prediction, and power. Part II stresses heavily Herbert Simon's present-day attempt (which is representative in the administrative literature) to structure the behavior systems of administrative activity and to develop an epistemology for administrative analysis largely upon the theoretical groundwork of the philosophy of science known as "logical positivism." Part II represents the reduction of the methodological premises of this theory to the terminology of the psychological premises of Part I. Part III, in conclusion, redefines some administrative concepts in accord with a refined philosophy of purpose.

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[1] Edwin O. Stene, "An Approach to a Science of Administration," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 34, pp. 1127–1137 (Dec. 1940). Also see Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948), p. 185. In Chapter 9 Waldo says, in effect, that *purpose* is the basic concept of an administrative science.

## I. SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

DEFINITION NUMBER ONE: KNOWLEDGE. *All knowledge stems from, and exists for, the sake of action. In addition, the locus of meaning lies in behavior.*

Knowledge is the product of action. Each new experience of man involves consideration of three images, or stages, of action. He assesses his present situation. He then selects those sections of past experience which exist in his conscious mind. These two images finally combine to create a contemplation or expectation of future experience. The degree of man's rationality is measured by his ability to foresee and assess the variables of an expected situation in terms of past occurrences and present conditions; and his knowledge is synonymous with the rational process whereby past action is utilized to base expectations of future experience.

Similarly, the locus of meaning lies in action. For example, a definition of boiled water illustrates that inherent in the meaning of the concept are the progressive steps or actions whereby the desired state is attained. In like manner, a "policy" becomes defined only if all the administrative operations effectuating it are described retrospectively, or are describable prospectively. In semantics, those words whose denotable referents are the product of the most common experience are the words most easily understood. To Quixote, windmills meant armies because he acted as if they were armies. With Sancho Panza these same objects evoked a different pattern of behavior. Common experience makes for mutual understanding.

DEFINITION NUMBER TWO: PURPOSE. *Purpose is the expressed desire man has for a general future state, which desire is a manifestation of past action and experience.*

Purpose is man's rational explanation for existence and action. It is a product of all his past activity, and is the ongoing aspect of knowledge. Since man cannot know the totality of his past experience, similarly his purpose, or calculation of future experience, must necessarily be broad and vague. "All I want is enough to eat and a roof over my head," epitomizes a common purpose. Of course, if man could summon to mind all past action affecting him at all times, he could, theoretically, predict precisely what his immediate future would be. But if he could so absolutely predict the future, by the same token he could not control it. He could neither select nor choose alternatives, since this would destroy the prediction. On the other hand, if man could bring none of his past experience to mind before action, his future existence would be in serious peril.

Between the extremes of determinism and purposelessness, and irrationality and purposelessness, lies knowledge. Purpose is knowledge oriented toward the future. The concept of purpose, then, implies the desire of the human being to increase the awareness of the variables conditioning his existence, so that he may be better able to control his future. Though apparently paradoxical, the more he knows his limitations, the freer man is, for this enables him to scale down his general purpose-system to fit reality. The end result of this process is the refinement of the general purpose-system itself.

DEFINITION NUMBER THREE: PREDICTION. *Prediction is the process whereby the external general-purpose system is refined through development of internal systems or more exact expectations.*

Prediction is the process whereby purposive action is analyzed, organized and refined. It represents the attempt to set up concrete internal systems of more exact expectation, within the broad external purpose systems. In natural science, the observer studies an environment of limited variables to discover patterns and laws of behavior. These laws are essentially "frozen behavior" which the scientist can thaw out at any time. Through logical consistency, the experimenter develops exact expectations and predictions (or high-level probabilities thereof). Where conflicting experimental data burst out from the limits of logical consistency, there the scientist recasts his theoretic scheme to "explain away" the contradiction—which was the origin of quantum mechanics. Conversely, when the logical scheme grows too large for the field of consistent empirical data, it often dissolves as soon as the data "catch up" with it. Such was the case with the development and consequent abandonment of the theoretical concept of an "ether."

Social science, in turn, following the general philosophy of natural science, deals with general purpose systems in an attempt to define the goals of a social situation. Government is an institutional device whereby conflicting normative systems are debated and settled. Within governmental institutions, private groups, as well as social science analysts, tend to publicize, clarify, and organize group goals.

The trend is for natural science to fill the general purpose systems with concrete behavioral rules, which, in turn, lend greater meaning, in the sense of predictive guides, to the norms of the external system. In this way, natural science refines and makes more responsible the social process of settling normative behavior. (For example, in the fields of health and social welfare, the general purpose system becomes more meaningful with the advent of medicine and psychology.) Both the natural and the social science disciplines complement one another in the degree to which they mutually are able to control the future.

DEFINITION NUMBER FOUR: POWER. *Power is the measure of the degree to which what is attained, as a result of calculated action, conforms to the initially sought desire or purpose.*

Power is the measure of the accomplishment of purpose through prediction. It is based upon the ability to select the best process whereby the desired goal may be most closely approximated and thus represents man's capacity for awareness of the variables conditioning any projected activity. The power process involves two steps. First, the individual must analyze and scale the range of his desires and wants. Then he must select that desire which represents the most advantageous compromise with his awareness of the conditioning variables. The spoiled child, who need not compromise demand by his own action, has, for that very reason, more power than the tired mother. The magnitude of an individual's power is greatest when the desired is equated to the achieved. As the discrepancy between the goal-in-view and what is attained increases, power, conversely, wanes.[2]

The observer's determination of the power which one group "has" over another follows the same general pattern. Thus, in a case in which a lobby has tried to "influence" a legislature, to measure the degree of power of the one over the other, the first step, as above, would involve categorization of the range of interests and demands of the respective bodies. Such information could be gathered through a study of the past behavior and the present expressions of purpose of the individual groups. Then would follow a description of the totality of intergroup behavior, occurring at both the formal and informal level (from legislature to hotel room). Finally, the prediction of how much power the one group exerted would be made, based on the sum of this information. To verify the prediction, the tenor (or value-orientation) of the law actually passed would be matched with the forementioned catalog of interests to deduce the degree of modification in the expectancies of each group. The accuracy of the prediction could then be verified.

It may be objected that even though the new *law* might make possible the preferred future behavior of one group, this fact alone would not prove that the group had *caused* it to take shape. Causation however, in both natural and social science is a relative, not a metaphysical concept. Thus, if one could affirm that a number of events, "x, y, z" (entertaining a Senator at dinner, etc.) had, over a reasonable period of space-time, been the "accepted way of" (i.e., had preceded) event "A" (law favorable to the entertainer), and a number of time-related events had established a sequential chain—then whether or not these events *caused* "A" would be immaterial. The only valid question would be whether event "A" could be predicted to "happen after" events "x," "y," and "z."

The power process, then, describes these stages: (1) Man acts. (2) The sum effect of these acts alter's man's unconscious drives and conscious purposes. (3) Man relates conscious purpose to future action by assessing the compromise he will have to make of desire to predicted action. He creates the most favorable balance of these two factors. This marks the degree of power he expects to have. (4) He acts. (5) The power he has is now measured by the degree to which the attainment of his goal conforms to the desired goal-in-view.

The old saw "the proof of the pudding is in the eating" may serve to clarify this concept of power. Before it is consumed, "pudding" may differ, in the mind of the eater, from pudding after it is consumed. Thus, if one eats pudding hurriedly, and becomes distressed, then the poorly digested pudding is "different" from the viewed pudding simply because it was not as "good" as one had anticipated; because of miscalculation of process, the attained end differs measurably from the desired end. The consumer's power in relation to the pudding (i.e., his ability to satisfy a desire) was, as a direct result of his action, diminished. The saying might be rewritten thus: "The power one has to satisfy his desire for pudding, is directly proportional to his ability to predict the process whereby he may act relative to pudding to effectuate that desire." Prediction of the eating *process* defines what the pudding actually is. This process approach reveals the inherent meaning of power.

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[2] The use of the label "power" is only for sake of convenience. The institutional label of the peculiar situation would dictate the suitable *designatum*. In law, "decision" or "authority" might be used. In ethics, "responsibility" or "morality" might be employed.

RECAPITULATION: KNOWLEDGE represents the catalog of a large body of past human action. PURPOSE represents the arrangement of some of this knowledge in the contemplation of a general future course of action. PREDICTION consists in the search for a fuller prescience of action within general purpose, directed toward the satisfaction of a shorter-range desire. POWER measures the degree to which attained desire, as a result of predicted action, conforms to the initially-sought desire.

## II. PURPOSE AND PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

In *Administrative Behavior*,[3] Herbert A. Simon introduces to the field of public administration the value theory of the school of philosophy known as "logical positivism." The core concept of the positivist theory holds that two elements are inherent in most human utterances or statements: a factual element and an ethical one. Insofar as any observation in experience would be relevant to the determination of the statement's truth or falsity, then, to this extent the proposition asserts a fact subject to verification. In the degree to which an imperative element or a choice is implicit in the proposition, to this extent the statement is ethical.. In short, a factual element is one equatable to empirical verifiability; an ethical element is one equatable to subjective choice or selection.[4] The proposition "To boil water, steps 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' are requisite" is a highly factual one because the substance of its assertion may be exactly proved by experience. But to be meaningful as a guide to action, the statement must at some future time be chosen for use, implementation, or testing.[5] It is this criterion of instrumentality which clarifies the element of choice implicit in every proposition.[6] However, the fact that the location of the choice in space-time is often indeterminate (and ultimately arbitrary), leads Simon to the proper conclusion that "Decisions are something more than factual propositions."[7] The "something more" to which he refers, he relegates to the arbitrary, undefinable, and vague area of human choice. At this juncture, where propositions become convertible from the epistemological to the psychological processes—here the positivists clearly perceive the boundary line for the delimitation of their field of analysis.[8]

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[3] (New York, 1947), Ch. 3.

[4] Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (2nd ed., London, 1950), pp. 38, 102–110. Also see Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.

[5] The word "verifiable" means not only truth ("veri"), but its definition through action ("fiable").

[6] A conventional syntactical shorthand employed by the logical positivists serves to emphasize this point. This is the "if-then" chain of linked propositions. If one rephrases the above proposition to read "If one wants to boil water, then steps 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' are requisite," the "if" clause indicates the element of choice, and the "then" clause denotes the verified consequence.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

But it is undeniable that the great concern of administration lies with this very element of choice and selection. Realization of this leads Simon from the epistemological plane of positivism—wherein the positivist approach, among other things, "clarifies the distinction so often made in the literature of administration, between policy questions and questions of administration"[9] to the psychological realm of the decision-making process, where, admittedly, "the separation between the ethical and the factual elements in judgment can usually be carried only a short distance."[10] But if the logical plane of positivism represents the distillation of the factual elements from an area of systematized inquiry (i.e., the judgment process), and if the yield from the pragmatics of the situational context be so lean, it may be asked just what is the substance that remains for logical clarification? The point is that the methodological premise for both epistemology and pragmatics is the same; the goal, or norm, common to both fields is the belief in prediction. The one represents the search for predictively accurate hypotheses; the other represents the individual or group quest for predictive guides to action. So long as this mutuality holds true, then, as the field of administration gradually becomes more systematized, the epistemological yield will accordingly increase.

The present essay represents an attempt to structure the methodology of administration through the working concepts of "purpose" and "process." As will be demonstrated below, this approach not only is entirely consistent with the positivist philosophy, but, in addition, can clarify the degree to which statements are "factual" (through the continuum of predictability). This approach also has the advantage of using the terms of decision-making and action rather than of epistemological analysis.

It was pointed out above that the concept of verifiability lies at the heart of the logical positivist theoretic. A verifiable proposition was defined as one which anticipates experience. Converted to subjective terms, a factual proposition is one which affords an individual some prediction of behavior. Where, for example, the observer sees his environment in terms of "boiling water," then he may visualize a strict limitation of this situation in terms of "process" (in terms of the factual proposition relative to the water-boiling procedure). This is true, simply because, in this instance, purpose and process become interchangeable.[11] Here the degree of verifiability is high. But whether the observer will decide to invoke this process will, in turn, be determinable by the degree to which he sees this delimitation of choice as contributory to a supervening, preëxistent purpose (e.g., the desire to purify water, or the craving for coffee).

"Purpose" thus becomes definable as the element which impels choice (the ethical element), that choice arising in an environment to a degree less delimitable (or predictable) than the environment of the consequent process.[12] In terms of the positivist analysis, "purpose" describes the environment where the ethical and factual elements are commingled. On a time scale, the system arising before (i.e., the system "conditioning") choice is the "purpose system"; that consequent on choice is designated the "process system." The quantitative differential between a purpose system and a process system is simply this: In a purpose system the degree of verifiability (or predictability) of choice is lower than that occurring in a process system. Graphically, any behavioral situation might be visualized as lying on a continuum of predictability, running, left to right, from no predictability to complete predictability thus:

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[8] See, for example, Rudolf Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago, 1950), pp. 37–42.

[9] Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 45. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[11] See Part I, Prediction and Power.

| Purposelessness | Purpose | | Purpose | Determinism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (predictability) | | |
| No Process | Process (low-level) | | Process (high-level) | Absolute Process |

Where neither choice nor a conditioning element of choice is discoverable (at the left end of the continuum), choice is indefinable. The great body of the continuum represents the area where choice and delimitation are interactive, running from that area where choice is less predictable to the situation where choice becomes meaningful through process. At the right terminal of the continuum, choice again becomes meaningless. Choice at this end is absent not because of total lack of predictability, but rather because of the total awareness thereof. This is the philosopher's realm of determinism. The following discussion of a concrete decisional situation will help to clarify this stratification of the environment of judgment in terms of prediction.

*1. The Element of "Purpose" in Decision-Making.* Simon illustrates his factual-ethical scheme by recourse to a passage in the United States Army *Infantry Field Manual,* wherein he finds these three main premises:

1. Attack successfully!
2. An attack is successful only when carried out under conditions of surprise.
3. The conditions of surprise are concealment of the time and place of attack, etc.[13]

Statement 1, Simon designates as ethical, since it contains an imperative quality. Statements 2 and 3, however, because they are themselves non-imperative, are "purely factual."[14]

Reduced to pragmatic terms, Statement 1 is purposive in the sense that to the one who "believes" in attacking successfully, it affords but little predictive clue as to what process is involved in equating actual success to desired success. If one wants to attack successfully, he must search for the conditioning variables of his behavioral context which will provide implementation of this desire. Therefore, "Attack successfully!" is purposive because it only qualifiedly predicts a process whereby a successful attack can be achieved.

Assume that Statement 1 were replaced by "Stage a mock attack on the allied encampment!" This would be a highly purposive statement in that it does not describe the process whereby the mock attack might best be effectuated. But assume that Statements 2 and 3 above were used by the actor to refine the process involved in a mock attack. The internal consistency of 2 and 3 would not be impaired by their application to this purpose system, since the attack would indeed be a surprise attack. But their appropriateness to the purposive proposition would be seriously defective. When the proposition became a fact (when purpose became an actuality), it would appear that the undesired and unforeseen consequences involved in attaining the purpose would outweigh achievement. Because of the improper choice of the process, the desirable goal was not "reached," in the sense that it was not desired upon attainment.

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[12] See Part I, Purpose.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

[14] *Idem.*

So it is that when the observer misinterprets the environment of his decision, as in this hypothetical case, no limited or isolated number of predictive facts will rectify the purposive miscalculation. The ultimate objective must be carefully weighed in respect to the total fact situation, so that it may be effectuated through the observer's power to predict. The pyramidic devolution from the ethical apex to the levels of greater predictability develops only after a careful appraisal of the total behavioral situation. But connecting each link in the process chain from the original desire to the attained goal, is an evaluation, or prediction, that each such step will be vital to the total purpose. The more the observer is able to analyze the interrelated environmental factors involved, the more he is able to predict the attainment of the desired goal; but the cement which holds these factual bricks together is the evaluation process. Conversely, the less the evaluative process is capable of being refined through this brick path of facts, the greater the content of unpredictability. Expectation can never, through process analysis, be entirely predictable, since the environment of purpose cannot be known in its totality. Where the predictive element is of a low-level, there the observer's environment may be largely designated a "purpose system."

*2. The Element of "Process" in Decision-Making.* In theory, every decision is a factual judgment. Assume that in Simon's illustration the commander, with absolutely no knowledge of Statements 2, 3, or any others, had shouted: "Attack successfully!" When asked, after the resulting debacle, why he did so, he might reply: "I said it because I wanted to." Here, then, would be a purposive statement of the highest degree of imperative and arbitrariness. A desire was formed and rashly enunciated; defeat ensued. But suppose that the commander, immersed in the continuum of determinism, could know the totality of past and present variables conditioning his every situation. Then he might utter "Attack successfully!" because he was going to try to do so, and "because" his army was going to be defeated as a result. He could do nothing to alter the fact of his utterance of "Attack successfully!" and this very statement would be a valid prediction of (in the sense that it would precede) a previsioned pattern of activity. Just as "Boil water!" predicts the events there involved, so, too, the commander's utterance would predict all that would follow it. In the case of determinism, no imperative statement could logically exist, since evaluation and judgment imply a conscious choice; and complete knowledge of the future bars any control over it. Within the deterministic premise, all values would become absolute facts, and thereby would possess equal validity.[15]

Within a general purpose system, the factual elements may be so arranged and understood that an apparently arbitrary utterance such as "Attack successfully!" engenders a whole series of anticipated reactions which will implement the sought goals. The ejaculation would be analogous to the pulling of a trigger on a cleaned, loaded, and well-aimed rifle, when the desire was to hit the target. It would say something about the observable world, in the same manner as "Fire!" shouted in a crowded theater, or a cry of "Help!" in the presence of a policeman would evoke a predictable process of events.

The search of the observer within any system is for that consistent chain of processes which represents the fulfillment of a preconceived purpose. The chain describes the step-by-step reduction of a general purpose system to process. The general purpose system gives rise to some process system. These systems synthesize to form another purpose system, which impels a consequent process system; and so on until the overall purpose system itself becomes defined. As between any two systems, or contexts for action, where the nature of the one situation allows for less predictability than that of the other, the former, to the observer, may be thought of as a "purpose system." Since the latter system allows for a more careful mapping out of future action, it may be thought of as a "process system."

## III. SOME BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE CONCEPTS RECONSIDERED

*1. Organization.* Every organization represents an attempt to refine some broad social purpose system by the rough structuring of process systems through which the purpose is effectuated. Within the organization group itself, there exist special (or internal) purpose systems and process systems. Each such special purpose system has its internal process system, and conversely, each process system has its own internal purpose system. The differentiation between a purpose and a process group on all these levels, lies in the degree to which each system's patterns of behavior are predictable. Where one system has a higher level of predictable behavior than another, it may be called a "process system" relative to that other. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers is a purpose system in relation to the Treasury Department, though relative to the President himself it is a process body. This is so because in answer to the key question of "How are you going to act over the next year's time?", the Treasury's reply is the most behaviorally predictable. The President's response is the least predictable.

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[15] Waldo's discussion of the "naturalistic fallacy" is apposite here. The fallacy lies in the belief that any "ought" for human conduct may be derived from an array of "is's"—or the belief that any value statement may be derived from any number of facts (*op. cit.*, p. 82). But the above discussion demonstrates that a factual statement is meaningful in the pragmatic sense only if it at some time becomes subject to choice. All facts thereby become instrumentalities. They are then meaningful only as "oughts." The only fact independent of choice lies in the context of determinism. It then becomes evident that no "is" (i.e., determinism) can ever be deduced from any array of "oughts."

Does the continuum of predictability of behavior yield any "principle" which might be applicable to reorganization? Luther Gulick treats of "purpose" and "process" organizations in his development of functional principles of organization.[16] Instead of refining these terms, he turns to a functional definition of the practical consequences of the one or the other method of organization in terms of prestige factors and coördination. Simon points to the fundamental ambiguities inherent in the terms "purpose" and "process" which defeat their utility. The most he does to clear this ambiguity is to assert that there is no essential differences between a "purpose" and a "process," but that the distinction is only one of degree.[17] The "distinction of degree" which Simon adverts to is that which lies on the continuum of predictability of behavior.

Let us assume the reorganizational problem faced by a city administration with respect to the question of physician employees. Let us assume further that heretofore the doctors have been deployed among the various purpose departments of the city administration without regard to their process similarities. The issue is: Should this group be reorganized on a city-wide basis as a process department? Utilization of the predictability test would involve the analysis of the behavior patterns of each small group of departmental physicians. Interviews of the doctors could be made, in which they would be asked to describe their activities. The more exactly the doctor could predict his activity in reference to a special problem, the greater would be the process orientation of his work. If one also interviewed the departmental heads and asked them how they would react to a certain hypothetical situation within their competence, the level of their predictable behavior would be considerably lower. The central city administration itself apparently would possess the lowest degree of predictable pattern-processes. Therefore, on the continuum of predictability, the city, departmental, and medical administration would scale in a low, medium and high point, respectively.

With this refinement of the level to which these individuals comprise a process system, one could better weight the consequences of reorganization in terms of the advantages and disadvantages outlined by Gulick.[18] For example, suppose that the advantage of a process reorganization was chiefly the enhancing of professional pride, and the offsetting disadvantage was the danger of hindrance of purpose attainment. If the group were highly process-oriented relative to the departmental purpose system, then, in light of the process-advantage of prestige, the favorable balance might lean toward integration. The fact that the process system had developed patterns of predictability far in excess of its departmental purpose system, is evidence that the danger to that purpose would be slight. Put in terms of control, there would be fewer ways to effectuate any policy which might issue from the departmental level in respect to this process system, and therefore control over the system would be lessened. Just as the functional control of the purpose system over the specialization of typing is universally slight, so, too, its control relative to this highly process-oriented medical system would be nugatory.[19] The general test, then, is the degree to which a purpose system's change of policy affects the predictability of the behavior patterns of the process system.

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[16] "Notes on the Theory of Organization," *Papers on the Science of Organization* (New York, 1937), pp. 1–47.

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

[18] *Loc. cit.*

The organizational trend is for the nuclei of the process systems to crystallize into larger and larger areas, so that the purpose system becomes gradually "captured" thereby. This evolutionary growth is a most slowly measured one. In any event, as the "eating process" becomes more predictable, the "pudding" of the general purpose system will gain stability, and thereby will attain richer definition.

*2. Policy and Administration.* For long the theoretician has earned his daily bread through the demolition of dichotomies. As Paul H. Appleby points out in his *Policy and Administration*,[20] some writers inflated the two-headed dragon of policy and administration and then valiantly proceeded to chop off its heads. To say that policy and administration are intermingled at every level of government and social action, may indeed destroy an illusion; but it prescribes no conception to replace it. Perhaps it is wiser to ask what *are* these two elements which pervade all systems of social action.

Some clue to their nature is afforded by the administrative literature. In Chapter 1 of the above-mentioned work, Appleby uses "policy-making" in at least four senses. In one sense, policy-making is the legitimate concern for the expression of a broad goal or purpose, with little regard for its implementation. The enactment of general legislation is a simple illustration of such policy-making.[21] Policy-making may, however, involve not only the legitimate expression of a general objective, but its fulfillment by a closely allied act. Thus, the legislature makes "quite specific" policy by its enactment of claims bills.[22] A third view of policy-making adds to the above the issues of illegitimacy or challengeability. President Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory is an example of this and one may conclude that "Wherever there is action affecting the public, there is policy-making."[23] Finally, policy-making may be simply equated to the general term "value," or purpose.[24]

A synthesis of these limited treatments of "policy-making" yields three elements conditioning the definition of the term. First, policy-making is the expression of a general purpose, value, goal, or objective. Second, the value goal's importance is defined by its being subject to conditioning variables (i.e., it is politically controversial, or administratively and judicially review-able). Finally, it envisions some broad implementation of the policy. Through prescription, rather than description, of process, policy-making serves to generate action.

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[19] One might query that if this is the test of a process system, why is not the function of typing departmentalized? The reason is that typing lies so far toward the "process" end of the predictability continuum that its "interference" with purpose and coordination is manifestly nil. In addition, the functional factors of prestige and skill development are not paramount.

[20] (University, Alabama, 1949), pp. 15–22.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 10.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[24] "Value judgment, hence policy-making takes place in the administrative process" (*ibid.*, p. 17).

*"Policy-making" occurs at that point in a system where there is a low level of predictive guides relative to the system which it generates.*

*"Administration" describes action at that point in a system where there are highly predictive guides in relation to the generating system.*

*3. Authority.* "Authority" is a way of talking about the interaction of purpose and process systems. The role of hierarchy in authority is to legitimize purpose. This means that if two groups are interacting, the system with the lower level of predictability will have the authoritative status over the other. Hierarchically, then, purpose systems have "authority" over process systems.

The functional approach to the concept of "authority" represents a reversed picture. The literature of administration reflects increasingly the phenomenon of "authority coming from below." This trend, observed by Barnard, Touchet and others, is but a manifestation of the nuclear growth of "process-thinking."[25] It means that internal systems are reaching that level of predictability, relative to external purpose systems, which in many cases enables them to dictate the policy, or "authority," of the latter group. This "capturing" of purpose systems by process systems is reflected in talk concerning "the inertia of organization," or the organization's ability to "run itself."

If, on the one hand, a purpose system invokes legitimacy to assert control over the process system, and if, on the other hand, the process system functionally influences the purpose system, is there any "line" beyond which the one or the other action will not be taken? In the abstract, the presumption probably lies in favor of the process system, since that body is engaged in creating a more ordered and patterned mass of expectancies and standards. But where clear reversals in general social value systems dictate modification of the process system, it seems clear that the latter will yield.

## IV. CONCLUSION

This essay represents the exploration in an analysis of purpose, of the philosophic phase of social action in order to discover the foundations of a well-grounded theory of public administration. The most that can be said for an essay such as this, is that it follows Goethe's injunction concerning the uncertainty involved in the verification of any hypothesis or theory. When the proposition fails to represent certainty, then uncertainty itself becomes the new reality. If pretentious theories of public administration are converted to modesty when reduced to reality, then modesty itself becomes the new pretension.

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[25] For a treatment of the philosophy of "process-thinking," written from the perspective of a physicist, see Launcelot Law Whyte, *The Next Development in Man* (New York, 1948).

# POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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The dominant belief among both teachers and graduate students of political science seems to be that political theory constitutes the heart of their subject; yet political theory is not, in practice, the core of political science teaching. Such is the schizoid condition of political science and political scientists that is revealed by the investigations of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching of the American Political Science Association.[1] The hypothesis advanced in this note presents a dual reason for the unfortunate situation: it is partly that political theorists have failed to keep up with the times and have not engaged in sufficient value-free theoretical study of the raw data of politics, and partly that vast numbers of political scientists have falsely concluded that one of the most important parts of the traditional study of political theory—political ethics—is not susceptible of scientific treatment and should rigorously be eschewed.

A renewed interest in the study of systematic politics, evidenced most recently by the appearance of Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan's *Power and Society; A Framework for Political Inquiry*,[2] gives ground for hope that the first of these deficiencies may be in the process of being made up. It is not clear that the second is being so well taken care of, and there is even danger that the new interest in systematic politics may add impetus to the avoidance of value theory. To understand these developments, we might do well to consider briefly the general course of thought about our subject during recent years.

The postwar period has seen a great ferment among political scientists as to their proper place and role. The more extensive contact of political scientists with the practitioners of related disciplines during the war period, the natural emphasis of crisis times upon the production of tangible and useful results, and the increased emphasis on research which followed, doubtless have all contributed to this growth of self-criticism. In part, it manifests itself in a renewed concern with the definition of the proper field of political science. The conflict between those who make "power" the key word in their definition and those who assign this role to "state" continues to be fought from old entrenchments, to relatively little profit. In part, the discussion centers upon the newer concern of method. But although many assert vigorously that political science possesses its own distinctive method, they have made singularly little progress in making clear, to the present writer at least, what this distinctive method is. It may yet be concluded that our field is synthetic and eclectic, that within a given area we must make use of all the methods of social science.

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[1] See the Report of this Committee, *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951), pp. 126–127.

[2] (New Haven, 1950.)

This conclusion seems, in fact, to be implied by Professor Lasswell's most recent contribution to the subject.[3]

Although the concern with methods has yielded little in the way of a *distinctive* method for political scientists, this is not to deny that it has produced important results. For instance, it has awakened many of us to a consciousness of the usefulness, for our purposes, of the tools that have been developed by workers in other fields, especially social psychology. Another effect, and one that is especially important for the field of political theory, is an increased emphasis on precision and on concrete and verifiable facts. A natural consequence of this emphasis is the tendency to avoid the intangible subject of values, or at least to avoid analysis in this basic field. And while the ideological struggle of our day has done a great deal to modify the extreme relativism of the 'thirties and to impress political scientists, as well as others, with the importance of "values," for the most part they do not know what to do about it. After a few helpless gestures in the direction of applying research to the problem of values, they all too frequently fall back upon assertion—often in a strident tone that ill conceals the underlying uncertainty. In any event, the technique of outshouting our rivals may be observed to be better fitted for the propagandist than for the scientist.[4]

Insofar as the developments just described serve to prevent the wasting of effort on vague speculation and to obviate thinking in terms so ill-defined as to make thought fruitless, they are helpful. Political philosophy in the past has all too frequently shared with other branches of philosophical endeavor a reliance upon concepts too fuzzy or ambiguous to be useful. But the vacuum left by the abandonment of faulty methods of philosophical analysis needs to be filled. Political philosophers will do well to be guided by the modern trend of general philosophical work, which is to give attention to meanings and careful definition of terms, and to be satisfied, at least in the first instance, with something less than all-inclusive metaphysical systems.

Lasswell and Kaplan divide the field of political theory into two parts: the empirical propositions of political science and the value judgments of political doctrine.[5] In the article on research policy, Professor Lasswell dismisses the latter from consideration with the remark that "we do not turn to research to discover our fundamental values. . . ."[6] The present writer has no quarrel with any political scientist who wishes to deal only with the empirical propositions of our subject; and, while he would argue that there are important empirical elements involved in political doctrine, he believes that it is sound to give separate treatment to political doctrine and political science in the narrow sense.[7] What is important, however, is that we do not assume that political doctrine can be left to take care of itself. All of the empirical propositions of political science that can be discovered may be worse than useless if they are put to the service of the wrong values.

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[3] "The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 133–142 (March, 1951). Elsewhere, Lasswell states the very important point that political scientists must cease to confine their studies of causation and correlation to two-factor analysis and must be on the lookout for significant clusters of variables that tend to be related, in dynamic equilibrium, in some sort of organic whole. See Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. xiv–xix, especially pp. xv, 8.

[4] Some would go beyond assertion to an investigation of what values are in fact pursued. *Cf.* Lasswell, *loc. cit.*, p. 134.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. xiii. They also state that "political philosophy" includes both "political doctrine" and "logical analysis of both doctrine and science" (*ibid.*, p. xi). Apparently then, political philosophy overlaps part of each of the "two distinct components" mentioned above, but this is not clear. In any case, they give no further attention to the logical analysis of doctrine.

The validity of value judgments can not be determined with mathematical certainty. They can not be proved or disproved in the way in which a proposition of geometry can be demonstrated. But this is not to say that we can do nothing to test their plausibility—that we must simply accept or reject them without analysis and without being able to communicate to others the grounds for our judgments.

Certainly, then, the great question on which all else turns is how to discover what values are "right," or at least what values are probably better than others. (Secondarily, we may concern ourselves with the question of who should seek this answer, although the presumption would seem to be that the task falls within the province of political philosophers.) If everyone were agreed as to the proper hierarchy of values, perhaps we would be safe in assuming that they were correct. Obviously, however, there is the sharpest disagreement between the partisans of the two great ideological polar opposites of our day. Moreover, there are millions of individuals not firmly committed to either of these alternatives, for whom, especially, any light that can be shed on the rational grounds for choice will be most useful. But we need not turn to this great dichotomy for an example of the need for examining the ethical presuppositions of our political actions. Differences in political value judgments are rife. Lasswell and Kaplan state that their values "are those of the citizen of a society that aspires toward freedom."[8] But what are these values? Even if we assume an agreement on the meaning of freedom—a large assumption, since definitions of freedom abound—would all agree that it is the highest good? Is an imposed discipline sometimes good? Mr. Lasswell also believes in "shared power." Is this because shared power always increases freedom? Or is it because sharing is, under certain circumstances, a good in itself? Suppose it becomes necessary to choose between a relatively low level of freedom, shared equally by all, and greater freedom for a few? If sharing, and therefore, presumably, some kind of equality, is good, what kind of equality is it that is good? Equal liberty? (To do what?) "Absolute" equality? (What does that mean?) Equality of welfare? (What is that?) And so on, *ad infinitum.* Such questions underlie Lasswell and Kaplan's book, as they underlie any analysis that omits the philosophical problems. To ignore them is to ignore the very foundation of our subject.

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[6] *Loc. cit.*, p. 134. In fairness, it should be pointed out that he does go on to state that "research-mindedness is essential if we are to reduce the ambiguity of our ultimate aspirations by translating them into concrete practices" (*ibid.*).

[7] To be sure, the two may be treated in the same book—kept distinct but brought into relationship with each other in accordance with what Lasswell and Kaplan call "configurative analysis." The writer has made such an attempt in *Liberal Democracy—Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950).

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. xiii.

How are the questions of political ethics to be answered? First of all, a vast task of definition lies ahead of us. Our terms must be rendered more precise. We must still do for political philosophy what Lasswell and Kaplan have essayed for political science. We must seek also for some means of quantification. If precise measurements elude us, as surely they often will, at least we must be able to establish relative measurements, as by setting up tables of preference. Then, when we do come upon "ultimate" values (can we ever be sure we have done so?), what is to be done about them? Is there nothing but for each to accept his own system of values as final, at least for him? Surely our values sometimes change. What makes them change? Is it merely some fixed, and at present unalterable, process, such as the aging of the tissues? Undoubtedly the latter has something to do with it; but so do other factors—experience, most clearly. What about thinking? Just plain thinking. Reflection may lead us to change our preference as we see more clearly the consequences of a given line of action. Moreover, it may be suggested that thoughtful contemplation of a given state of being may in itself change our valuation of that state. It is also true that knowledge of how others evaluate a given experience may affect our own judgments, especially if the others are persons for whom we have respect.

As was hinted above, what values are "ultimate" is by no means so simple a question as is frequently assumed. We talk much of the "dignity" of the individual; but until that term is further analyzed, we can not be sure that it implies an "ultimate" value. If by the "sacredness" of human life we mean that it constitutes an absolute value, presumably we can not justify capital punishment. In political philosophy, as in other fields of applied ethics, what is needed is an unremitting study of consequences. As John Dewey has pointed out, if we pursue the policy of examining and reflecting upon all the consequences of pursuing any goal, we tend to reduce the goal to still other goals, and so on, in what may even be an infinite regress, so that the means-end duality tends to disappear.[9] Whether or not this traditional distinction can be completely transcended, it is certain that empirical investigation has significance almost without limit in the field of values. Some philosophers believe that ethics may become a completely empirical science.

Parenthetically, an important distinction is in order at this point, lest it seem that the writer is calling upon political philosophers to invade the heart of the field of moral philosophy. It is one thing to be concerned with the theory of ethics, with the question of what, if anything, makes ethical judgments valid. It is quite another thing to study, analyze, define, reflect upon, and study the consequences of, the pursuit of various values in the political realm. Incidentally, it soon becomes apparent that rival ethical theories often lead to identical judgments of relative values. This fact itself is of great importance in showing that the disagreements among moral philosophers have less relativistic implications for political philosophy than is widely believed.

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[9] "Theory of Valuation," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Chicago, 1939), Vol. 2, No. 4, esp. Sec. 2. In another place Dewey remarks, about "tastes," that far from not being subject to dispute, they are the only things worth disputing about, "if by 'dispute' is signified discussion involving reflective inquiry" (*The Quest for Certainty* [New York, 1929], p. 262).

To return to our main theme, the scientific temper of the times, with its great concern to deal with the verifiable, can be exceedingly helpful to the study of political philosophy itself. It would indeed be tragic if, simply because the material is refractory, it led us to rule out of our field of study its very foundation. Furthermore, in our concern with research, let us not overlook thought! The great tradition of political theory concerned itself mightily with ethical questions. If some of it has been discredited by the faultiness of its analysis and the vagueness of its concepts, this should lead us to correct the faults rather than to abandon the field. Nor should political theorists seek escape in chronicling the history of thought. It is of vital importance to be aware of our tradition and to seek for the correct interpretation of significant developments in it; but if political theorists rest content with such work, they will have forsaken their heritage.

My plea is not only to stress the importance of political philosophy; it is a plea for both political philosophers and empirical political scientists to mend their ways. Political philosophers should tackle philosophical problems with renewed vigor and with attention to careful definition and painstaking analysis. At the same time, they should take pains to keep their work in touch with the practical problems of the age and should make full use of the empirical propositions of political science as they are developed.[10] On the other hand, my plea is for concern about, and attention to, political philosophy on the part of those political scientists who choose to concentrate their own creative efforts on other branches of the subject. Unless political philosophers have some familiarity with the "empirical propositions of political science" and unless political scientists who choose the more "practical" branches of the subject for their special domain have some understanding of, and appreciation for, the study of the value schemes they so cheerfully assume, there will be little chance for fruitful work for either.[11] Until such changes occur, the commonplaces of political philosophy will seem esoteric to their "practical" colleagues, and political science will lack the unity without which its claim to be a "discipline" is tenuous indeed.

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[10] This is not to say that they should write for the practical politician. A book on political theory is no more likely to be widely read by the occupants of county court houses than a book on economic theory is to obtain currency among shopkeepers.

[11] Of course, it is not implied that there are not political philosophers with practical interests or practical political scientists with an appreciation for doctrine, but only that such individuals are the exception rather than the rule.

# SHORT ARTICLES AND MEMORANDA

## WHERE PAINE WENT WRONG

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"The people of America understand *rights* better than *politics*. They have a clear idea of their object, but are greatly deficient in comprehending the means."[1] It is the thesis of this essay that this statement, made by Thomas Paine in June of 1780, provides an exact key to his own political thought, and particularly to its central weakness. It was he, not the people of America, who failed to understand politics and who was therefore unable to devise means whereby the rights, of which both he and they had so noble a conception, might be permanently secured. This failure was the initial cause of his being rejected by his fellow Americans—a rejection begun long before he left this country in 1787, and merely consummated when he returned in 1802 to be reviled as a drunkard, an atheist, a potential carrier of Jacobinism, and a defamer of the late General Washington.

Paine was none of these but the last, and it is not to the credit of our forefathers that they cast him off in his old age, leaving him to die in a lonely New York rooming house and be followed to the grave on his farm at New Rochelle by no mourners save a Frenchwoman and her sons, two Negroes, and one American Quaker. The author of *Common Sense* and *The Crisis Papers* deserved better. But it is to their credit, and a sign of their discrimination, that the men working in the revolutionary period to make republican government a going concern took their own counsel and not that of the national hero whose advice for independence they had taken rapidly and wholeheartedly. They went their own way, and their conduct of public affairs was not much influenced by the continuing stream of advice which flowed from his pen between 1776 and his death in 1809. In practical matters Paine could teach them nothing, for he was from the beginning, and remained until the end, a novice in the politics of republicanism.

This was not from lack of zeal. His devotion to the cause of liberty was as unswerving as it was intense; in its name he renounced a fortune he might have had, and was quite prepared to renounce his life (but not his honor), should that be necessary. Furthermore, the freedom he sought was not a philosophical abstraction. Paine's theory was a forerunner of the great humanitarian reforms of the nineteenth century; his ideal was a grand republic in which the pursuit of happiness should be possible for all men. It was a wonderful vision, and Paine would gladly have led the way to its realization. But among the Americans of his day he remained a prophet rather than an effective leader, because he was incapable of bridging the gap between what was and what might be.

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[1] Letter to Joseph Reed, June 4, 1780, in Philip S. Foner (ed.), *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine* (2 vols.; New York, 1945), Vol. 2, p. 1186. All subsequent references to Paine's writings will be to this edition and will be cited by volume number only.

Actually he believed the means to his magnificent end to be implicit in the end itself: let all men accept the pursuit of liberty, happiness, and the common good as the pole star of their political conduct, and the good life would readily and automatically follow. The heart of his thought and the basis of his belief in representative government was his theory of the rights of man. These rights were first principles; and from them he derived most of his opinions about the structure and practice of government, as well as about its purpose and end. This habit of thought was unfortunate because it seriously limited the range of his ideas. In particular, it served to block the incorporation into his working theory of knowledge acquired from the observation of actual political facts. Logical deduction from *a priori* assumptions was the only method congenial to a mind inherently inflexible and surprisingly limited in its capacity for growth.

Paine's proof of the validity of his first principle was the usual one of the era, with minor variations. He sometimes derived man's rights from the conventional state-of-nature concept,[2] once by resort to the evidence of Scripture as a means of ridiculing Burke's appeals to the precedents of antiquity;[3] most frequently he considered them simply as attributes of man *as man*: "As . . . it is impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin of man, it consequently follows, that rights appertain to man in right of existence only, and must therefore be equal to every man."[4]

He did not attempt to give an explicit and definitive definition of the content of man's rights;[5] but he did draw a distinction between rights that were natural and rights that were civil, and he made this distinction a criterion for determining the proper sphere of governmental action. In a letter to Jefferson in 1789 and in *The Rights of Man*, he defined natural rights as those which a man is able to exercise without the cooperation of others, such as "thinking, speaking, forming and giving opinions . . . or in other words, rights of personal competency."[6] Civil rights were those which men could enjoy only in concert with each other, those "of personal protection, of acquiring and possessing property, in the exercise of which the individual natural power is less than the natural right."[7] It was to secure these imperfect rights of the second order that men entered into civil society, thereby making them civil rights. Civil rights were subject to regulation by the society; but those of the first order, the rights of personal competency, remained outside the sphere of governmental control.[8]

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[2] *Dissertation on First Principles of Government* (1795), Vol. 2, p. 583.

[3] *The Rights of Man* (1791), Vol. 1, pp. 273–274.

[4] *Dissertation on First Principles*, Vol. 2, p. 583.

[5] The "Plan of a Declaration," a document prepared by a committee appointed by the National Convention in 1792 to draw up a constitution for France, which may have been written in part by Paine, contains a fairly complete list of what might be called civil, political, and social or economic rights. See Vol. 2, pp. 558–560.

[6] Letter to Thomas Jefferson, (?), 1789, Vol. 2, p. 1298; cf. *The Rights of Man*, Vol. 1, p. 275.

[7] *Idem.*

[8] *Idem.*, and Vol. 1, pp. 275–276.

This was a convenient classification, but it certainly could not serve as a working criterion by which to determine the proper functions of government. No fixed or permanent line can be drawn between that which a man can do alone and that which he can do only with the aid of others. Forming an opinion, for example, depends on the acquisition of information, an activity for which the competence of an individual may not be sufficient.

What Paine emphasized more than anything else in his theory of rights was equality. "Every history of the Creation, and every traditionary account . . . agree in establishing one point, *the unity of man;* by which I mean that men are all of *one degree*, and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights. . . . "[9] This was the primary basis of his attacks on monarchy, on aristocracy, on property qualifications for voting, and on the Burkean conception of the perpetually binding contract.

He followed alternative lines of reasoning to derive republican government from this fundamental principle. His favorite was the slightly indirect one of proving first that hereditary government could not be squared with equality of rights, and consequently that representative government was the only legitimate form. The assumption was, of course, that these two forms were the only possible ones. His logic can be followed in an attack on Burke. The great weapon he used here was the assertion that each generation had a right to govern itself. Rights belonged only to the living; the dead had none, and since "every generation is equal in rights to another, it consequently follows, that there cannot be a right in any to establish a government by hereditary succession, because it would be supposing itself possessed of a right superior to the rest, namely, that of commanding by its own authority how the world shall be hereafter governed, and who shall govern it."[10] Paine then proceeded, by facile logic and sheer assertion, to prove the exclusive validity of representative government based on the principle of equality. "Reasoning by exclusion, if *hereditary government* has not a right to exist, and that it has not is provable, *representative government* is admitted of course."[11] And—of course—equality was the necessary principle of such a government. "The true and only basis of representative government is equality of rights. Every man has a right to one vote, and no more in the choice of representatives. . . . Who is he that would exclude another? That other has a right to exclude him."[12]

Since the principle of equal suffrage followed necessarily from the natural equality of men, the interposition of a demonstration against hereditary government would seem to be superfluous. But such a demonstration constituted Paine's most cherished argument. He never tired of demolishing the principle and practice of hereditary monarchy. Sometimes he focussed on the violation of equal rights which it involved, sometimes on the absurdity of entrusting government to persons naturally incompetent to govern—children, rogues, doddering old men, and even those given to fits of insanity, of whom George III was undeniably one. In *Common Sense*, in *The Crisis*, in *The Rights of Man*, in *A Dissertation on First Principles of Government*, Paine leaped to the attack with such obvious relish that one suspects it to have been something of an obsession. The first two books were written for Americans in the process of resisting a hereditary monarch, and the second two for the English and the Dutch respectively, both of whom, Paine hoped, were on the verge of doing likewise. But whatever the context, the stupidity and wickedness of monarchy always remained his chief argument for republicanism. His attitude was typically this: Abolish monarchy, and all will be well; kings and lords are bad, but the people are good. It is "the pride of kings which throws mankind into confusion";[13] and it is monarchy which breeds war, for "Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of government."[14]

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[9] *The Rights of Man*, Vol. 1, p. 274; cf. *Common Sense*, Vol. 1, pp. 9, 13; and *Dissertation on First Principles*, Vol. 2, p. 583.

[10] *Dissertation on First Principles*, Vol. 2, p. 576.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 577.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 577–578.

This preoccupation with the evils of monarchy was unfortunate. There were two other roads to representative government in Paine's writings; had he explored them more fully, they might have led to a more adequate theory of operative republicanism. One was the common natural rights *via* social contract route, combined with the distinction which he often drew between society and government, as in the opening pages of *Common Sense:* "Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness *positively* by uniting our affections, the latter *negatively* by restraining our vices."[15] In *The Rights of Man* he added that nature had not only forced man into society by creating him with wants which he could not satisfy alone, but that she had also "implanted in him a system of social affections, which, though not necessary to his existence, are essential to his happiness. There is no period in life when this love for society ceases to act. It begins and ends with our being."[16] This love, however, is not adequate for directing the conduct of men in society; they require the institution of government, their "badge of lost innocence," to supply their defect of moral virtue.[17] Paine did not explain precisely what he meant by morality or moral virtue, but he seems to have had had in mind something like the golden rule.[18] In a later essay he described the origin of government in a slightly different way: "In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to, and a guarantee of, the equality of rights."[19]

If Paine had probed more persistently into the dark side of human nature suggested in these sentences, he might not have tended so constantly to think of representative government as an automatic millenium in politics. To be sure, his was a garden variety of contract theory and he might have fallen into the common trap of assuming man's wickedness, or at least his imperfection, as a force impelling him into civil society, and then dropping it once the threshold of government had been crossed. Still, it might have occurred to him that the same defect of moral virtue which drove man into organized society would almost certainly follow him there and remain to plague his social relations, whatever the form of government might be. In establishing the principle of equal rights, Paine made much of the "unity" and "oneness" of man. "Man is man in every condition of life, and the varieties of fortune and misfortune are open to all."[20] He did *not* apply this principle of likeness to man's wickedness or capacity for wickedness. Kings were bad, the people good. With some exceptions to be noted later, this was Paine's belief, and his only answer to the question "What makes bad government bad?" Kings were the major, if not the only, threat to man's happiness and liberty; and once they were dethroned, there was little to be feared. Paine's mission was the abolition of monarchy. Like a true missionary, he came to see in the establishment of republican government the advent of a new era in which all would at last be well.

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[13] *Common Sense*, Vol. 1, p. 9.

[14] *The Rights of Man*, Vol. 1, p. 343; see also *The American Crisis*, Vol. 1, p. 136.

[15] Vol. 1, p. 4.

[16] Vol. 1, p. 357.

[17] *Common Sense*, Vol. 1, pp. 4–6.

[18] *Idem.*; see also *Rights of Man*, Vol. 1, p. 275.

[19] *Dissertation on First Principles*, Vol. 2, p. 583.

There was a second argument for representative democracy which Paine mentioned but did not develop: "The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected."[21] Here is an excellent starting point for an elaboration of the proposition that no man or group of men is good enough to be trusted with the government of others, that the sources of injustice and oppression in monarchies will also be present in republics, and that no system of government will, of itself, eradicate man's propensity to pursue his own rights and interests beyond the natural restraints of reciprocity. This was the prevailing theory of Paine's contemporaries in America, both radical and conservative, and is a measure, I think, of the superiority of their theory over his. He lacked the patience for working out such a theory and found it easier and quite satisfactory to say, "But that which sufficiently establishes the republican mode of government, in preference to a kingly one, even when all other arguments are left out, is this simple truth, that all men are republicans by nature, and royalists only by fashion."[22]

It would have been convenient for Paine if Nature had also provided a precise pattern for the construction of a well-ordered republic. It was a problem which concerned him somewhat, but he thought it not a matter of vital importance because it was not a matter of principle: "But as to the organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of government shall be arranged and composed, it is altogether *matter of opinion*. It is necessary that all the parts be conformable with the *principle of equal rights;* and so long as this principle be religiously adhered to, no very material error can take place, neither can any error continue long in that part which falls within the province of opinion."[23] His chief emphasis, then, was that the form of government abide by the principle of equal rights; discovering the most effective way to secure those rights was never for him, as it was for so many Americans of that era, an absorbing pursuit. His inclination was to think of republican government as an end in itself, identical with the enjoyment of natural rights, rather than as the best, but not an absolutely guaranteed, means to that end. This relative lack of concern with the subject should be kept in mind in analyzing his ideas on the structure of government, scattered somewhat haphazardly throughout his writings from 1774 to 1809.

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[20] *Constitutional Reform; To the Citizens of Pennsylvania on the Proposal for Calling a Convention* (1805), Vol. 2, p. 1001.

[21] *Dissertation on First Principles*, Vol. 2, p. 579.

[22] *The Forester's Letters*, a series of letters written in 1776 in reply to Tory attacks on *Common Sense*, Vol. 2, p. 80.

There is some discussion in *Common Sense* of what the form of republican government ought to be. Paine critized the British Constitution for its complexity and its division of powers, and asserted that the best form of government was the simplest because it was the easiest to repair when out of order. He disposed of the principle of separation of powers, for which the British Constitution was so renowned, and as the Americans believed, rightly, with simple dispatch: "*How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, and always obliged to check?* Such a power could not be a gift of a wise people, neither can any power, *which needs checking,* be from God . . . ."[24]

Later Paine came to the conclusion, shared by his more experienced countrymen, that even in a republic men cannot be trusted with unchecked power. In 1778 he expressed approval of the Pennsylvania Constitution's provision for the removal of justices of the peace by the General Assembly. The power of removal ought to be somewhere, he said, "for until it shall please God to make man over again, which perhaps he never will, the present construction of him does not admit of unlimited confidence, for that would be *power absolute.*"[25] Even later, in the essay intended as a primer of republicanism for the Dutch, he warned that nation against parting with too much power, or for too long a time.[26] But in spite of this avowed distrust of political power, he never accepted the theory of separation of powers so popular with the men who framed the first state constitutions and with those who opposed, as well as with those who advocated, the ratification of the Constitution in 1787.

In his thoughts on the structure of government Paine concentrated on the legislature, because he considered it to be the natural representative of the people's will; of the executive and judicial departments he had very little to say. Election of the legislature by universal suffrage followed from his belief in natural equality, and it may be assumed that he shared the responsibility for the abolition of the property qualification for voting in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.

The principle of equality did not provide a complete pattern for the proper organization and operation of the legislature, and on these questions Paine never really made up his mind. His ideas were not constant, and they contained two ambivalent, if not contradictory, strains of thought. One reflected the typical American distrust of legislative assemblies; the other was closely akin to Rousseau's theory of the general will.

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[23] *Dissertation on First Principles,* Vol. 2, p. 584.

[24] Vol. 1, p. 8.

[25] "A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Present Situation of their Affairs" (1778), Vol. 2, p. 295.

[26] *Dissertation on First Principles,* Vol. 2, p. 587.

The distrust of legislatures was expressed in an attack on Parliament almost a year before the appearance of *Common Sense.* "The wisest assemblies of men are as liable as individuals to corruption and error. The greatest ravages which have ever been committed upon the liberty and happiness of mankind have been by weak and corrupted republics."[27] There was no analysis of the cause of this trouble, nor were there suggestions for its general prevention. Until 1786 Paine's primary safeguards against legislative misrule were two: the limitation of a written constitution including a bill of rights, and the check of annual elections. These would serve to keep the representatives in line. He recognized the possibility of corruption at the polls but believed that an extensive suffrage would render it improbable. It would also lessen the influence of faction by "having the number of electors too numerous to be reached, and composed, as they naturally will be, of men of all conditions, from rich to poor. The variety prevents combination, and the number excludes corruption. . . . "[28] This very argument admitted the possibility that corruption could occur in democracy as well as in monarchy, but Paine provided few additional safeguards against it. He rejected the prevailing belief in bicameralism as essential to the protection of liberty, he and Franklin being the leading exponents of unicameralism.[29]

Although the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was severely criticized for its unicameral legislature, Paine did not then write a systematic defense of that feature. Before he wrote such a statement he had seen the Pennsylvania Assembly in action for a number of years and had observed with growing dismay the operation of party politics—something of which his previous republicanism had taken little account. In Pennsylvania the conflict between so-called radicals and conservatives was unrestrainedly bitter. For Paine this was a shock, and one which he never absorbed. In 1786 he wrote to Daniel Clymer, "The proceedings of the Legislature for these two years past are marked with such vehemence of party spirit and rancorous prejudice, that it is impossible any country can thrive or flourish under such manifest misconduct."[30] The immediate controversy was between debtors and creditors. The former controlled the state legislature when Paine wrote, and had attempted to increase the amount of paper money in circulation and to repeal the state charter of the

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[27] "A Dialogue Between General Wolfe and General Gage in a Wood Near Boston" (Jan. 4, 1775), Vol. 2, p. 48.

[28] "Address to the People of Pennsylvania," Vol. 2, p. 288.

[29] It should be noted that the colonial legislature of Pennsylvania was unicameral, and that this precedent would naturally have made unicameralism congenial because familiar to the people of that state. Their adoption of the system cannot be attributed solely to Paine's influence.

[30] Vol 2, p. 1256.

Bank of North America in order to prevent it from repudiating their inflationary currency. Paine was furiously angry at what he considered to be the debtors' betrayal of justice. "The attack of the late Assembly on the bank, discovers such a want of moderation and prudence, of impartiality and equity, of fair and candid inquiry and investigation, of deliberate and unbiased judgment, and such a rashness of thinking and vengeance of power, as is inconsistent with the safety of the republic."[31] And what was to be done? Elect good men, "who will at once throw aside the narrow prejudices of party, and make the good of the whole the ruling object of their conduct. And with this hope, and a sincere wish for their prosperity, I close my book."[32] Thus he aligned himself with Rousseau in assuming that a just republic required all individuals to submerge their private desires in the quest for the general will.

In fairness to Paine it must be said that he was not satisfied with the convenient if unlikely remedy of the election of "good men." He devised two others, each of which he modified in the succeeding years. One would have imposed a limitation on the power of the legislature; the other would have introduced a change in its method of procedure. Paine considered the revocation of the Bank's charter a breach of public honor and a violation of individual rights which ought not to be contemplated by men of republican faith. Such acts should be placed beyond the reach of any legislative assembly. He therefore proposed a distinction between what he called ordinary legislation and those acts of a legislature which vested rights in individuals. The latter, of which charters of incorporation were a common form, should not be revocable by subsequent legislatures.[33] The proposal was, of course, an anticipation and possibly a source of the doctrine of contract written into the law of the Constitution by John Marshall to protect vested property rights;[34] and Paine could not quite square it with his insistence on annual elections as a protection against legislative error or perfidy, or with his belief that no generation had a right to rule beyond its time. He accordingly introduced a slight and not altogether successful change. The distinction between the two types of legislative acts should remain; but those of a contractual nature should be placed beyond the reach of subsequent repeal or abridgment only after they had been passed by two successive assemblies.[35]

The second remedy amounted to a modification of Paine's belief in unicameralism, now considerably shaken by the violence of Pennsylvania politics and particularly by the behavior of the debtor-controlled legislature. Paine wrote:

> My idea of a single legislature was always founded on a hope, that whatever personal parties there might be in the state, they would all unite and agree in the general principles of

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[31] *Dissertations on Government; The Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money* (Feb., 1786), Vol. 2, p. 410.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 378–382.

[34] See B. F. Wright, Jr., *The Contract Clause of the Constitution* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 16–18.

[35] *Constitutions, Charters, and Governments* (1805), Vol. 2, pp. 991–992.

> good government—that these party differences would be dropped at the threshold of the state house, and that the public good, or the good of the whole, would be the governing principle of the legislature within it.
>
> Party dispute, taken on this ground, would only be, who should have the honor of making the laws; not what the laws should be. But when party operates to produce party laws, a single house is a single person, and subject to the haste, rashness and passion of individual sovereignty. At least, it is an aristocracy.[36]

The modification of pure unicameralism which he proposed was designed to prevent such action. The legislature was still to consist of one house; but for the discussion of political problems and issues, the house was to be divided into two parts. The first part would debate while the second listened, and then the second would debate while the first listened. The vote would be taken by the house as a whole. This plan, Paine believed, would prevent precipitous decisions and lessen the influence of passion in the determination of public affairs.[37]

It was an ingenious scheme, but it did not strike at the real obstacle to the smooth and untroubled course of self-government for which Paine hoped. It would not have eliminated the inevitable clash of individual and group interests. Paine did not believe that these private and partial interests should be taken into consideration in the enactment of republican laws, and it is this part of his theory which is so distinctly Rousseauistic. In 1778 he gave to the people of Pennsylvania a definition of the legislative function which might almost have been taken *verbatim* from the *Social Contract:* "It is the office of a Legislator to construct laws for the conduct and government of all, himself being one of them. The State appears before *him* with an *undivided* interest; and the several members collected into one body from the several counties, form a *whole* acting for a *whole*, themselves being included."[38]

The difference between this conception of legislation and that expressed in Madison's statement that "The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government,"[39] needs little comment. Paine was incurably naïve. Even when he faced the problem at all, which he rarely did, he brushed it lightly aside with the statement that conflicts arising from different interests and opinions would be easily resolved because there was in man's social capacity "either a right, which being proved, terminates the dispute, or a reasonableness in the measure, where no direct right can be made out, which decides or comprises the matter."[40]

One might expect that observation of republicanism in operation for several years would have directed Paine into a more realistic vein. Not at all. In

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[36] *Dissertations on Government,* Vol. 2, p. 409.

[37] "Answer to Four Questions on the Legislative and Executive Powers" (1792), Vol. 2, pp. 526–527; *Dissertation on First Principles,* Vol. 2, p. 585.

[38] "Address to the People of Pennsylvania," Vol. 2, p. 294.

[39] *The Federalist,* No. 10 (Modern Library ed; New York, 1941), p. 56.

[40] *Public Good* (1780), Vol. 2, p. 306.

*The Rights of Man* he came close to being more abstract in his reasoning than he had been before. For there he defined a republic as not "any *particular form* of government. . . . Republican government is no other than government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well individually as collectively."[41] It was not a very useful definition, certainly, not even in the golden age of the Enlightenment, and it was not one to which Paine himself consistently adhered. The republicanism which was the opposite of his target, monarchy, was meant at least in part to be the republican *form.*

The truth of the matter is that Paine never grappled with the problem which his contemporaries in America believed to be at the center of republican government. That was the task of achieving at least a moderate measure of justice in a society ruled by men who would always and unavoidably be influenced by private and sometimes selfish interests. The defect was a serious one in his political theory, and it accounts for his rank among democratic thinkers of the second order of greatness.

The weakness was essentially a blurring of an idealized conception of republicanism with the historical actuality. Paine deduced his principles of political action from his preconceived ideal of republican government; he did not derive them from observation of men engaged in the actual process of governing themselves. This is a common failure among political thinkers. In Paine's case it is to be attributed to his background and experience, his temperament, and his method of reasoning.

In a sense, Paine's theory of democratic politics was defective because it was immature. He was thirty-seven when he came to America, and until that time he had had absolutely no experience with republican government. He was the son of a corset-maker and had himself learned and followed that trade intermittently. He had also sailed on a privateer, taught school, and worked as an officer of the excise. The only government he knew was that of George III, and he knew that government as a member of the English working class, disfranchised and beyond the pale of political participation. But for more than a century before he left England, the Americans had been members of virtually self-governing communities. As electors and as public officers in one capacity or another, a large proportion of them had had direct experience in self-government and had learned a great deal about politics. Paine lacked this background and never overcame the lack. He liked to think of himself as a practitioner of pure reason, unfettered by the past with its prejudices. As a matter of fact, his mind was imprisoned in the past in that he never cut the intellectual ties which bound him to the age of monarchy. Opposition to that system, and specifically to George III, first stimulated him to thought and forever thereafter shaped his conceptions of republicanism. When he wrote *Common Sense,* he was like Marx writing the *Communist Manifesto.* Like Marx, he knew the existing system with all its evils; but of the system that was to come after the Revolution, he knew only that it was to be good. Unlike Marx, Paine had an opportunity to see the new world in operation, but his political thought was not much altered by the sight. One of the remarkable things about *The Rights of Man,* written almost fifteen years after *Common Sense,* is that, except for historical narrative and some borrowing from Madison's attack on Montesquieu, it could just as easily have been written in 1776. If Paine learned anything about politics during the intervening years, this book contains no evidence of it. It was rather the work of one who remained a genuine Peter Pan of the Age of Reason. From 1776 until 1809 Paine's political thought continued to be shaped by its genesis in opposition to monarchy and limited by his inability to gain in wisdom through mature observation.

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[41] Vol. 1, pp. 369–370.

As an Englishman living under the corrupt regime of George III, Paine found an easy and credible scapegoat for all the evils he saw (and they were many) in the King in particular and in monarchy in general. More than this, he habitually saw the problem of government as almost exclusively that of protecting the rights of the people against the government. He ignored the other part of the problem, that the government had also to govern. Thus he saw the people on one side, the government on the other, and he saw the people as *one,* united against their common enemy. Too, he made the easy but fallacious identification of the oppressed with the righteous. And so, again like Marx and Marxists, Paine tended to see all the enmity and friction in human society dissolving away with the final disappearance of that common enemy.

Even after the Americans had defeated their monarch and established their own governments, Paine never really accepted the republican belief that government was nothing more than the servant of the people. He always took a peculiar pride in asserting that he had never sought, nor would he accept, a place in the government—and this largely because he still was blinded by his pre-Revolutionary English notion of government as a source of honor and profits. Possibly, too, he dimly sensed that an opposition role, even in a republic, was the only one which he was equipped to play. Whatever motivation lay back of it, his attitude was significantly different from the sense of duty which compelled Jefferson, for example, to leave the gracious leisure of Monticello for Washington politics, as ruthless then as now.

Paine's preoccupation with the evils of monarchy kept him from realizing that democracy had its difficulties too, and this was why he was so upset by the behavior of the rash and selfish Pennsylvania legislature. His baleful protests against factions and the spirit of party might have been copied from the New England sermons of a half-century earlier; and he, like the old Puritan divines, strenuously exhorted the people to elect "good men" to restore the government to purity and justice. Paine was not alone in this fear and distrust of party. Many Americans felt the same way, but they, at least, had come to accept the fact that men would differ, and sometimes violently. Paine had not.

Another man might have observed the turbulence of party and the sharp divisions in society with more equanimity and understanding. For Paine it was temperamentally impossible. His calling was to be an apostle of democracy, and it was not until he came to America and devoted himself exclusively and wholeheartedly to the propagation of the rights of man that he really "found himself." He was never happier than he was during the American Revolution. There is much good writing in *Common Sense*, in *The Rights of Man*, and in *The Age of Reason*, but there is nothing to match the magnificent verve of the *Crisis* papers. These were the outbursts of a man who was finally fulfilling his profoundest urge, and that was to fight for a cause with utter devotion and with no reward save "the love and thanks of man and woman." This was all that Paine wanted in those years, and happily he had it. But it set him apart from the great majority of the people.

He took great pride in the fact that he received no money for his writings and gave his services for nothing.[42] This was noble (though somewhat self-consciously so), but it was also a pathetic imitation of the aristocratic ideal of generous service to country and was already inappropriate in a nation where government was no longer the exclusive concern of the rich and the well-born.[43] The public good was quite literally his only interest and his only business; he had no separate private interest which could conflict with it—neither family nor property. Herein lay the cause of his failure to find a place in his theory for the influence of self-interest on man's political behavior. For him it was fulfillment, not sacrifice or compromise, to act always in accordance with the general welfare. He would have been the ideal citizen in Rousseau's ideal state. Yet this lack of roots, of attachment—the very disinterestedness on which he prided himself so much—really kept him from being truly "a man of the people," especially of the American people. He could not be a proper representative for them, nor could he truly be their mentor in politics, because he shared neither their feelings nor their interests. One can almost say that in his devotion to republican government Paine lost sight of the end for which it was presumably only the means—the happiness and welfare of the individual as conceived by the individual. He himself never felt the prick of selfish interest conflicting with public interest; he never learned the necessity of compromise because he had no occasion to. His was an all-or-none temperament, and he was happiest when he devoted his all to a noble cause.

Paine's method of reasoning was closely related to this temperament and, like it, made him alien to the prevailing spirit of political inquiry and practice in America in the late eighteenth century. Obviously the men of the revolutionary generation were not slaves to precedent, but they had a healthy regard for the past and believed that experience—their own and that recorded in history—was an invaluable guide to political action, and in practical affairs a complementary, if not indispensable, companion to Nature and to Nature's God. Paine believed that the overthrow of monarchy meant the beginning of a new era, and that the history of men under the old tyranny could have little relevance for an age in which men proudly governed themselves. Logic and Reason were his guides, and they were not friendly to the untidy compromises which characterized American politics in that age and have continued to do so ever since. He was a rationalist of the purest type, and his reasoning was abstract, logical, and habitually dichotomous. This is to be seen, for example, in his definition of the public good: "Public good is not a term opposed to the good of individuals; on the contrary, it is the good of every individual collected. It is the good of all, because it is the good of everyone: for as the public body is every individual collected, so the public good is the collected good of those individuals."[44] This is verbiage, of no value in solving, or even clarifying, political problems. And yet this is the sort of thing that Paine loved to do. His ultimate failure to achieve any understanding of democratic politics, not to say of human behavior, is clearly evident in the following remark: "Those words, 'temperate and moderate' are words either of political cowardice, or of cunning, or seduction. A thing, moderately good, is not so good as it ought to be."[45] And similarly, "To know if any theory or position be true or rational in practise, the method is to carry it to its greatest extent; if it be not true upon the whole, or be absurd, it is so in all its parts, however small."[46]

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[42] See, e.g., Vol. 2, pp. 279, 362.

[43] Paine's later application for compensation for his revolutionary services from the Continental Congress and/or the state legislatures suggests that even the sacrifice of those years was accompanied with the comfortable expectation of the reward common in aristocracies—a grant or a pension.

These were not words congenial to the American mind of the eighteenth century. They express a conception of politics thoroughly alien to the philosophy of the men who first established republican governments in this country. These men shared a remarkably large body of common principles. Indeed, for a revolutionary age, the length of the political spectrum from Right to Left was amazingly short. Doubtless the agreement on fundamentals, the absence of any really deep rifts in opinion, was itself conducive to a belief in moderation, compromise, and conciliation as necessities, if not actually virtues, of political action. Such a belief was not congenial to Paine, nor to any man who believed, as he did, that right must be made to prevail at whatever cost; but his American contemporaries were much less absolutist in thought and action. Indeed, his essential alienness is most sharply illuminated by projecting him onto the floor of the Federal Convention. He would not have belonged, not so much because his ideas were more democratic than those of the majority there, but because he lacked a philosophical foundation for compromise and the tenacious patience required for the conciliation of conflicting opinions and clashing interests. It would have been very difficult for him to respond to the plea of his venerable patron Benjamin Franklin, that every member who had objections to the final document "doubt a little of his own infallibility," and affix his name to the instrument.

Paine was a crusader. The events which brought to fruition his splendid gift for rhetoric were a crusade against a royal tyrant, the birth of a new nation, and the beginning of a movement which he believed would at last bring the liberation of all men. He belonged on the advancing front of that movement. His legendary declaration, whether literally accurate or not, is entirely characteristic: "Where liberty is *not*, there is my country." Had the French Revolution been the beginning of a general European overthrow of monarchy, Paine would almost certainly have advanced from country to country as each one rose against its own particular tyrant. He would have written a world series of *Crisis* papers and died an international hero, happy and universally honored. His was a compellingly simple faith, an eloquent call to action and to sacrifice. In times of crisis men will listen to a great exhorter, and in that capacity Paine served America well.

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[44] *Dissertations on Government*, Vol. 2, p. 372.

[45] *Letter Addressed to the Addressers on the Late Proclamation* (1792), Vol. 2, p. 511.

[46] *Constitutional Reform; To the Citizens of Pennsylvania on the Proposal for Calling a Convention*, Vol. 2, p. 1002.

His country listened less attentively to his advice on politics and government. Both his method of reasoning and the content of his thought set him apart from the effective majority of his countrymen and made it impossible for him to share their consuming interest in the discovery and development of reason-saving, sin-proof political machinery. He reasoned from first principles, normative principles which provided the ends of republican government and also prescribed the means. Men had only to act in the spirit of republicanism in order to achieve it, and Paine expected men liberated from the evil-breeding system of monarchy to be both rational and good, and automatically libertarian in action. When they were not, he was dismayed. Such a theory had little place in it for an interest in auxiliary means for securing good government, and his contribution to the enduring institutional framework of American democracy was negligible.

It may be that Paine's contemporaries in America were wrong about some of their cherished governmental devices. With very few exceptions, they believed that an intricate system of separation of powers with checks and balances was required to restrain republican men from oppressing one another and from committing errors which they might subsequently regret. This system has not produced unmixed benefits in practice, and there are few who would defend it today without reservations. But the men of the revolutionary generation did realize, as Paine did not, that free government would not be achieved simply by the overthrow of monarchy. They were as devoted as he to the ideals proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, but they, in addition, were deeply concerned with the means of republican government. It is in this respect that their thought so far excelled that of Paine. They were not all democrats; but in an age when democracy had just appeared over the horizon, they had a realistic understanding of democratic politics and processes. They expected and were prepared to meet, conflicts of opinion and of interest, corruption, intrigue, betrayal of trust, incompetent leaders and irrational public actions—all this and more. Perhaps they were naïve in their belief that political institutions could be designed to compensate for the defects of human reason and virtue. But it cannot be denied that their belief in self-government had a toughness which Paine's theory lacked, as well as a depth which he failed to achieve or even to understand.

# THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EMERGENCY LABOR DISPUTES

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"The liberty of a democracy is not safe," Franklin Roosevelt once warned Congress, "if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself."[1] The private power to which he referred was that concentrated in the hands of big business. Today, thanks in large part to Mr. Roosevelt's own New Deal, his remark would apply with equal cogency to the power of organized labor. Together our larger corporations and labor unions "govern" the American people in ways that affect their livelihood and their living habits much more directly than does government itself. In some sectors of the nation's economy the consumer may still be sovereign, but in others real sovereignty has passed to the relatively small group of businessmen, financiers, and labor leaders who determine in large measure what kinds of goods shall be produced, in what quantities, and on what terms.

Rightfully, the consuming public has come to resent this usurpation of its sovereign function, but it is not always sure whom to blame. When shortages and high prices develop, however, it is less inclined to blame management than labor; management is usually given credit for having no other interest than to serve the public by supplying its needs at "reasonable," that is, competitive, prices. In those industries which are still highly competitive, this actually approximates what takes place. But in those industries—aluminum, steel, and copper smelting and refining, to name but a few—which are dominated by a few giant corporations, competition is no longer free but semi-monopolistic, at least as to price.[2] Here the "leaders" of the industry are in a position either to cut production below effective demand or, what amounts to the same thing, to refuse to increase production to meet the growing needs of the American people, making up the difference ultimately by keeping or raising prices above strictly competitive levels. Under these conditions, neither the consumer nor the small businessman is as free as he would be if competition were more effective. The consumer is not so free to buy what he wants at the prices he "ought" to pay, and the small fabricator of steel products, for example, who must depend on Big Steel to supply his essential materials, is not so free to stay in business as an independent operator.[3] But production thus held back by management is not immediately felt either in actual shortages or in higher prices, and even when there are not enough goods to go around, some continue to reach the market. Small wonder, then, that the public is so seldom aroused by managerially induced scarcities.

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[1] "Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws," Message to Congress, April 29, 1938. Reprinted as S. Doc. 173, 75th Cong., 3rd sess. (1938), p. 1.

[2] The most recent classification of industries according to the degree to which control is concentrated in a few corporations is to be found in the *Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1949* (Washington, 1949), pp. 15–18.

[3] For evidence that Big Steel and its subsidiaries have on occasion discriminated against independent fabricators, see the testimony before the Celler Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power on April 20–21, 1950. *Hearings before the Subcommittee . . . of the Committee on the Judiciary,* Serial No. 14, Pt. 4A (Steel), U. S. House of Representatives, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1950), pp. 283–356.

Labor, on the other hand, is at a disadvantage from the start in its relations with the public. The only effective way in which it can force serious consideration of its demands is to threaten to pull its members off the job, which means depriving the public of some service or commodity which it has come to take for granted. In this sense the public is a reluctant and usually innocent bystander. This role the public has accepted—up to a point—in the belief that the power of corporate management must be countered by a power equally great. But at the same time it insists that government take care lest labor's combative weapons—the strike, the boycott, and the picket-line—become unduly oppressive.[4] Unfortunately, this is no easy task. The public has become increasingly vulnerable to measures which in a less closely integrated economy would be relatively innocuous, and in any case it is unsure as to how much inconvenience it should be willing to endure as a fair price to pay for a system of free, collective bargaining.

The standard usually invoked by government officials in handling labor disputes is their conception of what the "public interest" requires. Unfortunately, it is hard to imagine a yardstick that could be more controversial and more relative as to time, place, and circumstance. Even the "public" in whose interest government is expected to intervene appears at times to be quite unreal. Walter Lippmann has suggested that this public is never a fixed body of individuals but rather "random collections of bystanders"—"busy men reading newspapers for half an hour or so a day." Such a public, he holds, is a "mere phantom"—"an abstraction."[5] Others, however, see the public as something quite tangible as long as it stays fairly small and compact. John Dewey, for example, believes that a public exists whenever a large number of persons have a common interest in controlling social transactions which affect them adversely. According to this view, any seriously disruptive strike not only creates its own public but determines the size as well, by the number of persons which it affects adversely. However, Professor Dewey admits that a public may become too large, too diffused, and too scattered to retain its identity. Such a loss of identity would almost certainly result if the "social transaction" were to have as many serious, enduring, and shifting consequences as an industry-wide soft coal or railroad strike. In this case, Dewey says, the trouble is not that there is *no* public but that there either is "too much public" or are "too many publics."[6]

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[4] For the methods by which labor unions, particularly the United Mine Workers of America, have used their economic power oppressively, see the *Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, on The Economic Power of Labor Organizations*, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1949), and the report of this committee, S. Rept. 1234, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1950).

[5] Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York, 1925), pp. 77, 119, 125.

[6] John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago, 1946), pp. 15–16, 137.

If, then, an emergency labor dispute really involves not one but a number of publics, *which* public is to have its interests protected? If it is assumed that the public whose interests are controlling is the *consuming* public, does this justify disregarding the more direct and tangible interests of the parties to the dispute as *producers*? This would mean that in any industry-wide railroad, soft coal, or steel strike, for example, a large "public" would be ignored on the rather doubtful assumption that because both employees and employers are also consumers their interests have been adequately cared for. Actually, the parties to the dispute, particularly the men and women on strike, are usually the very persons who are hardest hit by a prolonged work stoppage. The public at large may be seriously inconvenienced, but the strikers themselves and the workers laid off in other industries as a result of the strike must suffer, if only temporarily, the loss of their livelihood. Does it follow, for this reason, that the public to be protected in emergency strikes is made up of the persons, strikers and non-strikers alike, who are most dependent on an uninterrupted supply of essential goods and services? Such a public would include not only low-income groups everywhere but city dwellers of almost every condition and occupation. Certainly few of our state and national legislators take such a view of the public interest. Except for an occasional LaFollette or Norris, the majority who represent rural constituencies in almost every American legislature are conservative on the "labor question," even though their constituents are affected least seriously by most so-called emergency strikes. On the other hand, the legislators most likely to defend the right of labor to use its power to the full are those who represent the metropolitan areas most vulnerable to a prolonged stoppage of essential goods or services.

This much, however, is clear. None of the "publics" adversely affected by an emergency strike is likely to bear its share of inconvenience with patience, understanding, and a sense of humor, particularly if it has reason to believe that labor is largely at fault. In 1913 Samuel Gompers explained it as follows:

> The great abstract something called the public is made up of individuals of fallible judgment, human impulses, with motives that may be selfish and acquisitive. . . . It is chiefly interested in having its wants satisfied, its conveniences served. Although it may intellectually recognize wrongs and grant that they should be corrected, practical and financial influences will not infrequently overrule such convictions in favor of the apparently easiest solution of the difficulty even if the results are but temporary, which means victory for the stronger.[7]

It is not surprising that the very name "public" has a definite middle-class connotation which makes it suspect to labor. The worker may think of himself as an employee or a "hired hand" or a "wage slave," depending on how susceptible he is to the Marxian dialectic, but he is not likely to refer to himself as a member of the "public." Nor do those individuals who regard themselves as "upper" class; *they* are more likely, Morris R. Cohen once suggested not entirely in jest, to speak of themselves as "the country."[8] But neither class-consciousness nor self-consciousness keeps the great middle class from proclaiming itself to be the "great American public." In the mind of this public inconveniences tend to become hardships, hardships are magnified into catastrophies, and the violence normal to any militant mass action begins to assume the proproportions of a "reign of terror". This is the public which labor leaders have come, with some reason, to regard with misgiving.

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[7] "Compulsory Arbitration in the Railroad Engineers' Award," *American Federationist*, Vol. 20, pp. 22, 25 (Jan., 1913).

Mutual suspicion is heightened by the physical isolation in which millions of American workers—miners, merchant seamen, and factory workers—are forced to work and live. "To the coal digger," James A. Wechsler has pointed out, "'public opinion' is the mining family next door and down the street; he knows few men whose lives are not as completely identified with the union as his own—except the supervisory employees, whose homes are usually separate and slightly more elegant."[9] His only regular contact with the outside world is likely to be through the radio or the press, and these he can cut off at will. Nor are his leaders much more likely to keep a finger on the public pulse. John L. Lewis feels the brunt of public hostility almost every time his men leave the mines; but, as John Chamberlain suggests, "he cannot believe that public opinion ever really decides a coal-mine issue. The fight, as he conceives it, is—or ought to be—between himself and the operators. . . . The notion of a 'consumer' with his own rights is, to Lewis, something alien, part of that 'public opinion' that means nothing in a coal-patch."[10] Under these conditions it is only natural that the miner should develop his own, quite separate, sense of patriotism and responsibility for the national welfare.

What as to "interest"? Precisely what are the public's "interests" and "rights" in a labor dispute? Are they limited, as newspaper publisher James Gordon Bennett maintained editorially during the great railroad strikes in 1877, to the "right to wait and be patient" and the "right to demand fair play" on the part of the disputants?[11] Few, if any, public officials faced with a labor dispute of serious proportions have ever taken such a restrictive view of what the public interest requires. President Taft, for one, urged that the public has an interest in industrial relations not only "in its sovereign civic capacity in . . . maintaining justice and fair dealing" between disputants but also in preventing "any interruption to the normal and peaceful relations between employer and wage-earner [which] involves public discomfort and in many cases public disaster."[12] If, as Mr. Taft maintained, the public has this twofold interest in labor relations, its interests may require contradictory action on the part of public officials. A much higher (or lower) degree of governmental intervention may be required, for instance, to prevent the interruption of a vital public service than would be needed simply to maintain "justice and fair dealing" between the parties to a dispute.

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[8] Morris R. Cohen, *The Faith of a Liberal* (New York, 1946), p. 5.

[9] James A. Wechsler, *Labor Baron: A Portrait of John L. Lewis* (New York, 1944), p. 9.

[10] In the "Foreword" to McAlister Coleman, *Men and Coal* (New York, 1943), p. xv.

[11] *New York Herald*, July 20, 1877, p. 4.

[12] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1661 (Feb. 2, 1912).

In practice, the public has been much more interested in avoiding discomfort in a labor dispute than in seeing that justice is done both sides—and for a good reason. The "equities" of a serious labor dispute are almost always much more complex and difficult to assess than is apparent from the reports in the daily press. In matters of this kind, as in most other basic issues of public policy, the public at large is a better judge of how comfortably the shoe fits than of how efficiently and fairly the shoes have been made. The precise amount of shoe-pinching which it will tolerate in any given strike will depend on how highly it values the goods or services withheld and how effective the withdrawal has been. These, in turn, will depend not only on the industry affected but on the particular time the withdrawal is threatened. In "normal" times most businesses are legally free to invite an open test of strength with their employees; but in wartime, as Sewell Avery learned to his dismay in 1944, even a mail-order house can be forced, under threat of government seizure, to obey the directives of a War Labor Board. And in wartime public wrath against strikes and strikers is capable of becoming almost apoplectic. Throughout 1943, when the soft coal miners struck four different times in defiance of the government, John L. Lewis aroused at least as much active loathing in many quarters as the Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Tojos with whom the nation was officially at war. But few labor leaders are as single-minded and determined as Lewis, and none is so impervious to public opinion. Most were only too glad to give—and to keep—their pledge to do everything possible to avoid work stoppages during the war.

If industry alone is considered, the public's interest in uninterrupted operations closely parallels the extent to which the industry is monopolistic in nature. Where the monopoly is complete and legally sanctioned, as in the case of public utilities, the public has no other interest than to see that service is maintained without interruption and on reasonable terms. So, too, with government, which enjoys a natural monopoly to serve the public in its particular fields. Where these services are concerned, the public has usually not tolerated its own discomfort and inconvenience, let alone its safety, to be used by any disputant as a weapon against another. "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, any time, anywhere," Calvin Coolidge, as Governor of Massachusetts, told the striking Boston policemen in 1919, and the public whose safety he championed made him Vice-President. In somewhat the same vein President Roosevelt reminded federal employees in 1937 that they were under a "paramount" obligation to "serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government activities." A strike on their part, he told them, would be "unthinkable and intolerable."[13] Finally, in 1947, Congress gave the no-strike tradition in government service its own official sanction by making it unlawful, under the Taft-

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[13] *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,* Comp. Samuel I. Rosenman, Vol. 6: *The Constitution Prevails, 1937* (New York, 1941), p. 325.

Hartley Act, for any federal employee to participate in a strike.[14] This ban applies not only to individuals employed directly by the government but to the employees of any plant, mine, or facility of which the President has ordered seizure and obtained an injunction to forestall a strike.[15]

But in those "private" industries where competition—not government—is expected to be the prime regulator, the public's stake in uninterrupted service or production has never been so vigorously asserted or so completely accepted. This is particularly true of those industries which the federal power reaches only collaterally: manufacturing, intrastate commerce, and the service trades. For one thing, the products or services which a strike in these industries would deny to the public are not in themselves indispensable. They consist for the most part of countless goods and services which have made the American standard of living the highest in the world. They are not vital to the public, either singly or in their totality, except in so far as scarcities resulting from strikes make it difficult to control inflation during a period of preparedness, war, or reconversion. For this reason the public has no real interest in attempting to forbid, or even to delay or shorten, work stoppages in non-essential industries; and at most public intervention should be confined to encouraging or assisting the parties to the dispute to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. In disputes of this type the public has a greater interest in staying neutral, even at some inconvenience to itself should a strike result, than it has in using even the slightest coercion to secure or influence settlement. After all, strikes, even as recurrent as they were in 1919, 1937, 1946, and 1949, are still the exception and not the rule. Actually, more often than not, the parties themselves, if left to their own devices, are able to resolve their differences peaceably. Why should this be? "Simply that each side," Professor Sumner H. Slichter has suggested, "if it has an accurate knowledge of the willingness of the other side to fight rather than accept certain terms, is ready to accept the terms which will bring balance between the employer's willingness to stand a shut-down and the union's willingness to stand a strike."[16] If this is true, as most modern students of industrial relations seem to believe, the task of defining and protecting the public's interest is made considerably easier by confining the problem to those industries in which it should be really controlling.

What *are* the industries in which the public's interest should be really controlling? Certainly the list would include all interstate railroads and, to a lesser degree, other common carriers by land, sea, and air. Fortunately, both the managers who run the railroads and the brotherhoods which represent their employees have long recognized the public's great stake in uninterrupted transportation. Seldom are they agreed, however, as to what action or inaction this obligation requires on their part. Now that the railroads are no longer able to hold their own in a showdown with the brotherhoods, the managers—or at least a number of their leading spokesmen—have come to favor an absolute ban on any and all railroad strikes.[17] In taking this position they are only now coming around to the stand taken by President Harding in 1922, when he was forced to cope with a serious strike by most of the shopcraft unions. "The public must be spared even the threat of discontinued service," he told Congress. "Sponsoring the railroads as we do, it is an obligation that labor shall be assured the highest justice and every proper consideration of wage and working conditions, but it is an equal obligation to see that no concerted action in forcing demands shall deprive the public of the transportation service essential to its very existence."[18]

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[14] Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 *Stat.* 136, 160 (Sec. 305).

[15] See *United States v. United Mine Workers of America,* 330 U. S. 258, 284–289 (1947).

[16] "Strikes and the Public Interest," *Yale Review,* Vol. 35, p. 211 (Winter, 1946).

But the railroad brotherhoods, operating and non-operating alike, have never been willing to take this view of their obligations to the public. Even before they reached the point where they could best the railroads in a naked test of strength, the brotherhoods opposed any curb, however slight, on their power to strike. As they saw the situation as early as 1912, and as most of them still see it today:

> No fault can be found with the public's interest in keeping open the arteries of commerce; indeed, the railway is an essential part of our modern civilization. It is dedicated to the public use, and laws regulating it in the public interest are now an established policy. But with all of this, railways are privately owned, and the relations of the railway employee to his employer is private and not public. Whatever relation the railway employee may have to the public is secondary and through his employer. The railway hires, establishes the pay and regulations of employment, and exercises its prerogative as a private employer by dismissing the employee. In all this the public has no voice and very little interest.[19]

For obvious reasons the public itself has never taken such a narrow view of its interest in railroad and other transportation disputes. Since 1888 its representatives in Congress have experimented with a wide variety of adjustment techniques—mediation, voluntary arbitration, fact-finding, and adjudication of a sort—in an effort to find a formula that would somehow discourage strikes without banning them outright. The machinery now used to adjust disputes involving interstate railroads and airlines is the Railway Labor Act of 1926.[20] Under the present system the President is expected to head off any strike which, if allowed to take place, would deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service by rail or by air. To this end he is authorized to appoint a so-called "emergency board" to investigate the dispute and to report to him its findings and recommendations. Throughout the life of the board, usually thirty days, and for an additional thirty days thereafter, neither party is permitted to change any of the conditions out of which the dispute arose, except by mutual agreement. In this way the public is assured of a "cooling-off" period of approximately sixty days before the employees are legally free to suspend service.[21]

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[17] See the *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act Amendments of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare . . . on S. 3463*, U. S. Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1950), *passim.*

[18] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 64, pt. 1, p. 214 (Dec. 8, 1922).

[19] P. H. Morrissey, dissenting, in *Report of the Board of Arbitration in the Matter of the Controversy between the Eastern Railroads and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers* (1912), p. 122.

[20] 44 *Stat.* 577, as amended by 48 *Stat.* 1185 (1934) and 49 *Stat.* 1189 (1936).

In labor disputes involving other basic industries, the public has been much more hesitant in asserting its "rights". Until 1947, in fact, industries as vital to the national economy as coal and steel could be shut down in peacetime without the parties to the dispute so much as giving the public due notice or permitting its representatives to try their hand at mediation. For many years this policy, or lack of policy, could be justified on two grounds: first, that the industries were too weakly organized for a strike to be completely effective, and second, that in any event the production of coal and steel were somehow less important than their distribution by rail. Today it is at least doubtful whether either of these assumptions is valid. Both the United Mine Workers and the United Steel Workers of America are fully as capable as the railway unions of shutting down their respective industries, and the effects of their suspensions differ, so far as the public is concerned, chiefly in point of time. An industry-wide railroad strike, the nation learned in May, 1946, will paralyze the national economy almost instantaneously. A general strike in the soft-coal fields, on the other hand, will not be felt so keenly until existing stockpiles of coal above ground (usually no greater than a two-months' supply) have been nearly exhausted. To put the point a little more precisely than perhaps the facts warrant, the public's interest in a soft-coal strike would seem after sixty days to equal its interest at any time in a general railroad strike. The same point can be made, with somewhat greater reservations, of strikes in the oil, copper, and maritime industries.

Under the circumstances, then, it is not strange that Congress should have turned to the Railway Labor Act as a rough model for the adjustment of those labor disputes which are only slightly less serious than those which might disrupt railroad service. Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947[22] the President is authorized to investigate and to delay any dispute within the federal competence (and not already covered by the Railway Labor Act) which threatens to "imperil the national health and safety." But unlike his power to "freeze" emergency railway disputes, he has no way to prevent work stoppages in the less basic industries until *after* his board of inquiry has investigated the dispute and reported to him, without recommendation, its findings of fact. Then, in order to head off a strike or to have it called off, he must direct the Attorney General to obtain a court order enjoining any interruption of operations for a period of eighty days. Meanwhile the parties to the dispute are expected to make every effort to reach a settlement; but if after sixty days no settlement is in sight, the employees are asked, in a secret ballot, whether they wish to accept the employer's last offer. If they do not, the injunction must be discharged at the end of its eighty-day period. Then, and only then, is the union legally free to strike or to resume its strike.

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[21] Railway management is never free, of course, to suspend service without permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

[22] 61 *Stat.* 136.

Obviously, the effectiveness of the emergency board procedure will depend largely upon the President himself. Under both the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts he is the final judge as to whether a strike, if allowed to take place, would be serious enough to justify its postponement and investigation. It is not likely that he or any other elective official will minimize either the seriousness of a strike or the public's impatience. If anything, the reverse is true. As the official whom more than any other the public expects to "do something" in time of national crisis, the President has every reason, usually, for wanting to spare it the inconvenience of an emergency strike. The danger, then, is that he will be over-zealous and premature in his intervention—that he will act before the parties have exhausted every means of working out a settlement themselves, or that he will take the dispute out of the hands of his professional mediators and advisors. Nowhere is this danger better illustrated than in the handling of the running controversy between the nation's principal railroads and their employees in 1943. In the dispute involving the non-operating employees—the shopmen, telegraphers, and maintenance men one or two steps removed from actually moving the trains—not only had the parties *not* broken off negotiations, they had even signed an agreement on terms that an emergency board had recommended and that the President had urged the unions to accept. When a few weeks later Mr. Roosevelt reversed his stand and backed the Director of Economic Stabilization in setting aside the agreement as inflationary, he in effect unsettled a dispute that had already been settled.[23] Still later, in the related dispute involving the train- and engine-service brotherhoods, he took the dispute out of the hands of the National Mediation Board and, by summoning both parties to the White House, forced the Board to cancel a meeting which it had previously scheduled with them.[24] We have the testimony of three of the "big five" brotherhood chiefs and of the president of the American Federation of Labor that, if the President had kept his hands off the dispute, the parties would have reached a satisfactory settlement themselves "without stopping work for a single day and without causing the slightest bitterness"[25]—and, it must be added, without jeopardizing the stabilization program nearly so much as Mr. Roosevelt's final disposition of the controversy.

An even greater weakness of the emergency board procedure is that fact-finding, even when coupled with a cooling-off period, has simply failed to settle the more serious strikes. In the case of the Taft-Hartley Act, perhaps this result was to be expected. For political reasons management and Republicans generally have wanted the act to succeed, and labor and the Democratic administration have done their best—or worst—to "prove" that it is unworkable. But apart from the political disabilities under which it has been forced to operate, the Taft-Hartley Act is structurally defective in its provisions for coping with emergency strikes.[26] In a number of disputes, the board of inquiry has been forced to hurry its investigation in order to report to the President in time for him either to prevent the strike or to have it called off at the earliest practicable moment. But in contrast to the feverish activity required of the public officials involved, the parties to the dispute are at no time under any great pressure to reach an agreement. After sixty days the board of inquiry is reconvened to report back to the President what progress has been made toward a settlement; but at no time before, during, or after the injunctive period is it allowed to suggest the terms on which it thinks the dispute *ought* to be settled. The upshot is that the public has no way of learning the "merits" of the dispute from a disinterested board of experts and no real opportunity, therefore, to bring pressure to bear on the parties to reach an agreement. It was for this reason, as well as because of his natural distaste for any part of the Taft-Hartley Act, that President Truman appointed a special fact-finding board to investigate the threat of a general steel strike in the summer of 1949.[27]

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[23] See *Tenth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1944* (Washington, 1944), pp. 1–2.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2. See also *Transcript of Proceedings of the National Railway Labor Panel Emergency Board Appointed May 31, 1943*, pp. 1512–1513.

[25] See the *New York Times*, December 31, 1943, p. 8; *ibid.*, January 4, 1944, p. 13.

The fact-finding procedure of the Railway Labor Act has no such excuse for not working well. An emergency board has no reason to hurry its investigation: under the act it may take up to thirty days, or even longer if the parties agree, with the assurance that railroad service cannot legally be disrupted for another thirty days *after* it has filed its report. Nor is a railroad board handicapped by not being allowed to comment on the merits of the dispute. In its report to the President, the board is expected not only to report the conditions out of which the dispute arose but to suggest equitable terms on which it might be settled. The rest, of course, is up to the President. If he gives the board his unstinted moral support, as the public has every right to expect, the chances are better than even that the parties will accept the board's recommendations as the basis for an agreement. This, at least, has been true of the less serious disputes involving a single carrier or system. In the twenty-five year period since 1926, more than one hundred of these relatively minor disputes have been referred to emergency boards for investigation; and in only fourteen instances has one or the other party refused to accept the settlement which the board recommended. In the early years it was railway management which was most likely to be difficult, one system—the Louisiana and Arkansas and its subsidiary, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas—carrying its truculence to the point of rejecting the recommendations of no fewer than three different emergency boards.[28] In the last decade or so, however, it has been the brotherhoods which have been most inclined to flout the letter and spirit of the law. No only have they refused on occasion to accept the board's recommendations, but they have in at least three instances struck against individual roads[29] even before the board could complete its investigation; and in a number of cases they have threatened to strike over grievances and other matters which the act clearly intended should be arbitrated by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Even so, the Railway Labor Act has proved useful in minimizing the number and severity of strikes affecting a single carrier.

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[26] On this point, see the criticisms of Director Cyrus S. Ching in both the *First* and the *Second Annual Report of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service*, for 1948 and 1949, respectively (Washington, 1949, 1950), pp. 55–58 and pp. 5–8, respectively.

[27] See the *Report to the President of the United States on the Labor Dispute in the Basic Steel Industry, by the Steel Industry Board Appointed by the President July 15, 1949* (Washington, 1949), pp. 17–18.

[28] See the *Annual Report of the United States Board of Mediation* for 1931, pp. 19–28; for 1932, pp. 36–42; and for 1934, p. 1.

Unfortunately, presidential fact-finding has been much less effective in adjusting the more serious disputes which threaten to deprive an entire region, or even the nation, of railroad transportation. In the last decade the railroads have been embroiled in no fewer than sixteen nation-wide disputes with one or more of the twenty unions which represent their employees, and in only six disputes were the parties able to reach an agreement without recourse to the emergency board procedure. The other ten nation-wide disputes were referred to presidential boards for investigation, but only one—the 1948–49 non-op movement for a forty-hour basic work week with no reduction in pay—was settled voluntarily on the basis of the board's recommendations.[30] In each of the nine remaining nation-wide disputes, one or more of the unions (the operating brotherhoods were the greatest offenders in this respect) held out for greater concessions from the carriers than the board was willing to recommend. In May, 1946, this practice led to the most paralyzing strike in the nation's history, the forty-eight-hour walkout of the engineers and trainmen, which was followed in 1948 and again in 1950 by the threat of others almost as serious. In all three strike emergencies, the public was spared the consequences of a prolonged economic paralysis only because the President seized the roads in the name of the government and made it clear to the unions that he would act repressively.[31] At present the unions' strategy is apparently to confine strike threats to a single carrier or at most to four or five major trunk lines or terminals, leaving the rest free to operate. This strategy is designed not so much to "divide and conquer," since for many years the operating brotherhoods at least have been more than a match for any or all of the carriers combined, but to avoid the almost certain prospect of repressive intervention by the President.[32]

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[29] The Hudson and Manhattan (May 30–June 22, 1946); the Southern Pacific (July 21, 1947); and the Wabash (March 15–23, 1949). See the *Twelfth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board* (Washington, 1946), pp. 3, 50–51; *Fourteenth Annual Report* (1948), pp. 2–3, 45; and *Fifteenth Annual Report* (1949), pp. 3, 47–48.

[30] *Fifteenth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board* (1949), pp. 3, 45–46.

[31] These disputes are reported by the National Mediation Board in the *Twelfth Annual Report* (1946), pp. 1–2, 46–47, the *Fourteenth Annual Report* (1948), pp. 1–2, 49–50, and the *Sixteenth Annual Report* (1950), pp. 63–64. The other nation-wide disputes in which one or more unions rejected the recommendations of an emergency board are: the 1941 wage case, involving practically all railway employees; the two parallel but separate wage disputes in 1943, involving the operating and non-operating employees; the Diesel engine disputes of 1943 and 1950, the latter of which culminated in a five-day strike by firemen against four major trunk lines; and the separate movements launched in 1950 by the switchmen's union acting alone and by the conductors and trainmen acting in concert to win a forty-hour week for yard employees, both of which culminated in the strike emergency referred to above.

The railroad brotherhoods are not solely to blame for this sorry record. Repeatedly, throughout World War II, President Roosevelt made no more than a perfunctory effort to back up his boards. In 1941, when nineteen national railroad unions balked at accepting the wage increase recommended by an emergency board, he directed the board to mediate the dispute. The terms on which it then arranged a settlement were much more favorable to the employees than it had been willing to recommend as a quasi-judicial body strictly on the merits of the case.[33] Again in 1943 Mr. Roosevelt kept the brotherhoods from settling on the terms officially recommended by insisting that they were entitled to an extra increase "in lieu of" overtime and away-from-home expenses that his own emergency board apparently had not considered relevant to the dispute or consistent with the war-time wage stabilization program.[34] Not surprisingly, the brotherhoods began to lose interest in "bargaining out" a settlement with the carriers or in agreeing with them to arbitrate all matters in dispute. Instead, they learned to exhaust the procedures of the Railway Labor Act as quickly as possible, knowing that if they persisted long enough in their threat to strike the President would be forced to give their demands his personal, and usually sympathetic, attention. Under these conditions the emergency board was no longer considered the end of the line, but a "whistle-stop" on the way to personal arbitration by the President.

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[32] This was made unmistakably clear by David B. Robertson, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act Amendments on June 7, 1950, in justification of his union's strike against four major carriers, then in its twelfth day:

"SENATOR DONNELL. What was the reason, Mr. Robertson, that it was not called over the entire United States as had been authorized by the action taken by the membership?

"MR. ROBERTSON. Well, our experience showed that a Nation-wide strike is more or less impractical. That was our conclusion after the 1948 experience.

"SENATOR DONNELL. Why do you think a Nation-wide strike is impractical?

"MR. ROBERTSON. Well, it is too unwieldy in the first place, and in the second place the Government has interfered in these Nation-wide strikes to the point where you are not permitted to handle a Nation-wide strike.

"SENATOR DONNELL. In other words, that second point to which you refer, the action of the Government in regard to Nation-wide strikes, was one of the very important considerations in determining that this strike should be made applicable to only these four systems; is that correct?

"MR. ROBERTSON. Yes, sir.

* * *

"SENATOR DONNELL. You thought that it would be the best policy for the reasons you have indicated, to confine this strike to four railroads rather than to make it Nation-wide. In that way you thought you would be freer from the likelihood of Government interference; that is correct, is it not?

"MR. ROBERTSON. Oh. Yes, there is no question about that." (*Hearings before the Subcommittee . . . of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare . . . on S. 3463*, pp. 255–256, 258.)

[33] See both the *Report* and the *Supplementary Report to the President by the Emergency Board Appointed September 10, 1941* (Washington, 1941).

[34] See *Transcript of Proceedings of the National Railway Labor Panel* ["*Non-op*"] *Emergency Board Appointed February 20, 1943*, Bk. III, pp. 2768–2769, 2983, 2988, 3041–3042, and *Transcript of Proceedings of the National Labor Railway Panel* ["*Op*"] *Emergency Board Appointed May 31, 1943*, pp. 1517–1519.

Several measures have been proposed to rescue the fact-finding process from its present decline. One is to entrust the selection of all emergency boards to some non-political officer of the government, say the chairman of the National Mediation Board in disputes involving railroads and airlines, and the director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in all other disputes within the competence of the federal government.[35] In this way, it is said, the President would have less chance to encourage either party—which in practice usually means labor—to expect more than the fact-finders are willing to recommend. It is true that, once divorced from direct presidential control, the emergency board would no doubt lose much of its present allure for labor and management alike; but at the same time it would lose much of its effectiveness. Unless the recommendations of a fact-finding board are backed by the full force of a thoroughly aroused public opinion, experience has shown that they will not be accepted. And the only person with sufficient power and prestige to mobilize public opinion effectively on a national scale is the President himself.

A more practicable proposal is to retain the fact-finding board as the President's own creature, but to make its findings and recommendations conclusive and binding on both parties for a limited period of time. Thus Professor Sumner H. Slichter would authorize the President at his discretion to make the findings of his boards, in railroad and airline disputes, legally binding for as long as six months.[36] A trial period of this duration would be long enough to give the parties a real chance to reach an agreement voluntarily, he believes, and at the same time it would be short enough not to work a hardship on either party. This scheme would no doubt discourage either party from considering the emergency board procedure an easy way out of its difficulties, but there are at least two questions which would be left unanswered. The first is what could be done if the President should decide—as did Mr. Roosevelt in several notable coal and railroad disputes—that it would be unfair or politically inexpedient for him to "enforce" his board's recommendations. And even if he were to back up his board, what could be done at the end of the six-month period if either party should persist in its refusal to accept the settlement recommended by the board? It is only fair to add, however, that these are the questions which no voluntary system of adjustment can be expected to answer with complete satisfaction.

To many people, including a large number of industrialists, lawyers, and newspaper editors, all this suggests that the fact-finding process must be replaced by a system that is more directly coercive. As they see it, the only way in which the public can be fully protected is to outlaw strikes entirely in essential industries and require all disputes over the conditions of employment to be submitted to arbitration. Persons who accept employment in an essential industry should do so, it is urged, knowing that the public deems the service too vital to permit its suspension to be used by either side against the other. What these workers would be asked to give up, runs the argument, is not the right to quit as individuals whenever and for whatever reason they may wish, but the *right to quit in concert* and still retain their seniority, vacation and pension rights as employees in good standing. The right to strike is not absolute, as even so sympathetic a friend of labor as Justice Brandeis pointed out,[37] and to deny that right completely in essential industries, it is said, does not place workers in involuntary servitude. For the men who operate the railroads and electric light and power plants, that "right" is largely theoretical anyway. The public has always found a way to break strikes that seriously threaten its comfort and well-being.

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[35] See Sumner Slichter, "The Great Question in Industrial Relations," *New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 1947, pp. 5 ff.

[36] See his article, "To End Strikes in Essential Industries," *New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 12, 1947, pp. 7 ff., and his letter to Senator Donnell, printed in *Hearings before the Subcommittee . . . of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare . . . on S. 3463*, p. 136.

But for reasons that have nothing to do with its legality or its logic or even its practicality, this in itself may be no solution at all. If workers in an essential industry are to be asked to give up their most effective means of improving the terms of their employment, simple justice requires that some compensations should be provided. Yet in none of the eleven states where utility strikes have been banned at one time or another has such action been taken.[38] There, in most cases, the utility workers gained nothing except the certainty that, if they failed to reach an agreement with their employer, their demands eventually would be heard and adjudged by a board of arbitration. Even when the arbitral award was completely "fair," it placed the workers at a disadvantage with those in other industries, in which wages and working conditions are not a matter of fairness in the judgment of neutrals but of relative bargaining power.[39]

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[37] In *Dorchy* v. *Kansas*, 272 U. S. 306, 311 (1926).

[38] Sooner or later, most of the state laws banning utility strikes and requiring arbitration of labor disputes have been contested in the courts. The pioneer Kansas Industrial Relations Act of 1920 was declared unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court in *Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations*, 267 U. S. 552 (1925), insofar as it applied to processors of food products. The Michigan law was declared invalid by the State Supreme Court in 1948, and repealed in 1949. Most recently, the U. S. Supreme Court has held the Wisconsin Public Utilities Anti-Strike Law of 1947 invalid on the ground that the state had denied entirely a federally guaranteed right which Congress itself had restricted only to a limited extent in the Taft-Hartley Act. See *Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America, Division 998 et al*, v. *Wisconsin Employment Relations Board*, 340 U. S. 383 (1951). For purposes of determining the validity of state anti-strike laws it does not matter, apparently, whether the industry "affecting" commerce is a national manufacturing concern or a local public utility. In either case, the Court ruled, Congress has occupied the field and closed it to concurrent regulation by the states. Finally a few weeks after the Wisconsin decision, and on its authority, the Missouri Attorney General ruled the Missouri law invalid. This leaves seven states with anti-strike or compulsory arbitration laws of doubtful validity: Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

[39] Some of the states with compulsory arbitration laws, it is true, direct their arbitral

Professor Slichter has suggested a way out of the difficulty. If employees in essential industries are to be put under a special legal obligation to maintain uninterrupted service, they should be accorded special privileges—longer vacations, more liberal pensions, and, most important, wage increases as prompt and as large as those won in the industries in which unions are free to strike. In this way the public would have the assurance that service would be maintained without interruption, and the employees the satisfaction of knowing that they were as well off as if they were free to strike.[40]

Until this or some other equally logical scheme is put into effect, presidential fact-finding must continue to serve the public as its last line of defense against the irksome restrictions of an emergency strike. With all its imperfections, the fact-finding process has not served the public badly. If the emergency board and the President have done their jobs well, the public has been informed of the facts of the dispute and the settlement recommended. These actions have not always avoided, and often will not avoid, the inconveniences and even the occasional hardships of an emergency strike; but at least the public knows the terms on which the strike can be ended, if necessary, without doing serious injustice to either side. The illusion that employees in essential industries are free to strike has been preserved and, at the same time, the public has as much assurance as it would have under a more coercive system that in a major crisis a strike can be broken on terms that it deems fair. In this troubled age, it may be well both to preserve that illusion and to have that assurance.

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tribunals to take into consideration the wages, hours, and working conditions prevailing in the other industries and utilities, both inside and outside the state, which make use of the same or comparable skills and require a comparable expenditure of energy and effort. In New Jersey, for example, this formula (including several other standards) has frequently led to the award of wage increases "as good as, or better than, those obtained through private negotiation," and in some industries even higher than the wage increases won by workers doing similar work in industries where they were free to strike. See Robert R. France and Richard A. Lester, *Compulsory Arbitration of Utility Disputes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 23–25. Yet even in New Jersey, according to this same report, comparable skills are not always available within the state to serve as a rough guide; and, in any event, the standards prescribed have led to conflicting results in some cases (*ibid.*, p. 25).

In Pennsylvania the standards prescribed are actually so restrictive as to limit wage increases and other gains to those already won by other workers, some of them not unionized, who are also forbidden to strike. In one case the arbitration board awarded a wage increase one cent less than the company had offered to pay in the official "best offer" vote conducted by the State Labor Relations Board (*ibid.*, pp. 66–69).

[40] "To End Strikes in Essential Industries," *loc. cit.*, p. 54.

# NEW PARTY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE WEST

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Were DeTocqueville to return to the United States, he could observe anew that "Americans, of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions, constantly form associations." He would find contemporary groups, similar to those of the time about which he wrote, that are "serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive." Proliferation of new organizations within the two major political parties is taking place at a rapid rate. For the most part these associations are growing up outside the regular national, state and local party committee system. The constitutions and by-laws of the regular committees seldom take notice of, or accord recognition to, the independent and auxiliary groups; and the relationship between these *ad hoc* associations and the "statutory" committees is not often defined.

The new groups are found nearly everywhere, but they appear to be achieving somewhat greater importance in the West, particularly in those areas where the regular party organization is not strong. In Wisconsin, the Republican State Voluntary Committee and the Democratic Organizing Committee, both of which are self-styled "voluntary" groups, control their respective parties. Puzzled observers are told that these groups *are* the parties. Although the statutory party committees are in existence, their functions are, in the main, assumed by voluntary groups—allegedly because the former do not have "freedom of action" and are circumscribed with financial restrictions by state law. A Democratic Council is also in operation in a few counties in California, but it is not nearly so well developed as either the Wisconsin groups or its Republican counterpart in California. Three far-western party associations, however, have achieved real prominence during the New Deal era—the Republican Assembly of California, Pro America, and the Democratic Western States Conference. These attempt to operate respectively as a state, national and regional association, and they constitute significant experiments in party government and politics.

### I. THE CALIFORNIA REPUBLICAN ASSEMBLY

Following the 1932 elections, groups of Young Republican clubs in southern California dedicated themselves to the restoration of public confidence in the Republican party, and to mobilizing public opinion against the New Deal administration. In 1934 representatives of the clubs met at San Jose and later at Fresno, where they formed an association known as the California Republican Assembly.[1] The following year the Assembly was incorporated as an unofficial volunteer association of Republicans,[2] whose purposes are to "develop a statewide intelligent, aggressive and serviceable Republican organization . . . provide . . . a practical program for the betterment of the Republican party of the State of California . . . coordinate the activities of the various Republican Assemblies and . . . cooperate with them in improving the public relations of the Republican Party, in assisting political campaigns, in encouraging public forums and social programs, and in attracting a greater number of the electors to work together in advancing the interests of the party and our country."[3] The Assembly is composed of local Republican assemblies, in any city, town, community or geographical areas which have been approved by the Board of Directors of the Assembly. Each local assembly must be chartered by the Assembly, and it can be disciplined by it for being in financial arrears or for failing to fulfill the objectives and purposes of the charter.

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[1] Materials on the creation and development of this group are meager. Perhaps the most accurate and useful is the concise statement prepared by a former vice-president, Markell C. Baer, as "The Story of the California Republican Assembly" (mimeographed, Aug., 1948).

There are twenty-three county Republican assemblies operating under a model constitution prepared by the Assembly. The county groups in turn are composed of numerous chartered local assemblies within the county. These local assemblies are entitled to elect at least one director to the Board of Directors of the county assembly. Both the state and county assemblies, therefore, rest upon local component units, with the executive powers in each exercised by boards of directors. The state is further divided into districts each with a "regional director" elected annually by delegates to the Assembly convention from the various regions. In addition, there are congressional and assembly district councils, which also elect executive officers.[4]

The most spectacular, if not the most important, activity of the Assembly is the annual convention. In its composition, operation and function it is very similar to the Republican National Convention, except for nominating addresses. A Credentials Committee rules on contested seats and a Resolutions Committee prepares and submits a platform. The platforms are sometimes quite remarkable documents and often are more specific than those adopted by national conventions. The platform adopted by the Seventeenth Annual Convention (1950), for example, dealt with organized crime, asked for a clarification and strengthening of the lobbyist regulatory law to "prevent improper lobbying," and called for a report on campaign contributions by lobbyists. It also discussed the state's fiscal policies and repudiated a Republican state assemblyman because he was *not* a follower of party principles.[5] Pronouncements were made on a few federal matters, such as the Hoover Commission proposals.

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[2] See *Articles of Incorporation, California Republican Assembly, 1935.*

[3] See the *Code of By-Laws of the California Republican Assembly*, Article III. The by-laws are extremely elaborate.

[4] Organization, on the whole, has developed most rapidly in the urban counties. Actual total state membership is estimated as 7,000 paid-up members, with over half residing in Los Angeles County. At least as many additional persons appear to be actively connected with the Assembly, according to one official, but either have not been reported or have not paid their dues. Baer writes that membership in the Assembly is limited to "American citizens of good moral character, who are registered with the Republican Party, and who are accepted as members by their local organization" ("The Story of the California Republican Assembly," p. 1).

The most significant activity of the convention is the endorsing of party candidates for nomination to statewide offices. Several months prior to the election year convention, a Candidates and Fact-Finding Committee investigates the qualifications of all Republican candiates for nomination to office in the state.[6] The investigation of this Committee is carried on by means of polls, interviews with candidates and hearings, and its recommendations are usually accepted by the convention. The Committee and the convention refused to endorse Fred N. Howser for attorney-general in 1946, but Howser won both the primary and the general election. In 1950 the Committee, condemning his record, again refused to endorse him. The Attorney-General then appeared before the convention and plead for the Assembly to overrule the Committee, but the convention sustained the recommendation of its Candidates Committee and endorsed his opponent in the primary. Voters apparently agreed with the position of the Assembly, for Howser was defeated in the primary. On the whole, the record of the Assembly in getting its slate nominated is enviable, and the observation may be made that pre-primary endorsement by this body is an asset to a nominee. Local assemblies likewise endorse candidates for local offices, and sometimes for state offices. Endorsements are seldom made, however, in nonpartisan elections.

Assembly leaders give several reasons for creating the candidates committees and for making endorsements. According to a former president, it was felt that the "free for all" caused by cross-filing in the direct primary "offered little inducement to many potentially good candidates to run, and enabled an occasional off-color character to slip in. We felt that an organized energetic inquiry by a responsible, fair-minded group into the qualifications of candidates, and recommendations of the best would be a wholesome thing. We felt also that such endorsement might be the means of getting comparatively unknown but well qualified candidates off to a good start in a state race."[7] The Assembly accordingly tries to seek out promising persons in the party to support for public office. It was the first statewide organization, for example, to urge the nomination of Earl Warren for Governor of California. Later it took the lead in advancing him for national office, and played a part in bringing about his nomination for the vice-presidency. The incumbent lieutenant-governor was likewise first advanced by the Assembly.

Many public officials have publicly acknowledged their debt to the Assembly for its efforts in interesting and training them for elective offices or other positions of leadership. Numerous Assembly members are elected to the Republican County Central and State Committees; others have been appointed to such positions as campaign managers, or as members of resolutions committees, by the regular party organization. In fact, relationships between the local assemblies and regular party committees are usually quite close, which is perhaps symbolized in the fact that they frequently share the same office space.

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[5] The assemblyman was under indictment for assertedly accepting a bribe from a pension promoter. See *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 27, 1950.

[6] The Committee is composed of one member of the organization from each congressional district and six members at large, chosen by the state board.

[7] Letter to the writer from a former chairman of a Candidates and Fact-Finding Committee.

In addition to its self-styled function as "a training school for political leaders and for those officially engaging in the public service," the Assembly sponsors public forums, community dinners, study and research groups, social activities, and local projects deemed desirable in the community. Most of the time the leadership and energy for these projects of the state and local assemblies have come from the more progressive ranks of the party. Literature of the organization stresses that its members are engaged in the "cause of Intelligent Liberalism" as "a militant foe of demagoguery, corruption, expediency, compromise and inert or incompetent leadership."

In the sixteen years of its existence the Assembly has developed prestige and influence to where it is often mentioned in the press as being "the G.O.P. of California." There is, nevertheless, some criticism of the Assembly and its program by Republicans in the state. Some do not like its practice of proposing candidates, feeling that the voters at the primary should make up their minds on nominees without "suggestion" on the part of the Assembly. Others feel the Assembly usurps functions of the regular party committees, i.e., that an unofficial agency of the party is doing the work of an official agency. However unofficial it may be, the Assembly nonetheless does perform functions, in the nominating process, in the formulation of party principles, and in educational activity, which the State Central Committee either has simply failed to do or does not wish to do.[8] As a former president stated to the writer, "One great void in California is the lack of one official organization for party members to join and work with. Our state and county committees are full of 'generals' and 'colonels.' The 'privates' are either in the conflicting and competing volunteer groups or standing on the sidelines waiting for 'the party' to do something, unmindful that THEY are the party." The California Republican Assembly is designed to fill, at least partially, the "void."

## II. PRO AMERICA

Pro America was founded in Seattle, Washington, in 1933. The official literature of the organization credits "the threat to the freedom of the individual" following the 1932 election as the reason for its creation. According to this literature, "The State of Washington had a foretaste of the New Deal system and objectives, long before the rest of the country was aware of what was imminent. This was no doubt an outgrowth of work of radical organizers who had been active for years in the lumber camps of the Northwest. When the results of the elections were felt in Seattle, housewives and mothers realized that they must organize to protect the heritage of freedom fought for by their forefathers, if their children were to enjoy such freedom."[9] The name was suggested by Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, who was momentarily in Seattle when organizational details were worked out.[10]

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[8] It might be noted that several weeks after the 1950 Assembly meeting, the Republican State Central Committee sponsored what it called the "first statewide Republican pow-wow of its kind" at Fresno. Some 1500 party leaders gathered to hear speeches by all nominees. The meeting, however, carefully refrained from making endorsements and adopting resolutions. For accounts of the meeting see the *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 22 and April 24, 1950.

The fear of radicalism motivating the establishment of Pro America resulted largely from the temporarily successful political activities of the Unemployed Citizens' League of Seattle. Nominees for mayor and for several city councilmen endorsed by the League were elected in the spring of 1932, as were its choices for United States Senator, for Representative to Congress, and in the following November, for the state legislature. Practically all of these candidates were Democrats who would have been elected in the landslide without the help of the League. Nevertheless, conservatives all over the nation were badly frightened, and national magazines carried articles viewing with alarm political power at the hands of the organized unemployed.[11]

Pro America is at once inside and outside the Republican party. It is styled "a national, independent organization of women interested in work in the field of politics and political education." Included among its officers are "Republicans, Constitutional Democrats and women who have never been members of any political party."[12] It operates outside both the regular party organization's regulations and the Women's Republican clubs. Many women, however, belong to both the latter and to Pro America. Pro America staunchly upholds the two-party system, and believes that one should be affiliated with "the political party which is clearly pledged to uphold good government under the Constitution." The Republican party meets this standard, in the eyes of the organization, while the Democratic leadership is taking its party toward "statism and Fabian Socialism." The organization refers to itself popularly as a "National Organization of Republican Women." It does not, however, receive financial assistance from the Republican party, but operates under its own power. The organization takes the position that party policy should be formed at the grass roots, with attempts to make the party's legislators responsible for supporting such policies. A leaflet of Pro America points out that this is at variance with the practice "in other Republican clubs," where "policy is formed by the decisions of Republicans in Congress."

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[9] National Association of Pro America, *Manual on Organization* (Yakima, Wash., 1950), p. 2.

[10] Mrs. Roosevelt suggested the name as meaning "for the American system of government." She held the title of national Honorary President.

[11] In retrospect, these fears appear to have been highly exaggerated. For an excellent account of the political ferment surrounding the League, see Arthur Hillman, *The Unemployed Citizens' League of Seattle* (Seattle, 1934).

[12] *Manual on Organization*, p. 3.

Although Pro America calls itself a national organization, its strength remains largely in the West. The majority of its national officers and committee chairmen continue to come from California and Washington.[13] Local associations were started in Oregon, but did not survive because of a quarrel over the inclusion of the word "Republican" in the title. When Pro America refused to emphasize "Republican," the Oregonian members, who were zealous partisans, left and went over to the regular Women's Republican club. There are active units in Montana, and the newest ones are to be found in Idaho. Sizable units are also found in Illinois, Wisconsin and New Jersey. Pro America hopes to organize in the South, but realizes that its Republican connections must be minimized in that area. To date successful units have been established only in Oklahoma. A chapter is also operating in Washington, D.C.

From its inception, the principles of Pro America have been oriented toward the policies of the ultra-right wing of the Republican party.[14] It is more doctrinaire in this respect than most Republican groups, and finds itself at variance with some of the welfare proposals on housing and health espoused, for example, by Republican Governors Dewey, Warren and Langlie. Recent resolutions place the organization in opposition to the Brannan Farm Plan, the International Trade Organization as defined by the Havana Charter, the Lodge-Gossett Electoral College Amendment, and the operation of any business by the Federal Government in competition with private enterprise "except as specified in the Constitution."[15] A balanced budget achieved "by removing all waste and extravagance from federal spending," support for such Hoover Commission proposals as will save money, and commendation for J. Edgar Hoover's direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also appear in the resolutions. Pro America called for the adoption of the Kem amendment to the European Cooperation Assistance appropriation bill—which would refuse money to those nations planning to socialize any basic industry. This amendment is seen as a means of arresting the "trend toward socialism and communism."

Probably Pro America's most important contribution is in the field of nominations. After the filing date in the Republican primaries, the local and state units investigate the qualifications of each candidate and issue a report. From this conscious measurement of Republicans seeking nominations, the organization endorses and actively works only for those candidates who meet its own standards of fitness for the offices they seek. After the primary, the organization campaigns only for Republican nominees. Pro America also makes endorsements and campaigns actively in nonpartisan municipal, school, and judicial elections. Here the party affiliation, if known, is less important. In one case a known Democrat was supported in his candidacy for the Seattle City Council. Thus while the Republican party organization remains officially neutral in both partisan primaries and in nonpartisan elections, Pro America does not. This also distinguishes Pro America from young people's, women's, men's and other auxiliary clubs, which seldom openly endorse favorites in these contests.

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[13] The national headquarters is in Yakima, Washington. Pro America units are organized on the basis of cities and counties; each state having units also elects a state president and perfects a token state organization. Pro America units are found in all of the larger cities and counties in California and Washington, and in a considerable number of the small ones.

[14] Although Pro America and the California Republican Assembly were formed at about the same time with the common objective of revitalizing the party, it is interesting to note that the orientation of the former was essentially conservative, while the latter was center to left-of-center in outlook.

[15] See "Resolutions—Pro America," adopted June 27, 1949, and May 5, 1950.

In one additional particular, Pro America differs from the regular party committees. It recommends action on initiative and referendum propositions and takes an official position on a considerable number of measures before Congress and the respective state legislatures.[16]

Local Pro America units conduct educational programs among their members on public affairs and on the techniques of campaigning; they also sponsor forums and get-out-the-vote campaigns—activities which are similar to those of many party organizations and of the League of Women Voters. Although its membership is only about 10,000, the group is cohesive and very active. It exerts its influence largely in the conservative circles in the party, and quite naturally progressive Republicans are unenthusiastic about many of its policies. The latter, however, are not unmindful of Pro America's valuable campaign assistance, as well as of its vigorous activities in nonpartisan elections and on behalf of propositions appearing on the ballot.

## III. THE DEMOCRATIC WESTERN STATES CONFERENCE

A comparatively recent development in party activities is the "regional conference" consisting of periodic meetings of the national chairman and leaders of various state and local party organizations within a region. Most of these are simply "pep-talk" sessions primarily concerned with organization for a congressional election, and not with formulating policies.[17] The Republican meetings in Chicago in 1949, in Salt Lake City in 1950, and in Tulsa in 1951 offer illustrations of this type of "conference." These meetings were instigated in the main by the National Committee and were attended by midwest and Rocky Mountain state leaders. Although called "conferences" none of these groups has had a ruling body and none has been even semi-permanent. The Republicans, under the leadership of their former national chairman, Hugh Scott, announced plans in 1949 for a series of "topical" conferences all over the United States. Only one of these, the Republican Farm Conference in Sioux City, Iowa, materialized. Spokesmen for farm groups attended with the announced purpose of drafting a "farmer-formulated" agricultural program for the 1950 campaign. Aside from denouncing the Brannan plan and praising the Hope-Aiken formula, no farm program was forthcoming.[18]

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[16] At times, of course, county and state central committees take a position on certain initiative and referendum propositions; Pro America commonly takes a position on every proposition on the ballot.

[17] The chairman of the Republican meeting in Chicago in October, 1949, for example, stated that the conference had nothing to do with policy.

The multi-purpose "policy-publicity conferences" of the Democrats in the West have been somewhat more successful, especially the semi-permanent Western States Conference. This group was organized in 1934 and was active through 1940. Although it did not pass completely out of existence, the Conference was not reactivated until 1948. One of its chairmen writes that the "main purpose of the organization is to make the voice of the West audible in National circles pertaining to legislation particularly affecting the West and matters of major patronage. . . assisting in getting political appointments in numerous states and working as an organization in getting through Congress legislation affecting the West."[19] The Conference also endeavors to assist the state committees in matters of campaign organization and programs.

The Democratic Western States Conference consists of the national committeeman and committeewoman and the state chairman and vice-chairman of the following western states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. These forty-four party officials form the backbone of the organization, but several hundred other delegates from these states and from Alaska and Hawaii attend the meetings. The conference has no permanent headquarters, but usually operates out of the office of its chairman.[20] Unlike the Midwest Democratic Conference, the various committeemen and committeewomen are not recognized as a governing board.[21] The western party officials, however, carry on extensive correspondence with each other, and with Democratic leaders in Washington, D. C. The group meets sporadically as convenient occasions arise, such as the Jefferson Jubilee meeting in Chicago in May, 1950, and the joint meeting with the midwest association in Denver in May, 1951.

The Conference offers a sharp contrast to the two Republican organizations considered earlier. It performs no nominating or electoral activities as a group, and is without by-laws and permanent status. At the same time, the Conference has become a rather important adjunct of the Democratic National Committee. From the standpoint of the fortunes of the party nationally, the Conference is potentially of greater importance to the Democrats than the California Republican Assembly and Pro America are to the Republicans.

The 1949 meeting in San Francisco showed the regional organization at its best. With an announced program of "Land, Water and Jobs," the Conference brought as participants the Vice-President of the United States, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior and Labor, a score of other federal officials, and several members of Congress. Spokesmen from the various farm and labor organizations also took part in the proceedings. Altogether, nearly two thousand people were in attendance. A panel discussion was held on each subject and was led, in each case, by a cabinet secretary. There was wide audience participation during the question and answer periods. Before adjournment, a policy statement of one thousand words was adopted.[22]

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[18] A news release by the Republican National Committee, February 6, 1950, promised such a report.

[19] Letter to the writer.

[20] The present chairman is Calvin W. Rawlings of Salt Lake City, who is Democratic National Committeeman for Utah.

[21] The governing board of the Midwest Democratic Conference consists of the national committeemen and state chairmen and vice-chairmen from the thirteen states included in the conference.

The Conference, in the first place, is used by the Administration and by the Democratic National Committee to obtain support for the national party program.[23] The organization was created with the approval of the National Committee and the two work closely together. Underlying the Conference is the effort of its leaders and of the National Committee to promote an increased sense of national party responsibility on the part of state and local party leaders. In addressing one meeting, National Chairman William M. Boyle, Jr., stressed this point by saying:

> The role of the Democratic Party in these times is not only to gather votes, but to explain—to discuss with the people the meaning of the measures it proposes, and ways of making them effective. . . .
>
> We believe that successful candidates who have won offices under the banner of the Democratic Party are under an obligation to support the program of the Democratic Party. . . .
>
> To this new concept of party responsibility, we should devote not only the energies of our National Committee and our state and local leaders, but also the precinct workers. . . .[24]

By implication and tone, the Conference emphasizes that state and local organizations are expected not only to give support to the national party program, but to participate in formulating area-wide policy declarations. It thus provides the opportunity for consultation and candid interchange of ideas among national and local leaders and for developing a broader approach to socio-economic problems. The Conference is developing an awareness of, and education in such special problems as agriculture, labor, land utilization and natural resources. The qualifications of the representatives of various interest groups who attended the San Francisco meeting plus the wide coverage given to the sessions in the press, increased the educational value of the Conference. Although the Conference has no authority over various state and local party committees, its continued existence shows at least some realization that there are sectional problems which transcend county and state boundaries on which party policy is needed. It has shown a sense of responsibility for some attention to political planning.

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[22] A comprehensive summary of the statement and of several of the speeches will be found in *The Democratic Digest*, Vol. 26, pp. 15–18 (Oct.–Nov., 1949). Other extensive accounts of the proceedings will be found in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, 1949, and in the *New York Times*, September 19, 1949.

[23] At the Denver meeting, resolutions were adopted vigorously supporting President Truman's foreign policies and "affirming the constitutional authority of our civilian government over the military." In addition to this statement, the midwest and western groups adopted separate resolutions of special concern to their own areas. Transcripts of all panel discussions were made available shortly before adjournment. For a summary account, see the *New York Times*, May 27, 1951.

[24] *New York Times*, September 19, 1949. It may be noted that this Conference suggests a partial answer to the recommendation of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association "that the local party organizations should be imbued with a stronger sense of loyalty to the entire party organization and feel their responsibility for promoting the broader policies of the party." "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Supplement, Vol. 44, p. 47 (Sept., 1950).

Some may see in the Conference, especially the San Francisco meeting, faint adumbrations of a concept of administrative responsibility to party leaders. During the panel discussions, several participants raised questions with the department secretaries and other administrators on matters of both policy and administration. It scarcely need be said that in the United States little theory of the responsibility of administration to political parties has been developed. Existing practice is generally to the effect that administrators are not, and should not be, responsible to political parties—save in the matter of patronage. Nevertheless, a fruitful relationship between the Conference and the administrators charged with carrying out programs of particular interest to the West may be evolving. To say, however, that a philosophy of administrative responsibility is being developed, appears premature.

As a method of bringing together national and state leaders to discuss strategy and organization, the regional meetings have demonstrated their usefulness. The capacities of the Conference and of other regional organizations for providing a better representation in national party organizations, and as devices for promoting broader understanding of party problems and policies, are just beginning to be explored. Regional associations are still largely surcharged with the current of partisan politics, and their position in the framework of party government remains anomalous and undefined.

## IV. SUMMARY

The rise of all three of the organizations discussed above in one way or another is due to some discontent with the existing party committee system. Pro America was disturbed by the official party organization's preoccupation with patronage matters, as well as with its general neutrality in primaries and nonpartisan elections and on initiative and referendum propositions. The regular Republican organization was deemed too lackadaisical in pushing party policies, in fighting the "New Deal trend," and in its failure to insist upon doctrinaire purity. Typically, Pro America's literature stresses that it "wants the right Republicans, not just any Republicans." In a reaction similar to that of Pro America, the California Republican Assembly felt that the regular organization's indifference to nominations, added to the loose direct-primary (cross-filing) system, resulted in a failure to interest promising Republicans in seeking nomination or in becoming active in party affairs. Early sponsors of both groups also felt that the statutory organizations were weak in policy-drafting, political planning, and educational activities. "We seem to be struggling in the dark in California, improvising as we go along," writes a former chairman of the Assembly, "Our committee [Assembly] serves a good purpose in our big, complex state with its loose and lack-lustre party organizations."[25]

The Democratic Western States Conference, as well as various other regional associations of both parties, points up the fact that state and local organizations follow a sort of myopic neutrality toward problems not confined to their specific bailiwicks. Many local organizations are so concerned with county, city and state problems and in the election of local officers, that they fail to give adequate aid to congressional and presidential compaigns. Moreover, they do not take an active interest in the party's national program.

In summary, the growth of the new party associations signifies more than merely a healthy interest in public affairs. Their existence shows an awareness, though perhaps not expressed, that the old county-state party machinery with its basis in patronage and get-out-the-vote functions is insufficient to cope with modern demands on political parties. The formation of new groups stems, in a very considerable degree, from a feeling that parties have more important functions which they can and should perform. It appears to be the unanimous opinion of the leaders of these new organizations that the local party hierarchy is giving insufficient attention to formulating a community-wide or a regional party program. A strong emphasis on a revitalized party responsibility permeates all of these groups. The new Republican bodies especially are critical of the laissez faire attitude of the regular committees toward the all-important problem of nominations.

It seems obvious that where the official party committees lack the will or the effective organization to perform the requirements of a modern instrument of popular control, competitive extra-legal or auxiliary agencies will step into the breach. In most other nations the local party organizations sponsor or propose candidates, and otherwise act as a service arm for the national party. Where this is the case, a multiplicity of party groups is unnecessary, except perhaps for young people's and women's clubs. It is unlikely that those in control of the local party organizations in the United States are ready to change the structure and purposes of parties. There are important elements in both parties, however, who are dissatisfied with the basis and role of parties on all levels. So long as this feeling of frustration and discontent exists, the birth of new party associations may be expected. In time this may lead to an intraparty struggle of power—as it has in California and Wisconsin—which will force a reorientation of the concept of the place of political parties in the local community.

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[25] Letter to the writer.

# THE RECORD OF CONGRESS IN COMMITTEE STAFFING*

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One of the salient reforms of Congress embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was the authorization granted standing committees for the employment of adequate staff assistance. The point had been made repeatedly by critics within and outside the Congress that its standing committees must be equipped with first-rate professional staffs if they are to make intelligent legislative decisions on the increasingly complex and technical problems presented to the legislators for solution. Reliance upon executive branch research studies or upon the detail of executive agency technicians to the committees was held by many to be fraught with the danger of injecting special pleading and biases for the increasing number of administration-sponsored bills. For Congress to function as a coequal partner with the executive in the legislative process, these critics deemed it essential that Congress empower itself to obtain its own independent staff services and that it pay adequately for them.

## I. GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMITTEE STAFFING

Section 202 of the Legislative Reorganization Act authorized each standing committee—with the exception of the two Appropriations committees, which were not limited as to the number of appointees—to employ a maximum of four professional staff members and six clerks. Salaries allowed for professional staff were to range from a base of $5,000 to one of $8,000 per annum, which with cost-of-living increments actually range from about $7,300 to about $10,800. Clerical staff were to be paid salaries from a base of $2,000 to $8,000 per year. This section further provided that committee employees were to be selected "on a permanent basis without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office."[1] Later, by special provision, Congress permitted the Senate Judiciary Committee to expand its professional staff to six members to meet the heavy workload borne by that committee.[2]

That the caliber of committee staff has improved from that of the old days before passage of reorganization legislation goes without saying. Formerly a committee clerk and one or two assistants were attached to the congressional office of the chairman and were regarded more as his personal assistants than as committee staff. Today committee appointees not only are physically separated from the chairman's congressional office, but are normally regarded as aides to all members, often working with particular subcommittees as well as with

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* The author received a grant-in-aid of research for a study of committee staffing from the Social Science Research Council during the summer of 1948, and a grant from the research fund of the University of Kentucky enabled her to continue this study during the summer of 1950.

[1] 60 *Stat.* 834 (1946).

[2] S. Res. 66, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, pt. 1, p. 1327 (Feb. 17, 1949).

the full committee. The assignment of employees to the chairman or to the ranking minority member is left by the law to the discretion of each committee. A few have designated a professional employee as assistant to the minority, in which case the ranking minority member may view him as his personal assistant on committee work. However, the only committee employee who is considered highly political, and who serves as the chairman's political representative on committee staff, is the clerk. When party control changes, he may exchange positions with the assistant clerk or with the professional staff member to the minority.[3]

*Quality of Appointments.* A few generalizations may be made from a study of committee staffing under the new law in the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses. To begin with, improvement in the quality of staff has varied markedly from one committee to another. On some, considerations of spoils have weighed more heavily than those of education and relevant experience in the fields of committee jurisdiction. A few committees have not deemed it essential to employ any but a clerical staff.[4] Although party membership is normally given some weight in the making of initial appointments to all committees, in most cases persons who have made themselves valuable in the performance of committee assignments are retained at a time of party turnover, provided that they have not played an active role in partisan strategy or political compaigns.

Perhaps the reason that Congress has not fully exploited the provisions of the Reorganization Act for improving its legislative work by employing staff of first-rate professional competence on all committees is that, although the statute requires a majority vote of the committee members for appointment, recruitment and often actual selection of both professional and clerical staff are regarded as prerogatives of the chairmen, with majority approval too often a *pro forma* affair. Few chairmen have drawn even their own party colleagues into the selection process, while, as a matter of practice, the minority members appear to be excluded from personnel decisions on most committees. Responsibility for the failure of Congress to obtain the best possible staffing may thus largely be laid at the feet of those individual chairmen who are dominated by a narrow partisanship, dedicated to the spoils system, or unable to appreciate the value of the various professional disciplines as a contribution to the intelligent performance of their own tasks.

Because the law in question left untouched the seniority system for the selection of committee chairmen, Congress not only failed to face the larger problem of party responsibility, but left even the routine functioning of the committees to the mercy of political accident or mere longevity. A careful analysis indicates that 60 per cent of the Senate committees and 67.6 per cent of the House committees in the last two Congresses appointed staffs which could meet fairly objective standards of professional competence. Three Senate committees and five House committees showed serious weaknesses, including the appointment of persons of clerical background to professional positions, by deliberate appointment of persons with marked bias on specific legislative questions, and the failure to appoint a sufficient number of professional staff members to be of general service. Two Senate committees and one House committee in the Eighty-first Congress either showed inability to use any professional staff services or an addiction to spoils in staffing the majority of their positions,[5] while in the Eightieth Congress four Senate committees and seven House committees had revealed serious shortcomings in the selection of professional employees.[6] On the other hand, the committees now headed by hard-working chairmen of respected stature on the "Hill" are not those characterized by the employment of "political hacks" in sinecures on the professional staff. If Congress could find some method to ensure the elevation of the most vigorous and able members of the majority party to the chairmanship of its committees, the committee staffing problem probably would soon be solved.

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[3] In 1949 an exchange of positions took place on the following House committees: District of Columbia, House Administration, Public Works, Rules, Veterans' Affairs, and Ways and Means. It also took place on the following Senate committees: Agriculture and Forestry, Banking and Currency, District of Columbia, Judiciary, Labor and Public Welfare, and Post Office and Civil Service.

[4] Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and House Committees on House Administration and on Rules.

*Effect of Change in Party Control.* A change in party control has had less effect than might have been expected on most of the standing committees. Only on select committees and on the standing committees handling highly controversial legislation involving political platform commitments has party turnover induced marked staff changes. In fact, on the standing committees reconstituted in 1949, the Eighty-first Congress made only eight personnel changes on the Senate side and twelve on the House side which could be attributed solely to political reasons. These numbers are something of a surprise from a total of forty-two professional staff positions on Senate committees and fifty-one on House committees.

Moreover, it should be remembered that initial appointments on most committees are made with attention to party affiliation. (Questions may not be asked directly probing into an individual's party membership, but, as one staff member put it, an individual's native state, the identity of his acquaintances on the "Hill," or his previous experience may easily betray his politics.) Certainly few Republican chairmen during the Eightieth Congress had employed Democrats on their committees, except for those Democrats who had renounced their party program. Instead, many committee appointees of 1947 and 1948 had rendered yeoman service to their chairmen or patrons in the political battles of their constituencies and apparently received appointment as a reward for these services.

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[5] Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and the House Education and Labor Committee.

[6] Senate Committees on Agriculture and Forestry; District of Columbia; Finance; Rules and Administration; and House Committees on Banking and Currency; Education and Labor; Expenditures in Executive Departments; Merchant Marine and Fisheries; Public Lands; Public Works; and Un-American Activities. The Republican chairman of the House Expenditures Committee refused to disclose any information about his staff to the author on the ground that it was the business of no one but himself, and he advised her to go to Drew Pearson or Walter Winchell for information.

Why were so many of these Republican appointees retained by Democratic chairmen in 1949 and 1950? Perhaps one answer may be that committee staff had often proved helpful by their mastery of the details and routine of committee work. In addition, of course, many committees do not divide strictly along party lines on most of the issues confronting them. But a third and more fundamental reason suggests itself: many committees were headed in 1949 by conservative southern Democrats who maintain policy stands identical with those of their Republican predecessors. Such chairmen could see no impropriety in utilizing the services of the assistants appointed during the Republican regime. The low degree of staff turnover may thus be linked to the seniority system which frees committee chairmen from any feeling of party responsibility.

*Question of Tenure.* One may well question the provisions for tenure of committee staffs set forth in the Reorganization Act. Should we expect a Democratic chairman pledged to repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and friendly to the interests of organized labor to retain the services of a staff member who helped to draft the statute in question and whose principal contribution has been his particular labor views? If the decisions of the electorate are to have any efficacy in the making of policy, the chairmen of powerful standing comittees must have a free hand in the recruitment of staff members sympathetic with the choices expressed by the electorate. Certainly a system of real party responsibility running down through the committee structure would postulate a free hand for the chairman or the committee at a time of party turnover. What logic lies in the expectation that committee chairmen should remain surrounded by persons whose beliefs are not in accord with their own? The belief has, indeed, been growing in administrative circles that the heads of large departments should have more freedom in the selection of their immediate staff in order that policy changes may be more easily reflected throughout their departments. If we deem party responsibility desirable in the most highly political branch of our government, the Congress, should we accord less freedom to its leaders? Realism dictates that the greater the mastery an individual gains of a specialized field, the more likely he is to have formulated standards and a philosophy for action in his field.

*Lack of Systematic Personnel Arrangements.* The committees of Congress muddle through their staffing problems without benefit of systematic personnel procedures covering either professional or clerical positions. Position descriptions, personnel records, rational graduated salary scales, promotion systems, and central applicant referral facilities are absent, and each committee chairman is a law unto himself.[7] A few exceptional chairmen have turned to their own alma maters or to other law schools for help in staffing, and a handful have tried to attract competent young graduate students into the field of legislative analysis and to train them in junior positions for advancement. As a matter of practice, however, the great majority of positions are filled at the top salary level permitted by law. In the recruitment process chairmen usually seek the assistance of their clerks, whose backgrounds are largely political.

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[7] However, the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1951 inaugurated its own systematic application and records procedure.

In an effort to systematize personnel procedures, the Senate Republican Policy Committee at the beginning of the Eightieth Congress supplied to chairmen the names and personnel data of individuals deemed qualified for professional staff positions. The Policy Committee staff director also furnished advice concerning the desirability of the definition of duties and responsibilities for such positions and of the establishment of salary levels which would allow increments over a period of time. Nothing similar was done in the House, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee took no parallel step in 1949. Furthermore, the advice given in 1947 was heeded in only a few instances. Perhaps it is too much to expect persons whose thinking has been attuned for years to manipulation of positions for patronage or personal advantage to abandon the spoils system in favor of the modern personnel practice which should have been implicit with reorganization.

*Preponderance of Lawyers.* The preponderance of lawyers or persons trained in the law among committee professional staffs is discouraging to the social scientist. Congress itself, of course, is made up largely of lawyers; and since few attorneys are at all aware of the usefulness of social science analysis to the legislative process, perhaps it is to be expected that many committee chairmen fail to turn to persons trained in any discipline other than the law for committee work. Of a total of forty-two professional staff members on Senate committees in 1948, twelve were lawyers, but in 1950, of a total of forty-nine, twenty-one were lawyers. On the House side, of a total of fifty-one professional staff members in 1948, eighteen were lawyers; in 1950, of a total of sixty-three, thirty-four were lawyers. The number of social scientists remained constant in the two Congresses, standing at nine on the Senate side and nine on the House side in 1948, and at eight on the Senate side and ten on the House side in 1950. The failure to increase the total number of social scientists after Congress became Democratic in 1949 may seem inconsistent in view of the Fair Deal advocacy of more social legislation than was pushed by the Republicans.

One reason for employment of lawyers advanced by some committees is that they are helpful in bill drafting. This argument, however, is fallacious in the light of the existence of the Legislative Counsel's office on each side of the Capitol. This office is well staffed and exists primarily to render bill-drafting services. On the other hand, the great danger in overemphasis of legal training for professional committee work is that lawyers are too seldom exposed in their training to social, economic, and political problems. They bring to committee work the same narrow, technical, legalistic background already characteristic of so many legislators. In other words, "nothing new has been added" to the making of the legislative product.

*Administration of Committee Work.* At the beginning of the Eightieth Congress a tendency seemed to be developing to create the position of staff director to ensure unity of direction of the professional side of committee work. But in the Eighty-first Congress three committees—the Senate Appropriations, Senate Expenditures, and House Foreign Affairs Committees—abolished these positions with the clerks on these committees gaining in power of direction. Apparently both committee chairmen and clerks had felt in some cases that control over staff was slipping from their hands through the delegation of administration to one acknowledged professional head, and divided power was causing some administrative difficulties. The lines of authority are somewhat clearer now that the clerk, who is the chairman's personal representative, is the sole recognized director—if it is possible to concede that any staff member effectively directs committee work.

Professional work for a committee of Congress possesses marked differences from work of a similar level in an executive department. Because of such differences, former executive agency employees often find it a strain to adjust themselves to the "Hill." For example, lines of authority and responsibility are confused. Great as is the chairman's power over staff appointments on most committees, his tenure may be brief. And although the chairman may feel that he is running his committee, as a matter of fact each staff appointee is working for all committee members, each of whom must be pleased by prompt and satisfactory performance. The minority must be served as well as the majority. In addition, no staff employee is normally responsible to any other. Most have been employed through some political influence of their own. Unless the chairman intervenes, which is seldom, staff employees may not only work apart from others, but may at times determine the degree of cooperation they will demonstrate with their co-workers. The "informal" organization of his own committee staff may be baffling to unravel, especially to a newcomer; and because this organization is just as confused in almost every committee, it is a real problem for a new appointee to determine to whom to turn or what channels to follow for accurate data he may need. The problem of working with individual congressional offices and with the administrative services on the "Hill" is equally baffling and exasperating to solve. The decisive factor on the "Hill" is that no one—legislators or staff—owes anything to his peers. Real discipline is lacking. Few members of Congress, with the exception of several Senators who have been governors of states, have had administrative experience; and therefore few devote attention to the problems of developing channels of authority and communication.

The "Hill" career employee, who has usually served his apprenticeship as a secretary in a Representative's or Senator's office, adjusts best to the peculiar atmosphere of committee administration. Often he has studied law at night during his period of apprenticeship. In 1948, thirteen Senate professional appointees and fourteen House professional appointees were congressional career people. By 1950 the number had increased to twenty-five among Senate committees and twenty among House committees. Among them, restored to committee positions, were a few persons who had served the Democrats during their years of control from 1933 to 1947.

*Employment of Women in Professional Work.* Congress has been very slow to appoint women to professional staff positions, despite the fact that a few women have long served as chief clerks to committees. In 1948, there was only one woman permanent professional staff employee—on the House Veterans' Affairs Committee. Although there were four women in professional positions by 1950, little real progress had been made toward recognition that they might bring professional competence to committee work, for on the Senate side the three women added were performing work on a secretarial or stenographic level, disguised under another title. Insofar as it has insisted upon true professional qualifications for women as well as men, the House has a better record than the Senate.[8]

## II. EXAMPLES OF COMMITTEE STAFFING, 1947–51

It might be well to trace in detail the staffing of four committees, one of which represents a committee served by a highly competent staff, another a committee with a few serious weaknesses, and the third, a poorly staffed committee. The same quality pervaded the staffing of each of these three—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Public Works Committee, and the House Education and Labor Committee—in both the Eightieth and the Eighty-first Congress. In addition, it should be of interest to political scientists to examine the House Appropriations Committee because of its distinctive staffing and the important role it plays.

*Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.* The chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1947 sought a staff well-qualified to render nonpartisan assistance in this significant field. He turned to the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress to obtain, on a reimbursable loan basis, its chief international relations analyst and a research counsel in the same field. The former became staff director for the committee and brought to his work a wide background of education and experience, including the teaching of political science and several federal administrative assignments. The other research specialist secured from the Library of Congress had also been a professor of political science and had served on a regional War Labor Board, as well as on numerous governmental commissions. A third staff member, whose experience had been similarly academic, had at one time served as a field director of the Foreign Policy Association. No attempt was made by the ranking minority member to fill a committee staff position.

The staff remained intact when party control changed in 1949. When the third staff man left in 1950 to accept a position elsewhere, he was replaced by a State Department analyst who, prior to his work for that agency, had taught political science and economics. The clerk, who had previously served in the offices of two Michigan Senators and on the Republican conference staff in the Seventy-ninth Congress, was retained by the Democrats.

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[8] In 1949, the woman professional staff member on the House Veterans' Affairs Committee was shifted to chief clerk, a position she had held for fourteen years prior to 1947. The House District of Columbia Committee moved its chief clerk, a practicing lawyer, to a professional staff position.

A special subcommittee created to sift the charges made by Senator McCarthy in 1950 was given an appropriation to employ a staff of its own for the brief period of the investigation. A chief counsel and four assistants constituted the professional staff. Of them, the chief counsel and the three assistant counsels for the majority came from private law practice, but all had at one time been Federal Bureau of Investigation agents. The assistant counsel serving the minority had been employed in a congressional office and had worked for a House committee.

On the whole, the full committee was understaffed in view of the major significance of its work and the heavy legislative burden it carries. The policy of the staff director, to whom most of the responsibility for recruitment had been delegated, was to insist not only on a doctoral degree or its equivalent in broad experience, but on persons who had not become immersed in narrow specialties. Such persons were hard to obtain.

*Senate Committee on Public Works.* Pervading the staffing of the Senate Committee on Public Works in the two Congresses was an ambivalence of devotion to merit and to spoils. Certainly the committee chairmen never divorced the latter factor from consideration. In 1947 the first chairman recruited two engineers from the Army Engineer Corps, a questionable source in view of the overt alliance between Congress and that agency. These men were retained in 1949. The first chairman brought in also a counsel whose experience had been in a war agency and in codification work for a state legislature. The counsel voluntarily left the committee in 1949. A fourth man, possessing considerable "Hill" experience but with no professional training, actually worked in the chairman's senatorial office but was carried on the committee payroll as a professional staff member. He was, of course, not retained when the chairman was defeated, but he found a position in another committee member's office. One new professional staff member appointed in 1949 was a woman who had been confidential secretary in the new chairman's senatorial office. She was assigned to secretarial duties described as "professional"—a term of little meaning. The second new professional employee was recruited on a temporary basis as a special investigator of labor-management problems. His career had been in part political, as an employee of a state legislature, and in part industrial, in investigatory duties similar to those performed for the committee. The Republican clerk, a one-time state legislator, came to the "Hill" originally as clerk to a special subcommittee on displaced persons. In 1949 he was replaced by a Democrat, formerly a clerk in the new chairman's office and during the Eightieth Congress the minority professional staff employee to the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. This committee was unusual during the Eighty-first Congress in the fact that it did not employ a lawyer.

*House Committee on Education and Labor.* The sharp cleavage within the House Committee on Education and Labor, resulting from the political nature of its principal legislative tasks, has carried over into the selection of staff. The results have placed the committee at a serious disadvantage in the study of legislation before it.

The Republican chairman during the Eightieth Congress admitted that original appointments were "frankly political" and had been divided on a patronage basis among majority members. He selected the clerk, a man who had been his own secretary for eighteen years, and the counsel, who had at one time been employed as a National Labor Relations Board attorney and later as counsel for the Smith Committee of the preceding Congress.[9] A majority member in sympathy with the chairman's views named another professional employee, whose previous experience had been as an accountant for a bank corporation. Another majority member of similar views recruited a former union printer. The ranking minority member named a man trained in law who had served as his clerk for the former Invalid Pensions Committee of the House for a number of years.

The new Democratic chairman in 1949 summarily discharged the professional staff, including his own appointee of the previous Congress, and even went so far as to have the locks changed on committee doors in order to exclude them. His first appointee was a former Michigan Congressman, whom the committee refused to confirm. A new clerk was brought in whose experience had varied from private business to that of a congressional secretary to one of the members and political appointments in his state and in the federal government. A labor law specialist was obtained as counsel from the office of the General Counsel of the NLRB. A second new professional appointee, of limited education, had been an inspector and hearing examiner in the Immigration and Naturalization Office in the chairman's district. A so-called research specialist was recruited in 1949 directly from labor organizational activity and "political action" for the United Automotive Workers. After the death of the chairman in May, 1950, the entire majority staff was assured tenure only until January, 1951. The minority professional staff member during the Eighty-first Congress had been chief investigator for the committee during the Eightieth Congress, and earlier he had been a congressional secretary.

At no time did this committee employ a specialist in the field of education, although legislation for federal aid-to-education was a subject of major importance and bitter controversy to the committee for the entire four-year period. Liaison between the committee and the parallel Senate committee was as sketchy as between the majority and minority staffs. Perhaps symbolic of the ideological cleavage within the committee was the physical separation of the offices of minority from majority staff during both Congresses.

*House Committee on Appropriations.* Because the House Committee on Appropriations has long enjoyed a firm tradition of tenure and insistence on qualifications of a professional nature for its staff, and also because it is not limited by the Reorganization Act as to the size of its staff, it is, in effect, *sui*

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[9] Select House Committee to Investigate Acts of Executive Agencies Which Exceed Their Authority, 79th Congress.

*generis* among the standing committees. The nature of the work of this committee, which has long been divided among a number of standing subcommittees, dictates the employment of a large staff. The present staff is classified as entirely clerical, despite the fact that qualifications of a professional level are sought in all persons employed as assistant clerks and as clerk. The chief clerk of this committee is far more a real administrative staff director, selected for professional experience rather than for talent as a political manipulator, than almost any other clerk on the "Hill."

The present clerk, appointed to this position during the Eightieth Congress, has had a broad background in legislative and administrative work. Prior to his recruitment as principal assistant clerk of this committee, he served as budget officer for the Federal Security Agency. Service as a budget officer in the Navy Department preceded that on this committee for his principal assistant clerk. One of the older assistant clerks, who has been with the committee for twenty-four years, came originally from the Senate Military Affairs Committee staff, and another assistant clerk, who has served the Appropriations Committee for thirty years, had earlier worked for seven years in the old Bureau of Fisheries. Among the other assistant clerks, one was recruited directly from law school in 1933; another, with foreign trade experience, from an executive branch position; and a third, a lawyer, from work on the "Hill" as a congressional secretary and as a committee clerk. Budgetary work in the Department of Agriculture provided the work experience for a young accountant, now an assistant clerk. Another younger staff member, trained in law, had taught economics and later had served as a lawyer in the Federal Trade Commission. Several young assistant clerks had either served as a congressional secretary or worked in an executive agency. Two trainees, listed as junior assistant clerks, were in one case a law student and in the other a graduate student in political science.

A number of innovations have been instituted in committee work since the passage of the Reorganization Act. In the first place, the committee has been enlarged by four clerks, two junior staff members, and the entire stenographic staff. It is now possible to conduct a training program for more responsible staff assignments. Secondly, the old practice of assigning an assistant clerk to follow one particular set of appropriations from year to year has been replaced by a system of rotating clerical assignments. The theory of the clerk in adopting the principle of rotation is that the handling of a variety of items will enrich the experience of all members of the staff and maximize their value to the committee. A third change was the utilization during the Eightieth Congress of consultants from thirty-five private organizations on a per diem basis, as well as the use of a rather large investigative staff borrowed from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During the Eighty-first Congress, the clerk borrowed eight budget employees from the departmental service, exclusive of the Bureau of the Budget, to work with each subcommittee's assistant clerk in statistical analysis during the peak workload. He simultaneously reduced to two the size of the investigative staff, and these former FBI employees are now permanently with the committee. Other investigators were requested, as needed, from various executive agencies not under investigation. A fourth change was the creation of a political staff for the committee, consisting of a clerk to the majority, a clerk to the minority, and a stenographer assigned to each subcommittee chairman's office. The political staff is physically separated from the permanent staff, on a principle of asepsis, and is not considered a part of the regular staff.

## III. CONCLUSION

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 attempted to meet a need of Congress of which many legislators today are not fully cognizant. The legislative burden has so increased by reason of modern industrialization and advancing technology, the critical posture of our foreign relations, and the growing web of our international responsibilities that congressional committees could no more be expected to operate successfully without competent staff assistance than we could expect the employees in the executive branch of George Washington's day to direct our present administrative functions.

The student of American government must remember that the principle of separation of powers, indeed, of the bicameral system, postulates the need for independent and comprehensive analyses of policy in the legislative committees. Were this country operating under the cabinet system of government, independent research facilities in the legislative branch could be dispensed with. Were party responsibility real instead of a mere fiction in our political system, such research facilities could be concentrated in the party policy committees of both houses instead of in the standing committees. But the hard fact that faces us is that pressure groups are growing ever more powerful and vocal, dissipating the ragged shreds of party responsibility, to the confusion of our legislators. Unless members of Congress can turn to competent men and women with a broad view of governmental problems and with wide experience, devoid of biases, in order to obtain rational diagnosis of cause and effect in our society, they will become more than ever the victims of the lobbyists' "pulling and hauling" in all directions at once. The sad fact for the political scientist is that Congress itself in so few instances realizes that persons well-educated and well-informed in the social sciences and with adequate governmental experience could lighten the burden modern society places on the legislator. Until this realization becomes an actuality, the great promises of improvement in the legislative process implicit in the Legislative Reorganization Act will lie largely unfulfilled.

# NEWS AND NOTES

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

### *Forty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Transactions of the Executive Council and General Business Meeting*[*]

The Executive Council of the American Political Science Association convened in International House, Berkeley, California, on Monday, August 27, at 10:00 A.M. President Peter Odegard called the meeting to order. The following officers and members of the Council answered the roll call: M. Margaret Ball, J. Alton Burdine, Taylor Cole, Royden J. Dangerfield, J. A. C. Grant, Luther Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Albert Lepawsky, Edward H. Litchfield, James L. McCamy, John D. Millett, Peter H. Odegard, Carl Swisher, and Edward Weidner. Past Presidents John Gaus and James K. Pollock, Committee Chairmen Bertram M. Gross, Charles M. Kneier, Walter H. C. Laves, George A. Lipsky, Roscoe C. Martin and William S. Stokes, and Acting Chairmen Harold M. Dorr and Lloyd M. Short were also present.

President Odegard briefly reviewed the meetings held by the Executive Committee during the year, noted the completion of the Association's effort to incorporate, and recorded the president's participation in a number of the meetings of regional political science associations. He then called attention to the long and difficult process faced by each president in the appointment of the new Association committees. He suggested that this process raised fundamental questions of the future of committees in the structure of the Association and recommended that the Council consider the issue more fully at some later session. President Odegard also recounted the efforts made during the year to secure foundation support for research committees, for a new Committee on Policy and Planning and for several specialized activities of the Association.

The report of the secretary-treasurer and executive director was presented by Edward H. Litchfield. He noted that the Association's overall financial position might be described as follows:

1. The Association's total assets amount to $32,717.32. This includes $24,154.55 in endowment funds, $866.45 which are earmarked for the Committee on the Advancement of Political Science Teaching, and $7,696.32 in an operating account made up of cash in bank, petty cash, and several small sums on commercial deposit.

2. Last year's operation was calculated to cost $61,152 on a 12-month basis, or $50,662.80 on an abbreviated fiscal-year basis. Actual expenditures amounted to $50,957.89, or an over-expenditure of $295.09. Actual revenues for this abbreviated fiscal year, plus the appropriation from the Carnegie grant for this period, amounted to $52,878.45, or an excess of revenues and appropriation over expenditures of $1,920.56.

3. Note must be made of the disposition of the grant which the Carnegie Corporation made to the Association for organization purposes on April 11, 1950. The Executive Committee determined that this amount should be spread over a two-year operating period

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[*] Copies of the *final* program of the 1951 meeting of the Association, held in San Francisco, California, August 27–30, are available on request from the executive director, American Political Science Association, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

during which the initial organization of the Executive Offices might be undertaken. $1,400 was spent during the fiscal year 1949–50 for the purchase of office equipment, and the remainder of $8,600 was distributed between fiscal year 1950–51 and fiscal year 1951–52. As of July 31, a total of $5,700 has therefore been spent and $4,300 remains in the operating account for appropriation for the fiscal year 1951–52. The latter amount has been included in the budget proposed for next year.

In his capacity as executive director, Mr. Litchfield also presented a budget for the fiscal year 1951–52, covering both editorial and executive functions of the Association. The budget contemplated an income of $64,716.00 with an expenditure of $63,392.00 and an estimated surplus of $1,324.00. The secretary-treasurer noted that present revenues are increasing at a rate which will enable the Association to continue its current activities after the expiration of the Carnegie grant in 1952. Finally, Mr. Litchfield recommended the appointment by the president of a Committee on Financial Development, which would attempt to plan the Association's financial program for the next several years. President Odegard indicated that, unless there were objections from the floor, the appointment of a Committee on Financial Development would be recommended to the president-elect. There were no objections. It was moved by Mr. Millett, seconded by Mr. Grant, that the report of the secretary-treasurer be accepted and the budget proposed by the executive director be adopted, with the proviso that only totals and not the individual items be considered as binding.

Reporting as executive director, Mr. Litchfield called attention to the organization of the Executive Offices of the Association in Washington and to the number of new activities performed by those offices. Included were a new Personnel Service, now extensively used by departmental chairmen, by both senior and junior members of the Association seeking new employment, and by a wide variety of federal and international agencies seeking temporary and permanent staff members. Mr. Litchfield also mentioned the *Newsletter* to departmental chairmen, which seeks to bring to the attention of political science departments material of concern to them. In this connection he asked that chairmen advise him of the type of material they would like included in the *Newsletter*, to the end that it might be of maximum usefulness. The executive director also stated that a new questionnaire for political scientists would be distributed within the next several weeks. He asked the patience of the members, explaining that the questionnaire was necessary for the preparation of a new *Directory*, for an adequate personnel service and for other purposes. Similarly, attention was called to the various ways in which the Association had been able to assist federal agencies, including the White House, a number of congressional committees, the Bureau of the Census and the Department of State, as well as others, in the performance of their functions during the past year.

The role of the Governmental Affairs Institute, which is affiliated with the Association, was set forth. The Institute's efforts to plan professional programs for over three hundred political leaders coming to this country from many parts of the world were mentioned. In this connection, attention was directed to the fact that a large number of political scientists had been active in this program in the past year and that a similar program might be anticipated during 1951–52. Miscellaneous other activities performed by the Executive Offices in Washington include types of assistance to chairmen of departments, joint sponsorship with The American University of the Joint Institute for Teachers of Government, and a variety of related undertakings.

The managing editor, Mr. Taylor Cole, gave both an oral and a written report. He stated that special attention had been given to stimulating the examination and analysis of recently published reports of committees of the Association by the preparation of a number of articles dealing with the problems raised in those reports. Mr. Cole announced that, since taking office in 1949, the managing editor had received 368 articles for review or possible inclusion in the REVIEW. Mr. Cole also noted the increase over the previous year in the number of pages published, which he estimated as totaling approximately 1,280 in 1951. He explained that this increase had been possible without exceeding the budget appropriation which had been adopted at the previous Executive Council meeting.

After expressing deep appreciation for the invaluable services of James W. Fesler and Harold Zink as associate editors during the preceding year, the managing editor proposed names for membership on the Editorial Board. On motion of Miss Ball, seconded by Mr. Millett, the following panel of names was approved by the Executive Council: Merle Fainsod, Harvard University, associate editor; Robert J. Harris, Louisiana State University, associate editor; Frederic A. Ogg, University of Wisconsin; Franz L. Neumann, Columbia University; Charles S. Hyneman, Northwestern University; Philip W. Buck, Stanford University; Charles M. Kneier, University of Illinois.

Mr. George A. Lipsky, chairman of the Local Arrangements Committee, reported on the Committee's activities during the course of the year. He called attention to the special circumstances under which the meeting was held in San Francisco, the extra costs incurred by hotels in that area, and the splendid contributions of the University of California in both personnel and financial support. He paid a special tribute to his administrative assistant, Al M. Loeb, for his excellent assistance during the course of the year.

Mr. Bertram M. Gross, chairman of the Committee on Political Parties, reported both orally and in writing on the work of the Political Parties Committee. He noted its reorganization, the fact that it had had several full committee meetings and several subcommittee meetings, and that its members had been engaged in extensive work in pursuance of committee assignments. He delineated the research program which the Committee had projected, visualizing the ultimate preparation of four reports dealing with these subjects: "Money in Elections," "National Conventions and Party Responsibility," "Primaries and Party Responsibility," and "An Analysis of Reactions to the Committee's Earlier Report, 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.' " He indicated that the Committee intended to prepare the reports in a semi-popular vein in order that they might have a wide public usefulness, and that each would contain from fifty to one hundred printed pages.

Mr. J. A. C. Grant reported both orally and in writing on the activities of the

Program Committee. Mr. Grant explained the problems of committee chairmen, who are obliged to prepare round tables for annual conventions in an Association which has developed such diversified interests as to make it impossible to cover all significant subjects in these discussions. He indicated that the problem in San Francisco was complicated further by the fact that, unlike the practice on the East Coast, the San Francisco hotels charge for all of the meeting rooms, with the consequence that very real and practical limitations are imposed upon the number of sessions which the Association can afford to support. He noted also the general desire of the membership to have at least a few round tables which will cut across the subject-matter lines that are developing in our expanding discipline. Finally, he said that his extensive correspondence with the membership on these subjects had led him to believe that there is a general desire that the organization of round tables give greater recognition to significant research activities of the members. Mr. Grant pointed out that it has become a policy of the Association to organize round table discussions to consider published reports of standing committees of the Association. The San Francisco meeting had therefore been planned to cover "Goals for Political Science" and "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System."

The report of the Committee on Nominations was presented by Mr. Charles M. Kneier, the Committee's chairman. Mr. Kneier explained the procedure employed by the Committee to secure suggestions from the membership. The steps included a note in the *Review*, requesting names for consideration, and also a letter from the chairmen of the Committee to the chairmen of 115 political science departments offering graduate work in political science. In response to these efforts, suggestions were received from 72 persons, and the total of suggested names varied from 45 for president-elect to 132 for membership on the Council. Mr. Kneier reported that, as a result of the Committee's deliberations, it would present the following nominations to the Annual Business Meeting of the Association to be held on August 29: president-elect—Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council; vice-presidents—Lane W. Lancaster, University of Nebraska; Harold D. Lasswell, Yale University; Lloyd M. Short, University of Minnesota; new members of the Executive Council for a two-year term—John H. Ferguson, Pennsylvania State College; Oliver Garceau, Bennington College; Lee S. Greene, University of Tennessee; Boyd A. Martin, University of Idaho; Dean E. McHenry, University of California at Los Angeles; Robert S. Rankin, Duke University; Ivan M. Stone, Beloit College; David B. Truman, Columbia University.

In the absence of Mr. William Anderson, Mr. Litchfield briefly summarized the content of the written report of the Committee on Awards. The report listed the Committee's recommendations that the Woodrow Wilson Foundation award be granted to John H. Herz for his book, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, published by the University of Chicago Press; that the Freedom House-Willkie Memorial Award be given to James L. McCamy for his volume, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*, published by Alfred A. Knopf; that the Franklin D. Roosevelt Award not be made, since none of the books submitted to the Committee seemed to be sufficiently outstanding. Mr. Pollock suggested, and the Council agreed, that an effort should be made to encourage the Theodore Roosevelt Foundation to establish a similar award in future years. Upon motion of Mr. Pollock, seconded by Mr. Lepawsky, the question of future awards policy and practices was referred to the Executive Committee with power to act.

The Membership Committee report was submitted both in writing and orally by the chairman, Mr. Roscoe Martin. In the period from October 1, 1950, to August 15, 1951, the membership had increased from 5,126 to 5,667, or a net increase during ten and one-half months of 541 members. Mr. Martin pointed out that this increase was particularly significant in view of the fact that it came during the same period as the recent increase in membership dues.

In the absence of Chairman Claude Hawley, Mr. Harold M. Dorr reported for the Committee on Advancement of Political Science Teaching. The highlight of this year's committee activity was the publication of *Goals for Political Science*, copies of which were distributed to all individual members of the Association. Mr. Dorr pointed out that both publication and distribution had been made possible in large part by the grant from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Mr. Dorr noted that the Committee's future plans center upon three major areas: first, matters relating directly to the teaching of political science; second, work involving cooperation with other committees of the Association whose substantive work has bearing upon the teaching of political science; and third, work involving the cooperation of organizations outside the Association, such as the National Council for Social Studies, the Citizenship Education Project at Columbia University, and others. In the subsequent discussion there was considerable emphasis upon the desirability of bringing about a closer cooperation with those who teach social studies in the high schools and preparatory schools, in order to secure greater understanding on the part of students when they reach the university level and to provide for a wider use of our own materials.

In the absence of the chairman of the Committee on American Legislatures, Mr. Litchfield summarized the Committee's activities by noting that its manuscript was still in progress, that substantial efforts had been made by the Committee in the past year, but that additional funds were needed for the continued compilation of data, for meetings of the Committee, for the preparation of the data for publication, and for assisting the Committee in the important task of encouraging and aiding responsible public officials to take the leadership in their respective states to carry out the recommendations of the Committee.

In the absence of the chairman of the Committee on Citizen Participation in Politics, the Committee's written report was filed and the executive director noted that the report contained a summary of a substantial number of individual activities undertaken by the chairman and members of the Committee in the furtherance of the general purposes for which the Committee had been organized. It was also pointed out that, in the absence of funds, the Committee was handicapped in the planning of its future program.

The report of the Committee on the Far East was noted. Chairman Quigley's written report indicated that no meetings had been held during the year, though several of the individual members had been able to have brief discussions with one another. Several suggestions for committee consideration were briefly noted in the chairman's report. They included the desirability of surveying the existing teaching and research situation in American colleges and universities, intensive study of procedures and curricula desirable for the preparation of political scientists in the field of Far Eastern teaching and research, the development of a publication program with reference to monographs seeking publication, annual surveys of Far Eastern political developments with relevant documents and excerpts, encouragement of the publication of additional collections of basic documents, and a variety of similar proposals. Mr. Quigley expressed the opinion that with additional funds the program could be more precisely agreed upon and work undertaken to implement it.

Mr. Walter H. C. Laves reported both orally and in writing for the Committee on International Relations. The Committee feels strongly that it is important to avoid giving to an informal group of this type responsibilities without resources to carry them out. The Committee expressed the belief that, were such funds available, the Association might assume positive and major responsibility for programs involving teaching of international relations, research in international relations, activities related to the International Political Science Association, advice to governmental and private organizations on exchange of persons programs, and the promotion of publications exchanges. The Executive Council noted the recommendations and referred them to the Executive Committee for implementation.

The report of the Committee on Labor-Management Relations was submitted in writing by Mr. Edward W. Carter and was commented upon briefly by the executive director, who noted that the report addressed itself to such questions as "What skills are requisite for competence in the field of labor-management relations?" "Are there opportunities for research and writing in the field?" "How may the political scientist conduct courses in labor-management education?" and "What topics in the labor-management field are suitable for courses in political science?" The report contains suggestive comments on these and related questions, though, necessarily, no problems are treated at length. The report was referred to the Executive Committee for action.

Mr. William Stokes reported both orally and in writing for the Committee on Latin-American Affairs. He noted that the major objectives of the Committee included (1) the improvement of teaching and research in the Latin American area in accordance with a recommendation of President Odegard in his letter of January 15, 1951; (2) the completion of projects and commitments outstanding; (3) the development of the Committee as a liaison agent for

Latin Americanists in their relationships to government, the learned foundations, and professional organizations. In pursuance of these objectives, final arrangements were made for publication of Professor George I. Blanksten's bibliography of the major works on the Latin American governments, to be published in the successive issues of the *Review of Inter-American Bibliography;* for the preparation by Professor Macdonald of a list of the most significant works on the Argentine Republic; and for a variety of other projects under way. The Committee explored with the State Department the possibility of formalizing the technical contacts between academicians and practitioners in the field of Latin American affairs, and the chairman expressed the hope that a relatively definite arrangement might soon be concluded in this respect. The chairman also reported that word had been received in February from the Ford Foundation indicating its inability to support a monograph series of studies of political institutions of several Latin American countries.

Mr. Gaus reported both orally and in writing as chairman of the Committee on Public Administration. He noted that the Committee had held no meetings during the year, and clearly raised the issue as to what the Executive Council expected the subject-matter committees to do. He asked whether committees were expected to seek staffs and whether such staffs should be exclusively assigned to the committees, or to be part of the central staff of the Association.

Mr. Franz L. Neumann, chairman of the Committee on Research Methods, submitted a written report noting that his Committee had been constituted very late in the year, that no meeting had been held and that, in the absence of funds with which to support the Committee's activities, there were no immediate plans for the Committee's future activities.

The report of the Committee on Science and Technology was submitted in writing by Mr. Arthur N. Holcombe and was orally summarized by Mr. Albert Lepawsky, a member of the Committee and member of the Executive Council. Mr. Lepawsky noted that the Committee had recommended application to the Ford Foundation for funds with which to undertake a careful investigation of the question "How may the American people maintain a proper control of governmental activities involving the formation of public policy by officers exercising a wide discretion in the interpretation and dissemination of secret information?" The project raises for consideration this further question: "How shall the essentials of democracy be preserved when men in power are making decisions of the highest importance on the basis of facts which are not available to the public or even to the Congress?" For the proposed undertaking, the Committee suggests the employment of three research techniques. The first is the technique of staff research, the second that of small policy-discussion conferences among experts in the field of inquiry, and the third the use of a special commission of inquiry composed of persons of knowledge, objectivity, judgment, and prestige. It is estimated that it would cost approximately $200,000 to undertake effectively research by the three techniques proposed. The Executive Council considered the general proposal and urged the Executive Committee to take appropriate action at the earliest possible time.

The president noted that there were a number of Association organization problems still outstanding. These include the functions of the secretary-treasurer, the relationship between the Executive and Editorial Offices, the duties of the executive director, the functions of the Executive Committee, the composition and function of the Executive Council, and the place of the committees in the total Association structure. On motion of Mr. Millett, seconded by Mr. Litchfield, the president was authorized to appoint a Committee on Organization to consider these and related matters and to forward its recommendations to the Executive Committee as soon as possible, in any event in advance of the next Executive Council meeting. The motion was carried unanimously.

The subject of the International Political Science Association was discussed in some detail. Professor Barents of the University of Amsterdam was present to represent the International Association. He briefly described the publication of *International Political Science Abstracts* and outlined the plans for the Second World Congress, which will probably be held in The Hague in September, 1952. As a consequence of the general discussion of the relationships between the American and International Associations, the need for adequate American representation in the activities of the International Association was emphasized, and it was specifically mentioned that an American should be designated to sit on the Steering Committee. It was moved by Mr. McCamy and seconded by Mr. Lepawsky that the executive director prepare a proposal for executive committee consideration, defining the relationships to be maintained between the Office of the Secretary General in Paris and the Association's Executive Offices in Washington.

The Council adjourned for the day at 5 o'clock. It reconvened in the Hotel Mark Hopkins on August 28 at 9:00 A.M. The president pointed out that, pending final decision of the Association as to the functions of the office of secretary-treasurer, an interim decision had been made in December of 1950 to combine the duties of the secretary-treasurer and executive director by the election of the incumbent executive director to the office of secretary-treasurer. It was noted that the Organization Committee, authorized by the Executive Council, would deal with this question during the coming year. In order to continue the present arrangement, it was therefore moved by President-Elect Gulick, and seconded by Mr. Taylor Cole, that the executive director be instructed to cast a unanimous vote for Mr. Edward H. Litchfield as secretary-treasurer for the year ending at the time of the annual meeting in August, 1952. The motion was carried by unanimous vote.

A resolution thanking and commending the University of California for its assistance during the year was presented by the executive director and adopted by the Council for submission to the business meeting. The executive director presented similar commendatory resolutions concerning State Department documentation and the work of the Program and Local Arrangements Committees. These resolutions were also adopted by the Council for submission to the business meeting.

President Odegard reviewed in detail the Association's efforts to obtain financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. He indicated that officers of the Association had encountered considerable uncertainty in the minds of some of these Foundations' executives as to the appropriate functions to be carried on by a professional membership society. Specifically, some had raised the question as to whether the Association should undertake research activities by means of its existing research committees. He said further that the question had been raised by one of the senior members of the Association as to whether or not the committees should be entirely disbanded.

There was considerable discussion as to whether or not the research committees should be retained. There seemed to be little sentiment in favor of abandoning the committees, though some reservations were expressed as to the value of publishing reports which were nothing but a collection of opinions, with no supporting material resulting from scientific observation. Some members of the Council expressed concern that every effort be made not to water down the value of individual work by forcing it into a mould acceptable to the opinions of a large number of other Association members. On motion of Miss Ball, seconded by Mr. McCamy, the Council unanimously decided that, subject to the president's power to change the composition of committees and to abolish them where necessary, the present committee structure should be continued for two years; that in the interim the Organization Committee, previously referred to, should be given jurisdiction to study this question when it considered the other organization questions referred to it.

After considering the recommendations of the chairmen of the research committees concerning financial support, it was moved by Mr. Dangerfield and seconded by Miss Ball that the Executive Committee be used as the agency to determine the priority of the several committee proposals and the bases upon which financial support should be sought. The motion was adopted unanimously with the further understanding that the Executive Committee was instructed: (a) to restrict the projects to fields best designed for group rather than individual research efforts; (b) to authorize committee activities only in fields in which factual and scholarly efforts might be profitably undertaken; (c) to continue to publish committee reports on behalf of the committees, even though the officers of the Association be in disagreement with the contents thereof; and (d) to obtain the advice of the Committee on Policy and Planning, when and if established, before any final decision is taken with respect to the functions of the research committees.

The Council was adjourned at 12:15 P.M.

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The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was held in the Golden Empire Room of the Mark Hopkins Hotel, San Francisco, California, on Wednesday, August 29. The meeting was called to order at 5 o'clock by President Peter Odegard, who announced that a quorum was present. The president briefly reported upon meetings of the Executive Committee, the incorporation of the Association, the general operations of the Executive Offices in Washington, the broad aspects of the Association's financial position, the ten per cent increase in membership during the past year, and the decision of the Executive Council to extend the life of present research committees for two additional years.

The secretary-treasurer and executive director, Edward H. Litchfield, reported upon the financial position of the Association and on the activities of the Washington Office during the preceding year. The content of his comments duplicated the material presented to the Executive Council as set forth in the minutes of that body. He concluded by informing the business meeting that the Executive Council had adopted a budget contemplating an expenditure of $63,392.00 and a revenue of $64,716.00, with an estimated surplus of $1,324.00.

The managing editor of the REVIEW, Mr. Taylor Cole, reported orally upon the Association's publication activities and problems of the preceding year. He expressed his hope that it would be possible to continue to maintain the REVIEW at 320 pages per issue, and commented upon the completion and publication of *Goals for Political Science* by the Committee on the Advancement of Teaching. He concluded by noting that the Executive Council had approved appointments to the Board of Editors of the REVIEW as set out in the minutes of that meeting.

Mr. Charles Kneier, chairman of the Nominating Committee, explained the nominating procedure followed by the Committee. On his motion, seconded by Mr. Pollock, the following names were placed in nomination: president-elect—Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council; vice-presidents—Lane W. Lancaster, University of Nebraska; Harold D. Lasswell, Yale University; Lloyd M. Short, University of Minnesota; new members to the Executive Council for a two-year term: John H. Ferguson, Pennsylvania State College; Oliver Garceau, Bennington College; Lee S. Greene, University of Tennessee; Boyd A. Martin, University of Idaho; Dean E. McHenry, University of California, Los Angeles; Robert S. Rankin, Duke University; Ivan M. Stone, Beloit College; David B. Truman, Columbia University.

The president asked the executive director if further nominations had been filed in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The executive director stated that none had been filed. The president asked for further nominations from the floor; and since there were none, it was moved by Mr. Pollock, seconded by Mr. Martin, that the nominations be closed. The secretary-treasurer was instructed to cast the vote for the slate of officers as presented by the Nominating Committee. President Odegard turned the chair over to President-Elect Gulick, who expressed the Association's deep gratitude to the retiring president and wished him every success during his forthcoming year at Oxford University.

Professor Barents of the University of Amsterdam was present as an official representative of the International Political Science Association. He extended a cordial invitation to all members of the American Political Science Association both to membership in the International society and to attend the Second World Congress, which will in all probability be held at The Hague in September of 1952.

On behalf of the Executive Council, the executive director presented for consideration by the members the resolutions approved by the Council, commending and thanking the University of California and other California institutions for their splendid assistance during the preceding year. The resolution of thanks, approved by a unanimous vote, was as follows:

RESOLVED: That the Association record its sincere appreciation to the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, the University of California at Los Angeles, San Francisco State College, to their officers, faculty and students, and to the Coro Foundation for their indispensable assistance in planning and carrying forward the 47th Annual Meeting.

That the Association particularly express to the President and Officers of the University of California its deepest appreciation for the professional, financial, and material assistance the University has provided the Association during the past year as well as during the period of this meeting.

The following resolutions of thanks and of recommendation were also presented for consideration by the membership and were approved by unanimous vote:

RESOLVED: That the American Political Science Association, assembled in San Francisco for its 47th Annual Meeting, express its deep appreciation to the Committee on Local Arrangements, under the chairmanship of Professor George A. Lipsky, and to his Administrative Assistant, Al M. Loeb, for the able organization and arrangement of staff, and the very efficient manner in which the meeting has proceeded.

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RESOLVED: That the American Political Science Association, assembled in San Francisco for its 47th Annual Meeting, express its sincere appreciation to the Committee on Program under the chairmanship of Professor J. A. C. Grant for the excellent meeting which it has developed.

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BE IT RESOLVED by the American Political Science Association in annual meeting assembled:

1. That the Association express to the President of the United States and to other appropriate authorities of the Federal Government its conviction that the full and expeditious publication of the record of our foreign relations has become of increasing importance in these times of international tension.
2. That the Association note with approval the increase in the volume of pamphlet materials explaining to the American public the facts of our foreign policy.
3. The Association notes with great regret and special concern a tendency to slacken the pace of publication of the basic documentary materials which are essential to teachers and writers, whose task it is to interpret our foreign policy to students and to the general public. This responsibility cannot be fulfilled unless the basic record is available as soon after the events as possible.

The Association notes with deep concern the developing lag in the publication of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, a series which has been issued annually since 1861, and which provides the raw material for an intelligent understanding and interpretation of our foreign policy. The lag in publication has now reached the alarming total of 17 years, and we note that the House Appropriation Committee states its opinion that in fiscal 1952 (House Report #685, 82nd Congress, 1st Session) "for the preparation and printing of foreign relations volumes . . . no more than the amount of funds provided in the 1951 appropriation Act for these purposes should be expended at this time."

On investigation we find that this limitation will mean that the gap, instead of being narrowed, will actually be lengthened. The Association regards this as a dangerous tendency and hopes it will be reversed in the interest of an alert and informed public opinion.

4. That the Association, while applauding the Department of State's program of publishing *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, stress the importance of accelerating the rate at which the volumes in this series appear.

5. That the Association reiterate its previous requests that early consideration be given to publishing the diplomatic documentation of this country for the period 1829–1860, thereby closing the principal gap in the existing record.

6. That the Association urge the Department of State to expedite its publication entitled *United States Treaty Developments*, consider resumption of its definitive publication entitled *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, and devote increasing emphasis in the *Department of State Bulletin* to the completeness of the current documentation of our diplomacy.

7. That the Secretary of the Association be directed to bring these resolutions to the attention of the President, the appropriate Committees of the Congress, and the Department of State.

President Gulick recognized Mr. Martin, who called the membership's attention to the fact that the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO had invited the Association to designate one of its members to serve as a member of the National Commission, and that Past President Peter Odegard had been appointed by President Gulick to serve in this capacity.

The 1951 Business Meeting was adjourned at 6:05 P.M.—EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD, *Secretary-Treasurer*.

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The Tenth International Congress of Local Authorities, meeting in Brighton, England, June 25–30, 1951, was attended by more than 335 municipal officials from twenty-two countries. The countries represented included Australia, Israel, the Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and Yugoslavia, as well as countries of western Europe. In addition, five international organizations were represented. The American delegation included six representatives from the United States Conference of Mayors, in addition to persons representing several other private and governmental organizations. The two main topics of discussion were "Local Authorities and Education," and "Water Supply and Sewage." The next International Congress of Local Authorities is to be held in Vienna in 1953.

The Ninth International Management Congress, meeting in Brussels, Belgium, July 5–12, 1951, included a panel discussion on management advances in public administration, although the Congress was devoted primarily to the subject of industrial management. Working papers for the panel discussion were prepared by George H. Deming of the University of New Hampshire, under the sponsorship of John Langmuir, and by John A. Willard, under the auspices of the National Management Council of the United States. The discussion was led by Herbert Emmerich, director of the Public Administration

Clearing House, in cooperation with Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College. The Tenth International Management Congress will be held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in 1954.

The fifth annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association was held at the University of California (Berkeley) on August 27, 1951. The program of the meeting included round tables on the following topics: "Party Behavior in the Western States," "Direct Legislation," "Western Resources and the National Defense Effort," and "Great Britain's Social Experiment." In addition, the program included a session which was sponsored jointly by the Western Political Science Association and the western chapters of the American Society for Public Administration. Featured at this session were the presidential address for the Association, by Samuel C. May of the University of California (Berkeley), and an address by John M. Gaus of Harvard University, president of the American Society for Public Administration. The latter spoke on "The Mingling of Study and Practice in Public Administration."

The New York State Political Science Association held its fifth annual conference in New York City, October 19–20, 1951. The program of the meeting included two panel discussions, one on the topic "The United Nations and the Far East," and the other on the topic "The Political Scientist and the Problems of Loyalty." The principal paper for the first of the two panels was read by Alfred G. Katzin, special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations, while the principal paper for the other panel was read by Robert E. Cushman, professor of government at Cornell University. Luther Gulick, president of the American Political Science Association and of the Institute of Public Administration, addressed the conference on the subject "Political Science: Some Observations on the State of the Profession." In addition, the conference was addressed by Spruille Braden, chairman of the New York City Anti-Crime Committee, on "Ethics and the Public Service." The following were among the resolutions adopted by the Association at its annual business session.

> Resolved: That the New York State Political Science Association welcomes the American Political Science Association on the occasion of the annual convention of the American Political Science Association in Buffalo, New York, and wishes to extend such facilities for local arrangements as the New York State Political Science Association can provide.
>
> Resolved: That the New York State Political Science Association extend to the American Political Science Association a cordial invitation to hold its 1954 conference in New York City.

Officers elected by the Association for 1951–52 are: Clinton L. Rossiter of Cornell University, president; John Murdoch Dawley of Fredonia State Teachers College, vice-president; and George A. Bell of Champlain College, Wallace S. Sayre of the City College of New York, and Ronald MacGregor Stout of Colgate University, members of the Executive Council. The Executive Council has named Archie T. Dotson of Cornell University as secretary-treasurer of the Association.

The Southern California Political Science Association is continuing with its series of quarterly meetings begun in 1948. Meetings of the Association have recently been held at Pomona College (April 13, 1951), the University of Southern California (July 20, 1951), and Los Angeles State College (November 2, 1951). The program of the meeting last mentioned centered upon a paper, presented by Robert G. Neumann of the University of California at Los Angeles, entitled "Are France's Moderate Parties Doomed?" Officers of the Association for the academic year 1951–52 include: Carlton C. Rodee of the University of Southern California, president; and Ivan Hinderaker of the University of California (Los Angeles), Luther J. Lee, Jr., of Pomona College and Lester H. Phillips of the University of Redlands, members of the Executive Committee.

The twentieth annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association was held at Chattanooga, Tennessee, November 8–10, 1951. The program was approximately equally divided between southern government and politics and international relations and comparative government. "The Democratization of the German Civil Service" was the subject of the presidential address by Taylor Cole of Duke University. Edward H. Litchfield, executive director, American Political Science Association, represented that Association at the meeting and discussed the activities of its Washington office. Others to address the meeting were Paul T. David, Public Administration Service, and Albert Gore, member of Congress. The Southern Political Science Association will hold its next annual meeting at Nashville, Tennessee. Its newly elected officers include: George W. Spicer of the University of Virginia, president; Joseph M. Ray of the University of Maryland, vice-president; and Mavis Mann of the University of West Virginia, recording secretary.

The annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists for 1952 will be held on the campus of the University of Notre Dame on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, April 24–26. Suggestions concerning the program for this meeting should be sent to Harold M. Vinacke of the University of Cincinnati, president of the Conference, or to Royden Dangerfield of the University of Illinois, chairman of the Program Committee.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Historical Division, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, is preparing some forty monographs involving aspects of HICOG operations in Germany. While some of the studies are classified, others are available in printed form without restriction. Studies in the latter category which have been published or are in press are: *The Allied High Commission for Germany: Its Establishment, Structure and Procedures*, by Elmer Plischke; *United States Policy and Program in the Field of Religious Affairs*, by Beryl R. McClaskey; *The Exchange of Persons Program in Western Germany*, by Henry P. Pilgert; and *The Development of Information Services in Western Germany*, by Henry P. Pilgert.

Established in May, 1950, the Historical Division, has a staff of American social scientists, most of whom are on leave from American universities. Harold Zink recently returned to his position at Ohio State University after serving for fifteen months as chief historian of the Division. He has been succeeded by Roger H. Wells of Bryn Mawr College. The professional staff includes, in addition to persons already mentioned, Hubert G. Schmidt, Guy A. Lee, Rodney Loehr, and J. F. J. Gillen. Communications regarding the Division or its publications should be addressed to the chief historian, Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, HICOG, APO 80, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

The United States Department of State has deposited in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., approximately 100,000 frames of microfilms of documents of the old German Foreign Office. These microfilms cover the period from August, 1914, to November, 1918. While not presenting a complete documentation of German foreign policy during the first World War, they contain some of the principal political files and therefore offer large opportunities for research. These files are open to qualified scholars, and photostats of documents can be purchased. The Department expects that additional microfilms for the years 1914–1918 will later be released. The British Foreign Office has made a similar release of these German documents to the Public Record Office in London.

A leaflet listing *Census Bureau Publications on Governments* has been issued by the Bureau of the Census and is available from that agency upon request. This bulletin describes briefly each of the fourteen reports on governmental finances and employment which the Census Bureau expects to issue in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1951, and lists other recent publications of the Bureau regarding state and local governments.

*International Political Science Abstracts*, a new quarterly sponsored by the International Political Science Association and the International Studies Conference, with the support of UNESCO, made its appearance in May, 1951, with a double number consisting of abstracts of some 700 articles published in 1950. It is expected that the abstracts, 100 to 200 words in length, and taken from about 60 periodicals published in all parts of the world, will in the future appear not later than three to six months after the originals. To maximize their utility to users in many countries, articles published in English will in general be abstracted in French, and articles in other languages will be abstracted in English. The journal is under the editorship of Professors Jean Meynaud, University of Paris, Saul Rose, University of Aberdeen, and Bruce Lannes Smith, Foreign Service Institute, Washington 25, D. C. Distribution will be through *Presses universitaires de France* and Blackwell's, Ltd., Broad Street, Oxford, England. For American subscribers, the price is $3.00.

With the aid of a recent foundation grant, the Center for Research on World Political Institutions in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University has undertaken a three-year interdisciplinary study of the history of political integration. Dana G. Munro, director of the School, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, director of the Center, have announced the appointment of two historians who will be members of the group that is to be engaged in the study. The historians are Maurice DuP. Lee, formerly instructor in the department of history at Princeton, and Francis Loewenheim, who recently finished his studies for the doctorate at Columbia University.

The Institute for Social Research in Oslo, Norway, has offered a prize of 10,000 Norwegian crowns for the best paper on the relevance of research to the problems of peace. The papers to be submitted in the contest are to deal with this question: "To what extent is it possible to establish criteria for the delimitation of research of direct relevance to the problems of peaceful adjustment in international relations?" It will be expected that papers include attempts at theoretical as well as functional clarification of such problems as are suggested by the following questions: In what sense and under what conditions would it be possible to speak of a science of peaceful adjustment? How could such a science be integrated? To what extent would existing science fit into a similar integration? How could a science of peaceful adjustment influence actions and contribute towards changing international relations over a period of time? If several areas of research were found to be generally recognized as highly relevant to the problems of peace, would there still be any possibility of establishing criteria for the construction of priority lists for the guidance of institutions and foundations dedicated to the promotion of peace? The papers to be submitted not only will be expected to present theoretical and functional discussions of relevant criteria of this kind, but also will be expected to give concrete examples of the possible application of such criteria to problems and theories in various fields of the sciences.

Papers are to be submitted in English or French to the Institute for Social Research, Kronprinsengst. 5, Oslo, Norway, before April 1, 1952. They may be prepared by individuals, or by groups of individuals. The length of the papers is optional, but 70 to 150 double-spaced pages have been tentatively indicated as the most suitable length. To ensure anonymity of authors during the evaluation of the papers, a manuscript and a statement of authorship must be enclosed in separate envelopes, both marked with a motto chosen for the paper.

The jury which has been appointed by the Institute to judge the papers consists of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, director of the Social Science Department of UNESCO, Professor Daniel Katz of the University of Michigan, and Professor Arne Noess of the University of Oslo. The jury will be free to withhold the prize if none of the papers are found to qualify. The Institute reserves copyright, and will arrange for the publication of all of the papers which the jury considers to be of sufficient merit to be published.

The Committee on Statistics of the University of Chicago has established, under a five-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, a program of post-doctoral awards to provide training and experience in statistics for scholars whose main interests lie outside that field. Recipients of the awards must have received the doctor's degree prior to commencing the program, except in the case of recognized research workers whose experience and accomplishments are adjudged to be clearly the equivalent of the training required for the doctorate. Candidates whose mathematical preparation includes less than the usual sophomore year of calculus, or its equivalent, will not ordinarily be considered, but previous training in statistics is neither required nor expected. Candidates having under way research programs in their own fields will be preferred. Recipients of the awards must spend eleven months studying statistics at the University of Chicago, and they will be expected to enroll in a number of regular courses. There will be three awards per year, to holders of the doctorate or to persons with equivalent training and experience in the biological, the physical, and the social sciences. Each award will be $4,000 or slightly more, and office space will be provided. In addition, $600 to $1,000 will be available for clerical, computational, and research assistance. There will be no tuition charges.

Applications, or requests for further information, should be addressed to the Committee on Statistics, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Illinois. Applications for the academic year 1952–53 should be received by February 1, 1952.

The United States Office of Education, in cooperation with the Department of State, has announced the availability of fellowships to United States graduate students as provided under the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. Two graduate students are exchanged each year between the United States and each of the other American republics signatory to the Convention. In addition to the United States, the participating countries include: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. Charges for transportation to and from the receiving country, for United States students, are paid by the United States government. The receiving government pays tuition and provides a monthly maintenance allowance. In some cases a small sum is allotted for books and incidental expenses.

The following qualifications are specified for graduate students in the United States who apply for the fellowships: United States citizenship, the bachelor's degree or its equivalent, the initiation or completion of some graduate study, a satisfactory knowledge of the language of the country in which the student wishes to study, good health, moral character, intellectual ability, and a suitable plan of study or a research topic which has been approved by the student's adviser or supervising professor. Students who desire to submit applications should write to the International Programs Branch, American Republics Section, United States Office of Education, Washington 25, D. C. Applications for fellowships for the academic year 1952–53 must be received by the Office of Education not later than January 15, 1952.

The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration has granted a request of the Brazilian government for aid in establishing an International Center for Research and Training in Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro. A staff of five persons is being supplied by the United Nations for this project. The program includes a three-month series of seminars on the staff aspects of public administration. This series of seminars, which began November 2, will be followed in February by a one-month international seminar to which representatives of all of the other Latin-American nations will be invited. On March 1, the new training course of the Getulio Vargas Institute will begin. This course will continue through the academic year, closing at the end of November, 1952. Harvey Walker, of Ohio State University, will be a lecturer in budget formulation and execution at the Getulio Vargas Institute for the full program beginning in November, 1951, and closing in December, 1952.

The Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, has recently established a Chair of Military History. It is anticipated that this Chair will be filled by civilian scholars, including historians, political scientists and sociologists, as well as specialists in related disciplines. The incumbent for the first few months is Thomas Mendenhall, a historian of Yale University. An *ad hoc* committee, consisting of Harold Sprout of Princeton University, President James P. Baxter, III, of Williams College, and Rear Admiral Charles J. Moore, USN (Ret.), of the Brookings Institution, has been set up to review the qualifications of prospective appointees to the Chair.

W. Leon Godshall, professor of international relations at Lehigh University, was elected national president of *Pi Gamma Mu* at the eleventh annual convention of this Society, held in Washington, D. C., on June 16, 1951. He has named Eugene H. Miller, professor of political science at Ursinus College, as chancellor of the Eastern Region, and has named Benjamin H. Williams, of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, as vice-chancellor of the Atlantic Region.

*Further Data for Studying the Supply of Political Scientists.*[1] The United States Office of Education, in its analysis of earned degrees awarded in 1949–50,[2] shows a considerable increase in the total number of earned degrees awarded in all subjects as compared with the preceding year—18 per cent in bachelor's, 14 per cent in master's, and 25 per cent in doctor's degrees.

There was probably an equivalent increase in degrees awarded in political science, but the figures are not strictly comparable inasmuch as special categories were made this year of degrees awarded in public administration and international relations, which have been traditionally treated as subareas of political science. The following table shows degrees awarded in the three fields in 1949–50:

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[1] For an earlier note presenting data on the supply of political scientists, see this REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 724–725 (Sept., 1950).

[2] Robert C. Story, *Earned Degrees Conferred by Higher Educational Institutions, 1949–50* (Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, Circular No. 282).

| | Total Bachelor's Degrees | Percentage of Total Bachelor's Degrees | Total Master's Degrees | Percentage of Total Master's Degrees | Total Doctor's Degrees | Percentage of Total Doctor's Degrees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Science | 6,346 | 1.46 | 710 | 1.22 | 127 | 1.91 |
| Public Administration | 273 | .06 | 190 | .33 | 14 | .21 |
| International Relations | 981 | .23 | 279 | .48 | 25 | .38 |
| Total | 7,600 | 1.75 | 1,179 | 2.03 | 166 | 2.50 |

Whether, from the viewpoint of advocates of general education, it be regarded as "good" or "bad,"[3] it is at least worth noting that, whereas public administration and international relations have customarily been regarded as fields of concentration for graduate work only, more institutions awarded bachelor's diplomas in these fields than awarded graduate degrees. In the instance of public administration, 25 institutions reported that they awarded 273 bachelor's degrees, whereas only 3 institutions gave the 14 doctorates awarded.

With the above totals as the basis for computation, political science retained in 1949–50, among the traditional seven social sciences (anthropology, economics, geography, history, political science, psychology and sociology), the same relative ranking in bachelor's degrees (fifth, again not quite as many awarded as in sociology) and in doctor's degrees (fourth, again about 30 doctorates fewer than in economics) that it had in 1947–48. In master's degrees, with the revision of categories, political science becomes third, behind history and psychology. This situation is probably explained by the fact that a master's degree in international relations or public administration is often regarded as a desirable or essential prerequisite to government service, whereas a doctor's degree in these fields is less frequently emphasized.

Forty-one institutions granted doctor's degrees in political science; about ten times as many men as women received the degree. Harvard awarded 56 of the doctorates granted during the three-year period; Chicago was second with 31; Georgetown and California, each with 25, Columbia with 23, and Fordham with 16, rank high. But political science seems to have less oligopoly, in so far as the awarding of doctorates is concerned, than many disciplines.

About six times as many men as women received master's degrees in political science during the three-year period.

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[3] See the discussion of the unity of political science in *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951), pp. 52 ff. and pp. 74 ff.

Master's and doctor's curricula in law, where the degrees awarded represent postgraduate work in jurisprudence, also contribute to the supply of political scientists. Five hundred and thirteen master's degrees (slightly less than 1 per cent of all master's degrees) and 27 doctorates (slightly more than 0.4 per cent of all doctorates) were awarded in this area. It is also clear that some economists, sociologists and historians receive what is in effect training in political science skills.

It is apparent that this type of analysis is only partially valid because of the limitations of the data. There are obvious differences in nomenclature; e.g., what is history, sociology, economics, or social science in one institution may be political science in another. A not untypical college, for instance, has recently abolished the political science concentration in favor of a general social science major with emphasis on political science. Its registrar will henceforth report more "other social science" majors and fewer majors in political science. Does this step alter in fact the supply of political scientists?

Another source of error is in inaccurate or inadequate reporting. Several slips in recording may occur between the individual student, who thinks he knows "in" what field he "majored," and the United States Office of Education. These are more likely to be errors of omission than of commission; thus our report probably underestimates the number of degrees granted in political science. One obvious area for "error," or, at any rate, for uncertainty of calculation, arises in the interpretation which registrars put upon the reports that they receive from students or departmental chairmen, or upon the failures of students and departmental chairmen to make reports.

In an effort to determine how many errors there were, the Social Science Section of the Division of Higher Education, United States Office of Education, queried 112 chairmen of departments which were not listed as giving degrees in political science. The following additions were received: A.B.'s, 138; A.M.'s, 14; and Ph.D.'s, 5. Eighty-one of the 112 institutions did not reply to this inquiry; probably some of them also awarded degrees in political science.—CLAUDE E. HAWLEY AND LEWIS A. DEXTER, *United States Office of Education.*

*Selective Service Advisory Committees.* Perhaps no problem has caused more difficulty and consumed more of the time of administrators of activities in war time which require specialized personnel, than has that of the specialist under the draft. During World War II this problem became so acute that a number of extraordinary mechanisms were created to assist the Selective Service System in dealing with the problem. These included such devices as advisory committees in a number of fields, voluntary groups assisting state appeal boards, and certifying procedures instituted in federal agencies having special responsibilities for certain types of procurement of material.

In 1948 this problem arose again with the drafting of personnel for the services. It was determined jointly by the Selective Service System and the National Security Resources Board at that time that a system of advisory committees should be set up within the Selective Service System, and that these committees should report directly to the director of Selective Service and be advisory to him. These committees were to be charged with the responsibility of advising the director on such policy matters as lie within the purview of the Selective Service System, and were also to advise him with regard to the disposition of cases of individuals presenting particular problems or involving difficult policy questions. Consequently, six committees were established in the engineering sciences, biological sciences, humanities (including linguistics), healing arts, physical sciences, and social sciences. When advising on general policy matters, these committees have functioned most frequently as a committee of the whole, although they do meet from time to time as individual committees when dealing with problems pertinent to their own fields of interest.

The committees have been influential in the development of national policy to a degree not anticipated when they were first established. For example the problem of student deferment now in force was developed by the committees and adopted by the Administration. They have also made numerous recommendations dealing with employment of personnel in industry and special problems of graduate education. It is probable that in the coming months, when the problems of Selective Service will become immeasurably greater because of the expected severe personnel demands of the armed services, the committees will be called upon even more than in the past.

Roscoe C. Martin, chairman of the department of political science of Syracuse University and former vice-president of the American Political Science Association, is a member of the Committee on Social Science Personnel.—M. H. TRYTTEN, *Office of Scientific Personnel, National Research Council.*

## AN OPEN LETTER PROPOSING A SCHOOL OF CULTURAL LEGAL STUDIES

Dear Colleague:

This letter is addressed to scholars seriously interested in the wider aspects of legal studies, and especially to those scholars in law, the humanities, and the social sciences who are sufficiently interested in the cultural study of law to be willing to spend a good deal of time and effort to promote that objective.

The plan to be described shortly was suggested by the recent transfer of The School of Letters from Kenyon College to Indiana University. The School of Letters, founded four years ago on receipt of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, is composed of three senior fellows, a director, and twenty-two fellows, representing different universities and colleges. Among them are many of the most distinguished literary critics in the country. They were brought together partly by a common dissatisfaction with the prevalent state of literary studies in the colleges and universities; and their cooperation was probably facilitated, despite sharp differences among them, by their sharing the view that literary criticism should be rescued from formalism and enlivened through the vivid recreation of the artists' thought. The School functioned during past summers in six-week sessions, at each of which about one-third of the fellows taught. Students are graduates who obtain advanced credit, auditors, and various others.

The proposal is to organize along somewhat similar lines a *School of Cultural Legal Studies.* Among those of you who have devoted years to the cultural study of law, whether you are "primarily" historian, political scientist, philosopher, law teacher, anthropologist, or fall in some other convenient classification, there will be many views regarding such a School. The following remarks represent my own present thoughts on the subject. They are stated somewhat categorically in order to save space—the important thing now is to get relevant ideas discussed. Obviously, the major premise of this letter is that the proposed project would require much consultation and wide cooperation of every sort.

Accordingly, without the benefit of the many suggestions which I hope will be forthcoming, I present the following tentative proposals:

1. *The School of Cultural Legal Studies* (or whatever it should finally be named) would have as its objective the humanistic, social-scientific study of law. It would have no vocational objectives other than the incidental training of younger or future teachers of law, social science, or the humanities (and of any new disciplines that may emerge).

2. The faculty (fellows and executive committee) of the School would consist of scholars from *all* the disciplines who have contributed significantly to cultural legal studies. They would represent all important viewpoints, being united in the common objective and in a willingness to collaborate, by teaching and conferences, with other scholars who have different perspectives or philosophies.

3. In addition to the regular faculty, various other scholars, some of them foreign, would be invited to teach or lecture in the sessions of the School.

4. The School would conduct summer sessions of six to nine weeks, initially, at least, at a different university each summer. The host university would provide a physical plant and library, and it might receive a portion of the fees derived from tuition.

5. It would be necessary to explore: (a) a subsidy by one of the foundations; (b) admission of students, auditors, and foreign students; (c) tuition fees; (d) fellowships; (e) faculty questions, including salaries; (f) university credit for work done and courses passed.

6. Students would be recruited from all the social sciences and humanities and from the law schools. This provision, I think, is essential because no one group could supply a sufficient number of students to make the effort worthwhile. Moreover, there are many advantages, which need not be emphasized here, in having serious students from the various disciplines work together.

7. Many possible curricula, stimulating and delightful, have stirred my imagination. With some intentional arbitrariness, I submit the following as a possible curriculum for each summer session:

   (a) Three general courses
   (b) Three courses on a specific subject matter

(c) A seminar of and by the faculty, each of whom would hold forth for one week. Selected students would be invited to participate in this seminar and others permitted to attend it.

I refrain from describing the contents of the above courses and seminars so that you may feel entirely free in your thinking on this subject.

8. The executive committee, in charge of the School, should represent various viewpoints, universities, and disciplines, and its membership should be rotated. An essential need is to assure by its constituency that every qualified scholar and every scholarly viewpoint will receive fair and equal treatment. This is not easy; but it can be done!

9. A test period of at least three years would be required. If, at the end of that experimental period, the School should be continued on a secure basis, certain other matters should be explored, especially concerning (a) publication, e.g., of faculty seminar reports and teaching materials, (b) the organization of cooperative research units, (c) the carry-over of projects beyond the summer session, and (d) perhaps eventually the organization of a national research institute.

10. What is the next step to be taken at this time? This is the question regarding which I am particularly in need of help. I am willing, without any additional commitment, to serve as a temporary post office and conduit for transmitting suggestions to interested persons.

Accordingly, *I invite you to write me regarding the above proposals*, setting forth your views and especially your suggestions regarding organization. Do you think that the proposal is feasible? What changes and additions to the above proposals do you suggest? Are you willing to participate in the project? Have you any suggestions regarding the financing of the School? Do you think that I should ask a few persons, representing different universities and disciplines, to meet as a temporary organizing committee? Whom do you suggest should be invited to serve in that capacity? What other suggestions do you have to offer?

I have tried in this letter to avoid even the suggestion of exhortation or salesmanship. Interested scholars will, I am confident, understand the needs and opportunities adverted to, without embellishment of any kind. I should have preferred to write a personal letter to you regarding the above matters, but there are obvious advantages in the method used, not least of which is that no one who is not greatly interested in the cultural study of law will feel under any obligation to reply. I hope I have made the proposal sufficiently clear to those who are seriously interested in the indicated objectives.

Sincerely,

*Indiana University.* JEROME HALL.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Byron R. Abernethy has taken a year's leave from his position as professor of government at Texas Technological College to serve as regional director of the Wage Stabilization Board, Region 10, Dallas, Texas.

Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College served during the past summer as consultant to the World Health Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, on problems of program development. He also attended the sessions of ECOSOC as representative of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the International Union of Local Authorities.

Francis R. Aumann is on leave from his position at Ohio State University and is serving as a visiting professor at the State University of Iowa.

Thomas S. Barclay is on leave from his position at Stanford University for the academic year 1951–52.

Frederick C. Barghoorn has been advanced to an associate professorship in political science at Yale University.

Jorge Basadre, Peruvian historian and one-time director of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the Pan American Union, is to be visiting professor of Latin American affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia during the second semester of the academic year 1951–52 and during the summer session of 1952. His appointment at the University of Virginia has been made possible by a grant from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation.

William M. Beany, Jr., instructor in politics at Princeton University, spent the past summer in field research under a grant from the Princeton University Research Committee for a study of certain selected judicial practices.

Robert P. Benedict is serving as acting head of the department of government at Boston University during the absence of Professor Lashley G. Harvey.

LeRoy Bennett, assistant professor of political science and public administration at Michigan State College, has received a Ford Foundation grant for a study of the United Nations which he is currently conducting.

Frank Blackford, formerly a teaching fellow in political science at Michigan State College, has been appointed administrative assistant to the governor of Michigan.

William J. Block, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted an appointment at The Citadel.

George F. Brasington, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of political science of Emory University.

Gary Brazier has been appointed to an instructorship at Ohio State University.

Henry L. Bretton, formerly a predoctoral instructor at the University of Michigan, has been appointed to a regular instructorship at that University.

John E. Brigante has resigned from his position at Boston University to become director of the Boston Office of Price Stabilization.

Philip W. Buck will be on leave from Stanford University from January to October, 1952, for research in Great Britain on methods of economic planning there.

Eugene Burdick (Lieut. Comdr., USNR), who in civilian life is assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley), is serving as academic consultant for an advanced course in strategy and sea power which has recently been organized at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

James M. Burns has been named chairman of the department of political science at Williams College.

James L. Busey, assistant professor of political science at the University of Wyoming, taught during the first term of the summer quarter of 1951 at New Mexico Highlands University.

I. L. Claude has been granted a year's leave of absence from his position as assistant professor at Harvard University in order that he might accept a Ford Foundation fellowship.

Gordon B. Cleveland, instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina, has received a grant from the Ford Foundation to explore the experiments under way to improve the teaching of the basic course in American government. He will make his headquarters at Syracuse University, but will visit several eastern universities to examine their methods of teaching the course.

Morris H. Cohen, assistant professor of government at Clark University, received a faculty fellowship from the Ford Foundation for the academic year 1951–52. His plans for the year include service as intern in several government offices in Washington, D. C.

Francis W. Coker, professor emeritus of Yale University, is serving as lecturer at that institution for the academic year 1951–52.

O. B. Conaway has been named assistant director of the Bureau of Public Administration at Boston University. He will have charge of this Bureau and of the Institute of Public Service at Boston University during the absence of Professor Lashley G. Harvey.

Harry Rex Davis has been advanced to the rank of assistant professor at Beloit College.

Robert G. Dixon, Jr., has taken a year's leave from his position as assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland to study law at Stanford University under a Ford Foundation grant.

William F. Dowling, Jr., is serving as an instructor in government at Clark University for the academic year 1951–52, in the absence of Assistant Professor Morris H. Cohen.

Alex N. Dragnich is serving as acting head of the department of political science at Vanderbilt University.

William Ebenstein of Princeton University was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania during the summer of 1951.

N. Marbury Efimenco has been advanced to an assistant professorship at the University of Michigan.

John Ericksen, recently of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Oklahoma.

Alfred P. Fernbach has returned to his position as associate professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia after a year's leave spent in Europe and England on a Fulbright research grant.

Wesley Fishel, formerly of the University of California (Los Angeles), has been appointed as an assistant professor of political science and public administration at Michigan State College.

Michael Flach is serving as a visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Oregon.

Ossip K. Flechtheim, associate professor of government and history at Colby College, is serving as visiting professor in the law faculty of the Free University at Berlin. He is also lecturing at the *Hochschule fuer Politik* in Berlin during the winter term of 1951–52.

D. F. Fleming has resigned from the chairmanship of the department of political science of Vanderbilt University and has been appointed to a research professorship.

John L. Fletcher, Jr., has been appointed to an instructorship in government at Boston University for the academic year 1951–52.

Peter J. Fliess, assistant professor at Louisiana State University, has been granted a leave of absence to enable him to accept a Ford Foundation fellowship for the improvement of teaching. He will visit a number of eastern universities with a view to studying the improvement of the content of courses in international law and relations.

Guy Fox has been granted a year's leave of absence from his position as associate professor of political science and public administration at Michigan State College to enable him to teach at the University of Ryukyus in Okinawa and to advise the civil administration of the islands in matters of taxation and fiscal administration.

J. Leiper Freeman, Jr., has been appointed research assistant with the rank of instructor at Princeton University. He will devote part of his time to teaching political science and part of his time to research on the Ford Foundation project on organizational behavior.

Louis L. Friedland has been promoted to an associate professorship in public administration at Wayne University.

Reed L. Frischknecht has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Utah.

Murray W. Fuller, a graduate of the City Manager Training Program of the University of Kansas, has been appointed city manager of Madison, South Dakota.

Oliver Garceau of Bennington College is serving as visiting professor at Williams College, and is also continuing his work at Bennington. At Williams College, he is teaching a course in political behavior jointly with Professor James M. Burns.

Herbert Garfinkel, formerly instructor at the Illinois Institute of Technology, has been appointed as instructor in the department of political science and public administration and as research associate in the Governmental Research Bureau of Michigan State College.

Frank Grace has been advanced to an assistant professorship at the University of Michigan.

George A. Graham of Princeton University acted as consultant to the Subcommittee on Ethics of the United States Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare during the summer of 1951.

Daniel R. Grant has been granted a partial leave of absence by Vanderbilt University to enable him to serve as assistant director of the Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, Tennessee. The Community Services Commission is a temporary agency which is charged with the duty of making proposals for the readjustment of metropolitan intergovernmental relations and services in the Nashville area.

W. Brooke Graves will be a visiting professor of public administration at Florida State University during the second semester of the academic year 1951–52.

Fred Greene has been appointed to an assistant professorship in political science at Williams College.

Lee S. Greene has been granted a year's leave of absence from his position as professor and head of the department of political science of the University of Tennessee and has been appointed executive director of the Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, Tennessee.

Alan P. Grimes has been advanced to an associate professorship in political science and public administration at Michigan State College.

Heinz Guradze is teaching comparative government and international organization in the winter semester at the University of Cologne, after having taught at the same University during the past summer.

Andrew Gyorgy of Louisiana State University has been granted a leave of absence from that institution to enable him to accept a research appointment at Yale University.

Thomas T. Hammond has been granted a year's leave from his position as assistant professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia.

Lashley G. Harvey has taken a year's leave from his position as chairman of the department of government at Boston University and is at the London School of Economics under a Fulbright grant.

Ferrel Heady has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Michigan.

Dell G. Hitchner has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Washington.

C. Leonard Hoag is on leave from his position as associate professor of political science at Middlebury College and is serving as foreign affairs specialist in the Division of Public Studies, Office of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.

John P. Horlacher is on leave from his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania to serve as head of the Philadelphia regional office of the Wage Stabilization Board.

Robert Horn of the University of Chicago has been recalled to active duty in the United States Army. He is serving with the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.

Schuyler Dean Hoslett has been advanced to an associate professorship and named assistant dean of the School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University.

H. B. Jacobini has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the Huntsville Center of the University of Alabama.

Harry V. Jaffa, recently of the University of Chicago, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Ohio State University.

Donald B. Johnson, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted an appointment at Iowa State University.

Richard B. Johnson, assistant professor at Tufts College, is teaching at the

University of Maryland during the absence of Assistant Professor Robert G. Dixon, Jr.

Hattie M. Kawahara has been advanced to an assistant professorship at Wayne University.

Kazuo Kawai of the *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, Japan, has been appointed visiting lecturer at Ohio State University, after having served during the past summer as a visiting member of the political science staff of Stanford University.

Hans Kelsen of the University of California (Berkeley) was a visiting member of the faculty of the University of Washington during the summer of 1951.

David T. Kenney, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has been appointed to an instructorship at Southern Illinois University.

Jarold A. Kieffer, formerly a member of the social science staff of the University of Minnesota, has joined the staff of the Office of Defense Mobilization in Washington, D. C.

Frank L. Klingberg has been advanced to a full professorship at Southern Illinois University.

Robert J. Koblitz, formerly an instructor at Harvard University, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Bard College.

Morton J. Kroll has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Oregon.

Lynwood A. Lardner has resigned from his position as assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University to enter federal service.

Walter H. C. Laves, recently visiting professor at the University of Michigan, has been appointed consultant to the Economic Corporation Administration and is now giving full time to this agency.

K. C. Leebrick, who recently retired as professor of government, veterans' adviser and vice-president of the University of Hawaii, has been named assistant to the high commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific. He is to be in charge of historical records and reports and is to assist the high commissioner in matters concerning the United States Department of State and the United Nations.

Nathan Leites of the Rand Corporation is serving as lecturer at Yale University for the academic year 1951–52.

Roy C. Macridis is on leave from Northwestern University for the academic year 1951–52 for work under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

M. Nelson McGeary of Pennsylvania State College taught during the past summer at the University of California (Los Angeles).

William McIntosh, assistant professor of political science at Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial State College, spent the past summer in study and research at the University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras.

Alvin J. McNeil, recently a graduate student at Boston University, was a visiting instructor in political science at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College during the summer session of 1951.

Boyd A. Martin, chairman of the department of social sciences of the University of Idaho, will be a visiting professor at Stanford University for the winter and spring quarters of 1952 to offer courses usually offered by Professor Thomas S. Barclay.

Henry L. Mason, formerly a graduate student at Columbia University, has been appointed as an assistant professor of government at Louisiana State University, where he will offer courses in comparative government and international relations.

Eugene Mawhinney, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted an appointment at Northeast Missouri State Teachers College.

Marvin Meade, a graduate of Fort Hays Kansas State College and the University of Kansas, has been appointed as a research assistant in the Bureau of Government Research of the last named institution.

James H. Meisel has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Michigan.

Charles A. Micaud has returned to his position as associate professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia after spending the first semester of the academic year 1951–52 in France for the Yale Institute of International Studies.

B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch recently returned to New York City after spending nearly six months in Europe. While in Europe, he taught at the Institute of Advanced International Studies of the University of Paris and the *École Nationale d'Administration*, and delivered lectures at several other European universities.

Graeme C. Moodie, for the past two years a Commonwealth fellow at Princeton University, has returned to his post as lecturer at St. Andrews University, Scotland.

Robert J. Morgan, recently a graduate student at the University of Virginia, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Nebraska.

Ward M. Morton, associate professor at Southern Illinois University, has been recalled to active duty as a reserve air force officer.

Michel Mouskhely of the University of Strasbourg will be a visiting professor at Boston University during the second semester of 1951–52.

Milton E. Muelder, professor and head of the department of political science and public administration at Michigan State College, has been named director of the Office of Research Development at that institution.

Frank Munk of Reed College served during the past summer as professor in charge of special courses in world political geography organized by the commanding general of the Fourth Air Force at the University of Portland for officer-instructors from air force reserve officer training corp units in seven western states.

James N. Murray, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted an appointment at Northwestern University.

Ivan Nagy is on leave from his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Oregon for work under a grant from the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation.

Felix Oppenheim of the University of Delaware is a visiting associate professor in the department of philosophy at Yale University during the present academic year. He is teaching ethics and political theory in Yale's program of directed studies.

R. Vance Presthus, formerly associate professor at the University of Southern California, has been appointed associate professor of political science and public administration at Michigan State College.

Eugene C. Price, formerly a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed as an instructor in the School of Public Administration of Florida State University.

William R. Pullen, recently a graduate student at the University of North Carolina, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at that University. He will be attached to the university library to organize and service the public documents section. The organization of the materials in this section is being facilitated by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Maurice M. Ramsey has been advanced to an associate professorship in public administration at Wayne University. He is also serving as assistant to the dean of the Graduate School at that institution.

Ellsworth Raymond has been appointed as a lecturer in the department of government at New York University for the academic year 1951–52, where he is offering courses in Russian affairs.

Harry W. Reynolds, formerly of the Philadelphia Housing Authority, has been appointed as an instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

S. Grover Rich, Jr., has taken a year's leave from his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Utah to accept a Ford Foundation fellowship. He is making Columbia University his headquarters, and is examining teaching methods and programs in the general field of international relations.

Fred W. Riggs, formerly research associate with the Foreign Policy Association, is serving in the New York office of the Public Administration Clearing House as assistant to Rowland A. Egger, associate director of the Clearing House.

Walter L. Riley has been named assistant dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Washington.

Benjamin Rivlin has returned to Brooklyn College after a semester's leave, during which he studied colonial problems in France and French North Africa under a travel grant from the Social Science Research Council.

Elston E. Roady has returned to Florida State University with the rank of assistant professor, following completion of his graduate studies at the University of Illinois.

Friedrich Roetter has been advanced to a full professorship in political science and economics at Upsala College.

Frank E. Rourke, a graduate student at the University of Minnesota, is serving as a part-time instructor at that institution for the academic year 1951–52.

Dankwart A. Rustow has taken a year's leave from his position as associate professor of political science at Oglethorpe University for work under a grant from the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation. He is engaged in research on aims and methods of social science teaching.

Allan Saunders of the University of Hawaii is serving as visiting professor at Boston University for the academic year 1951–52.

James D. Schneider, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, was recently appointed personnel staff officer in the Division of Personnel, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee.

John R. Scott, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has been appointed headmaster of Onarga Military Academy in Illinois.

Samuel L. Sharp, associate professor at American University, is serving as visiting lecturer in foreign affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia.

Ralph Smuckler has been appointed to an instructorship in political science and public administration at Michigan State College.

Albert Somit of New York University has been called to active duty in the United States Army as a reserve officer.

Cummins E. Speakman, Jr., of the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia has been appointed foreign student adviser at that University.

David Spitz is on leave from Ohio State University for work under a Ford Foundation grant.

T. Noel Stern of Boston University will be a visiting professor, under a Fubright grant, at the University of Strasbourg during the second semester of 1951–52.

John O. Stitely is on leave from his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island to serve as executive aide to the governor of Rhode Island.

Ivan M. Stone has returned to his position at Beloit College after serving as a visiting expert in the United States Information Centers Program in Germany. While in Germany, he made a tour of *Amerika Häuser*, discussing various aspects of United States foreign policy. Earlier in the summer he delivered a series of lectures in England for the British United Nations Association.

Graham H. Stuart has returned to Stanford University after a sabbatical year spent in Europe. During his absence from Stanford he lectured at the *Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales*, Geneva, Switzerland; at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies; and at the National War College in Washington, D.C.

Richard N. Swift has taken leave from his position at New York University to serve for a year as visiting lecturer in government at Harvard University.

Philip B. Taylor, formerly of Northwestern University, has been appointed as an instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Kenneth W. Thompson, formerly of Northwestern University, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Chicago, and he will participate in the program of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy of that University.

Harold T. Towe, a member of the political science staff of the University of Toledo and a lieutenant-colonel in the United States Army Reserves, was called to active duty on July 15, 1951, as military government officer of the Second Army, Fort Meade, Maryland.

John E. Turner has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Minnesota.

Paul P. Van Riper is on leave from Northwestern University for the academic year 1951–52 to engage in research in administrative methods and procedures for the comptroller general of the Department of the Army.

John. P. Vloyantes has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Utah, following a year which he spent in Holland under a Fulbright grant.

Ralph M. Wade has been advanced to an associate professorship at the University of Wyoming.

Schuyler C. Wallace of Columbia University was a visiting member of the faculty of the University of Washington during the summer of 1951.

Robert E. Ward, assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been named assistant director of the Center for Japanese Studies at that University.

George A. Warp of the University of Minnesota is serving for a period of six months as consultant to the Public Administration Clearing House in Tokyo, Japan. He is advising the Clearing House on plans for a Public Administration Service, a project which is being financed by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Leo Weinstein has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Chicago.

Norman Wengert has been granted a year's leave of absence from his position in the department of government of the City College of New York to enable him to undertake a special assignment in program management for the Program Staff, Office of the Secretary, United States Department of the Interior.

Allen S. Whiting, recently a graduate Student at Columbia University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Northwestern University.

Kurt Wilk, associate professor of history and government at Wells College, taught at the University of Rochester during the summer of 1951.

Robert R. Wilson is on leave from Duke University to serve as a visiting professor at the University of Istanbul, Turkey, under a Fulbright grant.

Elaine Windrich has been appointed to an acting assistant professorship at Stanford University, where she will offer courses usually offered by Professor Philip W. Buck.

Raymond W. Young has been appointed as lecturer in the department of government of New York University for the academic year 1951–52.

Belle Zeller has been advanced to a full professorship at Brooklyn College.

## IN MEMORIAM

While this issue was in press, news was received of the unexpected death of Frederic A. Ogg. His contributions to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW have been summarized—to the extent that it is possible to summarize the devoted labor of twenty-four years—in Harold Zink's article on "The Growth of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1926–1949," which appeared in the June, 1950, issue of this REVIEW. The following most appropriate comments were made on October 24 by Dr. E. B. Fred, the president of the University of Wisconsin (*Ed.*):

"The death of Frederic Austin Ogg, emeritus professor of political science, deprives us of one of our outstanding scholars. A man who grew up with the science of politics in the United States, he leaves behind a great body of work as a living memorial to his years at the University.

"Thousands who were privileged to sit in his classes in comparative European and American government remember his patience and his immense sense of justice, as well as his deep understanding of the science of politics and the art of government.

"It gives us pleasure to remember that he was a prophet with honor among us. On the occasion of his retirement three years ago, colleagues and friends from near and far met to honor him at a testimonial dinner on the campus. The nation's top political scientists turned out in New York City to do him honor when he retired in 1949 from twenty-four years of service as editor of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. Last year a group of his outstanding students wrote and dedicated to him a book, *The Study of Comparative Government.*

"The faculty of political science, as well as the faculties of all our departments, schools, and colleges, join me in farewell tribute to a splendid colleague, a great scholar, a true gentleman, and a loyal and time-tested friend."

Elias Huzar, associate professor of government at Cornell University, died unexpectedly in Washington, D. C., on December 28, 1950, at the age of thirty-five. A graduate of William Jewell College and of Princeton University, he had been a member of the faculty at Cornell since 1938. Denied the opportunity of serving in the armed forces, he embraced the chance to contribute his specialized skills to the furtherance of the war effort in the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, from 1943 to 1945. It is indicative of the quality of his services that he was given temporary appointments with the Bureau of the Budget in 1946, 1948 and 1950. In 1948 he served as consultant to the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, making an administrative survey in Alaska and in Washington of the Alaska Indian Service. Despite his teaching duties and his professional administrative activities, he found time to publish a dozen articles and an outstanding study entitled *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Military Appropriations, 1933–1950.* The "Elias Huzar Library Fund" is being collected at Cornell University as a living memorial to one whose loss to the profession has been deeply and widely felt.

William Marion Gibson died following a heart attack on July 6, 1951, at forty-seven years of age. His death brought to a close a career which included university teaching and service for the United States Government, in both civilian and military capacities. Educated at the University of Richmond and at Harvard and Duke Universities, he was for more than a decade a member of the political science staff at Duke, where he was known to students for his instructional skill and for his insistence on a high standard of student performance. During this period he published the monograph entitled *Aliens and the Law* (1940), in addition to contributing to professional journals. His academic activities were interrupted by World War II, in which he served, first as lieutenant, and later as lieutenant commander, in the United States Naval Reserves. He returned to teaching at the end of the War, but in 1947 was requested to go to Washington, D. C., to render special services for the Central Intelligence Agency. Resigning from his position at Duke, he remained with this Agency until the time of his death.

Ford Poulton Hall, professor and head of the department of government and dean of the division of adult education and public services of Indiana University, died unexpectedly September 21, 1951, at the age of fifty-two. Receiving the bachelor's degree at Carleton College in 1921, he attended Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar, taking the Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Civil Law degrees in 1924 and 1925, respectively. He entered the University of Minnesota in 1925, and completed his work for the degree of Master of Civil Laws there while serving as instructor in the department of political science. In 1930 Oxford University conferred the degree of Master of Arts on him. Known to his colleagues for his searching and thoughtful study, he was a member of the faculty of Indiana University for almost a quarter of a century. In his chosen field of research, he is probably best known to specialists for the several editions of his *Government and Business*, his *The Concept of Business Affected with a Public Interest* (1940), and his *State Control of Business through Certificates of Convenience and Necessity* (1948). In the general field of political science, he collaborated on *The American National Government: Law and Practice* (1949). In the field of public service, he became active in the organization of the first merit program under the social security law in welfare administration in Indiana; and, later, as acting director, he organized the state merit system under the 1941 Indiana statute. He served as consultant to state and federal agencies and for several years held the post of chairman of the Monroe County Welfare Board. In addition, he acted as a technical consultant to numerous civic groups interested in the improvement of government.

Howard Louis Jamison, a member of the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., died following a heart attack on October 11, 1951, at the age of twenty-eight. Graduating in 1945 from Hamilton College, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, he later attended Harvard University, where he devoted himself primarily to study in the field of political theory. He was awarded the A.M. and Ph.D. degrees at Harvard in 1947 and 1950, respectively. For a brief period of time he taught at Harvard, and from 1949 to 1951 he was a member of the political science staff at Wellesley College. He had taken an administrative post in the Central Intelligence Agency approximately two weeks before his death.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Combined Boards of the Second World War; An Experiment in International Administration.* By S. McKee Rosen. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. 288. $4.00.)

The Combined Boards of World War II—the four civilian bodies established to ensure Anglo-American economic cooperation—offer a peculiarly timely subject for the administrative historian. The issues so sharply disputed from the formation of the first two boards in January, 1942, to the final transformation and dissolution of all four in 1945 and 1946 are alive today; and the alternate high hopes, disillusionment, and sense of practical, though limited, achievement are reflected in current attitudes toward new efforts at organized international economic cooperation. We owe a debt to Dr. Rosen for writing this history in spite of the pressures of his busy official life, and we are in his debt too for the conscientious and energetic way he has performed his task.

From 1942 to 1944, Dr. Rosen was the analyst assigned by the Bureau of the Budget's Division of Administrative Management to work with the boards on their continuing organizational problems and from 1944 to the end he continued to follow their vicissitudes from close at hand. He lived with the boards, suffered with them; he interviewed their members and their staff, and their opponents as well; and he compiled the materials of history while carrying out his daily responsibilities.

Dr. Rosen points out in characteristically candid fashion that his work is written from the American standpoint, but, as he also points out, there were sharply divergent attitudes towards the boards in the U. S. government. The standpoint can be more precisely determined. By an odd quirk, the officials of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget tended to be more personally identified with the destiny of the boards than any other group of American officials, including those working directly for or with the boards, and this book reflects rather clearly the opinions held and supported in the Bureau's Division of Administrative Management; indeed, the general attitudes that pervade the work are more like those of a Britisher like Mr. Robert Brand than those of an American like General Clay.

It is fortunate that Dr. Rosen has stayed so closely with the emerging positions that he helped to develop at the time. A fully rounded history would be an impossible task at the moment; and Dr. Rosen wisely decided not to wait for that far-off time when a British history of the boards would be completed.[1] He performed a far more useful service by, in effect, reliving those years as they seemed to those in the then old State Department Building than he could have done by giving us a retouched photograph with a blurred British profile and smoothed out American side, a glowing Budget smile, and an annoyed military frown.

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[1] A good deal of insight into the British attitudes toward the boards (British hopes and reactions were less sharply divided than ours) can be found in W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, *British War Economy* (London, 1949); the contrast between this history and the work under review is illuminating. Among other studies providing interesting side lights on the boards may be mentioned Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948) and Donald M. Nelson's *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York, 1946). In general, the account and interpretation to be found in *Industrial Mobilization for War* are paralleled in much more developed form in Dr. Rosen's work.

The general outline of the boards' history is, of course, familiar. The first two—the Combined Raw Materials Board, CRMB, and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, CSAB—were offspring of the ARCADIA conference in the Christmas season after Pearl Harbor; two other combined offspring of those disastrous-hopeful days were destined to play a far more decisive and fateful role: the Munitions Assignments Board and the Combined Chiefs of Staff; but these lie outside the scope of Dr. Rosen's work.

CRMB had a relatively cheerful life. Composed of a U. S. and a U. K. member, it decided early not to push for the highly ambitious role that its ambiguous charter might have allowed. It concentrated on a series of difficult and relatively non-controversial commodity problems, and was content with making itself useful. In 1945 its commodity committees were enlarged from their original exclusive Anglo-American membership to include representatives of other nations, and the board itself went out of existence at the end of that year.

CSAB also had a straight Anglo-American base; in a remarkably short time, it became primarily a forum for an out-and-out wrangle between Admiral Land and Sir Arthur Salter, with Mr. Lewis Douglas being helpful in the background. In a practical sense, CSAB ceased to function early in 1943, though even after the multi-member United Maritime Authority was organized in 1944, CSAB lingered on for a year or more as a paper organization.

The other two boards—the Combined Food Board, CFB, and the Combined Production and Resources Board, CPRB—were born in the summer of 1942; both were binational organizations. A few months later, Canada was invited to membership on each; Canada accepted, not reluctant, but certainly not over-eager.

CFB weathered its trials and tribulations; its effectiveness gradually increased, and it found its fullest fruition in the multi-nation commodity committees that were established in 1945, and in their successor, the International Emergency Food Council.

CPRB was for most of its career a bitter disappointment to those who hoped to establish an "Economic High Command"; but it too eventually found a job to do, and a job it could do; in time, its non-military supply committees helped in the development of the supply program for UNRRA and for the liberated areas generally. It went out of existence at the end of 1945, but its multi-nation commodity committees continued to function for some months longer.

Dr. Rosen draws a series of conclusions from his study of the four boards, conclusions of interest and value to all students of public administration. He calls attention to the rather special circumstances surrounding the formation of the boards, the significance of national cultural characteristics for international administration, the need for effective national representation on international agencies, the difficulties caused by blurred objectives and by segmentation among related agencies, and the importance of symbolic values in international effort. Rather than attempting an analysis of these conclusions—an analysis that would be largely by way of concurrence—it may be useful to set down some additional reflections that arise from a reading of the history of these four agencies.

1. *National Coordination and International Action.* Among the most spectacular difficulties of the boards were those caused by the lack of unity or coordination among the national agencies—especially on the American side. CRMB had a relatively untroubled life; its U. S. home base was the War Production Board, whose jurisdiction in the field of raw materials was undisputed. CFB took a long time to get established with any effectiveness: it was caught in the split between the Department of Agriculture and the War Food Administration. CSAB collapsed in large part because U. S. control over shipping was divided, with the bulk of the U. S. merchant marine under the direct control of the Army and Navy and not amenable to management by the War Shipping Administration, a fact that Sir Arthur Salter pointed to on occasion with more cogency than tact. CPRB's somewhat self-assigned role of Economic High Command was hopeless because its U. S. home base—WPB—was totally incapable of playing such a role in the U. S. economy. And the difficulties of all four boards were compounded by the constant uncertainty and strife between the U. S. production agencies like WPB and export-import agencies like BEW. The lesson to be derived from all this is obviously a special variant of Paul Appleby's dictum that you can't decentralize until you have centralized.

2. *Objectives, Function, and Role.* All the boards suffered, in varying degrees, from uncertainties about what they were supposed to do, how they were supposed to do it, and what kind of agencies they were supposed to be. The ultimate objective was winning the war; the broad function was concerting the use of available economic resources; but there was no general agreement on the concept of role. Writing in August 1950, Dr. Rosen says:

> It is perhaps well to reemphasize here the major aspect of the combined pattern, viz.: (1) such international agencies do not displace national authorities but provide for direct contact between responsible officials of national establishments; (2) they further the flow of information and afford effective channels for it; (3) they provide consultation, focus issues, and facilitate decisions; (4) their recommendations are carried out in the last analysis by national agencies.

This is an admirable summary which is widely applicable to international organizations. (It may be noted that the definition does not fully apply to agencies like UNRRA, the Bank, and SHAPE that have under their own control resources that have been turned over to them.) To return to the boards: much grief would have been avoided if this summary could have been engraved on the entrance to the offices of the four boards in 1942. Note the case of CPRB. The organizational planners in WPB, taking all too much advantage of the ambitious if ambiguous charter of the new agency, made a series of remarkable proposals, such as that the CPRB "develop, promulgate and enforce specific combined programs;" that the OLLA [Lend-Lease Administration] be abolished "with transfer of its record-keeping functions to Treasury Procurement and absorption of most of its remaining functions into the CPRB"; and that the BEW be made "advisory only, to the CPRB on matters of production requirements, supply and distribution (including export and import functions)." The Bureau of the Budget planners carried on in the same fine glow of international good will, though the Bureau expected that most of the "actual implementation" would be carried out by national agencies "under directives."

With this dramatic overture, the plot unfolded quickly. General H. B. Aurand, U.S.A., Chief of Staff of CPRB, proposed one day that it allocate 15,000 tons of shot steel to UK; the steel was to come out of U. S. production already allocated to the U. S. Army. The matter was not taken through the established requirements procedures of WPB nor, apparently, was the U. S. Army consulted. CPRB approved. Within a week General Somervell had arranged for General Aurand's promotion and translation to a higher, or at least a different, sphere of activity. Somehow, thereafter, CPRB received a minimum of cooperation from the War Department.

It should be noted that in WPB, the Program Vice Chairman, Mr. James S. Knowlson, would unquestionably have consulted with the Army before reducing an allocation of steel and would almost certainly not have proceeded to act at all without Army concurrence; yet the U. S. representative on CPRB who agreed to the reallocation was none other than Mr. James S. Knowlson.

Such, in skeleton form, is the one notable incident in which the advocates of a "strong" board tried to act decisively on their convictions. (Cf., e.g., the following from a Budget memorandum of October, 1942: "In naked truth, what this means is that the time has come either to put real content into these structures on paper—or to abolish them. They must be made real staffs and boards.") It is not easy to reconcile the surprise and disturbance that Dr. Rosen expresses over this episode with the calm and balanced statement of the role of the Boards cited above; but old battles leave scars.

Some years ago, the authors of *Industrial Mobilization for War* wrote: "The combined boards [i.e., CRMB and CPRB] were never any stronger than the implementing powers of WPB." In context, the statement is meant as criticism of the lost opportunities of these two boards; in actuality, it is the statement of a fact and of a probably inevitable condition. The U. S. member could not (perhaps one should add, "should not") deliver more than he could control. The hope that the creation of CPRB, for example, would enable Mr. Nelson to exercise more power over U. S. agencies than he could manage as WPB Chairman was illusory. Indeed, the action of Mr. Knowlson in the Aurand incident can be described, in a technical sense and without reflection on Mr. Knowlson personally, as irresponsible.

The initial collapse and subsequent modest reëstablishment of CPRB turned around a realization of role—of the kind of agency it could and should be. The moral is broadly applicable. Supporters of newly established international agencies have been known to oversell what they help to create; their creations suffer in consequence.

3. *The Manageable Margin.* One of the constant complaints about the boards was that they concerned themselves with "spot adjustments" and individual critical commodities and problems rather than with over-all planning and "combined programming." Obviously, this is another facet of the uncertainty about role, as well as about function—it relates to the kind of agency as well as to the work to be done. Historically it is now clear that the boards were most effective when they set aside grandiose schemes in favor of practical and limited tasks where the use of institutional machinery for Anglo-American cooperation was welcome. Acceptance of this fact came slowly—grudgingly. Dr. Rosen puts the point neatly in describing the arrangements ultimately worked out between CPRB and UNRRA: "For one thing, many items were in such free supply that they could be obtained directly through the national supply agency of the buyer's choice. Programming such items on a combined basis appeared superfluous. Other commodities were not subject to allocation by the national allocating agencies or not under export control. Still others were in very short supply or were available in only one country. All in all, combined programming in such cases seemed either unnecessary or impossible."

This comment is addressed to the special problems that CPRB, and the other boards, faced in handling UNRRA's needs. But these cautionary thoughts were unfortunately not kept in mind in reference to the total productive effort of the United States and the United Kingdom. In general, only a minute percentage of the total volume of supplies and shipping of those two nations was in any practical sense available for management and diversion; and the governmental machinery required for total production programming and control within the United States alone would have been stupendous. Partly by design, much more by the sheer pressure of circumstance, the boards (aside from CSAB) in their different ways settled down to dealing with the manageable margin—that tiny fraction of all commodities and generally very small fraction of any one commodity that could be controlled and moved in space and time. Planning is crucial in all large scale operations, national and international; but there should be no embarrassment in concentrating planning activities on the field in which action is feasible. It may be added that the assembly of combined statistics, as by CPRB, can and should cover a wide front; but the value of an illuminating statistical survey lies as much in its indication of the areas where planned combined action is not necessary or not feasible, as in pointing up the trouble spots where the international agency can do some good.

4. *Pooled Resources vs. Deficit Planning.* Still another ambiguity in the role of the boards was reflected in the stumbling over the divergent concepts of "pooled resources" and, in Knowlson's phrase, "deficit planning." In the Roosevelt-Churchill announcement of the formation of CSAB appears the phrase:

"In principle, the shipping resources of the two countries will be deemed to be pooled. The fullest information will be interchanged." For CFB, the phrase reads: "In principle, the entire resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool, about which the fullest information will be interchanged." The phraseology in the charters of the other two boards is less directly to the point, though the common pool concept underlay the "combined programming" authority of CPRB.

The application of the concept proved troublesome. As it happened, the same difficulties arose in the lend-lease operations. Hancock and Gowing, in their *British War Economy*, while praising lend-lease in both theory and practice, are saddened by its practical divergence from the pooled resources theory. Paradoxically enough, many of those concerned with the boards spoke of the "lend lease concept" as the opposite of the "pooled resources" concept. In any event, the source of the difficulty is obvious enough. For the great majority of the manageable sinews of war, the United States was supplier, the United Kingdom recipient. The question that arose was inevitable; in the words of Congressman Vorys: "So here we have this anomalous situation of where 44 nations are asking for stuff, where we have put up four-fifths of it, yet we have to get the consent of the British, that is the Combined Boards operation . . . ." Congressman Vorys was referring to the special problem of allocations for UNRRA, but the same question was asked about the whole range of board activity, over and over again in different forms throughout the war. The practical consequences were visible; in those areas where the British contribution—manageable margin—was not infinitely smaller than ours, and above all in dealing with supplies to be obtained from third countries, the boards worked most effectively and had their most substantial part to play. In those areas where international allocation consisted in fact of a transfer of U. S. supplies to U. K., the boards had difficulties; here they were in competition, so to speak, with the U. S. agencies that controlled exports in terms of money, export licenses, allocations or otherwise—Lend-Lease, BEW, WPB, the Department of Agriculture, the Armed Services. Here the concept of pooled resources ran into acute resistance along the lines indicated by Congressman Vorys.

It is obvious that while the total over-all contribution of the United Kingdom was smaller than our own, it was very large and crucially important, if one takes into account all aspects of war involvement: men, money, materials, shipping, provision of a staging area and airfields, etc. The amount is even more notable if the contributions of the Commonwealth and the Governments-in-Exile—all acting under British leadership—are also taken into account. (Canada in this respect was on its own, or acting largely under U. S. leadership; the Canadians themselves, or the U. S. members acting on their behalf, placed Canadian resources in the combined pool.)

These are valid considerations, but they could not be brought effectively to bear on commodity problems where the United States did all the giving and the United Kingdom all the receiving. The problem remained unsolved. It is a problem of great importance today. In international organizations ranging from UNESCO to the International Materials Conference, from the International Bank to NATO, the power relationship is uneven; over and over again, the ultimate deficit can be filled only by us. A grotesque mirror-image of the same problem can be found in the Russian sphere; but the Russian solution is abhorrent to us. Furthermore, I, for one, am convinced that a "realistic" solution *à la Russe*, under which the other members of NATO and the other organizations would play a mere satellite role, would prove suicidal for the United States. The recent events in Iran provide a startling and sobering illustration of the practical significance of symbols in international relations, and of the extraordinary importance of recognizing national dignity as well as national interest. The reconciliation of democratic participation in international administration with a practical recognition of power relationships is essential; it can not be effected by ignoring either term of the equation.

5. *By-passing and Bi-lateralism.* A recurrent complaint of those associated with the boards (on the American side) is that they were by-passed, and the complaint is reaffirmed by Dr. Rosen. In part, the complaint refers to the fact that there was a constant process of negotiation and agreement between U. S. and U. K. officials outside the confines of the boards on matters that fell more or less within their competence. This is generally looked on by Dr. Rosen as an undermining of the boards' authority; to the British, on the other hand, both on practical and on theoretical grounds, then and now, this dispersion seemed wise. To the British the boards constituted only one specialized part of the combined process by which the war was won. So much for the general complaint: more specifically—and here the complaints of the Americans become shrill—by-passing was the sin committed by the President of the United States when he reached an agreement with a member of the British government without reference to the boards.

The phenomenon and the complaints are not unfamiliar within national administration, and many of the same opposing considerations that an administrator weighs or should weigh within a government or within a department on whether or not to by-pass are relevant here. Actually, by-passing on the working level, and by the President, were both essential. To take all the innumerable daily problems through the formal machinery of the boards would have swamped them. And the opposition to the President's intervention has a little bit of the flavor—to put the matter in an unfair way—of saving the boards even if the war had to be lost.

There were two underlying causes for the by-passing. One was the multiplicity of dealings; here the real fault was the failure to establish or observe adequate recording arrangements so that there could be a usable record of all relevant decisions whether taken via the formal machinery or not. The second type of by-passing represents another kind of difficulty, one that was almost exclusively American. The difficulty was the persistent lack of coordination between the White House and the rest of the administration. CSAB foundered on the by-pass rock, the by-pass in this case consisting of an agreement between the President and Mr. Lyttleton, the British Minister of Production. The

U. S. side of CSAB, consisting of War Shipping Administration officials, was furious at Sir Arthur Salter when he pressed for CSAB action to effectuate the President's agreement to allocate a certain amount of U. S. shipping for British needs; and CSAB in effect ceased to function. But the British went back to the President and eventually got what they wanted.

The fact was that Admiral Land and his subordinates disagreed with the President on this point, and were anxious to do little or nothing to carry out his policy. This problem is not new for us, nor is it one that is soluble by international organization. Detailed charters, combined secretariats and all the rest are no substitute for the ability to concert national action in fulfillment of governmental agreement.

By way of final comment, by-passing presents somewhat different problems when the international agency affected is multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral. Fundamentally, of course, both types of agencies are inherently bound to be by-passed in some sense because, as long as they are not international governments, they are not and cannot be the exclusive channel for communication among the member nations. They represent in their respective spheres part but not all of the process of international cooperation. However, while it is inevitable to by-pass—in some sense—international organizations, bi-lateral or multi-lateral, it is extremely dangerous to by-pass multi-lateral organizations in the casual and cavalier fashion with which the combined boards were treated. The symbolic significance of organizations such as UN and NATO is infinitely greater than that of the four boards taken together, and the consequences of serious disruption would be catastrophic; an action that threatens the prestige of UN or NATO is therefore *ipso facto* a dangerous one. And, in more immediate fashion, while an extra-organizational agreement between a U. S. and U. K. agency might become embarrassing to one of the combined boards, because it was not duly weighed or not duly recorded, it was still a U. S.-U.K. agreement and part of the whole combined fabric. However, in a multi-lateral agency, a side agreement between member A and member B may subvert or prevent general agreement among all members. Except by sheer luck, side agreements fit into the cooperative texture only if so planned and so handled.

The foregoing reflections are merely illustrative of the kind of analysis and speculation that Dr. Rosen's study invites. Indeed his book is replete with incidents and observations that beg for comment: the Elliott-Marvin Plan for a fifteen-member Joint Shipping Board (and two new U.S. boards to deal with shipping); Dr. Rosen's expressed preference for "non-national" secretariats; the boards' lack of public relations; the role of Hopkins; the origin of the boards (Dr. Rosen's account is nicely paralleled in reverse in Hancock and Gowing); Welles's and Wallace's violent opposition to the language in a proposed executive order that was taken *verbatim* and *literatim* from the Roosevelt-Churchill announcement. And so forth.

The list of questions worth pursuing could be greatly extended. More books like this will help to bring the study of international administration out of the clouds down to earth where administrators actually live.

A final slightly petulant and very minor footnote is irrepressible: it seems unfortunate that the Columbia University Press apparently by-passed the old-fashioned practice of proofreading in publishing such a handsome and expensive volume.

HAROLD STEIN.

*Washington, D. C.*

*Law and Society in the Relations of States.* By P. E. CORBETT. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1951. Pp. x, 337. $4.75.)

Concentration upon the development of a code of minimum human rights, voluntarily accepted and made the law of a world society recognizing individuals as members, is recommended by Professor Corbett as the most fruitful field for future activity in the sphere of international law. He reaches this conclusion after a detailed review of international legal theory, practice and the realities of the cold war. The volume is an excellent one for use among those who must know at least the fundamentals of international law.

Abandonment of the myth that there is now a "law" among nations is one of Professor Corbett's principal aims. He prefers to call the accepted doctrines an "international consensus," for this designation indicates that the doctrines are ineffective if not generally accepted by states which find them to be in the states' interest. He has no place in his pantheon for those who preach natural law. He is prepared to say, "Why not frankly admit either that there is no law transcending the State, or that law in the international context is something so different from law in the State that a different set of habits has to be developed for its interpretation and evaluation?"

The term "law" is seen to have value only because it may serve the purpose of persuasion. This suggests that glorification of the international consensus as "law" has value primarily in the field of propaganda warfare among the untutored multitudes. No one who really knows the subject, as foreign office officials know it, is expected to be deluded into believing that they deal with anything more than an active but fluctuating consensus. Some would call Professor Corbett cynical when he concludes, "Wherever the advantages of change overbalance in sober calculation those of conformity, the State will favor change, and in the absence of external control, will act accordingly."

In view of his feeling that there can be no reliance upon the observance of the consensus in the absence of external control, Professor Corbett causes no surprise when he adds, "The view defended in this book is that there is a growing perception that the future of any law of nations and that of international organization are one and the same." He links the firming of consensus to the point where it may not be violated with impunity with the creation of a system of international organization which will provide the external control of which he speaks. He does not thereby become an exponent of World Federalism or

Union Now, for he sees no possibility of bringing into existence the world community through sudden adventures in constitutional union which would ignore the ingrained differences of culture together with inequalities of social and economic achievement. He sees the necessity for attack upon the problem at a fundamental level, namely the differences in culture. But he expects these to be slow to change, and he calls, therefore, for a step-by-step approach.

The International Labor Office is chosen as the model for future efforts to remake the world. Professor Corbett likes its step-by-step approach to the problem of improving and equalizing labor conditions. He notes that no great international code of labor standards was thrust before parliaments for ratification. He thinks that failure would have been the result of such a shock approach. For this reason, he thinks the United Nations unwise to have attempted the shock approach to human rights by adopting the Declaration of Human Rights and by trying now to formulate a Covenant which will require ratification. He would approach the subject slowly, one step at a time.

Having reached the conclusion that attempts at constitutional construction of a world union will be fruitless until the underlying cultures are in greater harmony and inequalities eliminated, and that this revolution can be achieved only gradually, he suggests that the place to begin is with the individual. He would take one aspect of the individual's life which is of vital concern to millions, namely the aspect of legal inequality. For this reason he urges the West to devote its attention to that subject. He suggests that an alternative starting point might have been the individual's desire for freedom of expression, but he discards this suggestion "because it has a certain cold abstractness which reduces its popular appeal."

Popular appeal is believed to be of great concern in pressing the development of a world community. Corbett is not one of those who think that the peoples of the world crave a world community and are held back only by scheming leaders. He finds that "the most massive of all the checks on world organization is the inert multitude which holds the majority of voting strength." He believes that this multitude is not a reservoir of world brotherhood, and that one indulges in fantasy if one expects it to share what privileges it has with aliens of all breeds and manners of life. Thus, Corbett seeks a program which will have popular appeal so that it may gain the adherence of the multitudes. He expects that the concept of "legal equality" is the note which should be sounded. He would not scrap the United Nations but urges its gradual (and he stresses gradual) reorientation around the forces of human rights.

The West is thought to have faltered in its efforts to win the world to acceptance of a system of law and order as conceived by the West because it has not made clear that its object is not to preserve capitalism or to impose western ideas of life and government but to raise the standards of living in the intellectual and spiritual sense, as well as the material sense, everywhere in the world and by whatever economic and political system each particular country may prefer.

The middle chapters of the book are concerned with the more conventional subjects of textbooks on international law: land, waters, air, individuals, immunities, war, neutrality. The author gives an excellent brief review of the consensus existing in each field and includes material up to the moment. On some shadowy subjects he digs deep into the record, but he does more. He suggests the direction in which the subject may move in the future, or in which it ought to be guided if guidance is possible. He is often critical, as when he examines the presidential proclamation of 1945 declaring United States interests in the "continental shelf." He finds that other nations have now gone far beyond the original United States position and threaten to embarrass the United States in that the three-mile doctrine has been weakened, and worse confusion than before has been introduced into the age-old issue of freedom of the seas. In consequence, the long process of replacing old claims of sovereignty with a broad consensus on freedom of the seas is being reversed by the seaward extension of various aspects of national administration. The possibilities of a world community in this field are dimmer than in years past.

The wisdom of the Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals is questioned, not because punishment was not in order, but because the court professed to be applying an international law. Corbett would have preferred a simple statement that the victors were going to apply justice as they saw it and were going to conduct a trial to make certain that the defendants were punished only on formal proof of the acts of which they were accused, whether or not those acts were generally admitted to be criminal under a law of nations. He suggests that further efforts at refinement of the laws of war are a waste of precious time. He would prefer to concentrate upon removing the causes and preventing the outbreak of war rather than upon deflecting efforts into the mitigation of war's effects.

This book is not a substitute for the exhaustive treatises which give the massive treatment of details required by the specialist. The chapters on international organization do not have the complete treatment offered by Hans Kelsen's recent *The Law of the United Nations.* The theme of human rights which Professor Corbett espouses as the key to future progress toward a world community is not developed with anything like the thoroughness of that remarkably able and exhaustive brief, Lauterpacht's *International Law and Human Rights.* Corbett has provided rather a provocative introduction to the detailed works, something like Brierly's famous *Introduction,* but with this advantage, that it is much more up-to-date even than Brierly's recent fourth edition. The book, filled with solid material, incorporates the intriguing thesis of books such as Philip C. Jessup's recent *A Modern Law of Nations,* which declares that international law must bring individuals into its orbit if it is to progress. It cannot continue to limit itself to the concept that only states may be persons in international law.

The publisher has probably gone too far to claim on the jacket that Corbett marks a radical departure from all previous thinking in this field. The ideas have been in the air, particularly since World War II, and some have reached the drafting board. These ideas seem reasonable to the new generation of students of international law, if one may believe what is heard in the classroom. Professor Corbett is dignifying them with his prestige, and others who have progressed not quite so far may find in his study the material which will give them the urge to strike out in his direction to build the world community by the indirect method. Certainly, all who have espoused work in the field of human rights for no other reason than the milk of human kindness will be glad to have Professor Corbett's support of this approach as the only one likely to succeed.

Objective measurement of the reasonableness of Professor Corbett's thesis is not easy for any one. Perhaps such an effort can be initiated by seeing what Soviet authors oppose, and by arguing that any scheme opposed by them may be thought to be potent in furthering the ideas for which the West has stood. A clue as to Soviet thinking is offered by a recent review in a Soviet law review of Philip C. Jessup's *A Modern Law of Nations*. The claim is made that Jessup has tried to introduce the individual into international law as a person and to press for a world standard of human rights solely to permit the United States to intervene in the affairs of other states. This approach would violate current concepts of sovereignty in Soviet eyes and would serve as an excuse to forestall development of progress in the Soviet direction. Since Corbett espouses something of the same thesis as Jessup, his book will probably be equally criticized. Yet as one reads his study, one will probably feel that he has something far broader than the narrow, immediate interests of the United States in mind. He looks for a world community which is not shaped in the image of the present economic or political system of the United States. He is prepared to swing his sword in all directions, including that of the United States, and he chooses as his starting point the theme of "equality." This has been the theme with which Soviet delegates have always wished to begin in meetings of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. It has not been the first step urged by the United States, which has called for concentration on freedom of expression. It may be that Professor Corbett has found a happy point of entry into the new world which is really impartial, at least in that it will require every one to mend his ways in some measure or other. If this be so, the cooperation of states is not to be expected, and Corbett's premonition that a theme must be chosen which will excite multitudes is correct. The peoples of the world will have to be aroused to go over the heads of governments and demand action. Such a world-wide cry for action is not easy to organize without the help of the means available to governments, yet who can say from this distance that it is impossible of achievement?

JOHN N. HAZARD.

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*The Idea and Practice of World Government*. BY GERARD J. MANGONE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 278. $3.75.)

The idea of world government, as expressed in various theories down through the ages, is here analyzed in relation to man's different conceptions of state and society. As to the practice, or rather practicability, of world government, the author, while emphasizing the difficulties, remains optimistic. He contends that world government based on the tenets of western democracy can be established by common consent, provided there is a common world outlook, "constantly nourished by a vigorous belief in the freedom of individual choice, the toleration of minorities, and devices which permit critical opposition in government" (p. 193). The author relies on "a preachers' union of world leaders devoted to the gospel of democratic procedure" to convert mankind to "the values of compromise, concession, tolerance, and compassion" (p. 217). It hardly needs to be stressed that no amount of preaching is likely to induce humanity, divided as it is into ideological and power blocs, to adopt a "common ethics," let alone the philosophy of western liberalism, and to embrace "world patriotism." We may accept the author's premise that democratic world government presupposes a democratic world society. If we recognize, on the other hand, the improbability of the emergence of such a "world conscience" in the foreseeable future, it follows that such a world government must remain a daydream.

The author implies that universal belief in democracy is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a practicable liberal world government. He takes Rousseau's myth of the general will for an adequate description of political reality, and characterizes the modern democratic state as an organization in which "the people as a whole . . . merge their wills" (p. 62) to carry out the purpose of democracy. Similarly, once humanity as a whole *wills* world government, there will *be* world government. Nevertheless, the necessity might arise "of creating a nucleus of power to implement the preceding principles and to defend their assertion by force" (p. 218). If so, "armies will [have to] be mobilized to defend democracy and advance the dictum of liberty for all regardless of race, creed, or status" (p. 219). Mobilized by whom? We may have to look "for one state which may accomplish the task as a kind of 'chosen instrument' for humanity" (p. 103). These statements imply the possibility that the United States might justifiably assume this role and establish world government "by consent" through world conquest.

That a common system of values, if it were adopted, is not a sufficient condition for the existence of world government, is evidenced by present-day attempts at federation in Western Europe. The people of most of this area are united by similar institutions, a common culture, and an increasing European consciousness (notwithstanding Mangone's denial [p. 51]). Yet, the implementation of the Benelux Union and the Schuman Plan has met with numerous obstacles. These endeavors are not even mentioned in the book. A detailed study of such attempts at economic unity on a small scale might have shed light on the question whether unity on a world scale is possible. But we gain no knowledge from statements such as: "Unless effective trade organizations and resource development projects, for example, can be organized on a supranational level, there seems little prospect of even a fertile soil in which to plant the husbanded seeds of free fellowship" (p. 214). Although the author has resisted the temptation of giving a detailed blueprint of a world constitution, he has committed the opposite error of dwelling in generalities. "What is sought is some kind of strong, universal political organization which will satisfy the need for a more equitable distribution of this planet's quite limited wealth . . . " (p. 102). Or again, "What is required of world government is the adequate fulfillment of man's imaginative joys and the gentle release of his emotional tensions as much as the proper balance of economic conflicts" (p. 115). Such statements abound throughout the work.

The book is based substantially on the author's doctoral thesis which won an award for its contribution to international peace. The work has all the earmarks of a respectable dissertation. The text, interspersed with numerous quotations, documented by 400 footnotes and a twenty-page bibliography, displays an encyclopedic knowledge. There are many digressions which have little connection with the main topic. The often told "rise" of nationalism, of international law, of industrialism, is once more recorded. Lacking are a grasp of political realities, clarity and consistency (not to speak of originality) of thought, which should be the primary objectives in the training of graduate students. The author's extensive erudition and patient labors have thus done little to clarify the problems with which he set out to deal. These qualities, combined with a semi-poetic style and a laudable compassion for humanity do not by themselves constitute a significant "contribution to international peace."

FELIX OPPENHEIM.

*Yale University.*

*The Search for Peace Settlements.* BY REDVERS OPIE AND ASSOCIATES. (Washington: Brookings Institution. 1951. Pp. xviii, 366. $4.00.)

That such a substantial and serious volume as the present one should and could be written upon what is, after all, a more or less conjectural problem would have seemed to most students of the question somewhat surprising a few years ago, or early in World War II. Peace settlements were historically made at the end of wars and written about afterward. The explanation lies in two directions. On the one hand there was the movement which sprang up in 1941–42 to postpone any peace settlements at the end of World War II until feelings had cooled down and better settlements could be achieved than were achieved, or so it was argued, at the end of World War I. On the other hand, the present volume was published after six peace settlements had been concluded, although one, that with Japan, was concluded after the present work went to press. The first factor has complicated the international situation very greatly in the postwar years, even if it has made possible—and necessary—the kind of work now before us. (It is interesting to note the contrast between the attitude mentioned with respect to the peace settlements and that taken in pushing through negotiation of the United Nations Charter.) The second aspect of the situation is accentuated by the continued deadlock over the prospective German and Austrian treaties (if any) and the situation in Korea.

The present work, in which the principal author had the assistance of Dr. Joseph Ballantine and the supervision of Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, not to mention the aid of several other members of the staff of the Brookings Institution, is, as would be expected, a thorough and scholarly performance. It reverts to wartime conditions and policies and actions and traces the course of events from the end of the war to and through the conclusion of the Italian treaty and the treaties with the so-called satellite states. It goes on to speculate about the Austrian, German, Japanese, and Korean settlements with all available factual data put to maximum use and with most careful judgment exercised at all points. A concluding chapter entitled "Retrospect and Prospect" is added, in which some attempt is made to explain the large amount of confusion and failure which has attended the peace settlements, or efforts to achieve them, by blaming the Russians.

The reader will hardly be able to escape the impression that we have mainly ourselves to blame for the situation described—indeed, some responsibility is attributed to the United States in the present volume. How anything else could flow from such a naïve or romantic or partisan view of the Russians as obtained in the White House and the State Department in 1941–46 (in contrast to the realistic appraisals voiced by a few students whose opinions were ignored, or to the type of realistic study of foreign policy expressed in George Kennan's excellent recent volume, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*), is hard to imagine. Fortunately, by 1946 it was beginning to be perceived that the purchase of mythical unanimity among the Great Powers or of illusory agreement with the Russians by all sorts of concessions, as had been done at San Francisco, was not advisable with respect to the peace settlements. The Brookings volume provides an entirely admirable aid to the study of this sad period in American diplomacy, but it should be supplemented by a reading of the Kennan book.

PITMAN B. POTTER.

*The American University.*

*The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II.* By ROBERT H. CONNERY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 527. $6.00.)

This is a valuable addition to the administrative histories dealing with experience during World War II. The author, a well-known scholar in public administration, worked, after other experience in the Navy Department, for three years under the leadership of Professor Robert G. Albion, the Administrative Historian for the Navy. He had the benefit of access to naval records, assistance of Navy staff, and consultation with persons who carried large responsibilities during the war. Yet the fact that this is not an official history preserved for the author independence of responsibility and judgment. The result is a study which links the perspective of administrative science with penetration into detail and practice in an area where the experience of the past warns of the needs of the future.

The volume is a story of organizational problems and developments, and of administrative techniques, in material procurement operations as conducted or coordinated at the departmental level of the naval establishment. Its content may best be explained by reference to three aspects of the discussion. First, roughly the first third of the book is an analysis of the movement in the Navy Department toward the establishment of the needed machinery for coordination of all activities related to material supply. Two basic defects called for quick correction. One was the full devolution of authority over supply operations to the bureau level. Secretary Knox's "most pressing problem . . . was to make effective the tremendous expansion program of the Navy, but no administrative machinery existed to coordinate this program" (p. 55). The other, in part a corollary of the first, was a deficiency in statistical analysis of the raw material needs for the expansion program. The situation required some focal point of control between the civilian production authority and the Navy bureaus. The answer which might have come through integration of material supply with logistics under the Office of Naval Operations, came instead in the creation of the post of Under Secretary (June 20, 1940) and the emergence of this official into a "wartime chief of material," whose main functions came after January, 1942, to be exercised through an Office of Procurement and Material. On the whole, operations remained at the bureau level, and the function of the departmental office was coordinative, and looked upward to WPB and downward to the bureaus. Second, a larger portion of the book deals with the operation of the coordinative structure in each of the various aspects of material supply—facts and figures, contract clearance and negotiation, price controls, renegotiation and profit limitation, subcontracting and little business, production goals and scheduling, and financing production. The problems and program approaches in each of these are sketched with emphasis on the functioning of the machinery of executive control. Third, material supply in the Navy is analyzed in the setting of the problem of civilian control. The location of the function of material procurement was the subject of a contest between those who believed it should be merged with other Navy functions under a single military chief of staff and those who believed there should be "a structural balance between various parts of the Navy Department so that questions of major policy would have to come to the responsible civilian chief—the Secretary—for decision" (p. 431). Mr. Forrestal, Under Secretary and later Secretary, favored the latter view. Under his leadership a structural bifurcation developed during the war, and it was retained in the Navy Reorganization Act of 1948 which "limited the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Operations to command of the operating forces and their immediate logistical support" and strengthened civilian control "by giving legislative status to the Chief of Naval Material, as the principal staff officer to the Secretary of the Navy for material" (p. 437).

Although the subject of exposition is internal departmental coordination, the author has treated adequately, and with avoidance of a narrow departmental view, the relationships of the Navy with the over-all control organization. Relations with Congress have been omitted because these are the subject of a companion volume by another author. While the volume conveys the impression of ever-continuing progress toward improved structure and technique, under the leadership of an able central staff, it yet shows both the dangerous delays and the failure to develop adequate solutions for many problems, such as statistical reporting and analysis on material needs and correlation between material procurement and strategic planning. In this respect the volume should help those with responsibilities in this emergency to see where performance must be better than it was last time. But its greater value, particularly for the student of administrative science, extends beyond the particulars of mobilization technique; it is a splendid case study of the problem of achieving coordination of decentralized operations in a large and complex structure. Some may be disappointed that the discussion does not move to the level of informal relationships, particularly between civilian and military personnel. It is, however, rich in references to the sources and quality of civilian leadership at the departmental level. It reveals the large part played by a few men, notably Mr. Forrestal, in developing the Navy's material organization and in leaving "a substantial legacy in the form of a greatly improved administrative structure" (p. 433).

Added at the end of the book is a 52-page chronology, with three parallel columns showing war events, defense measures, and navy organization and policies.

EMMETTE S. REDFORD.

*University of Texas.*

*Policy for the West.* By BARBARA WARD. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1951. Pp. 317. $3.75.)

Barbara Ward has done a real service to the cause of freedom. Her latest book, *Policy for the West*, gives real meaning to today's headlines at a time when the average citizen has every right to be confused about world affairs. It is clearly, concisely, even beautifully written. Free men who are looking for a keen analysis of the position of the West, together with a prescription for what must be done to win our struggle against Communism, should read this book—not once but twice.

The volume is divided into four main parts. In the first part the author examines the nature of the challenge to the West which international Communism raises, and the steps we have taken thus far to meet that challenge. In the second part she examines the relative strength of the East and West and decides that mere defense is not enough. Then, after a provocative discussion of the impact of defense expenditures upon the western economy, she devotes her third section to questions of western unity. Can the West unite? Are common policies possible? Where should we place our emphasis during the next two years if we are to meet the communist menace? What should our long-range policies be?

One may disagree with her answers to these questions. Or one may doubt whether her recommendations—particularly in the economic field—are feasible in view of the unwillingness of sovereign states to make the necessary concessions. But one cannot doubt her basic assumption that bold and daring action is needed.

The author devotes her last section to a chapter which she entitles "Faith for Freedom." She reminds us that Communism is really not revolutionary in character but reactionary, and that the western experiment is actually the most audacious and exhilarating that man has ever made. If we have faith in the rightness of our cause, if we understand clearly the dynamic character of our political philosophy, and if we will work together to achieve our common goal, freedom will prevail.

The author's analysis of the contemporary scene may be very simply put. She believes that unless the men in the Kremlin miscalculate, they will not involve us in a general war. Rather, in view of the communist interpretation of history, they expect the capitalist world to do most of the work of destroying itself through ever-deepening crises. The Soviets will bide their time, gaining in power as capitalism flounders about in one major upheaval after another.

Since we cannot expect to convert the Soviets to a more reasonable interpretation of history, what course is open to us? The only hope, says Miss Ward, is to create in the free world conditions of such strength and stability that even the Soviet leaders cannot misunderstand or underestimate them. This in essence is the Acheson policy of building situations of strength. We need in the West two types of strength: (1) sufficient military strength to deter the Kremlin from aggression; (2) a social strength and cohesion that will discourage the Communists from fomenting civil war. Merely building up these positions of strength will not, of course, do away with communist hostility and pressure. But it will make it possible for the West to hold them back.

This reviewer has only one further observation to make. If anyone has ever doubted the ability of the fair sex to analyze the problems of our time in a thoroughly competent manner, he should read Barbara Ward's book and his mind will be set at rest on this point.

FRANCIS O. WILCOX.

*Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

*Impact of War on Federal Personnel Administration, 1939–1945.* BY GLADYS M. KAMMERER. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 372. $6.00.)

The task Miss Kammerer set for herself in this study was a challenging one. For the federal civilian service is so large and so complex and its personnel policies were necessarily changed so rapidly under the pressures of war that it is almost impossible to generalize about causes and effects on the service as a whole. But Miss Kammerer has achieved a desirable degree of perspective and her general treatment of the subject helps to round out the more limited, but sharper pictures which have been presented in numerous agency or functional case studies. Because her subject is so broad, one feels at times that her treatment is superficial, but she has wisely avoided less significant detail and has been discreet in her use of illustrations. She drew chiefly upon the experience of the War and Navy Departments, the Office of Price Administration, and the Agriculture Department for her details of agency personnel management. These were good choices, but one cannot help wishing she had had opportunity for more varied observation and consultation as she conducted her survey.

She approaches her subject with an evident favorable bias toward the merit system, toward the Civil Service Commission, and toward federal administration. This is a natural bias for a political scientist who has specialized in administration, and a reader should not look in such a book as hers for the sensational kind of criticism that flows so freely from the halls of congressional inquiries and from the pens or microphones of certain news commentators. Nevertheless, Miss Kammerer is critically objective as she reviews the wartime personnel developments.

Miss Kammerer's conclusions are summarized in a listing of five major achievements and four unsolved problems. The achievements which represent permanent contributions or improvement of the federal service are:

1. The survival of the merit system—despite a serious deterioration of standards and of quality in federal recruits. Such deterioration was no more than occurred in industry, and came from the pressures of a tight labor market rather than from any weakness or ineptitude in public personnel management. The survival of basic principles was possible only because of the readiness to scrap outmoded systems and to improvise to meet unprecedented problems of time and of numbers.

2. Success in recruitment—a task shared by the Civil Service Commission and the war agencies themselves.

3. Progress in training—the inevitable sequel to expanded personnel of limited experience and prior training. To the war agencies naturally goes the credit for pioneering developments in this field.

4. Improved employee relations—another area of agency as distinguished from central personnel development.

5. New recognition of personnel administration—a "catching up" in government of a status for personnel management well established at an earlier date in progressive industry.

The four unsolved problems cited by the author are (1) controls on transfer and promotion; (2) the handicaps of a rigid and inadequate salary structure; (3) controls on the numbers of federal employees; (4) controls on subversive elements. It is perhaps significant that these are the very areas of personnel administration about which Congress or its committees showed their greatest concern. And as one reads the discussion of these topics, there are occasional places where one wishes the author had probed more deeply for the "why." For example, she is critical of the administration because of its lack of a more positive salary policy and its development of a too-rigid promotion policy. Yet persons who were on the Washington scene during the war know that the policies developed to deal with such issues were hammered out by the practical pressures of interplay between the executive and the legislative branches.

The author's interest in the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency has led her to minimize the significant role played in the wartime personnel picture by the Council of Personnel Administration. This meeting-place of departmental and agency personnel directors under the leadership of Chairman Frederick M. Davenport and his able staff had a unifying and creative influence of major importance in the evolution of federal personnel administration. Two other centers of influence on the personnel scene were the President's Liaison Officer for Personnel Administration (during the war, Mr. William H. McReynolds) and the Bureau of the Budget. Miss Kammerer recognizes them, but focuses her attention on the Commission and pays highly deserved tribute to Arthur S. Flemming, the dynamic leader of its wartime program.

EDGAR B. YOUNG.

*New York City.*

*The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion.* BY DAVID B. TRUMAN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1951. Pp. xvi, 544, xv. $5.00.)

Professor Truman's book is a contribution to the literature of systematic political science. It seeks to develop a unified statement of the role of interest groups in the political process, utilizing the findings of research in social psychology, cultural anthropology, and political science since Arthur F. Bentley's pioneering work in 1908. Readers of the book will also notice the influence of Graham Wallas, particularly in its commitment to the goal of analyzing political data in non-normative, empirical statements of verifiable relationships about the political behavior of men.

The book is divided into three parts. The major theoretical proposition of Part I is that political interest groups are similar in origin, structure, and operation to non-political patterns of social interaction, and that the political behavior of men is to be interpreted not in terms of any intrinsic differences from other forms of interpersonal activity but in their peculiar relationships to the institutions of government. The author's naturalistic view of political behavior is fortified by its compatibility with investigations into group structure and process in the other social sciences, which, with the exception of economics, do not share, the prejudice of traditional democratic theory against the "invidious" character of interest groups, factions, blocs and minorities. Rather than treating the group as opposed to the individual or to the state, Professor Truman looks upon groups as natural patterns of integrating the individual with the formal institutions and processes of government, and his development of this theme follows an honorable tradition from James Madison down to Beard, Dewey, and Herring.

Part II of the book deals with the political behavior of organized groups in terms of a general statement of their internal dynamics. External group behavior is analyzed as an outgrowth of internal political factors. Group leadership and group policies are visualized as originating in the problems of maintaining group cohesion in the midst of members' conflicting attitudes and multiple, overlapping group affiliations. Several of Truman's propositions in this section of the book represent a considerable theoretical advance over the formulations of such theorists as Robert Michels.

Part III is the most empirical and least systematic section of the book, although the author by no means departs from his effort to explain political behavior in terms of verifiable propositions deducible from his earlier theoretical premises. In these chapters Truman draws upon the monographic literature of the past fifty years to suggest general propositions concerning the relationships of interest groups successively to political parties, elections, legislatures, administration, and the judiciary. These relationships are viewed in process terms, with governmental structure being treated as a dependent variable explainable in terms of the cleavages and alignments of group leaders and organizations.

Professor Truman's volume will be enthusiastically received by teachers of political science who are seeking a conceptual framework in which to present the great mass of empirical, historical, and descriptive materials that political science has accumulated about the "realities" of political organization. We have long been aware of the distinction between formal structure and informal behavior, but our structural and value-impregnated categories have led us to interpret behavior as deviation from *a priori* values of organization or of orthodox democratic theory. While in no sense denying the influence of structure as a factor in political behavior, Professor Truman's unflagging effort to find in the group concept a method of analyzing both structure and behavior as interacting elements constitutes a milestone toward a systematic formulation of the dynamics of government.

AVERY LEISERSON.

*University of Chicago.*

*Public Relations and American Democracy.* BY J. A. R. PIMLOTT. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 265. $4.00.)

Mr. Pimlott talks good sense in this book. A British civil servant who spent a year in the United States under the Commonwealth Fund, he has seen his subject whole—and high time someone did this! Then he has presented his evidence and discussed its meaning with sophisticated perception governed by objectivity, but lacking any of the invective found in so much of the less informed discussion of public relations.

The book divides into three parts. First, Mr. Pimlott reviews the current efforts of the public relations men to gain status and acceptance as a profession and to promote the notion that in business they are really public servants, although their fees are still paid for benefits received by their clients. Examples are taken generously from published discussions of the trade. The assumption throughout the book is that public information specialists, whether working for government, for business firms, or for a variety of clients "differ in detail and not in kind, and that each reflects a universal response of American institutions to the demands of a highly complex society knit together by a highly complex system of mass communications."

Next, the author presents a summary and analysis of current publicity practices in the federal executive agencies. Generally speaking, the setting and the outline for federal publicity are still the same as this reviewer found in 1937, but some changes have occurred in details. For example, the public information practices of the military departments are more prominent now; the Treasury bond campaigns have been established; the use of government-made documentary films did not continue as seemed possible in the 30's, while the radio networks now prepare their own public service features and seldom use government releases. The most significant change is a new collaboration between commercial advertisers, through the Advertising Council, and federal agencies, as well as some other non-profit agencies bent toward public purposes. Under this arrangement, government campaigns have been conducted to sell bonds, to prevent forest fires, or to conserve food, to name only examples. On the negative side, since 1937, the provision of information services outside of Washington by civil agencies is little changed, and administrative coordination is still as slight as ever.

Finally, Mr. Pimlott tackles ably the significance of public relations for American democracy. Above all, he punctures the messianic argument devised, in their search for status, by some public relations specialists who say that they should become society's experts in applied social science and in human relations as a whole. Hardly, says Mr. Pimlott. They are not especially qualified by training, and this field is one for specialists in many different occupations, including management counseling, education, labor relations, personnel management, social work, politics, and religion. At the same time, the development of public relations has helped to raise the level of responsibility to the public.

If the function of public relations specialists is not to save the world, it is to contribute to more effective mass communication in a complex society. The increasing evidence of the failure of mass media to implant much information with the great majority of citizens exposed to the media demands some drastic solution unless the older assumptions of American democracy are to be changed. If the solution is to make communication effective, the public relations specialist as popularizer has his role socially defined. "The better the job of popularization, the more smoothly will society function, but also the greater the understanding which the plain citizen will have of his own place in relation to the 'big' and seemingly inhuman groups whose interplay is important for the 'dynamics of group behavior.' "

Mr. Pimlott is informed, wise, and even-tempered. His book is a fresh, invigorating note in the literature of propaganda.

JAMES L. MCCAMY.

*University of Wisconsin.*

*Uncle Sam's Acres.* BY MARION CLAWSON. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company. 1951. Pp. xvi, 414. $5.00.)

*The Closing of the Public Domain; Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900–50.* BY E. LOUISE PEFFER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 372. $4.50.)

These two books are concerned with the management of the landed estate of the national government, but they are intended for different audiences.

Marion Clawson, a career official who left the Bureau of Agricultural Economics to lead a new program of resource management in the Bureau of Land Management, presents the complex job of administering and developing our federal land and related water resources. A third of his book tells the story of the acquisition and disposal of our public lands, including the program of public reservations which was to be linked, at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the conservation movement. His very able and informative summary of "How We Disposed of Our Public Lands" is a lucid history of a very tangled tale. It should help "John Q. Public" understand that the current return to a policy of national land acquisition is necessary to care for essential public interests in land and water use, which exclusive private ownership does not secure.

Just as the President's Water Resources Policy Commission could not ignore land policies, so Clawson finds land policies constantly involved in water issues. He devotes a good chapter to the evolution of federal policy and programs of water development. While generally defensive toward critics who habitually allege federal bureaucratic "confusion, duplication and overlapping," the author concedes that in the water field these charges are true. However, he lays responsibility not upon the water agencies but upon the failure of Congress to formulate consistent water policies. He, therefore, discounts the efficacy of the Hoover Commission proposals for reorganizing the water functions until Congress shall have resolved the policy issues which feed the "unfair" competition of rival pressure groups. Later, in reviewing the principal resource operating agencies, Clawson finds one "bad boy" in the group, viz., the Corps of Engineers, whose political strength permits it on occasion to violate the President's instructions and to ignore directives of Congress.

While Clawson gives an impeccable critique for the composition and use of advisory boards in federal administration, he (as well as Miss Peffer) gives no adequate indication of the unhealthy influence of these bodies over the Grazing Service (and its predecessor, the Grazing Division) during the first twelve years under the Taylor Grazing Act. Instead, there is the implication that the system used by this agency has been administratively superior to that used by the Forest Service and long criticized by some of the livestock organizations. This aspect of resource administration does not receive in either book the examination it deserves.

A final long chapter (with other scattered passages) examines issues of policy and politics inherent in resource management. Included are questions, such as further federal acquisition of lands, state versus federal ownership, state water rights, the imbalance between land and water programs, federal payments to states and local agencies in lieu of taxes, and the handicaps to good administrative management imposed by the legislative and appropriating processes in Congress.

As the operating head of an agency subject to vigorous pressure-group activity and the consequent congressional criticism, Clawson shows both courage and insight in his discussion of these phenomena and of the manner in which the federal administrator should deal with them as he seeks to give expression to the "public interest."

Miss Peffer's study began under the guidance of the late Frederick L. Paxson at Berkeley and was completed under the auspices of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University. It traces the major public domain policies since the end of the nineteenth century. It is a detailed account of the struggle in Congress and among interest groups between the traditional policy of "land held in escrow pending transfer of title to individuals, corporations or States," and the conservationist demand for public reservations "held in perpetuity in the interest of the collective owners, the people of the United States." Long before 1900, the traditional policy had been challenged, and occasionally contradicted by acts of permanent reservation. The controversy became acrimonious when fears developed that our arable land reserves were nearing exhaustion and that our timber would be universally despoiled if left solely to private ownership.

Theodore Roosevelt played a key role not only in launching the conservation movement on a comprehensive scale but in initiating federal development of land by irrigation and in revising the old land disposal laws and practices. With Pinchot, his "idea" man, organizer and Chief Forester, he drastically reduced the area of land available for alienation. He also began the genuine management of public lands, with consequent regulation of private users, including the control of grazing on national forests, the development of water power sites, and the classification of certain mineral lands. The study elicits the interesting fact that in the Roosevelt-Pinchot era the western cattlemen were generally in favor of the reservation program, while the sheep men were bitterly opposed. It was the Pinchot-led Public Lands Commission of 1903–1905 which exposed the highly unsatisfactory condition of the vacant western range lands and which proposed to classify them and place them in grazing districts for administrative management (in the Department of Agriculture).

The struggle to substitute a leasing policy for the mineral-claim patent system was part of the larger conflict of public domain "ideologies." The conservationists won only partial victory. This left a basic inconsistency in the "reservation-conservation" federal policy that today urgently needs attention. Except for a few metallic minerals, national philosophy and legal practice relating to the discovery and appropriation of minerals on federal public lands are still suited, in the reviewer's opinion, to the gold-rush days of a century ago.

Miss Peffer shows that in ambivalent contradiction to its reservation policies Congress continued until 1916 to support the homestead philosophy by important new offerings of land to individual ownership. Even Secretary Lane clung to the view that the arid West, through irrigation, was suited to homestead settlement. Between 1900 and World War I, the new dry-farming techniques plus the increased demand for food by a burgeoning population heightened the demand for any kind of land. "Initial homestead entries for every year between 1901 and 1919 were higher than for the highest year prior to 1900"

(p. 322). "Chiefly as a consequence of liberalizations of the Homestead Law, one-third of all lands which passed into private ownership under public land laws in the whole history of the public domain was disposed of in the twentieth century in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the century the homestead potentialities of the remaining public lands were widely declared to be almost exhausted" (pp. 323–324).

Miss Peffer's account of the Pinchot (Forest Service)-Ballinger-Ickes (Interior) feuds seems to place her in the camp of the latter. Her use of the evidence in the Ballinger period is exceedingly summary, and, in general, pro-Ballinger. There is only a foot-note reference to Professor Mason's study of that controversy which reached the opposite conclusion. Pinchot's biography (which she seems not to have used) supports her view that he was egotistic, impatient and combative, and that he seized advantage of any combination of favorable circumstances to push his program. But how does Miss Peffer (or anyone else) know that "after the rupture of his relations with Taft and his loss of official status, his policy was based on thwarted ambition, bitterness and determination for revenge . . . " (p. 331)? Her review of the jurisdictional fight resulting from Ickes' determination to take over the Forest Service (and the counter-program of Wallace and the Forest Service to administer the Grazing Districts) is also something less than objective. The Hoover Commission's divergent reports might have suggested that there are reasons of genuine administrative cogency for locating the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management in either the Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior.

The last part of the Peffer volume traces the struggle for control of grazing on the public domain. It contains brief but excellent accounts of the coming of the Taylor Grazing Act, the fee problem, Senator McCarran's efforts to control and, when thwarted, to punish the Grazing Service, and the abortive attempt of the big livestock associations to get Congress to turn over the grazing lands to the states for ultimate private disposal.

If some readers, sharing the reviewer's prejudices, differ with a few of the judgments stated or implied, they should nevertheless be grateful for the pungency which these characterizations and opinions give to this very valuable and scholarly work.

CHARLES MCKINLEY.

*Reed College.*

*Marx Against the Peasant; A Study in Social Dogmatism.* BY DAVID MITRANY. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1951. Pp. xvi, 301. $4.50.)

In 1927 there appeared, in a volume dedicated to the late Professor Edwin Cannan, a stimulating essay by Dr. David Mitrany with an interesting title, "Marx Versus the Peasant." Nearly a quarter of a century elapsed before the original essay developed into a full-fledged book. But in the interval it gained in topical interest.

The book is divided into four parts: The Ideological Conflict, The Marxist

Revolution, The Peasant Revolution, and Through Dogma to Dictatorship. The story is brought up to date by inclusion of the Cominform phase. It is amply documented and annotated and contains a useful bibliography.

The central theme is one familiar on the continent of Europe, both in western and, especially, in eastern Europe. It is the ideological and political conflict between Marxist socialism[1] and Communism, on the one hand, and agrarianism or peasantism, on the other, a conflict which has often led to disastrous division of democratic forces and which culminated in eastern Europe in the regimentation of the peasants by the victorious Marxism. This conflict has been, until recent years, of merely academic interest in England and the United States, where Marxism has never taken deep roots. In the United States, particularly, where close collaboration of industrial labor with the farmers has always been considered the *conditio sine qua non* of a successful progressive political movement, the dispute between Marxism and peasantism seemed a remote issue.

No wonder that, until Dr. Mitrany's pioneer contributions, this whole problem was neglected in the Anglo-American social science literature except, and inevitably so, in works dealing with the history of Russian social and political thought, such as Masaryk's monumental *Spirit of Russia.*

The changed international situation following the Second World War has, however, endowed the contest between Marxism and peasantism with a new significance. This circumstance is due to the overflowing of victorious Communism beyond the Soviet Russian borders, in the agrarian countries of Europe and Asia, and to the fact that the peasant of those areas has come to be regarded as an ally or potential ally of democracies in their struggle with Communist totalitarianism.

Dr. Mitrany properly seeks the roots of peasantophobia manifested by Communism and, in a very considerable measure, by democratic socialism, in the writings of Karl Marx and his close collaborator, Friedrich Engels. For they left an ideological legacy on this score which their intellectual and political heirs were never able to outlive. However, it is fair to add parenthetically that Marx and Engels, who dwelt so much on the evil effects of the industrial revolution on the working class, would have probably recoiled in horror, as did all democratic socialists, if they could have foreseen the much greater cruelties of the Soviet-style agrarian collectivism.

Various factors combined to convince Marx of the doom of peasant farming just as the peasant was emerging out of his long history of servitude to the status of an independent land proprietor. These were: Marx's predilection, grounded in the contemporary British experience (Britain being Marx's laboratory), for large-scale production in agriculture as well as in industry, uninhibited by the recognition of the economic law of diminishing returns and biological factors peculiar to agriculture; his theory of economic concentration in all phases of economic activity; and, last but not least, his cultural and political bias against rural folks.

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[1] An illuminating critique of the agrarian doctrines of Marx and Engels will be found in a little book by Viktor Chernov, published in Moscow in 1906, entitled *Marks I Engels O Krest'yanstve. Istoriko-Kriticheskii Ocherk.* The author is the scholarly socialist opponent of Bolshevism, one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the President of the Constituent Assembly which was dispersed by the Bolsheviks in January, 1918.

Dr. Mitrany gives a masterly account of the anti-peasant doctrine of Marx, which has dominated the socialist and Communist dogma (though not always the actual policy) ever since. Moreover, as so often happens, Marx's pupils were frequently even more Marxist than their teacher and with less justification. For, as Dr. Mitrany shows, Marx himself, under the influence of the Russian peasantophile socialists (the Populists or *Narodniki*), relented somewhat from the rigor of his original doctrine. He made significant concessions with regard to the *mir*, or the *obschchina*,[2] on which the Populists pinned their faith as a means of achieving a socialist society without inevitably passing through the capitalist stage, as postulated by the Marxist evolutionary scheme. It may be argued that Marx made these concessions with his tongue in his cheek, to appease his Russian admirers. Although, as his correspondence shows, he did not have too high an opinion of them, he was, nevertheless, flattered that Russian was the first language into which *Das Kapital* was translated (in 1872). At any rate, the Russian Marxists from the very beginning of the movement, in the 1880's, would have nothing to do with this dilution of the early Marxism. They embraced completely the original agrarian dogma. Tactical compromises and strategic retreats in policy, however, which involved jettisoning the dogma, were often resorted to by Lenin and his heirs.

Dr. Mitrany has performed a service in drawing attention once more to the Populist movement in Russia and its counterparts in other east European countries. The Populist movement, despite its early romantic exaggerations and Utopian elements, was a factor of outstanding importance in the Russian political and cultural arena, where it long battled valiantly the militant Marxism of Lenin and his friends. It is a measure of the strength of Russian Populism that Lenin had to adopt the Populist agrarian program as a means of gaining political power in 1917. And, it is also significant that, despite this far-reaching appeasement of the rebellious Russian peasantry, it voted solidly against the Bolsheviks in the only relatively free election which took place in Soviet Russia, shortly after Lenin and his friends seized power. This was the election to the Constituent Assembly for the convocation of which the Bolsheviks characteristically clamored while in opposition, only to disperse it when they no longer needed the Assembly as a political slogan.

In the West, as Dr. Mitrany points out, the Marxists were confronted with the stubborn fact that the demise of the peasant, which was expected by Marx and Engels as a concomitant of capitalist development, had not materialized. Peasant farming, if anything, had grown stronger as the 19th Century was drawing to its close. Not Marx, but John Stuart Mill, who defended small peasant farming in his *Principles of Political Economy,* which appeared in the same year (1848) as the *Communist Manifesto,* was vindicated by the course of history. The virility of peasant agriculture was an important contributing cause of the revisionist "heresy" and it affected, in an opportunistic sort of way, the agrarian policy of the European socialist parties. But all this made no impression on the official Marxist dogma of the growing socialist movement, which, during the quarter of a century preceding the First World War, played a more influential political role than during Marx's lifetime.

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[2] The peasant or village commune which prevailed in a large part of Russia prior to the agricultural collectivization of the 1930's. Under this system of land tenure, land was held jointly and distributed to the peasant families on some egalitarian basis, but each family cultivated its holding independently.

Even after the First World War, "The Socialists nowhere formally dropped the Marxist theory and policy from their programs; they often temporized in pressing it, or compromised on it in practice, but they always did so frankly as temporary expedients. The Communists played with the Marxist doctrine as they thought fit; they in turn proclaimed it solemnly anew or threw it overboard altogether if at any time their revolutionary bark seemed top-heavy." Still Dr. Mitrany concedes "that of all the parties belonging to the Second [Socialist] International, the British Labour Party alone continued to demand the nationalization of the land as an essential condition for any agrarian reform. On the Continent the old revisionist view was getting a more careful hearing than it had before, and the case for peasant farming was being put forward anew . . . ."

Nevertheless, this tendency, as the author shows, had not gone far enough to heal the old political cleavage between the forces of agrarian and industrial democracies, between the socialists and the peasant parties, with the resulting annihilation of both by the Communist or fascist juggernauts.

Enough has been said, I think, to indicate that the story which Dr. Mitrany tells should be of vital interest to every student of social science. One may dissent on some points with his analysis, and may wish to qualify some of his statements. Thus, when the author declares, for instance, that "There has always been a 'curtain' somewhere between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas . . . , " an amendment should be made that, roughly between the end of the Crimean War, in the mid-19th Century, and the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917, the "curtain" which divided Russia from the rest of the world was continuously being lifted. In general, there is discernible something of a physiocratic bias in the work. It may be argued that the author tips the scale, perhaps too far, in favor of the peasant in an effort to redress the imbalance that exists on the subject in the social science literature. But these are blemishes which detract little from the solid merits of the book. And not the least of its merits is the luminous style that makes this scholarly book delightful reading.

LAZAR VOLIN.

*Washington, D.C.*

*The Operational Code of the Politburo.* BY NATHAN LEITES. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xv, 100. $3.00.)

There is little need today to dramatize either the power of the Politburo or the difficulties experienced by the western mind in comprehending the mentality and strategy of that body. These difficulties have not been eased by the multiplicity of studies of things Russian. Partisanship toward or against Communism and its related symbols and movements have combined with the exigencies of postwar propaganda to warp most if not all of the studies of Bolshevik politics. The riddle-cum-enigma has been complicated by increasing success of the Politburo's campaign to withhold essential facts from its own people and from the world. Russian institutes and centers and groups have attacked various phases of the problem of elucidation with varying success. It is reassuring indeed to see a major contribution to elucidation come from the pen of a single author.

*The Operational Code of the Politburo* is the effort of an immensely well-read and discriminating scholar to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe necessary for effective political action. The present volume is unfortunately only part of a larger effort to deal comprehensively with this topic. It concentrates on the relations of the Communist Party to the outside world. It is not concerned with genesis. The fuller study will discuss intraparty relations, and try to show how Bolshevik concepts are related to Russian and western history and culture. It will treat the many connections between Bolshevik attitudes towards politics, and note the changes in them through time. Hence the present appraisal is tentative only. Since the major documentation is reserved for the later volume, the reader must rely chiefly on the author's skill in selection or in interpretation.

The rules of conduct presented are of three types: those explicitly stated by Lenin or Stalin; those fairly deducible from Soviet conduct and recognizable as such by Soviet practitioners; those fairly deducible from conduct but obscure to the Soviet politician. The rules apply to the party, not necessarily to the Soviet government. As a totality, they are Bolshevik, although individual items may be applicable to non-Bolshevik systems.

The analysis rests explicitly on the propositions that study of Bolshevik texts is valuable as a predictive aid since its practitioners are devotees of a secular religion; that the Politburo thinks its record to date is on balance successful and the success is due to application of "correct" Leninist-Stalinist principles; that international situations are comprehensible if they have a counterpart in early party history; and finally, that "Bolshevik attitudes toward power have not undergone any basic change since the conquest of power in Russia (or outside of Russia since 1939)." In other words, the Politburo regards itself in world politics as out of power and in a precarious position.

Exposition is organized into twenty short chapters covering the full range of standpoints from which the Politburo appraises situations with an eye to formulating policy. Each chapter includes one or more general rules of conduct, cites pertinent examples, and concludes with a few suggestions as to how recent Politburo behavior squares with the policy rules stated.

The careful reader will discern contradictions, ambiguities, and overlappings of treatment in the various chapters, especially in the formulations derived from Bolshevik texts. One can quarrel with the author on these limitations only with difficulty; he admits and celebrates them. If one admits Bolshevik capacity to change the party line capriciously, one cannot worry too much about the presence in a code of conduct of divergent precepts. The question then becomes—when does the Politburo favor one or another course of action as the most expedient in terms of advancing the party's interest? Unhappily *The Operational Code* gives comparatively little help in predicting choice where alternatives are closely balanced. The riddle remains, although Mr. Leites has taught us a great deal about the rules and strategy of the game.

In passing, one must thank the Rand Corporation for making the results of this study available to the wide company of those outside government who are eager to have them. But why is a hundred page book of straight text priced at three dollars?

CHARLES A. H. THOMSON.

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*Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power*. BY PAUL BLANSHARD. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. Pp. x, 340. $3.50.)

Paul Blanshard's dramatic confrontation of Communist and Catholic "systems of power" is in many ways a courageous document. He poses the problem bluntly, and seems quite willing to assume the risks and responsibilities of dogmatic expression. He is probably right in supposing that only so sharp a statement will summon the attention that, in his view, the issue deserves. There is no doubt that anyone undertaking to discuss the politics of Catholicism exposes himself to the charge of religious bigotry. It is natural that the Church should interpret any criticism of its regime and its policies as an attack on its fundamental principles and ideals. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to insist that a powerful Church eschew the posture of a persecuted minority and accept the slings and arrows of public criticism in fair debate.

Unfortunately, Blanshard does not enter this controversy with entirely clean hands. Although he insists that his subject is politics and not religion, he finds it difficult to avoid speaking of various aspects of Catholic ritual and belief as "superstitions." Now and then, a distinctively Protestant interpretation of the theological legitimacy of Catholicism's vicarship is interposed. These remarks lend a tone that might better be absent in a treatment purporting to speak only of social and political policy. To be sure, ritual and doctrine are ingredients of the power system, and may not be ignored, but they can be dealt with free of gratuitous theological judgments. (However, it should also be said that the tone of the book, while not all it should be, hardly adds up to a strident anti-Catholic work.)

The real difficulties in Blanshard's study are of another order. They bear on the basic hypothesis itself. This affirms that totalitarian Bolshevism and authoritarian Catholicism are equivalent, both as assaults upon the human spirit and as threats to western political democracy. A choice between these like systems is, for the child of the Enlightenment, no true choice at all. And America must guard against being seduced into a self-defeating alliance with the Church against Moscow. In support of this thesis, Blanshard uses the technique of parallel analysis, confronting the reader with the record of Communism and Catholicism on dictatorial governance, deification of leadership, freedom of speech and inquiry, priesthood, deception, and the penetration of target groups. The similarities turned up in the course of this analysis are offered as evidence of the essential likeness of the two institutions.

This mechanical comparison leaves much to be desired. The real question is not whether there are similarities, even "striking" ones, but how *essential* these are. We can understand Communism better when we use a conceptual model of an army or a church as a tool of analysis. But we mistake the abstract for the concrete when we suppose that Communism "is" the one or the other. Similarly, we can learn something about Catholicism by showing how some of its practices converge with those of a power-oriented political sect. But this is abstract and partial, whereas the judgments we make are concrete and total. The right judgment presumes that we have hit upon a model identifying the *essential features* of the system we are studying. This is the central task of all diagnosis, whether of persons or of institutions.

Two key words that bear on this problem are "totalitarian" and "authoritarian." Blanshard uses them interchangeably, a looseness that afflicts his entire intellectual procedure. But authoritarianism is consistent with *limited* power, in the sense that it can be restricted to a special sphere of life—as in the case of authoritarian business or military institutions—and in the sense that it can accept a rule of law. The platonic Legal State can exist without elections and parliaments; but it cannot be totalitarian. The totalitarian party-state of our time is characterized precisely by its unlimited appetite for power, its control over all aspects of human experience, its failure to establish rules of self-restraint, which is to say, a constitutional order.

It is legitimate and pertinent to point out that the Catholic interpretation of the sphere of "faith and morals" can be elastic, and that the Church itself presumes to define the limits of that sphere. This is potentially dangerous. But it is wrong to forget that tradition plays a large role in setting the limits of the Church's authority; that there are in fact rather definite, and limited, prerogatives considered essential to the well-being of the Church (which is not to say that we must accept these claims as justified); that, even where the Church is the dominant religious institution, it is effectively counterbalanced by other (economic and political) forces; and that the Church has a long record of intellectual and political accommodation. The analysis of doctrine is important, but it alone does not define a social system. It is vital to be aware of the Bolshevik assumption that the "historical interests" of the workers (and through them of society) are ineluctably reflected in the policies of the Communist Party. But we must also know that in practice the party has assumed control over all aspects of life and tolerates no other organized force in society. A potentially totalitarian doctrine does not of itself create a group competent to establish a totalitarian social order.

In his chapter on the Vatican's "strategy of penetration," Blanshard discusses the emergence of a "Catholic International." It is noted that a clearinghouse has been established, and conferences have been held to coordinate the activities of some European Catholic parties. These parties have certain common orientations and policies. We are invited to compare this instrument of penetration with that of the Communists. But it does not seem to occur to Blanshard to test his hypothesis by asking: Is the "Catholic International" more readily comparable to the Communist or to the *Socialist* international bodies? Is it a monolithic weapon in a struggle for total power or is it a loosely-bound, accommodative, coordinating agency, permitting rather wide differences and basically incapable of achieving a disciplined unity?

Similarly, when Blanshard compares Catholic work in the trade unions with Communist penetration, he is drawing conclusions about substance from a cursory inspection of forms. Again, the Socialist case is instructive. The Association of Catholic Trade Unionists does indeed function inside the unions, sometimes as a power caucus. But does the ACTU seek to gain control of these unions, to deploy them as manipulable weapons, as the Communists do? Or is its role a more limited one, reflecting an emphasis on certain principal issues rather than on the conquest of power? Is the history of ACTU in the United States not closer to the Socialist type of participation in the labor movement than to the Communist? If so, then the parallel with Communist penetration loses most of its significance.

The mark of scholarship is more than documentation, more also than the orderly assembly of undigested facts. It is above all the capacity to think things through to the end and to be unsatisfied with easy correlations of surface data. A true comparative analysis is not self-serving but self-testing. It is in this basic sense that Blanshard's book fails to meet the elementary canons of scientific inquiry.

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*The Chinese in Southeast Asia.* BY VICTOR PURCELL. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xxxvii, 801. $11.50.)

In the interwar years, the problems of national minorities focussed primarily in Europe, spilling over from time to time into the Near East. Since World War II, the aftermath of which pushed the European phase of the problem well into the background, it is the national minorities of southern Asia and of Africa which have held the spotlight, even though they have no international guarantees of the League variety to keep them in the public eye. If the grimmest demonstration of the evil potentialities of the problem was given in India, which could find partial escape only through partition, there were the makings of trouble on a large scale in the already harassed countries of Southeast Asia. In this substantial volume, one of the outstanding authorities on this area explores the earlier history and present circumstances of the millions of Chinese who have migrated southwards.

As with minorities elsewhere, the first point to be determined is the number of people involved, but from the nature of the problem the best answer which can be obtained remains an approximation. Even where there has been a recent and trustworthy census, there are a number of vital issues to be decided, centering around the question as to what persons are to be regarded as Chinese: Are the criteria to be those of race, of language, or legal status (and, if the latter, according to whose law?); for how many generations do the descendants of original Chinese immigrants remain Chinese; and what is the effect of the admixture of varying fractions of different racial strains? Mr. Purcell, well aware of the dilemmas and pitfalls, appears to settle for the sensible, if statistically somewhat unwieldy, concept of "persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race" or, alternatively, "ethnic Chinese," and comes to the conclusion that the total number of Chinese in Southeast Asia comes close to 10,000,000. The difficulty of arriving at a firm estimate is enhanced by his belief that there has been a very considerable clandestine immigration in the last few years into Thailand, Indochina, the Philippines, and perhaps Indonesia. As against his estimate of some 160,000,000 as the total population of the area, the number of Chinese might be seen as not dangerously large; but the concentration of Chinese in certain countries, notably Malaya and Thailand, their specialized roles everywhere, and their connections with a revitalized China make their presence a matter not only of great local significance but at least potentially of real international concern as well.

For the historian of the Chinese or of Southeast Asia, Mr. Purcell's account, for the most part on a country-by-country basis, of the early contacts of the Chinese with the area will be highly useful since it brings under one roof a large amount of source materials from various languages which date from many periods. Inevitably these materials are fragmentary, scattered, and anecdotal, but cumulatively they build up a reasonably coherent picture and are often both entertaining and revealing.

For most political scientists and for others more concerned with the contemporary scene and the prospects for the future than with the remoter past, the chapters dealing with the recent period will be of the greatest interest. Here the author is able to draw not only on the printed materials but also on his long experience in the Malayan Civil Service and his very recent travels throughout Southeast Asia. A huge mass of basic information has been brought together and subjected to analysis and interpretation, but Mr. Purcell frequently points out that far more research is needed before some of the most essential elements can be properly treated. In a suggestive aside he remarks that surprisingly little is known of the domestic life of the Chinese community, of the relations between Chinese and Chinese, and also that in all probability the Chinese have studied the Europeans in Southeast Asia to better purpose than the Europeans have studied the Chinese there.

One thing which emerges clearly from this study, even though the author does not himself lay great stress on it, is that the ending of the colonial era and the development of self-government have worked to worsen rather than improve the situation. Under colonial rule the Chinese, though occasionally restricted or harassed, could pursue their economic goals in peace with a neutral government above them, but once national governments came into existence they inescapably looked to the promotion of their own people and found themselves being removed by political means from their old established strongholds. As the advance of democratic self-government in India forced drastic reconsideration of the issues of communalism, so likewise political advance in Southeast Asia has tended to divide rather than to unite the racial camps. Although there were some countervailing tendencies, this advance served only to strengthen a drift which was characteristic of the present century. The coming of both Chinese and European women in large numbers worked to strengthen the centralizing tendencies in both communities; Chinese nationalism rubbed increasingly against the local nationalisms; and the period of Japanese occupation fanned racial hostilities.

As to prophecy Mr. Purcell is wisely restrained. The Chinese are an ancient race who keep their own counsel. They have accepted, normally with indifferent acquiescence, many different governments and have contested established authority only rarely, at the same time in large measure keeping the internal governance of their own community in their own discreet hands. Mr. Purcell does not say it, but it seems a not illegitimate conclusion from the materials which Mr. Purcell presents that, if Chinese Communism continues to prevail and gather strength at home, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, confronted by growing local nationalisms, will in the generality follow the lead of China.

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*Demokratie oder Anarchie? Untersuchung über die Verhältniswahl.* BY F. A. HERMENS. (Frankfurt A.M.: Wolfgang Metzner Verlag. 1951. Pp. xx, 412. DM.8–.)

*Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy.* BY F. A. HERMENS. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame. 1951. Pp. xix, 291. $4.00.)

During the past two decades, the author of the above volumes has acquired a wholly merited reputation as one of the world's leading authorities on contemporary electoral processes and representative institutions. While gaining this reputation, he has also become identified, both among his professional colleagues and in the mind of the general public, as one of the most vigorous and telling critics of proportional representation. Except for various articles dealing with one or another phase of his research into electoral behavior, the statement of Professor Hermens' case against PR had, until recently, been confined to his well-known *Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation,* which was reviewed in the October, 1941, issue of this REVIEW (Vol. 35, pp. 986–988 [Oct., 1941]). Since this study is out of print, scholars will be gratified to learn that a German edition has now been published. Except for certain supplementary materials relating to American electoral experience, designed chiefly for the German public, and a series of chapters devoted to

European experience with PR since World War II, the German volume varies little from the English-language original. Along with this German edition of his earlier work, Professor Hermens has published still another volume designed to carry the discussion of PR into the post-Hitlerian world for the benefit of the English-reading public.

In this newer work, the author's thesis remains relatively unchanged, although he restates it with the authority and conviction that flow from years of observation and research and from the vast amount of empirical data which he has amassed. For Professor Hermens there is no longer any doubt that PR, in contrast to a "majority" or "plurality" electoral system such as obtains in America and Britain, inhibits the integration of an effective parliamentary majority, encourages political irresponsibility and indecision on the part of politicians, and sets the stage for crisis government and dictatorship. With those conclusions, moreover, many of his professional colleagues, including this reviewer, will agree.

Undoubtedly the author understands as well as any observer that the prospect of stabilizing free popular government in our age depends preëminently upon our success in establishing a modicum of international order and in re-establishing social consensus disrupted by war and militant ideologies. In other words, despite his preoccupation with "governmental gadgetry," he is quite aware of the grave nature of some of the problems which free popular government must solve if it is to survive. But Professor Hermens is also old-fashioned enough to emphasize the contribution which political mechanics can make to the solution of such problems. He is impressed by the fact that political institutions, established among men, condition political behavior and to a great extent determine political habits and disciplines; that these institutions may either facilitate or impede governmental efficiency; and that, hence, the difference between the success or failure of contemporary popular government may well depend upon the question of the choice of proper instruments. These truisms are the logical premises upon which Professor Hermens has erected his case for the majority system and against PR; and if one looks at the record of experience which he has analyzed so ably, it is difficult not to agree with him that, in the matter of electoral systems at least, such premises are not lacking in factual confirmation.

Champions of PR may feel that Professor Hermens, in his zeal to produce working majorities in contemporary parliaments, rather cavalierly dismisses PR's historic function of fostering and protecting minorities. A century ago when the Hare plan of PR was being recommended by John Stuart Mill, that aristo-democrat offered as one of his reasons his fear that "superior intellects," being in the minority, would be submerged by the rising tide of manhood suffrage. If we abandon PR or some equivalent minority electoral plan, we might, as Mill suggested, deprive representative assemblies of "natural leaders." Moreover, in our day the expanding empire of the state threatens the whole conception of the open society and the protection which special groups of all sorts have hitherto secured because of their autonomous position in such a society. For such groups PR has more than once recommended itself as an instrument to slow down majorities intent upon invading group autonomy.

The rejoinder which Professor Hermens and most of his professional colleagues would undoubtedly make to such observations is that in the contemporary crisis of democratic government we must put first things first; that we must jettison institutions, however noble their pretensions, if they hamper the primary aim of survival. The moral of that answer appears to be that, in our day, Mill's "superior intellects" must be able to demonstrate their capacity for leadership within the ranks of the limited number of mass parties which democratic government can tolerate. As for minority groups of all sorts in this era of collectivism, they must protect their peculiar interests through the dynamics of compromise and bargaining carried on within the framework of a common party that will thus be enabled to mobilize a majority for effective political action or muster an articulate and influential parliamentary minority. Stated more succinctly, the moral appears to be that, to insure survival of free popular government, politics in the future must indeed make strange bedfellows.

Not the least interesting result of these electoral studies of Professor Hermens may well be their tendency to revive respect for the lore of the political scientist. Within their particular area these studies have demonstrated that there are "correct" principles for the organization, articulation and control of political power. They will accordingly lend prestige to that "science of politics" which was dear to the hearts of the American Constitution-makers and which the authors of the *Federalist* felt had "received great improvement" in their time. In 1787 this "science" produced a paper Constitution that has done tolerably well. Revived and bulwarked by the kind of empirical evidence which Professor Hermens' brand of research can provide, this "science," if pursued more zealously by others, might contribute much to the solution of the problem of political order in our own day.

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*La République et Son Pouvoir.* By MICHEL DEBRÉ. (Paris: Éditions Nagel. 1950. Pp. 207.)

In this brilliant, brief study, the well-known resistance leader and reformer of the French civil service, now senator from Indre-et-Loire, attempts a reassessment of the potentialities of free government (*gouvernement de la Liberté*) from the standpoint of the de Gaulliste movement. It is a passionately earnest plea, prefaced by a moving recollection of the hopes for governmental and social reform which animated the resistance.

Debré is one of that "younger" French generation who impress the foreign observer as a very different species of humanity from the traditional Frenchman. They are the carriers today of the movement for a united Europe, a subject on which M. Debré himself wrote a discriminating study last year. These men, whom one finds in all parties, seem more practical, pragmatic, businesslike and vital than the older generation.

The present study is, like other writings of M. Debré, permeated by a strong sense of the importance of "what works." Basic, ancient verities occupy the center of his attention. A government must be strong to be good; liberty cannot flourish together with anarchy; representation is the key to genuine republicanism. Curiously, Debré's general viewpoint closely resembles that of Immanuel Kant for whom republicanism and constitutionalism were the heart of free government; it is a viewpoint which Montesquieu fathered, but with an aristocratic bias which is lacking in both Kant and Debré. Also, there is an insistence upon service, duty and responsibility in both these writers which is quite alien to the *grand seigneur* from Bordeaux.

In the center of his analysis of free government, Debré places the analysis of delegation. "*La délégation transforme tout. Elle permet, et elle permet seule, et l'État et la liberté.*" This delegation of political power, while essential, must conform to three requirements: it must be limited, it must be freely consented to, and it must be usefully employed. The first requirement is, of course, linked to the essence of constitutionalism, the second to that of democracy and the third to government, in the strict sense. In stressing the first, Debré bids good-bye to much of the Rousseauistic tradition which has been the bane of continental popular government, while in retaining the second he preserves what is vital in it. The third requirement is, naturally, the peculiar and pressing concern of Frenchmen today, as it has been for decades. Debré declares: "*La délégation a un objet qu'il ne faut jamais oublier: permettre le gouvernement de la société.*" It is the point which Bagehot years ago made the center of his devastating rebuttal of John Stuart Mill's plea for proportional representation. It is the heart of M. Debré's like-minded discussion of the electoral system (*scrutin*). He deplores the fact that the *scrutin* is too often treated as merely a mechanism; he considers it crucial in free government. It is not merely a matter of choosing a delegate, but also, and more importantly, a matter of producing a coherent majority. Hence, Debré is an unqualified partisan of the majoritarian system of elections. In this connection, he marshals all the familiar arguments which are commonplace in English-speaking countries, but which are only too often overlooked in continental Europe.

Having thus clearly indicated his conception of delegation and what it takes to make it function properly, Debré proceeds to consider three fundamental conditions, as he sees them, of this "*ressort juridique*" of representative government. They are the permanence of the state, political education and the renewing of the governing group (*élite*). The first of these conditions leads to a recognition that a stable professional government service is essential; the second to an insistence that local autonomy, by providing a "school of free government," is indispensable, which certainly all of us in the English-American tradition would accept. But he proceeds to a demand for governmental control over press, radio and other means of mass communication as vital parts of popular education. He would organize such control ("thought control," the

Japanese called it) in terms of elevated morals, truth and constitutional defense. Debré is aware of the formidable issues such a proposal raises; the application of these principles is not easy, he says. We would say that it is impossible. And indeed, Debré fails to deal with the most vital question: who determines what is moral, what is truth, etc.? This omission is unfortunate, because surely the problems here touched upon are among the most decisive affecting the future of constitutional free government.

Debré's third point, concerning the renewal of the governing groups, is directed against the present tendency in all highly industrialized societies toward social stratification, not only in industry, but among labor, the professions and so on. Against any and all plans for a corporative organization of control, Debré pleads for "the vote of equal individuals." In this respect, also, Debré's central concern with the public service may be seen: it is a duty of the government, he believes, constantly to search for new talent and not to allow the services to become the privilege of certain families and cliques. But he considers even more important the problem of equal opportunity for talent in business and industry. It is very French for him to proclaim that *"le vrai vice du capitalisme, partant le seul reproche, c'est l'hérédité de la fonction."* This tradition of the French *patronat*, that the sons remain what the fathers have been, Debré sharply criticizes. The remedy he sees in free public instruction at all levels for every talented youth.

It is clear, from even this cursory review of Debré's central chapter (later chapters elaborate the key points about governmental power and public administration as the heart of the problem, and review French government of the last eighty years), that this senator is a philosopher and a political scientist of parts. One may quarrel with specific items in his analysis, such as the control of communication media, but, in its broad sweep, *La République et Son Pouvoir* is a striking instance of the revival of political thought in France. It also serves to reassure one on the score of the more dangerous potentials of the de Gaulliste movement. If their leadership is firmly attached to principles such as are set forth by M. Debré, free government in France has little to fear from the advent to power of *Le Général.* Indeed, they contain a program which is calculated to have greater appeal to Americans than the principles of the past.

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# BOOK NOTES, NOTICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, Vol. 90, pts. I–III, Eighty-first Congress, first session. Journal from January 3, 1949, to October 19, 1949.* PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1950, i.e. 1951. 3 vols. Pp. 5440.)

Senate Resolution No. 223, February 9, 1950, removed the injunction of secrecy from the Executive Journals of the Senate, and ordered that "Hereafter, not more than fifty copies of the Executive Journal for a session of Congress . . . shall be printed." At the same time, the Secretary of the Senate was authorized to dispose of the printed copies of the Executive Journals from December 1, 1901, through December 31, 1948, (vols. 33–90) with the exception of vols. 47, 49, 51, 54, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 69, 72, and 73, not yet printed. Vol. 91 is the first to be printed under the Resolution in an edition of 50 copies. The 1949 Journal record occupies but 1555 out of 5440 pages, the remainder being devoted to indexes and tables based upon years of experience by the Executive Clerk of the Senate in answering official questions. Separate indexes to the following groups of nominations are accompanied by a consolidated alphabetical index: Courts; Executive departments; Boards, Commissions, etc.; United Nations and related organizations; Ambassadors, ministers and envoys; Diplomatic and foreign service; Coast Guard; Public Health Service; Coast and Geodetic Survey; and Geographical (including district judges, U. S. attorneys, marshals, collectors of customs, collectors of internal revenue, postmasters, etc.). On pp. 2473–2485 in part II are very precise tables of treaty action, including a list of the executive reports. Then follow, in the remainder of part II and part III, separate indexes to the nominations for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. In 1949, nominations amounted to the record total of more than 55,000. The original pattern of the Senate, holding executive sessions behind closed doors to consider nominations and treaties submitted by the President of the United States, was finally changed on June 18, 1929, by an amendment to Senate Rule XXXVIII providing for transactions of all executive business hereafter in open session unless otherwise voted, with the debates of the subsequent open executive sessions reported in the *Congressional Record.* The size of the edition of the Executive Journal has varied greatly from time to time. Of vols. 1–3, 1st-19th Congresses, 1789–1829, 700 copies were printed; of vols. 4–16, 20th–40th Congresses, 1829–69, only 125 copies; of vols. 17–27, 41st–51st Congresses, 1869–91, 150 copies; of vols. 28–34, 52d–58th Congresses, 1891–1905, 250 copies; two subsequent orders for printing in 1931 and 1938 were for 500 copies of each volume, and the order has now been reduced to 50.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

*Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era.* BY JOHN M. BLUM. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1951. Pp. ix, 337. $4.00.)

Political scientists will hardly agree with the author when he says, on page 65, "In its scientific aspects politics involves only an understanding of relatively simple mechanisms and a willingness to use them." The description in this book of the mechanisms of political power in the Wilson administrations in Trenton and Washington shows that they were far from simple. A virtue of this study is that it illuminates the important interpersonal relations among the holders of power. If somebody someday writes a treatise on inner office politics in a democratic society, he will find this book a gold mine of illustrative material. The biographer presents the second Mrs. Wilson as Tumulty's most persistent opponent, even his enemy, in the politics in the White House. Once she, Colonel House, and Vance McCormick persuaded Wilson to get rid of Tumulty by appointing him to the Board of General Appraisers. Tumulty declined the appointment in one of the most abject letters this reviewer ever saw in print. Wilson kept him on through his second term, but his influence was much diminished. When the President collapsed, Mrs. Wilson became in fact regent of the United States, and for months she would not allow Tumulty to see Wilson. The final break did not occur until after Wilson had left the Presidency. Dr. Blum is the first scholar to have access to all of Tumulty's papers, and he has therefore been able to fill out many blank spaces—though some still remain—in the Wilson story. Tumulty, for instance, was apparently the "arbiter of patronage" in Wilson's first term. His use of the patronage is an interesting study in the mechanisms of political power; for example, in October, 1917, he sent to Daniel C. Roper, then Assistant Postmaster General, "a list of Senators, including the 'real friends of the Administration' who were 'entitled to priority' in patronage and the less active supporters 'entitled to secondary consideration' " (p. 157). Opponents seemingly got no consideration. The author is sympathetic to Tumulty, and still cognizant of his shortcomings and mistakes. On the treaty fight, for instance, Tumulty "understood the need for concessions" to Lodge and the Republicans if the treaty were to be accepted by the Senate. But "he sustained Wilson instead of challenging him. This was a loyal act performed at the wrong time. Tumulty had deliberately falsified the issue: the Lodge reservations did not necessitate renegotiation" (p. 228). Like the diplomat who is expected to lie for his country, perhaps a secretary to a chief executive may have to lie for his boss. This book is written in an easy style with apparent thorough scholarship. It is, in essence, a tragic story. Wilson did not usually appreciate loyalty.—DAYTON D. MCKEAN, *Dartmouth College.*

*The Negro and the Communist Party.* BY WILSON RECORD. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1951. Pp. x, 340. $3.50.)

This book accomplishes precisely what its title suggests; it relates the history of the Communist party and the American Negro. The task is performed carefully, competently and comprehensively. The book accomplishes more; it essays an analysis and evaluation of the non-communist programs of Negro protection and advancement. Mr. Record, with sympathy and sophistication, presents a critique of these activities with which many Negro social scientists can agree. Mr. Record does not endow the Negro with a *mystique* of loyalty and patriotism which makes him impervious to the appeal of revolutionary ideologies. This book recognizes the fact that the Negro is bitterly resentful. Most Negroes live a life of quiet desperation. In his view, Jim Crow and discrimination have only force as their justification. However, the Negro is a realist. The Communist Party failed to win the Negroes because it failed to win America. "Negroes are not . . . apt to support any party which in effect poses them against the 'liberal center'. . . . Negro advancement in this country is contingent on identification with white groups around a set of common problems." The Communists have been unable to capture any such significant white groups. Mr. Record is aware of the fact that "Negroes would constitute a valuable resource for any authentic third party movement built around organized labor. To command the support of American workers—and of American Negroes—such a movement would have to be grounded in the native radical tradition . . . Negroes have played an important role in shaping the American radical tradition; they are by no means loath to participate in its extension. But their loyalty will not be won to a movement that uses the window dressing of such a tradition as a front for the expansion of world Communism."—EMMETT E. DORSEY, *Howard University.*

*The Communist Problem in America; A Book of Readings.* EDITED BY EDWARD E. PALMER. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1951. Pp. xvi, 496. $2.50.)

Part I contains selections on Communist strategy by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, *et al.* The other three parts present selections from published writings of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Senator McCarthy, Justice Jackson, and others.

*Index of Congressional Committee Hearings (Non-confidential in Character) for Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses (January 3,* *1941, to January 3, 1951) in the United States Senate Library, Capitol Building. Second Supplement to 1935 Index.* COMPILED BY GEORGE T. WALKER. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1951. Pp. v, 419.)

The Senate Library in the United States Capitol has one of the most extensive collections of printed committee hearings in Washington, D. C., and has them assembled and bound in a continuous series of volumes. The Index has an arrangement by topics, then by committees (Senate, House, Joint, Select, and Special), and finally by Congress and bill number. Titles are given briefly, references being in all cases to the numbers in the bound series of volumes in the Senate Library. For users of committee hearings and other legislative materials, the present volume has an unusual importance in bringing together the references 1941–51, since the invaluable biennial *Document Catalog* was discontinued by order of the Joint Committee on Printing with vol. 25 for 1939–40.—J.B.C.

*Letters of Benjamin Rush: Volume 1, 1761–1792; Volume 2, 1793–1813.* EDITED BY L. H. BUTTERFIELD. (Princeton: Published by Princeton University Press for the American Philosophical Society. 1951. Pp. lxxxvii, 1295. $15.00 a set.)

A collection of over 650 letters, two-thirds of them here printed for the first time.

*Financing Defense; Federal Tax and Expenditure Policies.* BY ALBERT G. HART AND E. CARY BROWN. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1951. Pp. xiv, 161. $2.00.)

Second in a Twentieth Century Fund series on defense mobilization. Includes staff analysis and Committee on Economic Stabilization's recommendations on problems of meeting costs of national security.

*The New Military and Naval Dictionary.* EDITED BY FRANK GAYNOR. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. Pp. viii, 295. $6.00.)

A comprehensive glossary covering all branches of the armed services.

*A Councilman Speaks.* BY ARTHUR W. BROMAGE. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: George Wahr Publishing Co. 1951. Pp. v, 80.)

Ten essays, five reprinted, by a University of Michigan political scientist and alderman from Ward 6, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

J. ALTON BURDINE AND EMMETTE S. REDFORD

*University of Texas*

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## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Rumania, Political Problems of an Agrarian State.* BY HENRY L. ROBERTS (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 414. $6.00.)

Rumania's political destinies have been shaped by two basic factors: the agrarian character of her economy and the external influences of Big Powers. It is difficult to understand the political convulsions of this strategically located country without grasping the fundamentals of these closely intertwined problems. As a result of World War I, Rumania doubled her territory at the expense of Hungary and Austria, Russia and Bulgaria. She faced, in 1918, a difficult task of integrating these newly acquired and yet different areas within the framework of a unitary state. The success or failure of this integration depended, to a pronounced degree, upon the solution of the agrarian question, inasmuch as agriculture was and is the mainstay of Rumanian economy. The proximity of the Soviet Union with her radical solution of the agrarian problem added to the acuteness of the question. In 1921 Rumania, like many other Eastern European countries, passed a law of agrarian reform by which great estates were to be reduced to a certain maximum and the land was to be distributed to the peasants. While this step marked a positive advance, it proved insufficient in itself to cure the manifold ills of Rumania's public life, which continued to be plagued by instability and corruption. Between 1918 and 1944 Rumania had passed through at least four political phases: the Liberal, the Peasantist, the Carolist, and the Fascist. Her domestic situation was greatly complicated by the foreign policy issues. An essentially *status quo* country, Rumania had a great stake in preserving the Versailles order in Europe, and until the middle 1930's found it natural to be the mainstay of such *status quo* instruments as the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. The rise of Hitler, however, threw this policy out of gear and enormously complicated Rumania's international position. Having to choose, at a critical moment of the Second World War, between engulfment by Communist Russia and a satellite status with Germany, Rumania chose the latter. This did not save her, however, from becoming an unwilling Soviet satellite in 1945. The latter date marks the end of Rumania's independence, and henceforth her political and economic problems can be understood only within the larger framework of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. These and other things are described and analyzed by Mr. Roberts in an impressive volume which is undoubtedly the most thorough and scholarly monograph on the history of Rumania within the last third of our century. The author's description of the Iron Guard, this interesting phenomenon of Rumanian politics, is masterful, and so are his analyses of the political parties. His presentation of the postwar period is most lucid and interesting. And his cogent remarks about the incompatibility of the concept of "governments friendly to Russia" with the concept of their true independence should be read and pondered by all serious students of American foreign policy in the last decade.—GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, *Hamilton College.*

*Nomenclature des Établissements Publics et Semi-publics de l'État, des Sociétés d'Économie Mixte et des Fondations et Associations Subventionnées d'Intérêt National.* BY MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1951. Pp. 265.)

As a means of strengthening parliamentary control over public expenditures, law 49—958 of July 18, 1949, provided that the French government be required to furnish each year, with the budget, a statement of the offices, establishments, public and semi-public services of the state, and foundations having subventions from the state. Also included in the statement are all nationalized enterprises of industrial, commercial or other character, with an indication for each of their legal status, branches, and objects. Also included are mixed companies and other organizations, in which the state or the above-mentioned, together or separately, may have a financial interst equal to at least 30 per cent of the capital. For each of the above are also given the names and positions of the directors and members of the councils of administration. The present volume for the agencies whose budgets escape vote in the French Parliament contains data as of December 31, 1950, and is printed for the Assemblée Nationale as Annex 3 of Impression no. 11, 484, being the *Projet de Loi de Finances pour l'Exercice 1951.*—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

*European and Comparative Government.* BY ROBERT G. NEUMANN. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xii, 730. $5.00.)

A new textbook. Approximately equal parts of the book are devoted to Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Part V compares institutions and governmental principles and practices.

*Governments in Modern Society.* BY G. LOWELL FIELD. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. x, 554. $4.50.)

A new textbook in comparative government organized on a functional basis. In general, the four parts of the book deal with (1) background of history and ideals, (2) forms of constitutional government, (3) revolutions, dictatorships, and traditional regimes, and (4) issues between democracy and totalitarianism.

*Modern Political Constitutions; An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Their History and Existing Form.* BY C. F. STRONG. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1950. Pp. x, 383. $3.75.)

Third edition of an English introduction to political science using the topical approach to comparative government.

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Second edition, with minor revisions, of an Oxford scholar's comparative study (1946).

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Extensive revision, carrying study up to 1950, of book first published in 1939. This study, here published as a separate volume, was written, as was the original edition, for the volume *The Governments of Continental Europe*, edited by J. T. Shotwell. A revised edition of this volume is to be published by The Macmillan Company later in the year.

*Handbook of Latin American Studies: 1947; No. 13.* Prepared by the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. x, 239. $8.50.)

Annotated bibliographies of 1947 publications, prepared by 33 contributing editors; Francisco Aguilera, editor, and Charmion Shelby, assistant editor, are staff members of the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress.

*Cinderella of Europe; Spain Explained.* By Sheila M. O'Callaghan. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. Pp. 199. $3.75.)

A highly sympathetic account of the Franco regime.

*Area Studies in American Universities.* By Wendell C. Bennett. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1951. Pp. x, 82. $1.00.)

Appraisal of facilities for area training and research, with description of individual college and university area programs.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
# FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

MARIO EINAUDI
*Cornell University*

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## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

*The United States and France.* By Donald C. McKay. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. xvii, 334. $4.00.)

The standard established by the eight or nine volumes of the Harvard Press's American Foreign Policy Library is distinctly high; and Professor Donald C. McKay, himself Associate Editor of the series (the Editor, it will be recalled, is Mr. Sumner Welles), has, in his little volume dealing with France, ably maintained the standard. His basic position, as he eloquently sets it out both in beginning and ending his excellent essay, is the simple, but highly important, one that the United States and France are linked by a joint inheritance of free institutions based on the traditions of Western Christian Civilization, which we ought especially to appreciate at the present time when the risk is so serious that we may lose it. Professor McKay's knowledge of things French and his gift for clear exposition are so marked that the apparent simplicity of his background account—geographic, demographic, political, military, economic, and imperial—of prevailing conditions and problems in France almost conceals the sureness of his touch and the profoundness of his judgments. Nevertheless, these qualities do characterize the whole book. Its heart consists of the fifth chapter and of the tenth and final chapter, the former of which traces "Two Centuries of Franco-American Relations (to 1939)," while the latter has as a title "The International Scene: France and the United States." In turn, a first section of the final chapter is concerned with France in the Postwar World, a topic which is sympathetically though frankly treated; whereas a second section examines the United States in the Postwar World, our recent emergence into a position of leadership receiving a strikingly thoughtful analysis. A concluding section, in the form a Postscript, September 1950, is composed of observations based on a brief trip to France at the date mentioned. Aside from its intrinsic interest and importance, this concluding section is a reminder that Professor McKay's small volume, in addition to its other virtues, is exceedingly timely.—R. K. Gooch, *University of Virginia.*

*The British Overseas; Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers.* By C. E. Carrington. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp. xxi, 1092. $9.00.)

Here is another history of the British Empire. Its author, a manager of the Cambridge University Press, prefaces it with the statement: "May I add that I should not have undertaken this task if I had not had the good fortune to be born into one of the middle-class families whose members, for a hundred years, have moved freely about the Empire. An uncle or a cousin in every Dominion is a great help to thinking imperially." This book differs from its prewar predecessors in its admission of such terms as "decline" and "recession," and its more centrifugal emphasis on the work of the men on the spot. It is an example of the British textbook at its best. It is a colorful chronicle, packed with detail, and distinguished by the pride of past achievement. It has a good index, but no bibliography. Like practically all British works of this class, it is almost completely uninfluenced by the social sciences. Terms such as civilization, race, slavery, landownership, and philanthropy are used in ways that have no precise meaning. What is said about government and politics seems usually to be correct; yet there is no effort systematically to analyse the location and distribution of power. Nor is there any scientific handling of demographic questions, the economics of empire, or the clash of cultures. Here, however, is a book to which the student can be referred with safety, and from which the scholar may glean an occasional fact. It is not likely to conduce to scientific thinking; but it may help Americans to understand at least one of the many traditions that flourish in those countries of the Commonwealth that lie in the temperate zones.—W. HARDY WICKWAR.

*Hart and the Chinese Customs.* BY STANLEY F. WRIGHT. (Belfast: Wm. Mullan & Son Ltd. 1950. Pp. xvi, 959. $6.30.)

The full-length portrait of a great nineteenth-century administrator has finally been drawn, that of Sir Robert Hart, an Armagh Irishman, Inspector General of the Chinese Customs from 1863 to 1911. The present encyclopaedic volume definitively caps the work of other chroniclers of the modern international relations of that political anachronism, the late Chinese empire, the existence of which was undoubtedly prolonged through Hart's Customs Service. A former Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Wright enjoys the advantages which historical perspective offers. The foreign-officered Customs Service has completed the cycle of its useful existence and remains of interest only to the student of patterns of public administration. The writer's competence for his task is attested by previous authoritative publications on procedures and achievements of the foreign-dominated agency. Obsessed as we are today only with what the evil Europeans have done to Asiatic peoples, Wright ably expounds the diversity of essential services accruing to a backward government through the singleminded devotion of Hart and his multinational collaborators. He and his well-selected Commissioners were "men of unusual ability and force of character, though Hart remained the controlling genius, the glowing central core." The Customs was, to be sure, primarily a revenue-raising agency. Out of administrative chaos an efficient internationally staffed organization had emerged. By introducing probity and vigilance, this ancient fiscal regime became the pillar of Chinese public finance. The ministers of state at Peking were not slow to recognize its broader potential. As under the new treaty complex China confronted fresh embroilments with the Powers, the *Tsungli Yamen* increasingly resorted to Hart. In the great diversity of public requirements, domestic and foreign, his unique organization was encouraged to assume initiative and responsibility. The canvas is so broad as to make possible only hints at the almost incredible scope of Hart's part in China's progress as a modern state. The era recorded has now vanished as certainly as colonialism, and even as nationalism is passing. The vacuum is being filled by a specious type of false and misleading utopianism. But out of this experience of China, Wright is prompted to forecast "a new alignment of international relations, and international services will be needed to aid in shaping a future world policy."—ESSON M. GALE, *University of Michigan.*

*Enabling Instruments of Members of the United Nations; Part I: The United States of America.* EDITED BY WALTER H. ZEYDEN AND WALDO CHAMBERLIN. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1951. Pp. xvii, 126. $2.50.)

This is the first of a projected series of volumes designed to make available in compact form the various enabling instruments and legislative and executive acts by means of which Member Nations of the United Nations and the specialized agencies participate in the work of these organizations. Devoted exclusively to United States participation in the United Nations system, and presented as an experimental effort, this volume contains copies or portions thereof of the principal documents authorizing and implementing such participation as of August 1, 1950. These documents include the ratification of the United Nations Charter; the acceptance of the provisions of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court of International Justice; the basic legislation governing the Mission of the United States to the United Nations and representation in its principal organs and commissions; the legislation and executive orders designed to implement certain portions of the Charter; the acceptance of membership in the specialized agencies; and the ratifications of conventions, agreements, protocols, etc., which have been prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. In a section devoted to credentials are found specimen forms, including credentials for the appointment of United States representatives and their powers and authorizations. Brief explanatory notes and comments accompany most of the sections. In an interesting and informative foreword, the authors explain that the large volume of legislation and executive orders emanating from the United States Government relative to participation in the United Nations system has required the use only of those instruments which are either of primary importance or which illustrate a particular process. Thus, except for some 1949 appropriations act provisions, appropriations acts and various other enactments which have been required directly or indirectly as a result of United Nations action have been omitted. These omissions include authorizations and appropriations relative to such major operating programs as the International Children's Emergency Fund, United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. However, the statutes involved are referred to and discussed briefly. This little volume will be of considerable assistance to all persons working in this field, although it appears that the explanatory notes and comments will prove unnecessary for the specialist and inadequate for other readers. Finally, it should be observed that a considerable portion of the executive and legislative acts here presented can be found in a report of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, entitled *United States Relations with International Organizations, II; A Survey of the Legislative Activities of the Eightieth Congress* (Senate Report No. 1776, 80th Cong., 2nd sess.). This report dealt with United States participation in all major international organizations and included appropriations acts and legislative history as well.—ELI E. NOBLEMAN, *Washington, D. C.*

*Program-Making in UNESCO, 1946–1951; A Study in the Processes of International Administration.* BY CHARLES S. ASCHER. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1951. Pp. ix, 84. $2.50.)

This is the first in a series of studies in international administration sponsored by the Public Administration Clearing House. It represents, according to a foreword by Dr. Herbert Emmerich, Director of the Clearing House, "the first application to international administration of a technique of research developed in the United States during the last fifteen years: the capture and recording of the process of decision-making or of administrative evolution of an organization by a participant-observer." It is designed "to present objectively an account of what happened and then, independently, to offer comments on the significance and lessons to be drawn from what happened." Dr. Ascher, who was formerly Executive Officer for Program in the Office of the Director-General of UNESCO, points out that it was not his purpose to present either a systematic account of the structure of UNESCO's organization or a description of the Organization's activities, but rather a rounded picture of the process of program-making, which he defines as the process of formulating and determining the plan of work of the Organization. Since the formulation and execution of a plan of work necessarily involves and affects the budget process and the organization and operation of the Secretariat, Dr. Ascher has touched upon these and other aspects and problems, as well, without which no adequate discussion of his main subject would be possible. After brief chapters devoted to the background and setting and the constitutional provisions which affect program-making, the author proceeds in a clear and workmanlike fashion to a detailed consideration of the work-plans for 1948 and 1949, which is followed by a careful and full discussion of program-making between 1949 and 1951. Valuable and informative treatments of problems which are common to all international organizations are included, with special reference to such matters as concentration of effort, priorities, responsibility of Member States for proliferation, the relationship between program and budget, and program formulation in the Secretariat. This study assumes particular importance, not only because it is a "first" in the field, but because UNESCO's frame of reference is relatively less concrete and far more nebulous than that of the other specialized agencies. The basic value of this work, however, lies in Dr. Ascher's very frank discussion of fundamental problems which will have to be met and overcome if the international organizations comprising the United Nations system are to function effectively. It is a relief to note that this is not an *apologia*, but rather a thoughtful, well-written and carefully-documented analysis—both critical and descriptive—which is well worth the careful attention of persons interested in the field.—ELI E. NOBLEMAN, *Washington, D. C.*

*Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1950.* BY CLYDE EAGLETON AND RICHARD N. SWIFT. (New York: New York University Press. 1951. Pp. vii, 265. $4.50.)

The second volume in a series which reports the addresses and discussions of the Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. Conducted jointly by New York University, through its Graduate Program of Studies in United Nations and World Affairs, and the United Nations, it is designed to provide a comprehensive survey of United Nations affairs during the preceding year. Brief addresses on pertinent subjects are presented by various top-ranking members of the Secretariat of the United Nations, followed by discussion and clarification.

*The Survival of Political Man; A Study in the Principles of International Order.* BY ERROL E. HARRIS. (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., Inc. 1951. Pp. xi, 225. $4.00.)

An urgent plea to all mankind to mend its ways and return to international sanity and morality or face total annihilation. The author, a lecturer in philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, presents a scholarly and cogent analysis of the present state of the world, emphasizing that man's ingenuity in science, resulting in the unleashing of atomic weapons, may well result in his own destruction. The alternative is seen in a return to basic principles of religion and morality and in basic changes in the international system excluding power politics. " . . . theorizing and avuncular advice would hardly seem to be of much avail—what is required is exorcism."

*Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations.* BY HANS KELSEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1951. Pp. 909–994. $2.50.)

Supplement to *The Law of the United Nations*, reviewed in June issue of the REVIEW. Includes discussion of North Atlantic Treaty, action in Korea, and other recent developments.

*The Caribbean at Mid-Century.* EDITED BY A. CURTIS WILGUS. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1951. Pp. xxv, 284. $4.00.)

A collection of papers delivered by specialists in the field at the first annual conference on the Caribbean held at the University of Florida in December, 1950. Edited by the Director of the University's School of Inter-American Studies, this volume deals with such topics as Inter-American relations of the Caribbean area and economic, geographical, agricultural, sociological and anthropological, political and historical problems of the area. It concludes with a chapter on language and literature.

*Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, 1934. Volume II, Europe, Near East and Africa.* COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1951. Pp. xcv, 1002. $3.75.)

Diplomatic papers on the consolidation of Nazi party control over German domestic and foreign affairs, the initial phase of the Ethiopian-Italian conflict, trade discussions stimulated by the trade agreements legislation of June 12, 1934, and other matters concerning Europe, the Near East and Africa.

*Pacific Outpost; American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia.* BY EARL S. POMEROY. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951. Pp. xx, 198. $5.00.)

A large portion of the book is devoted to the history of the area. The remainder deals with the current situation, with Guam examined as a test case.

*British and Soviet Colonial Systems.* BY KATHLEEN M. STAHL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1951. Pp. 114. $2.50.)

Descriptions of the government of British dependencies and of five Central Asian Soviet republics.

*Belgian Foreign Policy Between Two Wars, 1919–1940.* BY JANE KATHRYN MILLER. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1951. Pp. 337. $5.00.)

Traces the diplomatic aspects of Belgium's foreign policy from the Peace Conference and its aftermath of reparations and war debts, down through the shift to a policy of independence and its sequel. Contains a general chapter on Belgian politics, 1918–1940, and a 15-page bibliography.

*Lénine et la IIIe Internationale.* BY BRANKO LAZITCH. (Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière. 1951. Pp. 286.)

The first part of this study deals with the origins of the Third International and the well-known part played by Lenin in the developments from 1907–1917. The remaining three parts of the book contain another conventional account of the foundation and of the proceedings of the first four congresses of the Third International, with sidelights covering the political strategy and tactics developed by the Comintern up to 1922.

*Coffee, Tea and Cocoa; An Economic and Political Analysis.* BY V. D. WICKIZER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951. Pp. xiii, 497. $5.00.)

First of a series of some twenty volumes on food, agriculture, and World War II undertaken by the Food Research Institute at Stanford with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. Written by a staff economist of the Institute, this volume deals also with postwar developments.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

**H. ARTHUR STEINER**[*]

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## POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

*Leviathan and Natural Law.* BY F. LYMAN WINDOLPH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 147. $2.50.)

To discuss effectively any philosophical issue, there must be some agreement on the questions to be asked. This author faces directly some of the oldest and most central issues in the theory of law and the state. Is any reconciliation possible between Hobbes and Aquinas? Windolph seeks to be a moderator between them, and to reach conclusions that are compatible in degree with the legal and political theories of each. In general, his conclusion is that sovereignty is a question of fact; the only political question, as sharply distinguished from moral issues, is who actually has absolute or ultimate power. Law, as he defines it, is an act of the government and not any possible norm that may exist in human thought outside of the behavior of those who rule. But, in contrast, Antigone's plea is also valid, for Creon's decree was against "the immortal unrecorded laws of God." Windolph concludes his book with these words: "Government for the people means a government conducted in accordance with the developing principles of natural justice. If the last is an illusion, or comes generally to be regarded as an illusion," democratic government "will surely perish from the earth." In a practical sense, Windolph can expect sympathy for only parts of his case from any single individual. The moral relativist may be willing to accept the idea of an ultimately absolute sovereignty, whose laws are by definition the justice of which political society is capable. But more likely he will say that the author's concept of what sovereignty must be is only hypothetical and not based on sober historical generalization. And those who believe with Antigone against Creon may not delight in Justice Holmes as a champion of natural law, even though he did declare his "faith in a universe . . . that has thought and more than thought inside of it." Certainly, they will not accept a definition of the state and its sovereignty in purely *de facto* terms. However, Windolph has one great merit: he is at least willing to ask the questions that his opponents will ask, and debate and discussion are possible on these terms.—FRANCIS G. WILSON, *University of Illinois.*

*Ideas and Men; The Story of Western Thought.* BY CRANE BRINTON. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1950. Pp. ix, 487. $6.00.)

This book surveys some of the main political and social ideas of the western world from the point of view of intellectual history. The approach differs from that of the conventional history of political and social thought, according to the author, in that it is concerned with "the relations between the ideas of the philosophers, the intellectuals, the thinkers, and the actual way of living of the millions who carry the tasks of civilization." Brinton covers an enormous range of material, beginning with classic Greek thought and early Christianity, moving through the Middle Ages into the Modern World via brief discussions of Renaissance Humanism and Protestantism. He then discusses the 17th Century manifestations of Rationalism and the 18th Century Enlighenment. The 19th and 20th Centuries are dealt with primarily in terms of the development of the 18th Century Cosmology and the attacks upon it from right and left. Finally, the author attempts an analysis of "our present discontents." His thesis is the Niebuhrian one that the present disillusionment with democracy is due to the over-optimistic view of human nature held by democrats. Like Niebuhr, Brinton advocates a more limited conception of the possibilities of human rationality and a recognition of the inherent selfishness of man. Although he does not expect democracy to bring heaven to earth, Brinton nevertheless remains a convinced democrat, since he believes that democracy is the least of the available evils. Although Brinton sets out to write an intellectual history, as distinct from a conventional history of political and social thought, he has actually done little more than provide brief sketches of the development of the ideas of the more important thinkers and there is little effort to relate them to the social situation. This is understandable, as the task he sets himself is just too great to be accomplished in a single volume. There are several good brief statements, such as the comparison between traditional Christianity and the Enlightenment, illustrated in part by an analysis of the ideas of Thomas Aquinas and Adam Smith. The final statement of the present status of the democratic world view is one which would find widespread support today. Although the book is clearly written and shows a wide range of familiarity with the literature, it has little value for the student of political theory. Even though he be a beginner and have little time, he would be well advised to read carefully one or two of the works Brinton summarizes so briefly rather than to waste time on such a general survey.—MAURE L. GOLDSCHMIDT, *Reed College.*

*A Socialist's Faith.* By Norman Thomas. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. x, 326. $4.00.)

*The Socialist Tragedy.* By Ivor Thomas. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. 254. $2.75.)

What is the status of socialism today and what are its prospects? These two recent books deal with such questions without clarifying them to any appreciable extent. Norman Thomas leaves you wondering what socialism is. The nearest thing to a definition he offers is this: "For myself, socialism has always seemed primarily a doctrine and movement consciously concerned with the common good" (p. 3). This is obviously too broad to serve as a useful definition. He rejects Marxism as a doctrinal basis for socialism. He says he hoped "that someone would do for our times what Marx has done for the workers of the nineteenth century . . . " (p. 299) and confesses his inability to do the job. Only one chapter out of twenty (ch. 14) even attempts to present what might be called a specifically socialist doctrine or program. This is really a book about Norman Thomas, giving his position on practically all domestic and foreign issues and surveying critically and almost nostalgically his own long and honorable career. Norman Thomas' faith is magnificent, but it is not particularly that of a *socialist*. It is much more that of a New Deal Democrat with a few excursions to the Left but also many to the Right. In spite of a number of positions which are those of a Republican (notably on the Supreme Court and on foreign affairs), Norman Thomas leaves you with the feeling that socialism has lost its *raison d'être* and has met with disintegration from within rather than defeat. Ivor Thomas, on the other hand, is a former member of the British Labour Government turned Conservative. His book is a systematic attack on the record of the British Labour Government and that of socialist parties everywhere in the world. He identifies socialism with *all* forms of collectivism (including fascism and communism), and he undertakes to prove that it must lead to totalitarianism and dictatorship regardless of the democratic and liberal convictions of some of its adherents. Its thesis is essentially the same as Hayek's and should arouse the enthusiasm of the National Association of Manufacturers, *The Reader's Digest*, and the Republican Party. It contains nothing new, but the old contentions are far better argued and more powerfully expressed than in most places. Norman Thomas strips socialism of everything except democracy, while Ivor Thomas takes all democracy out of socialism and leaves everything else in it. The two Thomases combine to give the reader the impression that socialism has flattened out into an ideological delta with no clear channel and no definite direction. Contrary to their avowed intentions, both men suggest that socialism cannot any longer be either defended or defeated: it can only be superseded.—René de Visme Williamson, *University of Tennessee.*

*Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts.* Translated by Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. (New York: Hafner Publishing Company. 1950. Pp. xii, 233. Cloth $2.50, Paper $1.25.)

Translation and extensive commentary by two Columbia University professors. Includes also fragments of lost parts of *The Epitome of Heracleides* and the Constitution as preserved by other ancient writers, fragments of Aristotle's early works and Plato's *Seventh Epistle.*

*The Sociology of Knowledge, Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge; A Critical Analysis of the Systems of Karl Mannheim and Pitirim A. Sorokin.* By Jacques J. Maquet. Translated by John F. Locke. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. Pp. xix, 318. $5.00.)

Study in social theory by a French writer trained at Louvain and Harvard; analytical preface by F. S. C. Northrop.

*Essays on Government.* BY ERNEST BARKER. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. vii, 304. $5.00.)

Second edition of book first published in 1945. In the revision, one essay has been dropped, two have been extended or revised, and two new ones have been added.

*Introduction to Civics and Politics.* BY SUDHIR KUMAR LAHIRI AND BENOYENDRA NATH BANERJEA. (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee & Co., Ltd. 1950. Pp. iv, 151. Rs. 2-8-0.)

Sixth edition of an introductory work prepared for the Indian reader. The approach to the principles of politics and the problems relating to citizenship is in the classical tradition.

*The Supervision of Personnel; Human Relations in the Management of Men.* BY JOHN M. PFIFFNER. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1951. Pp. viii, 454. $6.00.)

A new text. Major divisions are organization and management, social aspects of supervision, motivation, clinical approaches to troubled people, and selection and training.

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FRANCIS G. WILSON
*University of Illinois*

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HERBERT A. SIMON

*Carnegie Institute of Technology*

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